NL-KVK-27189542-BEN16 NIMD BENIN´S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Benin has a relatively stable multiparty system, with five successful presidential and legislative elections held since the early 1990s, most of which have been deemed free and fair. However, many democratic challenges remain, both politically and economically. As for the overall situation in parliament, there are 4 main party alliances and a considerable number of politically unaffiliated individuals or small parties. Political parties are in general very weak, with very few parties working according to an actual structure with members, a manifesto and so on. The current president, Yayi Boni, is near the end of his second term which will end March 2016. The alliance ‘Forces Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent’ (FCBE), made up of many parties and other actors, supports the president but has lost quite some ground in the April 2015 elections. PRB and RB-RB are established but struggling parties, and the main oppositional alliance ‘Union fait la Nation’ (UN) is seeking to move towards becoming one party. Meanwhile, within FCBE many ‘mini-parties’ and organizations exist but mostly only in name. Political life therefore seems to revolve around key individuals, mainly MPs, who do not seem to have a very strong link to their respective parties. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN BENIN 2012 saw the roll-out of the first operational phase after the decision in 2011 to jointly explore a programme with the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA). From 2012 to 2015 NIMD and AWEPA have worked on a basic approach of combining the NIMD objective of facilitating interparty dialogue and strengthening political parties with a clear focus on the role and functioning of parliament and the interactions between the parties in parliament. Next to training session for parliamentary staff and MP’s, the annual two rounds of public hearings with parliamentary multiparty delegations through the country are one of the most successful and locally appreciated activities. In 2015, the programme piloted a first class of a potential Benin School of Politics. The new more balanced and more fluid composition of parliament and the political party landscape potentially offer new doors to revive interparty dialogue and broad inclusive stakeholder dialogue on democratic reform of the political system. The school programme will be continued in 2016. Exchange activities The Benin programme has been quite active in linking up international politicians to share experiences with politics in Benin. AWEPA’s president and Minister of State, Ms Miet Smet, and NIMD’s Supervisory Board member, Mr Eimert van Middelkoop, participated in the 2012 opening parliamentary conference in Benin. In 2013, MP Ingrid de Caluwé of the VVD participated in a conference on Interparty Dialogue. French MP Bernard Lesterlin from the friendship committee of the French Assemblée joint the Beninese parliamentary delegation during public hearings throughout the country in 2014. And Beninese delegations went on learning missions to Senegal and Tunisia in 2014 and 2015. Steering Committee NIMD and AWEPA have established a Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage) composed of MP’s and political party senior leadership to guarantee local ownership and guidance over the programme design. The programme is presently managed by a local coordinator with supervision from AWEPA and NIMD headquarters in The Netherlands. Changes/deviations in 2016 programme/ToC: Following the presidential elections held in March 2016, the new President of the Republic of Benin, Mr Patrice Talon, announced his would review the Constitution. A constitutional reform committee, composed by political and civic actors, was set up and given the mandate of providing recommendations on issues such as political party financing, maximum number and length of presidential terms, institutional reforms, etc. In the framework of the programme interventions at system level, AWEPA agreed with the National Assembly of Benin to organise a workshop with Members of Parliament as soon as the constitutional reform bill was tabled. Unfortunately the this process was severely delayed and no action could be taken until the bill was tabled, this meant eventually that the dialogue sessions were postponed until January 2017. Regarding parliamentary dialogue on revision of internal regulations, contact has been made with the Member of Parliament who submitted a report on reforming the National Assembly’s “règlement intérieur” during the previous legislature. This report has been picked up by the current Parliament elected in May 2015, and a special committee was appointed to review and update it. AWEPA offered to organise a workshop to discuss its conclusions and to kick off the internal regulation reform process. This workshop could not be implemented in 2016 as the committee did not yet submit its report. It is currently scheduled to take place during the first semester of 2017 and will be reported on the 2017 contract. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. AWEPA NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 99950 7315 Programme monitoring 30000 programme advise and support 99950 Benin Budget local partner 75000 Disbursement Benin May 2016 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-BEN17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Benin continues to enjoy a stable democratic regime. The presidential elections of March 2016 recorded a high number of candidates, of the 36 a large number were businessmen. The election took place in a peaceful climate and resulted in the victory of Patrice Talon Athanasius William, a multimillionaire businessman who made his fortune in the cotton sector. In April of this year, the Talon administration announced its intention to initiate profound structural reforms which has since dominated the political news cycle. To do this, it established a political and institutional reform commission. The results of the work of this commission to revise the constitution were shared with the government recently, however the public are awaiting for the recommendations and results to be published. The reforms are expected to go to referendum after a vote in the national assembly. In the national assembly parties are yet to confirm their allegiance with the new government or announce their opposition and for this reason the parliamentary minority and majority are still unclear. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The main problem analysis in the ToC focusses on a lack of mutual trust, little political ambition, a deeply conservative political culture and a number of technical mismatches between the legislative system and the political system that prevents democratic transformation. In 2015 and 2016 a new speaker of parliament and president both vocal about democratic reform offers a window of opportunity to address some of the democratic deficits holding the countries reforms back such as a constitutional reform. In this sense the ToC is still very relevant to the political context. This translate into a programme that specifically aims to improve trust among youthful political stakeholders and thereby influencing the political culture, at the same time the programme is working towards interparty dialogue by supporting interparty activities to address political reform. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 103850 Benin budget 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-BEN18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018 Immediately after his investiture 6 April 2016, President Talon announced his intention to embark on deep structural reforms. To this end, he promptly set up a political and institutional reforms committee, which shared the results of its work with the Government by the end of 2016. The Government sent a draft revision of the Constitution to the National Assembly in March 2017 for review, using an “emergency procedure”. It was the latter that sparked a great upheaval throughout the political class but also in the ranks of civil society organizations and citizens, who strongly challenged a process that was not considered participatory and inclusive. At the vote in Parliament, 23 MPs (one of whom abstained) managed to get the bill reject. Indeed, the approval of three quarters out the 83 MPs was needed for the draft to be declared admissible. This rejection has subsequently weakened the entire political class, with numerous split offs in all major political parties and party alliances. The parliamentary groups in the National Assembly have been undergoing major restructuring since then. Two blocks are now distinguished at the level of the National Assembly: a block that declares itself from the opposition, with about twenty MPs at this point; and the block of the parliamentary majority composed of about sixty MPs. The movements and cleavages between the two blocks continues, while MPs created new parliamentary groups while others disappeared. It should nevertheless be emphasized that all political parties were unanimous on the need to reform the current party system in Benin, especially in term of party financing. It cannot be asserted that the government of Patrice Talon has definitively abandoned to review the current Constitution. Analysts expect him to bring even the constitutional review back on the table, possibly after the 2019 legislative elections. Currently reforms previously proposed by the Government are being taken over by groups of MPs of the majority to be introduced as a law proposed by parliamentarians. It seems a new strategy to get reforms through with less upheaval. These reforms relate to key elements shaping the political system, such as the Electoral Law and revision of other laws shaping the partisan system. The second major political development in 2017 was the internal crisis faced by next to all major political parties. La Renaissance du Benin (RB) saw the dismissal of its president and a congress electing a new board, and court cases. The Social Democratic Party is also facing a crisis, caused by a conflict between its current president, Emmanuel Golou, and its former president, Bruno Amoussou, who presides one of the major party alliance (l’Union fait la Nation - UN). Finally, the Force Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE), a party alliance created by the former President of the Republic Boni Yayi, has fractioned to the point of risking complete disappearance. Most of its leaders decided to plead allegiance to the current president, while others declared themselves of the opposition. It was reported by the media that president Talon is currently negotiating to create his own alliance of political parties. The latest development is one of crisis within the local councils, with the dismissals of mayors and contested elections of new mayors. Against this backdrop, efforts to facilitate well-informed inter-party and party-parliamentary dialogue are as welcome as ever. The current mode of governance -with attempts to push reforms through the National Assembly- demands even greater vigilance and flexibility in our efforts. The stakes are high with the upcoming legislative (2019) and presidential (2021) elections. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update The Theory of Change and problem analysis, as elaborated at the beginning of the programme, remains very much valid. The two political dialogue sessions held in 2017 on the constitutional review and partisan system reform informed the respective processes. Budgetary restraints and AWEPA’s internal problems meant that there was little follow-up during this year. Both processes are formally on hold, but strong indications suggest that the political system reform agenda will keep moving forward. It is therefore opportune to continue offering opportunity for political dialogue. And focus on specific reform topics with concrete input from political parties and civil society, and to continue to involve MPs in order to prepare the ground for future system-level reforms. All political parties but one are in flux. Capacity strengthening remains an interesting entry point in the current political context, especially with the ongoing reform pending. The intention is to help parties that show the will to impove. The aim is to support parties to better articulate positions and build capacity in terms of communication – competences that will come useful in the 2019, 2020 and 2021 elections. Our work with the National Assembly will facilitate work on system reform, builds the capacity of key political actors (MPs, Government officials) and bring accountability elements into the parliamentary culture. NIMD makes a start with this in 2018, building on previous AWEPA work. This component is funded under the EU project for which the SP provides co-funding. The latter co-funding element –in the form of a law-making and law-editing training for Parliamentary staff- that features in the 2018 SP plan for Benin.*) Building a critical mass of young politicians through the Benin Democracy School remains relevant. 2018 should feature a regular school year for a new group of students, while strengthening the ties with alumni and developing a plan to make most of the growing network. And ultimately improve the political representation of women and youth. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 184965 Benin budget 2018 local partner 18497 Disbursement Benin January 2018 local partner 34094 Disbursement Benin March 2018 local partner 31150 Disbursement Benin May 2018 local partner 64101 Disbursement Benin July 2018 local partner 37123 Disbursement Benin October 2018 local partner 31206 Disbursement Benin November 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Scale 0-5 Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Scale 0-5 Mid-term result Mid-term result Scale 1-10 Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-BEN19 NIMD Benin programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 309640 Benin budget 2019 61928 Disbursement Benin January 2019 3025 Expenditures Benin Q.1 2019 607 Expenditures Benin Q.2 2019 85924 Disbursement Benin July 2019 4775 Expenditures Benin Q.3 2019 83400 Disbursement Benin November 2019 8482 Expenditures Benin Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-BEN20 NIMD Benin programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 282754 Benin budget 2020 191026 Disbursement Benin March 2020 -676 Expenditures Benin Q.1 2020 65798 Disbursement Benin March 2020 12135 Disbursement Benin December 2020 1200 Expenditures Benin Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-BUR16 NIMD BURUNDI’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Burundi has witnessed decades of violent civil conflict between ethnic groups. Despite the fact that a peace process has made democratic transition possible, strong political distrust and a lack of inclusive dialogue between different groups continue to pose significant challenges. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN BURUNDI NIMD started to work in Burundi in 2008. The implementing partner organization in Burundi is ‘The Burundi Leadership Training Programme (BLTP)’. In the run up to the 2010 elections, NIMD and BLTP worked on getting the political parties to talk to each other and develop themselves as democratic parties. However, since the 2010 elections – which many opposition parties boycotted – Burundi has experienced several years of serious political deadlock, including a period when the different parties would not meet each other and several opposition leaders lived in exile. In 2013 and 2014, as part of a strategy for unlocking this political deadlock, NIMD and BLTP managed to engage the main 13 political parties in an 18-month capacity building project. This was a series of training sessions on how to develop a political party programme, including topics such as how to write a programme, how to develop policy positions and how to involve members in the provinces in such a process. These were multiparty training sessions so representatives of all the main 13 political parties attended the programme together. So at the same time as providing training on very useful technical information and skills, it was also a significant move towards building trust between the parties. In addition to the different multiparty trainings, NIMD also facilitated the process of parties holding internal party discussions, including consulting with their members in several provinces, and helped them to translate these discussions into policy positions on key issues. 2014 saw the last 6 months of this project and the start of a second project focusing on helping the parties to prepare for participating in the elections in 2015. This consisted of training sessions on topics such as how to select candidates, how to observe elections, how to work within the new electoral legislative framework and how to develop communication strategies for getting messages across to the electorate. These activities were executed both in the capital as well as in provinces esteemed to be potentially risky during elections. NIMD and BLTP also arranged for the independent electoral commission to participate in some of these sessions to enable them to exchange information with the political parties and to increase trust in the management of the electoral process. Democracy Schools Since 2011, NIMD and BLTP have also been running democracy schools in Burundi. The school programme started in two provinces and was aimed at training community leaders in democratic knowledge and skills. Currently, there are schools in 8 provinces. We constantly work on furthering developing the set up of the schools and the curriculum. For instance, the training modules now also address security problems because that is an important issue in Burundi at the moment. This means that the schools are now also open to policemen. Programme deviations/ToC update: The political crisis that started in 2015, continued in 2016. The nature of political violence changed from popular protests and clashes between protesters and security forces to targeted assassinations of high profile politicians and security officials, extra judicial killings, kidnappings and disappearances. The ruling party has increasingly consolidated its monopoly on power and state institutions. Political space for opposition parties to operate in the country became extremely limited. The Ministry of Home Affairs, charged with the management of political parties, continued the practice of splitting up political parties, creating government controlled versions of opposition parties and denouncing the original. Opposition parties have either seen their leadership assassinated, forced to flee of the country, or unable to organize functionally operating party structures. The exiled leaders of key opposition parties continued to be organised CNARED, a opposition coordination mechanism through which they aim to be recognised and effectively participate in the internationally mediated dialogue process on the Burundi crisis. Due to its composition CNARED remained an unacceptable counterparty for the Burundian government, as they accuse key members of its leadership to have been involved in the attempted coup d’etat of May 2015. The pluriform composition of CNARED also remained a source for internal frictions which further hampered its effectiveness as an opposition platform. There have been little indications that the consultations facilitated by former President of Tanzania Mkapa under the auspices of the East African Community have produced a dialogue that will resolve the crisis. In part, this was caused by the hostile position of the ruling party, but the weak and divided opposition also played a role and the absence of sufficient coherent political front of the Heads of State in the EAC region formed a further explanatory factor. The efforts of the UN to support this process and new resolutions of the UN Security Council have also been met with outright refusal and condemnation from the Government of Burundi. In the meantime the Government of Burundi has pushed forward its own internal Burundian consultation process led by the National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNDI). This has been seen as a way to produce pre-determined conclusions that will endorse the position of the ruling party and could pave the way for constitutional amendments that will remove presidential term limits, ethnic quota linked to the Arusha peace agreement and enable further reforms that will negatively impact on political space. While a constitutional revision has not yet taken place, several laws were passed and CSOs were banned that has already significantly reduced the democratic and civil space. These processes are expected to continue in the following year. A solution or breakthrough from one of the (international) dialogue attempts has failed to take place. At the same time, Nkurunziza’s position has not been substantially challenged by newly formed armed opposition groups, among other reasons because they did not have sufficient capacity to sustain an armed rebellion. Throughout the year, there have been speculations that internal divisions within the ruling party and security forces could lead to a challenge to the President’s power from within, but given the failed coup attempt in 2015 it is difficult to assess if this was a realistic scenario at any point during 2016. The threat of rapid deterioration into widespread political and ethnic violence in this case, which could have been the trigger for an international peacekeeping intervention, has not fully vanished at any point of the year. The year 2016 as such, closed with almost as much uncertainty as it started. A continuation of the current political deadlock therefore also presents itself as a likely scenario for (the first part of) 2017. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) UNDP Burundi USA State Department Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs NL Embassy Burundi Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) Burundi Leadership Training Programme (BLTP) Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 659377 5550 Disbursement Burundi Dec 2016 local partner 46080 programme advise and support 3237 Programme monitoring 11668 Disbursement Burundi July 2016 local partner 45285 Disbursement Burundi September 2016 local partner In general, the difference between different parties’ organizational capacity is quite large. There is a stark difference between the governing party, which has a functional structure, and the opposition parties, that attempt to operate while facing persecution and sometimes exist only because of infighting in the parties they originated from. A characterization of the parties grouped by allegiance to either the government or the opposition is provided below, indicating the difference that the current landscape means: The ruling party (CNDD-FDD), is focused on consolidating its bases for the continuous mobilization of members around activities for security building and local development (local infrastructure, building party headquarters, etc.); Two parties which have been integrated into the institutions of the Republic (UPRONA, FNL Bigirimana) face a very uncertain future because despite their legal status and seats in parliament their political identity is questioned. These parties exist in their current form after a split has occurred and leaders of their parties still lead independent political groups (Agathon Rwasa for the FNL and Charles Niditije for UPRONA). It remains questionable to what extent these parties will be able to to reorganize and reconstruct their bases in anticipation of uncertain future elections. Nditije’s and Rwasa’s political group formed a joint list of independents and despite them formally boycotting the elections they won seats in the national assembly. Rwasa and its members decided to take their seats, despite their boycott. Rwasa became the 1st Vice President of the national assembly and several members of Rwasa’s group have been appointed as ministers in Cabinet. Despite Rwasa’s shown effective leadership control over much of the old FNL structures and popularity his group formally is not a political party and this therefore poses significant challenges for consolidation and sustaining his political organization. Still the choice of UPRONA, FNL and Group Rwasa to enter institutions opens up some space of freedom and action they are all trying to take advantage of to find, in their own way, their respective bases to revive them and even lay the foundation for expansion; For the opposition parties united against the third term of President Nkurunziza, which have boycotted the elections and did not win seats in the assembly the focus is on survival. They exist despite the risks and the security constraints exercised by the Government. The functioning of the bodies of these parties is affected by this constraint. The meetings still held have no agenda turned to reconstruction and redevelopment objectives. In light of this report, the actors of these parties residing in the country operate in semi-clandestine fashion. Their leaders are largely abroad in exile. A key group of leaders have formed an opposition alliance called CNARED. This alliance includes a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians who initially protested against Nkurunziza’s third term (les frondeurs) and have since established their own political party (PPD). For obvious reasons this group has no legal status in the country. Another opposition party that initially participated in CNARED but since has decided to take an independent stance is UPD. This party’s leadership also consist of a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians that were expelled from the party in an internal conflict in 2008. This data is the aggregated result of measurement of scores of all key political parties on three aspects of organizational strength: a. Existence and regular meetings of a national structure: 0,58 b. Electoral organization in different constituencies: 0,90 c. Political position on the dialogue process: 0,55 In the breakdown of these scores, it can be noted that while under aspect B parties scored higher in general, aspects A and C had lower scores. Especially under aspect A, a notable difference exists between the ruling party that has a functional structure, and key opposition parties that either operate in secrecy and therefore are significantly challenged in organizing regular party structure meetings, or where sometimes party life is almost non-existent. The indicator is operationalized by the percentage of parties with increased scores. Individual scores of parties, available in the table below need to be compared between measurements. In order to be able to identify developments for individual parties, individual party scores and aggregates are available below. As extra information, the total aggregated score of all parties can also be compared between measurements. Recognition and approval ratings of political actors by citizens is on average quite low, just over 57%. However, political parties tend to be some of the least trusted and approved institutions. Looking at the data, a markable difference between approval and recognition (operationalized as trust in political actors) is visible between the government and the opposition party. While the government earns a high 72 percent, the opposition pulls down the average with 43 percent. In general, opposition parties are highly divided and weakly organized institutions. While the ruling party has acted oppressively over the last period, it is also in full control of the Burundian state. A qualification therefore can be that in the minds of citizens, the governing political party could be conflated with the institutions of the state. The Afrobarometer score on this topic from 2013/14 was used. The barometer distinguishes between trust in the ruling party and in the opposition party. For the quantitative data, the # of respondents who reply with “somewhat” or “a lot” are divided against the total respondents, and the scores for the ruling and opposition party are averaged. For the ruling party, the percentage of respondents who expressed trust is 72% For the opposition parties, the percentage of respondents who expressed trust is 43. The difference, although not taken into account in the quantitative data percentage, is notable. Another qualification is that this measurement was taken before the current political crisis, which may have affected trust levels in both ruling and opposition political parties. In Burundi during the 2015 elections, around which the baseline was measured, the level of polarization between political actors is very high. The level of polarization was raised due to president Nkurunziza’s announcement to make himself electable for a third term. This decision has been claimed to be both unconstitutional, as well as against the provisions of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The current government, that took office in August 2015, is not recognized by the main opposition parties. Apart from that, opposition leaders have been persecuted and harassed, while unclaimed attacks on military bases have taken place outside of the capital Bujumbura. While various international mediation attempts have taken and are taking place, none of these seem to offer a solution to the current situation in the near future. Polarization therefore remains high, and scenarios of increased tension and violence cannot be ruled out. Qualitative description: Participation in the general elections of parties that registered at the recognized electoral management body was used as an outcome indicator to measure levels of polarization. After examination of the filed records by political parties, the official electoral body CENI couted registrations from ten political parties, three coalitions and three independent candidates. The selected political players, who are set in the list below, comprise 9 actors of the opposition 4 of the presidential group. This clarification is important as it helps explain why to be registered does not mean participate in elections. Actors of the opposition, who boycotted the elections, are tagged with (*). Only 4 political parties out of 16 took part in the elections. 9 political parties, coalitions and independent candidates had publicly announced they would not participate considering that the context was not conducive. Note: The chairman of the CENI claimed he never received the paper to officially announce the boycott of the opposition. Therefore he considered that the elections would be held as if all the lists were involved. Accusing him of being controlled by the government, the opposition questioned the legitimacy of the CENI. List of political parties / coalitions / independent candidates selected for Elections of Representatives N° parties / coalitions / independent candidates CONSTITUENCIES Out of 18 POLITICAL PARTIES 1 FNL 18 2 CNDD-FDD 18 3 MSD* 18 4 SAHWANYA FRODEBU NYAKURI* 18 5 UPRONA 18 6 MRC RURENZANGEMERO* 17 7 UPD ZIGAMIBANGA* 16 8 PSD DUSABIKANYE* 5 9 SANGWE PADER* 3 10 PALIPE AGAKIZA* 1 COALITIONS 1 ADC IKIBIRI* 18 2 COPA 18 3 RANAC* 17 INDEPENDANT CANDIDATES 1 ABIGENGA AMIZERO Y-ABARUNDI* 18 2 RDB* 1 3 RUFYIKIRI ISIDORE* 1 In spite of diplomatic efforts from the region and the international community, there is no prospect for a way out of the current crisis. The former president of Tanzania, Mkapa, has held two rounds of consultations in May and July 2016 and presented his progress report to the heads of state at the East African Community Summit in September. He stresses the large differences between the vision of the opposition and the ruling party, and the lack of willingness to participate in any meaningful dialogue. While the government has launched its own dialogue process, this is controlled by the ruling party and does not entail a shared agenda towards peace and stability. The EAC continues its support for Mkapa’s attempt and pressure on the government. New rounds of talks are expected in October. This is an assembled indicator, that operates in two subsequent measurement steps. As a first step BLTP/NIMD determines whether a national agenda for peace and stability exists. The second step is to measure the percentage of key parties that sign this agenda. As there is still no national agenda for peace and stability, NIMD and BLTP will monitor the evolution of the internationally facilitated dialogue to see whether any agenda may result. For the time being the baseline is therefore 0%. We will therefore ensure the monitoring of the move towards that agenda for the mid-term and final evaluation. This outcome measures the level of trust between political rivals. The interventions carried out by BLTP/NIMD aim to improve this level of trust. At the moment, trust between different political parties is very low. This can be inferred from the high level of polarization between parties. At the same time, the personal trust between political rivals is also relatively low. This can be seen in light of the recent political crisis. This score is based on a measurement of trust based on a series of questions, which can be answered on a 1 to 5 scale (further explained in the methodology section). For all questions, a score closer to 1 indicates higher levels of trust, while a score closer to 5 indicates low trust. This measurement was done through a MOIT (Measurement of Interparty Trust)-test with focal points of all key political parties during two trainings on non-violent communication and negotiation skills and interparty dialogue in the framework of the project with the United States State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The test was conducted directly by BLTP’s programme responsible. The MOIT is based on a questionnaire, with all 22 questions. These questions are tested, validated, items used to assess both trust and the drivers of trust, on a common 5-point scale. In designing this questionnaire, the items have been mixed up, and they have been adjusted to suit the context. After the questionnaire, the answers have been re-ordered, so that averages for trust and drivers of trust can be calculated. An overall average has been calculated, to see how all interviewees score on average when it comes to inter-party trust. This overall score can be compared at mid and end term measurements All parties have incorporated and reflected the role of youth and women in their constitutional and statutory texts and strive to make them digitally and adequately represented in their internal organs, and when they sit there, in the institutions. This is a matter of choice and a deliberate desire to promote youth and women for responsibilities which facilitate their perception and their conditions of equality with men. However, there are no or too little vision nor articulated positions on the employment challenges and the integration of youth and women. The value was not available at the time of data collection. NL-KVK-27189542-BUR17 NIMD BURUNDI’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Burundi has witnessed decades of violent civil conflict between ethnic groups. Despite the fact that a peace process has made democratic transition possible, strong political distrust and a lack of inclusive dialogue between different groups continue to pose significant challenges. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN BURUNDI NIMD started to work in Burundi in 2008. The implementing partner organization in Burundi is ‘The Burundi Leadership Training Programme (BLTP)’. In the run up to the 2010 elections, NIMD and BLTP worked on getting the political parties to talk to each other and develop themselves as democratic parties. However, since the 2010 elections – which many opposition parties boycotted – Burundi has experienced several years of serious political deadlock, including a period when the different parties would not meet each other and several opposition leaders lived in exile. In 2013 and 2014, as part of a strategy for unlocking this political deadlock, NIMD and BLTP managed to engage the main 13 political parties in an 18-month capacity building project. This was a series of training sessions on how to develop a political party programme, including topics such as how to write a programme, how to develop policy positions and how to involve members in the provinces in such a process. These were multiparty training sessions so representatives of all the main 13 political parties attended the programme together. So at the same time as providing training on very useful technical information and skills, it was also a significant move towards building trust between the parties. In addition to the different multiparty trainings, NIMD also facilitated the process of parties holding internal party discussions, including consulting with their members in several provinces, and helped them to translate these discussions into policy positions on key issues. 2014 saw the last 6 months of this project and the start of a second project focusing on helping the parties to prepare for participating in the elections in 2015. This consisted of training sessions on topics such as how to select candidates, how to observe elections, how to work within the new electoral legislative framework and how to develop communication strategies for getting messages across to the electorate. These activities were executed both in the capital as well as in provinces esteemed to be potentially risky during elections. NIMD and BLTP also arranged for the independent electoral commission to participate in some of these sessions to enable them to exchange information with the political parties and to increase trust in the management of the electoral process. Democracy Schools Since 2011, NIMD and BLTP have also been running democracy schools in Burundi. The school programme started in two provinces and was aimed at training community leaders in democratic knowledge and skills. Currently, there are schools in 8 provinces. We constantly work on furthering developing the set up of the schools and the curriculum. For instance, the training modules now also address security problems because that is an important issue in Burundi at the moment. This means that the schools are now also open to policemen. Programme deviations/ToC update: The political crisis that started in 2015, continued in 2016. The nature of political violence changed from popular protests and clashes between protesters and security forces to targeted assassinations of high profile politicians and security officials, extra judicial killings, kidnappings and disappearances. The ruling party has increasingly consolidated its monopoly on power and state institutions. Political space for opposition parties to operate in the country became extremely limited. The Ministry of Home Affairs, charged with the management of political parties, continued the practice of splitting up political parties, creating government controlled versions of opposition parties and denouncing the original. Opposition parties have either seen their leadership assassinated, forced to flee of the country, or unable to organize functionally operating party structures. The exiled leaders of key opposition parties continued to be organised CNARED, a opposition coordination mechanism through which they aim to be recognised and effectively participate in the internationally mediated dialogue process on the Burundi crisis. Due to its composition CNARED remained an unacceptable counterparty for the Burundian government, as they accuse key members of its leadership to have been involved in the attempted coup d’etat of May 2015. The pluriform composition of CNARED also remained a source for internal frictions which further hampered its effectiveness as an opposition platform. There have been little indications that the consultations facilitated by former President of Tanzania Mkapa under the auspices of the East African Community have produced a dialogue that will resolve the crisis. In part, this was caused by the hostile position of the ruling party, but the weak and divided opposition also played a role and the absence of sufficient coherent political front of the Heads of State in the EAC region formed a further explanatory factor. The efforts of the UN to support this process and new resolutions of the UN Security Council have also been met with outright refusal and condemnation from the Government of Burundi. In the meantime the Government of Burundi has pushed forward its own internal Burundian consultation process led by the National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNDI). This has been seen as a way to produce pre-determined conclusions that will endorse the position of the ruling party and could pave the way for constitutional amendments that will remove presidential term limits, ethnic quota linked to the Arusha peace agreement and enable further reforms that will negatively impact on political space. While a constitutional revision has not yet taken place, several laws were passed and CSOs were banned that has already significantly reduced the democratic and civil space. These processes are expected to continue in the following year. A solution or breakthrough from one of the (international) dialogue attempts has failed to take place. At the same time, Nkurunziza’s position has not been substantially challenged by newly formed armed opposition groups, among other reasons because they did not have sufficient capacity to sustain an armed rebellion. Throughout the year, there have been speculations that internal divisions within the ruling party and security forces could lead to a challenge to the President’s power from within, but given the failed coup attempt in 2015 it is difficult to assess if this was a realistic scenario at any point during 2016. The threat of rapid deterioration into widespread political and ethnic violence in this case, which could have been the trigger for an international peacekeeping intervention, has not fully vanished at any point of the year. The year 2016 as such, closed with almost as much uncertainty as it started. A continuation of the current political deadlock therefore also presents itself as a likely scenario for (the first part of) 2017. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 27500 Disbursement Burundi February 2017 local partner 195334 Burundi budget 2017 local partner 45475 Disbursement Burundi April 2017 local partner 5240 Disbursement Burundi August 2017 local partner 3000 2nd Disbursement Burundi August 2017 local partner 70000 Disbursement Burundi November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-BUR18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018 More than two years after the political crisis erupted in the run-up to the 2015 elections, there is no comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in sight. The EAC-led dialogue on Burundi, facilitated by former Tanzanian President Mkapa has not yet succeeded in bringing the key protagonists around one table to negotiate on the key issues. Parallel to this process, the Government of Burundi and in particular the Ombudsman have started new initiatives for political dialogue with opposition in Burundi, offering opportunities for a breakthrough. Nonetheless, the government of Burundi is simultaneously exploring the possibility of constitutional reform enabling President Nkurunziza to run for a fourth term. The political landscape continues to be characterized by decreasing political space, polarization, exclusion of political opponents and marginalized groups from politics and decision-making and low-intensity political violence. Most political actors have moved from contestation around the 2015 elections to preparation for the next elections, scheduled for 2020. Anticipating these elections, major areas of concern are the regulatory environment for (opposition) political parties and the legitimacy and capacities of political parties. Additionally, in this context of limited political space, promising openings for working on democratic culture are to be found at the local level. • Outlook for 2018 The challenges Burundi is facing are huge and many fall outside NIMD’s sphere of influence. Still, experiences in the past two years have shown that NIMD is in a position to contribute to some of these issues. A key systemic obstacle for peaceful politics is the closed regulatory environment for (opposition) political parties. Investing in a revision of political party legislation and its application is one of the preconditions for a fruitful dialogue process and for the end of the political crisis. The different ongoing dialogue processes need to address this in order to yield sustainable results. NIMD contributes to this by stimulating a bottom-up agenda on this issue from the parties through discussion and dialogue, fed by analyses. Together with an investment in the capacities of political parties as legitimate and capable conversation partners for both the Burundian government and for the international community, we aim to get this topic on the agenda of ongoing dialogue processes. Credible and legitimate political actors remain invaluable for long-term democratic development in Burundi. The focus in 2018 will be on supporting the organizational development and vision formulation of political parties through strategic planning. Exploiting political space on the local level, activities that link former and current students of democracy schools with local branches of political parties strengthen the space for democratic diversity and democratic behaviour. Lastly, actions plans for improved participation of women formulated by female representatives in 2017 will be followed up with activities that engage political party leaderships on the need for and benefits of increased participation of women. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 238572 Burundi budget 2018 local partner 101628 Disbursement Burundi March 2018 local partner 56176 Disbursement Burundi September 2018 local partner 52893 Disbursement Burundi September 2018 local partner In general, the difference between different parties’ organizational capacity is quite large. There is a stark difference between the governing party, which has a functional structure, and the opposition parties, that attempt to operate while facing persecution and sometimes exist only because of infighting in the parties they originated from. A characterization of the parties grouped by allegiance to either the government or the opposition is provided below, indicating the difference that the current landscape means: The ruling party (CNDD-FDD), is focused on consolidating its bases for the continuous mobilization of members around activities for security building and local development (local infrastructure, building party headquarters, etc.); Two parties which have been integrated into the institutions of the Republic (UPRONA, FNL Bigirimana) face a very uncertain future because despite their legal status and seats in parliament their political identity is questioned. These parties exist in their current form after a split has occurred and leaders of their parties still lead independent political groups (Agathon Rwasa for the FNL and Charles Niditije for UPRONA). It remains questionable to what extent these parties will be able to to reorganize and reconstruct their bases in anticipation of uncertain future elections. Nditije’s and Rwasa’s political group formed a joint list of independents and despite them formally boycotting the elections they won seats in the national assembly. Rwasa and its members decided to take their seats, despite their boycott. Rwasa became the 1st Vice President of the national assembly and several members of Rwasa’s group have been appointed as ministers in Cabinet. Despite Rwasa’s shown effective leadership control over much of the old FNL structures and popularity his group formally is not a political party and this therefore poses significant challenges for consolidation and sustaining his political organization. Still the choice of UPRONA, FNL and Group Rwasa to enter institutions opens up some space of freedom and action they are all trying to take advantage of to find, in their own way, their respective bases to revive them and even lay the foundation for expansion; For the opposition parties united against the third term of President Nkurunziza, which have boycotted the elections and did not win seats in the assembly the focus is on survival. They exist despite the risks and the security constraints exercised by the Government. The functioning of the bodies of these parties is affected by this constraint. The meetings still held have no agenda turned to reconstruction and redevelopment objectives. In light of this report, the actors of these parties residing in the country operate in semi-clandestine fashion. Their leaders are largely abroad in exile. A key group of leaders have formed an opposition alliance called CNARED. This alliance includes a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians who initially protested against Nkurunziza’s third term (les frondeurs) and have since established their own political party (PPD). For obvious reasons this group has no legal status in the country. Another opposition party that initially participated in CNARED but since has decided to take an independent stance is UPD. This party’s leadership also consist of a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians that were expelled from the party in an internal conflict in 2008. In the context of Burundi, this indicator is operationalized as political parties with a political programme written and publicly available before the elections. In part because of NIMD’s effort to support political parties in the development of a political programme, a large # of political parties developed a political programme in the course of NIMD’s trainings: out of 13 parties, 11 developed a programme. Only 11 of these 13 belonged to the key political parties at the time. Out of these 11, only 2 (CNDD and UPRONA) did not have a programme publicly available before the 2015 elections. However, most political parties did not use the programmes actively in the campaign running up to the 2015 elections. This is an important qualification, that needs to be monitored for the mid and end term measurements. Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-BUR19 NIMD Burundi Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 320564 Burundi budget 2019 6409 Expenditures Burundi Q1 2019 13151 Expenditures Burundi Q2 2019 12510 Expenditures Burundi Q3 2019 61396 Disbursement Burundi October and December 2019 14295 Expenditures Burundi Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-BUR20 NIMD Burundi Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 141000 Burundi budget 2020 206 Expenditures Burundi Q1 2020 37532 Disbursement Burundi May 2020 8382 Expenditures Burundi Q2 2020 76940 Disbursement Burundi October 2020 2013 Expenditures Burundi Q4 2020 In general, the difference between different parties’ organizational capacity is quite large. There is a stark difference between the governing party, which has a functional structure, and the opposition parties, that attempt to operate while facing persecution and sometimes exist only because of infighting in the parties they originated from. A characterization of the parties grouped by allegiance to either the government or the opposition is provided below, indicating the difference that the current landscape means: The ruling party (CNDD-FDD), is focused on consolidating its bases for the continuous mobilization of members around activities for security building and local development (local infrastructure, building party headquarters, etc.); Two parties which have been integrated into the institutions of the Republic (UPRONA, FNL Bigirimana) face a very uncertain future because despite their legal status and seats in parliament their political identity is questioned. These parties exist in their current form after a split has occurred and leaders of their parties still lead independent political groups (Agathon Rwasa for the FNL and Charles Niditije for UPRONA). It remains questionable to what extent these parties will be able to to reorganize and reconstruct their bases in anticipation of uncertain future elections. Nditije’s and Rwasa’s political group formed a joint list of independents and despite them formally boycotting the elections they won seats in the national assembly. Rwasa and its members decided to take their seats, despite their boycott. Rwasa became the 1st Vice President of the national assembly and several members of Rwasa’s group have been appointed as ministers in Cabinet. Despite Rwasa’s shown effective leadership control over much of the old FNL structures and popularity his group formally is not a political party and this therefore poses significant challenges for consolidation and sustaining his political organization. Still the choice of UPRONA, FNL and Group Rwasa to enter institutions opens up some space of freedom and action they are all trying to take advantage of to find, in their own way, their respective bases to revive them and even lay the foundation for expansion; For the opposition parties united against the third term of President Nkurunziza, which have boycotted the elections and did not win seats in the assembly the focus is on survival. They exist despite the risks and the security constraints exercised by the Government. The functioning of the bodies of these parties is affected by this constraint. The meetings still held have no agenda turned to reconstruction and redevelopment objectives. In light of this report, the actors of these parties residing in the country operate in semi-clandestine fashion. Their leaders are largely abroad in exile. A key group of leaders have formed an opposition alliance called CNARED. This alliance includes a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians who initially protested against Nkurunziza’s third term (les frondeurs) and have since established their own political party (PPD). For obvious reasons this group has no legal status in the country. Another opposition party that initially participated in CNARED but since has decided to take an independent stance is UPD. This party’s leadership also consist of a group of former CNDD-FDD politicians that were expelled from the party in an internal conflict in 2008. In the context of Burundi, this indicator is operationalized as political parties with a political programme written and publicly available before the elections. In part because of NIMD’s effort to support political parties in the development of a political programme, a large # of political parties developed a political programme in the course of NIMD’s trainings: out of 13 parties, 11 developed a programme. Only 11 of these 13 belonged to the key political parties at the time. Out of these 11, only 2 (CNDD and UPRONA) did not have a programme publicly available before the 2015 elections. However, most political parties did not use the programmes actively in the campaign running up to the 2015 elections. This is an important qualification, that needs to be monitored for the mid and end term measurements. End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-COL16 NIMD COLOMBIA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 2014, Colombia went through two electoral contests. In March, a new Parliament was elected (using the gender quota of 30% for the first time), and in July, after a second round, Juan Manuel Santos was re-elected as President. These events produced a polarized political landscape. On the one hand, new political parties (like the Democratic Centre, led by former President Uribe) refused negotiations with the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). On the other hand, Santos achieved his second presidential term based on the campaign promise of reaching a final peace agreement with the FARC-EP before the end of 2018. At present, peace talks between the government and the FARC-EP are still going on in Havana. The ‘basic agreements’ of these talks are public. One of the agenda points on which the two parties have already reached consensus is political participation. This means that political inclusivity will be an important aspect of the peace process. It is expected that the negotiations will come to a successful conclusion in the near future. Democratic institutions It has become clear in recent years that Colombia needs to reform its democratic institutions to make them more inclusive and political parties more representative and disciplined. This becomes even more urgent in the face of a possible peace agreement with the FARC-EP. Therefore, the national government presented a proposal for political reform in September 2014, including issues such as congressional closed lists, the elimination of presidential re-election, implementation of the ‘zippered list’ and compulsory voting. However, the vast majority of these reforms were not adopted by Congress in 2015. Also, local elections will take place in 2015, during which more than 2,000 government officials such as mayors, governors, councilors and deputies will be elected. This situation poses a challenge to the political parties, both in terms of representation as well as candidate selection. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN COLOMBIA In 2015, NIMD’s activities in Colombia will focus on three programmes: The UNDP-NIMD-IDEA Respect for Women Political Rights programme (WPR Programme), the NIMD-Cordaid Programme for Democratic Dialogue for Environmental Security (PDDES), and a new initiative together with the Colombian government that focuses on the political participation of the youth. Through the WPR Programme NIMD will continue to support the women branches of all political parties in Colombia in order to strengthen their political skills and remove barriers to increase their participation. The PDDES programme brings together civil society actors and political parties around the democratization of environmental governance. The programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador. The third project, which is jointly executed with the Ministry of Interior in Colombia, aims to develop a strategy that combines technical, administrative and financial efforts to stimulate the political participation of young people. In addition to these programmes NIMD also offers direct bilateral support to the political parties in areas such as the capacity building of think tanks, candidate selection and the improvement of communication with civil society. This is one of the reasons why NIMD has opened a local office in Colombia in 2014. STRENGTHENING WOMEN IN POLITICAL PARTIES IN COLOMBIA In Colombia, violence against women has increased considerably in recent years. According to the newspaper El Tiempo, every six hours a Colombian woman is abused due to the armed conflict in the country, and a daily average of 245 women are victims of some type of violence. While there has been very little documentation of the violence used to impede women’s participation in politics in Colombia, violence against female leaders of social movements is common. Since 2011 UNDP, NIMD and International IDEA have worked with women and political parties in Colombia via the Democratic Strengthening programme. At the individual level, this work has included supporting the nomination of candidates, the promotion of women in legislative benches and commissions, and the creation of meeting spaces for elected women and social organizations. More than 1500 women took part in these activities. The political parties received technical support to assess and reform their internal rules and regulations. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. UNDP Colombia NIMD Colombia NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 554365 16881 Disbursement Colombia November 2016 local partner 10000 Disbursement Colombia December 2016 local partner 8674 Disbursement Colombia Nov 2016 (innovation) local partner 6554 Programme monitoring 38720 programme advise and support 35000 Disbursement Colombia January local partner 75000 Disbursement Colombia May local partner 26458 Disbursement Colombia September local partner The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in Colombia. A self-assessment survey was conducted among 9 political parties and contained 28 questions which addressed different subjects such as representivity, strategic planning, training, coordination, decision-making, communication and transparency. The collected data shows that parties assess themselves with an average of 81% out of a maximum of 100%. Particular weaknesses in political parties were identified in the strategic planning (61%) and training (76%) categories which produced the lowest results. It is worth noticing that almost all political parties have a positive perception regarding their accountability but this is rather a consequence of legal regulation, and not of the voluntary choice of the parties. In fact, most of them comply only with the minimums established by law. Political parties in Colombia face high expectations regarding the implementation of the political participation part of the peace agreement, however, there is little awareness and knowledge on conflict resolution tools and other instruments to peacefully resolve conflict and process social demands. The information collected shows that political parties are still weak in the implementation of democratic values as evidenced in the limited existence of horizontal coordination mechanisms, communication channels with local levels as well as the lack of consultation with their members and supporters. Additionally, the training and knowledge sharing actions that could mitigate this weakness appear as the lowest valued category in the perception indicator. In contrast, the sense of trust and mutual understanding between political actors is perceived as relatively positive; an important attribute needed to contribute to the stability of the peace building process. In the focus group discussion, political parties were asked how they perceived the democratic values of their encounters with other parties. They ranked the existence of democratic values with an average percentage of 68 (derived from different questions about this topic). The collected data also showed willingness from the political parties to collaborate with new political parties/movements and to make alliances around common interests, as has been seen with coalitions made around the peace agreement plebiscite. The first edition of the Democracy School has recently started, so there are no alumni yet who can incorporate the training in their daily life. Yet, this indicator will, over the years, give valuable information about the development of the quality of the democracy schools, and thus about its impact. Quantitative data: 69% average in survey Qualitative description In the survey conducted with political parties, they indicated the extent to which spaces for the participation of youth, women, indigenous people, afro-Colombians and LGBTI people are created or strengthened within their parties. Those responses averaged to a total of 69%. Often, these are general spaces for all marginalized groups. A few political parties annotated that they didn’t have any initiatives for the strengthening of these spaces in the last year due the peace process agenda and budget constraints. Colombia has a closed political system, with limited options for the emergence of political alternatives and an absence of regulations for the exercise of political opposition. However, due to the peace process there is a window of opportunity for political stakeholders to make changes in order to implement what was agreed upon under the “political participation” part of the accord. The legislative changes that need to be made constitute an important opportunity for NIMD to promote the aperture of the political system. The President submitted a constitutional reform act to Congress that establishes a simplified process to approve the legal reforms required to implement the Peace Agreement that has been signed with the FARC. In spite of the opportunity to make significant changes to Colombia’s political system, a strong polarization has characterized the current political scenario. The Government coalition and a large part of civil society promote the ratification of the peace agreements, in contrast to the Centro Democratico political party that has several unresolved issues with the agreement. The data collected shows evidence of a good level of attendance during NIMD events, and political stakeholders mention the importance of the support of NIMD. Baseline data is 0, project started in January 2016 and can only be measured once the year 2016 results are obtained. NL-KVK-27189542-COL17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 After four years of peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP in Havana, Cuba, both parties signed the final agreement on the 26th of September 2016, under the supervision of many state leaders and other prominent guests. The agreement was set to be approved by the public with a plebiscite one week later, and opinion polls predicted a comfortable win for the YES voters. However, a majority voted against the peace agreement in this plebiscite – albeit with a very small margin-, thereby underlining the stark division of Colombian society. Also, the extremely low turnout rates made clear that political participation as well as representivity are a very serious concern in the country. The negative outcome of the referendum has temporarily stalled the implementation of the already signed peace agreement, and leaves the country with a panorama of uncertainty. Currently, both parties have returned to the negotiating table to discuss possible amendments to incorporate the concerns of the NO voters. This process is complicated by the fact that apart from former president Uribe, there is no representation for a large part of the NO camp. In the meantime, public demonstrations are widely spread in the main cities, filling the streets with people who demand the peace agreement to be implemented now. As a result, President Santos has prolonged the cease fire with the FARC till the end of the year, in order to support the renewed negations. Simultaneously, the Colombian government started a new peace process with the second guerrilla group of the country; ELN. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update These events made clear that the need to improve the political system to make it more inclusive and representative is more pressing than ever. NIMD Colombia is convinced that inclusive dialogue and the promotion of democratic culture are key to overcome polarisation and reach long-lasting peace. The peace process constitutes a very important window of opportunity for much needed electoral reforms and an aperture of the political system. Therefore, NIMD will –apart from its conventional interventions- pursue an active role in the peace process, and it aims to keep its participation in both point 2 (political participation) and 6 (implementation) of the agreements. Despite the uncertainty caused by the result of the plebiscite, NIMD has identified 2 timeframes with corresponding interventions (pre and post revised agreements) that are most constructive given the current circumstances. In the first timeframe, during ongoing renegotiations, NIMD will focus on: A) Reforms for the improvement of the political system, by promoting multi-actor dialogue around the electoral system and the Statute for Political Opposition; B) Strengthening a democratic political culture by training future political and social leaders through Democracy Schools as well as by promoting the political participation of women, in territories most affected by the conflict, and C) the monitoring and prevention of political violence. In the second timeframe, it is anticipated that a new peace accord is ratified with a broader support base. NIMD expects that the formation of new political movements remains an integral part of this agreement. Therefore, it will focus on: A) Reincorporation of the FARC-EP and other new political movements in politics, by providing technical assistance for the formation of their political party, the exchange of best practices and the training of their members, and B) the monitoring of the implementation of the agreements on political participation. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 219865 75000 Disbursement Colombia February 2017 local partner 219865 Colombia budget 2017 local partner 75000 Disbursement Colombia February 2017 local partner 21442 Disbursement Colombia August 2017 local partner 10000 Disbursement Colombia November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-COL18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018 2017 marked the first year of the implementation process of the Peace Agreement signed late 2016 by the National Government and FARC-EP. In the political arena, this process entailed two main tasks: the demobilization and reincorporation of FARC’s members and the approval of constitutional and legal reforms by the Congress to provide an institutional foundation for the implementation of the Agreement. During the demobilization process, there were many concerns about the low responsiveness and capacity of the Government to fulfil its commitments under the Agreement. In terms of the legal amendments established in the Peace Agreement, the Congress has approved some of the most urgent constitutional and legal reforms. By June 2017, the disarmament process had finalized and the majority of FARC ex-combatants were ready to start their social, economic and political reincorporation process. FARC leaders announced their official transition to a political party during a national convention in August 2017. Due to the track record that the programme has managed to demonstrate during the first 18 months of implementation, DSH agreed to unlock the programme funds for the period 2018-2020 during the policy meeting on 18 May 2017. Looking forward, at the core of the Colombian political agenda are the two elections (parliamentary and presidential) that will take place in the first half of 2018. These elections entail a potential risk for the implementation of the Peace Agreement if the opposition wins and/or gets a majority in Congress. Simultaneously, the peace negotiations between the ELN guerrilla and the National Government, who reached a joint ceasefire in September 2017, will continue in Ecuador. • Outlook for 2018 In 2018, NIMD Colombia will keep working on a more open and inclusive political system that contributes to stability. This is especially important in circumstances that potentially can put the implementation of the Peace Agreement at risk, as is the case with the 2018 parliamentary and presidential elections. Furthermore, the programme aims to promote responsive and capable political parties by designing innovative tools for political parties to strengthen their capacities for democratic representation and policymaking. At the same time, environmental governance will be promoted in the framework of the 2018 elections. This subject has been a crucial focal point for several political actors to better connect with their constituencies. Interventions at the culture level will aim to prevent political violence during the elections through massive awareness campaigns, promote the leadership and capabilities of the Democracy School alumni and provide training on mediation and conflict resolution. Lastly, the inclusion of marginalized groups within politics will be supported by identifying and overcoming barriers to entry and developing strategies for the strengthening of political leadership of minorities. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 184000 Colombia budget 2018 local partner 18400 Disbursement Colombia January 2018 local partner 60000 Disbursement Colombia March 2018 local partner 72210 Disbursement Colombia September 2018 local partner 1000 Advanced payment by HQ for GPMD fee 2018 local partner 19660 Disbursement Colombia October 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-COL19 NIMD Colombia Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 255816 Colombia budget 2019 51163 Disbursement Colombia January 2019 6369 Expenditures Colombia Q1 2019 7446 Expenditures Colombia Q2 2019 10736 Expenditures Colombia Q3 2019 70485 Disbursement Colombia September 2019 16358 Expenditures Colombia Q4 2019 63196 Disbursement Colombia October 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-COL20 NIMD Colombia Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 182454 Colombia budget 2020 94876 Disbursement March Colombia 2020 22562 Expenditures Colombia Q1 2020 6077 Expenditures Colombia Q2 2020 87577 Disbursement Colombia October 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-DFS-Programme NIMD Dialogue for Stability: Inclusive Politics in Fragile Settings (DfS) is a five-year programme funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. DfS aims to contribute to the creation of open and accessible political systems and the legitimacy and responsiveness of political actors in countries affected by conflict and fragility, concentrating on five countries: Burundi, Colombia, Jordan, Tunisia and Ukraine. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 1500000 2nd installment May 2016 NIMD 1425000 1st installment Febr 2016 NIMD 75000 3rd installment Oct 2016 NIMD 1500000 Commitment NIMD 3000000 Funds received March 2017 NIMD 3000000 Commitment NIMD 3000000 Funds received June 2018 NIMD 3000000 Commitment NIMD 3000000 Funds received May 2019 NIMD 3000000 Commitment NIMD NL-KVK-27189542-DFS16 NIMD Dialogue for Stability: Inclusive politics in fragile settings (2016-2020) The number of countries and regions that are affected by conflict and fragility is globally on the increase. In Central America, a number of countries are hard hit by fragility and criminality; in the Horn of Africa and parts of sub-Saharan and West Africa instability and internal conflict continue to persist and in the MENA region, a number of countries are at risk of collapsing as a result of religious and political sectarianism. Also in the Eastern European neighborhood, high levels of tension and the use of force remain very worrisome. These conflicts are not limited to national borders. Increasingly, international dimensions are at play as the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine painfully reveal. The increasing instability at the eastern and southern borders of Europe also has an immediate effect on Europe’s own security and stability levels, as the current migration flows clearly unfolds. These developments require a fundamental rethink of the strategies and responses by the international community, informed by an in-depth understanding of the underlying root causes of the conflicts and fragility dimensions in these countries. To better understand and define its own role and positioning in the changing world order, NIMD recently embarked on a reflection process as part of the preparations for its multi-annual plan for the period 2016-2020. This resulted in the publication of its new Multi-Annual Plan entitled (MAP): ‘Stronger Parties. Deeper Democracy’. The MAP describes the vision, objectives, challenges and priorities for the period 2016–2020 and is underpinned by an elaborated Theory of Change. Its overall vision is “to contribute to legitimate and inclusive political systems which create favourable conditions for peace and security by accommodating divergent views and interests in society and by setting differences in a non-violent way”. Since NIMD is increasingly working in political environments which are extremely polarised and divided and in countries that moved either just out of conflict, find themselves in conflict or are at risk of moving towards conflict, NIMD has furthermore prepared an approach for working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In line with NIMD’s Theory of Change, this approach focusses on three interrelated levels related to political system, political actor and political culture change. Over the past few months, NIMD has engaged in consultations with the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore the possibilities for the Ministry to continue its support the NIMD beyond the current subsidy that comes to an end in December 2015. The outcome of these deliberations has resulted in the approval of a first grant under the Strategic Partnership for lobby and advocacy and the invitation to submit a five year programme to contribute to inclusive politics in fragile settings and for NIMD institutionally, on knowledge and innovation, monitoring and evaluation and fundraising. This programme called ”Dialogue for Stability: inclusive politics in fragile settings”, particularly aims to contribute to open and accessible political systems and the legitimacy and responsiveness of political actors in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The programme therefore directly contributes to the vision and objectives laid down in NIMD’s MAP and the goals on inclusive political processes and legitimate and capable governments as defined in the policy spearhead on Security and the Rule of Law of the MFA. Furthermore, it contribute to the aim of peaceful and inclusive sustainable development and accountable and inclusive institutions as defined in the 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recently adopted. NIMD will concentrate its efforts on a selected number of countries (Burundi, South Sudan, Ukraine, Tunisia and Colombia) where it can build on its existing political and partner networks, knowledge base and infrastructure. These country programmes will be based on a country specific baseline and theory of change, informed by an in depth political economy analysis. Furthermore, explorations and a limited number of activities will be conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Kurdistan and Israel-Palestinian territories. Depending on the political environments and potential entry points in these three countries and one region, they could overtime evolve into fully fledged programmes. Next to these country programmes, the Dialogue for Stability programme will further deepen NIMD’s knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture and gender diversity and inclusiveness. A specific part of NIMD’s knowledge agenda will be devoted to strategies, skills and expertise for working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition of the fact that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, NIMD will strengthen its knowledge base on new thinking about participatory democracy and stimulate and explore (programmatic and political) innovation in its new and existing programme countries. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 2843469 28042017 DfS report- FINAL Annex A (results framework) Annex B (DfS financial report 2016) Annex C (human interest stories) NL-KVK-27189542-DFS17 NIMD Dialogue for Stability: Inclusive politics in fragile settings (2016-2020) The number of countries and regions that are affected by conflict and fragility is globally on the increase. In Central America, a number of countries are hard hit by fragility and criminality; in the Horn of Africa and parts of sub-Saharan and West Africa instability and internal conflict continue to persist and in the MENA region, a number of countries are at risk of collapsing as a result of religious and political sectarianism. Also in the Eastern European neighborhood, high levels of tension and the use of force remain very worrisome. These conflicts are not limited to national borders. Increasingly, international dimensions are at play as the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine painfully reveal. The increasing instability at the eastern and southern borders of Europe also has an immediate effect on Europe’s own security and stability levels, as the current migration flows clearly unfolds. These developments require a fundamental rethink of the strategies and responses by the international community, informed by an in-depth understanding of the underlying root causes of the conflicts and fragility dimensions in these countries. To better understand and define its own role and positioning in the changing world order, NIMD recently embarked on a reflection process as part of the preparations for its multi-annual plan for the period 2016-2020. This resulted in the publication of its new Multi-Annual Plan entitled (MAP): ‘Stronger Parties. Deeper Democracy’. The MAP describes the vision, objectives, challenges and priorities for the period 2016–2020 and is underpinned by an elaborated Theory of Change. Its overall vision is “to contribute to legitimate and inclusive political systems which create favourable conditions for peace and security by accommodating divergent views and interests in society and by setting differences in a non-violent way”. Since NIMD is increasingly working in political environments which are extremely polarised and divided and in countries that moved either just out of conflict, find themselves in conflict or are at risk of moving towards conflict, NIMD has furthermore prepared an approach for working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In line with NIMD’s Theory of Change, this approach focusses on three interrelated levels related to political system, political actor and political culture change. Over the past few months, NIMD has engaged in consultations with the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore the possibilities for the Ministry to continue its support the NIMD beyond the current subsidy that comes to an end in December 2015. The outcome of these deliberations has resulted in the approval of a first grant under the Strategic Partnership for lobby and advocacy and the invitation to submit a five year programme to contribute to inclusive politics in fragile settings and for NIMD institutionally, on knowledge and innovation, monitoring and evaluation and fundraising. This programme called ”Dialogue for Stability: inclusive politics in fragile settings”, particularly aims to contribute to open and accessible political systems and the legitimacy and responsiveness of political actors in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The programme therefore directly contributes to the vision and objectives laid down in NIMD’s MAP and the goals on inclusive political processes and legitimate and capable governments as defined in the policy spearhead on Security and the Rule of Law of the MFA. Furthermore, it contribute to the aim of peaceful and inclusive sustainable development and accountable and inclusive institutions as defined in the 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recently adopted. NIMD will concentrate its efforts on a selected number of countries (Burundi, South Sudan, Ukraine, Tunisia and Colombia) where it can build on its existing political and partner networks, knowledge base and infrastructure. These country programmes will be based on a country specific baseline and theory of change, informed by an in depth political economy analysis. Furthermore, explorations and a limited number of activities will be conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Kurdistan and Israel-Palestinian territories. Depending on the political environments and potential entry points in these three countries and one region, they could overtime evolve into fully fledged programmes. Next to these country programmes, the Dialogue for Stability programme will further deepen NIMD’s knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture and gender diversity and inclusiveness. A specific part of NIMD’s knowledge agenda will be devoted to strategies, skills and expertise for working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition of the fact that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, NIMD will strengthen its knowledge base on new thinking about participatory democracy and stimulate and explore (programmatic and political) innovation in its new and existing programme countries. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 20180429 DfS Annual report 2017 (narrative) - FINAL Annex A - Indicator framework for the DfS programme Annex B - DfS financial report 2017 Final Annex C - Burundi story Annex C - Tunisia story NL-KVK-27189542-DFS18 NIMD Dialogue for Stability (DfS) 2018 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 DfS Annual Report 2018 Annex A - Financial Overview DfS 2018 Annex B - DfS AR 2018 IOI measurement Annex C - DfS OI measurement Annex D - DfS Human Interest Stories NL-KVK-27189542-DFS19 NIMD Dialogue for Stability: Inclusive politics in fragile settings (2016-2020) The number of countries and regions that are affected by conflict and fragility is globally on the increase. In Central America, a number of countries are hard hit by fragility and criminality; in the Horn of Africa and parts of sub-Saharan and West Africa instability and internal conflict continue to persist and in the MENA region, a number of countries are at risk of collapsing as a result of religious and political sectarianism. Also in the Eastern European neighborhood, high levels of tension and the use of force remain very worrisome. These conflicts are not limited to national borders. Increasingly, international dimensions are at play as the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine painfully reveal. The increasing instability at the eastern and southern borders of Europe also has an immediate effect on Europe’s own security and stability levels, as the current migration flows clearly unfolds. These developments require a fundamental rethink of the strategies and responses by the international community, informed by an in-depth understanding of the underlying root causes of the conflicts and fragility dimensions in these countries. To better understand and define its own role and positioning in the changing world order, NIMD recently embarked on a reflection process as part of the preparations for its multi-annual plan for the period 2016-2020. This resulted in the publication of its new Multi-Annual Plan entitled (MAP): ‘Stronger Parties. Deeper Democracy’. The MAP describes the vision, objectives, challenges and priorities for the period 2016–2020 and is underpinned by an elaborated Theory of Change. Its overall vision is “to contribute to legitimate and inclusive political systems which create favourable conditions for peace and security by accommodating divergent views and interests in society and by setting differences in a non-violent way”. Since NIMD is increasingly working in political environments which are extremely polarised and divided and in countries that moved either just out of conflict, find themselves in conflict or are at risk of moving towards conflict, NIMD has furthermore prepared an approach for working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In line with NIMD’s Theory of Change, this approach focusses on three interrelated levels related to political system, political actor and political culture change. Over the past few months, NIMD has engaged in consultations with the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore the possibilities for the Ministry to continue its support the NIMD beyond the current subsidy that comes to an end in December 2015. The outcome of these deliberations has resulted in the approval of a first grant under the Strategic Partnership for lobby and advocacy and the invitation to submit a five year programme to contribute to inclusive politics in fragile settings and for NIMD institutionally, on knowledge and innovation, monitoring and evaluation and fundraising. This programme called ”Dialogue for Stability: inclusive politics in fragile settings”, particularly aims to contribute to open and accessible political systems and the legitimacy and responsiveness of political actors in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The programme therefore directly contributes to the vision and objectives laid down in NIMD’s MAP and the goals on inclusive political processes and legitimate and capable governments as defined in the policy spearhead on Security and the Rule of Law of the MFA. Furthermore, it contribute to the aim of peaceful and inclusive sustainable development and accountable and inclusive institutions as defined in the 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recently adopted. NIMD will concentrate its efforts on a selected number of countries (Burundi, South Sudan, Ukraine, Tunisia and Colombia) where it can build on its existing political and partner networks, knowledge base and infrastructure. These country programmes will be based on a country specific baseline and theory of change, informed by an in depth political economy analysis. Furthermore, explorations and a limited number of activities will be conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Kurdistan and Israel-Palestinian territories. Depending on the political environments and potential entry points in these three countries and one region, they could overtime evolve into fully fledged programmes. Next to these country programmes, the Dialogue for Stability programme will further deepen NIMD’s knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture and gender diversity and inclusiveness. A specific part of NIMD’s knowledge agenda will be devoted to strategies, skills and expertise for working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition of the fact that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, NIMD will strengthen its knowledge base on new thinking about participatory democracy and stimulate and explore (programmatic and political) innovation in its new and existing programme countries. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 DfS Annual Report 2019 Annex A - Financial Overview DfS 2019 Annex B - DfS AR 2019 IOI measurement Annex C - DfS Human Interest Stories NL-KVK-27189542-DFS20 NIMD Dialogue for Stability: Inclusive politics in fragile settings (2016-2020) The number of countries and regions that are affected by conflict and fragility is globally on the increase. In Central America, a number of countries are hard hit by fragility and criminality; in the Horn of Africa and parts of sub-Saharan and West Africa instability and internal conflict continue to persist and in the MENA region, a number of countries are at risk of collapsing as a result of religious and political sectarianism. Also in the Eastern European neighborhood, high levels of tension and the use of force remain very worrisome. These conflicts are not limited to national borders. Increasingly, international dimensions are at play as the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine painfully reveal. The increasing instability at the eastern and southern borders of Europe also has an immediate effect on Europe’s own security and stability levels, as the current migration flows clearly unfolds. These developments require a fundamental rethink of the strategies and responses by the international community, informed by an in-depth understanding of the underlying root causes of the conflicts and fragility dimensions in these countries. To better understand and define its own role and positioning in the changing world order, NIMD recently embarked on a reflection process as part of the preparations for its multi-annual plan for the period 2016-2020. This resulted in the publication of its new Multi-Annual Plan entitled (MAP): ‘Stronger Parties. Deeper Democracy’. The MAP describes the vision, objectives, challenges and priorities for the period 2016–2020 and is underpinned by an elaborated Theory of Change. Its overall vision is “to contribute to legitimate and inclusive political systems which create favourable conditions for peace and security by accommodating divergent views and interests in society and by setting differences in a non-violent way”. Since NIMD is increasingly working in political environments which are extremely polarised and divided and in countries that moved either just out of conflict, find themselves in conflict or are at risk of moving towards conflict, NIMD has furthermore prepared an approach for working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In line with NIMD’s Theory of Change, this approach focusses on three interrelated levels related to political system, political actor and political culture change. Over the past few months, NIMD has engaged in consultations with the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore the possibilities for the Ministry to continue its support the NIMD beyond the current subsidy that comes to an end in December 2015. The outcome of these deliberations has resulted in the approval of a first grant under the Strategic Partnership for lobby and advocacy and the invitation to submit a five year programme to contribute to inclusive politics in fragile settings and for NIMD institutionally, on knowledge and innovation, monitoring and evaluation and fundraising. This programme called ”Dialogue for Stability: inclusive politics in fragile settings”, particularly aims to contribute to open and accessible political systems and the legitimacy and responsiveness of political actors in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The programme therefore directly contributes to the vision and objectives laid down in NIMD’s MAP and the goals on inclusive political processes and legitimate and capable governments as defined in the policy spearhead on Security and the Rule of Law of the MFA. Furthermore, it contribute to the aim of peaceful and inclusive sustainable development and accountable and inclusive institutions as defined in the 16th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recently adopted. NIMD will concentrate its efforts on a selected number of countries (Burundi, South Sudan, Ukraine, Tunisia and Colombia) where it can build on its existing political and partner networks, knowledge base and infrastructure. These country programmes will be based on a country specific baseline and theory of change, informed by an in depth political economy analysis. Furthermore, explorations and a limited number of activities will be conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Kurdistan and Israel-Palestinian territories. Depending on the political environments and potential entry points in these three countries and one region, they could overtime evolve into fully fledged programmes. Next to these country programmes, the Dialogue for Stability programme will further deepen NIMD’s knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture and gender diversity and inclusiveness. A specific part of NIMD’s knowledge agenda will be devoted to strategies, skills and expertise for working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition of the fact that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, NIMD will strengthen its knowledge base on new thinking about participatory democracy and stimulate and explore (programmatic and political) innovation in its new and existing programme countries. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 DfS Annual Report 2020 Annex A - Financial Overview DfS 2020 Annex B - DfS AR 2020 IOI measurement Annex C - DfS OI measurement Annex D - DfS Human Interest Stories DfS Final Evaluation Report 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-ETH17 NIMD In 2016, under the flexible fund facility that NIMD and AWEPA created to respond swiftly to emerging political trends, openings and developments in new countries or regions, the possibilities for a possible programme in Ethiopia were explored. A first scoping mission took place in April 2016, after a number of exploratory discussions between the Dutch MFA, the Dutch Embassy in Addis Ababa and NIMD-AWEPA. The outcome of the assessment was that there is interest in and room for a joint NIMD-AWEPA programme, although it should be developed and implemented gradually, through a ‘phased approach’. The conclusions of the assessment where shared and discussed with the NL MFA in July and a summary report was presented to Ethiopian stakeholders in August 2016. The assumptions and conclusions were positively confirmed and have laid the foundations the development of a country programme in Ethiopia in 2017. Given the political context in Ethiopia, the programme will start with capacity building for political actors as a first entry point. Through this capacity building, the building of trust among the political actors can be facilitated; this trust could then lay the basis for interparty dialogue in the future. Given the country's federal arrangement, a two-tiered intervention approach is proposed- at both the Federal and Regional levels. At a regional level the strategy is to start with Oromia, being by far the largest region, and then move to engage, as necessary, other regions depending on demand. The presence of political leaders willing to explore more democratic avenues of engagement, can only help to facilitate this process. The first phase programming is foreseen for two years (2017-2018), after which an assessment will be made on the actual political space to continue with the programme. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 NL-KVK-27189542-ETH18 NIMD n/a Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-ETH19 NIMD Ethiopia Pogramme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 100000 Disbursement Ethiopia February 2019 25922 Expenditures Ethiopia Q1 2019 50000 Disbursement Ethiopia May 2019 79103 Expenditures Ethiopia Q2 2019 150000 Disbursement Ethiopia Q3 2019 35036 Expenditures Ethiopia Q3 2019 40000 Disbursement Ethiopia November 2019 55956 Expenditures Ethiopia Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-ETH20 NIMD Ethiopia Pogramme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 348100 Budget Ethiopia 2020 32970 Expenditures Ethiopia Q1 2020 50000 Disbursement Ethiopia January 2020 16019 Expenditures Ethiopia Q2 2020 100000 Disbursement Ethiopia June 2020 14484 Expenditures Ethiopia Q3 2020 100000 Disbursement Ethiopia June 2020 8592 Expenditures Ethiopia Q4 2020 50000 Disbursement Ethiopia December 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-ETHFF17 NIMD Ethiopia One Percent Fund Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 155000 Ethiopia One Percent Fund budget 2017 109.983 Disbursement Ethiopia One Percent Fund 2017 NL-KVK-27189542-ETHFF18 NIMD Ethiopia One Percent Fund NIMD 1 295000 Ethiopia One Percent Fund budget 2018 222623 Disbursement Ethiopia One Percent Fund 2018 Final Report - 1% Fund Ethiopia 1% Fund Annex A - Result Framework and Financial Report 1% Fund Annex B - Human Interest Story 2018 NL-KVK-27189542-ETHFF19 NIMD Ethiopia One Percent Fund NIMD NL-KVK-27189542-FCAS16 NIMD In order to strengthen NIMD’s work in fragile and conflict-prone settings, applied research will be initiated by the Knowledge and Innovation Unit in consultation with programme staff and partners. Generally, the aim of such research will be to better understand the root causes of destabilisation in fragile settings, as well as cross-border issues and regional dynamics, and specifically, their impact on the functioning of the political system, its actors and the democratic culture. The outcomes of these research projects will be used to inform national and regional programme strategies, and to strengthen the NIMD programme interventions at various levels. Themes that could be considered include the scarcity of, and access to, natural resources; growing inequality; the rapidly growing youth cohort and its effects on socio-economic and political stability; cross-border conflicts; and dynamics related to illicit networks, drug trafficking and terrorism. Based on NIMD’s experience in working with political actors in fragile and conflict settings over the past ten years, six focus areas have been identified that particularly affect NIMD’s work in these settings. Under the Dialogue for Stability programme, NIMD aims to deepen its expertise, skills and tools on each of these six focus areas: i. Trust building between political rivals: ii. Supporting the conversion of former armed movements into political parties: iii. Fostering inclusive political settlements iv. Working in synchronicity with international conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions v. Advancing women’s political participation vi. Understanding the impact of illicit networks on politics in fragile and conflict affected settings. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 440000 84455 Knowledge development FCAS NL-KVK-27189542-FUNPOS16 NIMD In addition to the programme objectives that form the basis of the Dialogue and Stability programme, NIMD -in consultation with the Ministry- has decided to include an operational objective focussing on diversifying the funding base towards a broader range of donors in order to ensure the financial health and stability of the organisation. NIMD´s fundraising strategy for the coming five years will revolve around two ambitions: 1) diversification of the donor portfolio and 2) securing flexible, multi-annual funding. We realise that the combination will sometimes be contradictory, but both are important for NIMD. Diversification is needed to increase NIMD’s financial resilience and flexible multi-annual funding will help us to maintain our niche position. To achieve our fundraising ambitions, NIMD will focus on positioning; securing programmatic and thematic funding through multi-lateral and bilateral donors as well as private foundations; creating leverage and professionalising NIMD’s fundraising efforts and financial contract management. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 150000 50685 Programme expenditures NL-KVK-27189542-GEO16 NIMD Georgia Programme Since 2010, all of NIMD’s instruments are used equally in the Georgia programme: facilitating dialogue, strengthening the capacity of the parties and stimulating democratic behaviour. NIMD has supported politicians from different parties to work together by helping them to set up issues oriented multiparty dialogue platforms in Parliament, such as on gender or national minorities. NIMD helps the parties to build their capacity to function effectively by helping them to develop strategic plans and giving them training. NIMD also works on democracy education with democracy schools in 4 different regions, focusing particularly on developing the abilities of political parties, people working for civil society organizations, and local governments to lobby about issues that need addressing. Programme deviations/ToC update: • It is notable that external factors, namely the political developments in the country also influenced cooperation with political parties. Firstly, the ruling coalition - Georgian Dream fall apart, secondly, United National Movement (UNM) started to boycott the parliamentary sessions after the incident in Kortskheli (May 22, 2016), when supporters of government party physically assaulted the opposition leaders and lastly, after elections UNM party split into groups. It is also worth mentioning that only three parties (GD, UNM, AoP) were able to overcome the five percent threshold, leaving both liberal parties (FDs and Republicans) out of the parliament. • Explain if the ToC is still valid, or whether there is a need to adapt the ToC and/or the strategy for capacity building based on unforeseen developments There are only three parties left in parliament, in part because of the threshold. The current ruling party has a supermayority and the ability the change the constitution by itself. The pro-western liberal parties, which always had a strong relationship both with NIMD as well as directly with Dutch political parties (VVD, D66), have failed to overcome the threshold. This does not seem to be a healthy democratic situation, as there is virtually only 1 opposition party left. Therefore, NIMD will focus more on a more pluralistic political arena and the capacity building of opposition parties in 2017. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD Eastern European Neighbourhood OSCE Netherlands Embassy in Tbilisi NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 214430 3299 Programme monitoring 45000 programme advise and support 214430 Georgia budget 2016 local partner 75000 Disbursement Georgia March 2016 local partner 48133 Disbursement Georgia May 2016 local partner 61938 Disbursement Georgia September 2016 local partner 445 Disbursement Georgia October 2016 local partner The nature of relations between political actors and civic actors remains problematic in Georgia. The civic actors are deemed to be fairly important by all political actors. At the same time, the proclivity of the incumbent to influence the agenda of the civic actors remains unchanged. The political actors that are in opposition are in general supportive of the civil society representatives. Still it seems that these attitudes may change if the political actor now in opposition takes power. At the very least, that is demonstrated by the contrasting attitudes that the former incumbent demonstrated towards the civic actors while in government and now in opposition. Some political actors, however, do view most important civic actors with suspicion and distrust. Still the civic actors are considered very important by all political forces. Qualitative description: in the first half of 2016 8 political parties participated in at least 3 events that involved engagement with the civic actors. The records of these meetings were provided by NIMD office in Tbilisi. In the first half of the 2016, 3 new mechanisms of engagement between political and civic actors were implemented with the support of NIMD. The first mechanism engaged 8 political parties to formulate ethnic minority inclusion action plans. The second mechanism instituted an internship program for ethnic minority representatives within 5 political parties. The third mechanism instituted a dialogue between political parties and local civic actors using NIMD Schools of Democracy as a platform. In the framework of these initiatives a total of 27 events were organized by NIMD where 8 political parties met with various civic actors and discussed wide variety of key issues. The thematic content of the discussions ranged from ethnic minority inclusion to economic growth, unemployment, democratic development, poverty reduction, healthcare, and environmental issues among others. In 2016, 8 major political parties including the ruling party have agreed to foster ethnic minority participation in political life by creating action plans with the support of NIMD (1 for each party). Given the upcoming Parliamentary Elections on the 8th of October 2016, political actors have put some effort into addressing the concerns of the citizens. At the same time, their responses have largely remained too general and their political campaign was still focused on personalities rather than political programs; most of them have not yet presented electoral platforms, and so far, quite a few of them concentrated on issues that are at the very bottom of the public agenda. At the same time, it seems that the citizens have been paying closer attention to political manifestos than during the previous electoral campaigns. Still, according to the recent polls, the citizens remain very skeptical about political actors in general. In August 2016, more than half of the 10 political parties that had won seats in previous local and/or parliamentary elections did not yet present electoral programs with elections less than two months away. However, they did produce a total of 30 political documents and video missives. From the total of these 30 available documents, 15 demonstrated inclusiveness regarding the youth issues and gender equality. Practically none of them addressed meaningfully ethnic minority issues. This score is an average of the scores on the 5 capabilities that are listed in the table below. In July and August 2016, an organizational scan based on the 5C model was conducted to assess NIMD EEN’s capacity. In an anonymous survey with 11 staff members, the implementing partner scored an average of 4,5 out of 5. With all capabilities being well above average, NIMD EEN is a capable partner to implement the programme effectively. Quantitative data: 41,4 % To determine the level of trust in the political process we have chosen to examine public trust in Government, Political Parties, and Media as expressed by approval ratings in %. Additionally, we considered citizen trust in democratic development and in democracy as a form of government expressed in % of population positively assessing each indicator. In order to measure change, we have chosen to take the average (percentage) of the 5 indicators listed below. In 2016, the average score is 41,4%. Government – 32% Political Parties – 16% Media – 76% Democratic Development – 36% Democracy – 47% Qualitative description: We have used the results of the surveys and polls conducted by the well-established national and international organizations as well as the data provided by the Central Electoral Commission of Georgia. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) were chosen because of their long established credentials in the area and the high probability that they will be conducting the same or similar surveys in the coming years that will make the future assessment of developments possible. We arrived at Trust in Government score by averaging the combined score of public trust in executive, legislative, judicial and local branches of government. The scores for Media and political parties were readily available. As for the score for Democratic Development we averaged the citizen perception of improvement regarding the freedom of speech, human rights, rule of law, democratic governance and willingness to vote in the next election. The democracy score was based upon the public attitude towards democracy as the best form of government that was readily available from the survey we used. 13 male and 21 female NL-KVK-27189542-GEO17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Political polarization, informal governance and the parliamentary elections of October 8th, defined Georgia’s political landscape in 2016. The polarization between the two main parties, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) and the United National Movement (UNM) of former president Mr. Saakashvili did not recede. While GD’s overall approval rankings shrank in 2016 and the coalition itself fell apart (after the Free Democrats Party and later, the Republicans left), the UNM had difficulties to re-shape itself and expand its electoral base. This polarization contributed to the deterioration of citizens’ trust in the parliament and in political parties. The two individuals heading the parties continued to exert power from beyond the formal framework of politics and governance. While Michael Saakashvili, currently the Governor of Odessa in Ukraine, continued to address and mobilize (via video messages and online) support to UNM, the former Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, remained a defining political force for GD and its governance while officially distancing himself from any political role and therefore denying responsibility. This is a fundamental problem, as governance without accountability undermines the credibility of political institutions and risks portraying democracy as a cover-up for behind the scenes influence by interest groups and individuals. The elections of October 08, 2016 were generally appraised by international observers as free and fair, solidifying Georgia’s position of as a regional leader in democratic reforms. However, there are challenges that merit closer attention: The inability of pro-democracy political parties (The Republicans and the Free Democrats) to clear the 5% electoral threshold has weakened democratic forces in the country. The rise of the nationalistic “Alliance of Georgian Patriots,” which was able to gain enough votes to clear the electoral threshold is a clear sign of disillusionment of the Georgian voters with standing politics and shows that anti-democratic propaganda has taken root in Georgia. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update With GD currently primed to obtain super majority in the Parliament, it will be highly important that it does not turn its constitutional majority into a political weapon against the UNM and in favour of its own partisan interests; political pluralism must survive and thrive; efforts will need to be made to strengthen democratic political groups both within GD and UNM as well as in other groups and political parties. Therefore, the NIMD will continue its efforts to address the capacity of political actors, further improve the political and electoral playing field and enhance democratic political culture. This will be done through bilateral support programs to political parties, multilateral dialogue efforts to advance the participation of women, youth and national minorities and the operation of Democracy Schools. In 2017, as well as onwards, NIMD’s theory of change of simultaneously addressing the interrelated issues related to political actors, culture and system will attain heightened importance amidst rising anti-democratic sentiments, decreasing trust in political parties and further deepening polarization between the GD and the UNM, with a yet unclear role for the populist and anti-western Alliance of Georgian Patriots to play in that setting. . Political update 2017 Political polarization, informal governance and the parliamentary elections of October 8th, defined Georgia’s political landscape in 2016. The polarization between the two main parties, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) and the United National Movement (UNM) of former president Mr. Saakashvili did not recede. While GD’s overall approval rankings shrank in 2016 and the coalition itself fell apart (after the Free Democrats Party and later, the Republicans left), the UNM had difficulties to re-shape itself and expand its electoral base. This polarization contributed to the deterioration of citizens’ trust in the parliament and in political parties. The two individuals heading the parties continued to exert power from beyond the formal framework of politics and governance. While Michael Saakashvili, currently the Governor of Odessa in Ukraine, continued to address and mobilize (via video messages and online) support to UNM, the former Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, remained a defining political force for GD and its governance while officially distancing himself from any political role and therefore denying responsibility. This is a fundamental problem, as governance without accountability undermines the credibility of political institutions and risks portraying democracy as a cover-up for behind the scenes influence by interest groups and individuals. The elections of October 08, 2016 were generally appraised by international observers as free and fair, solidifying Georgia’s position of as a regional leader in democratic reforms. However, there are challenges that merit closer attention: The inability of pro-democracy political parties (The Republicans and the Free Democrats) to clear the 5% electoral threshold has weakened democratic forces in the country. The rise of the nationalistic “Alliance of Georgian Patriots,” which was able to gain enough votes to clear the electoral threshold is a clear sign of disillusionment of the Georgian voters with standing politics and shows that anti-democratic propaganda has taken root in Georgia. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update With GD currently primed to obtain super majority in the Parliament, it will be highly important that it does not turn its constitutional majority into a political weapon against the UNM and in favour of its own partisan interests; political pluralism must survive and thrive; efforts will need to be made to strengthen democratic political groups both within GD and UNM as well as in other groups and political parties. Therefore, the NIMD will continue its efforts to address the capacity of political actors, further improve the political and electoral playing field and enhance democratic political culture. This will be done through bilateral support programs to political parties, multilateral dialogue efforts to advance the participation of women, youth and national minorities and the operation of Democracy Schools. In 2017, as well as onwards, NIMD’s theory of change of simultaneously addressing the interrelated issues related to political actors, culture and system will attain heightened importance amidst rising anti-democratic sentiments, decreasing trust in political parties and further deepening polarization between the GD and the UNM, with a yet unclear role for the populist and anti-western Alliance of Georgian Patriots to play in that setting. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 53000 Disbursement Georgia February 2017 local partner 105000 Disbursement Georgia March 2017 local partner 180086 Georgia budget 2017 local partner 22086 Disbursement Georgia August 2017 local partner 15000 Disbursement Georgia December 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-GEO18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018 Political polarization, informal governance and the parliamentary elections of October 8th, continued to define Georgia’s political landscape in 2017. The polarization between the GD and the UNM did not recede. While GD’s overall approval rankings shrank in 2016 and the coalition itself fell apart (after the Free Democrats Party and later, the Republicans left), the UNM found it difficult to re-shape itself and expand its electoral base eventually resulting in the big part of its leadership forming the new “European Georgia Party”. The two individuals continued to exert power from beyond the formal framework of politics and governance. While Michael Saakashvili, former Georgian President and Governor of Odessa region of Ukraine, continued to address and mobilize (via video messages and online) support to UNM, the former Prime Minster, Bidzina Ivanishvili remained a defining political force for GD and therefore its government while officially distancing himself from any political role and responsibility. This is a fundamental problem, as governance without responsibility undermines the credibility of political institutions and risks portraying democracy as a cover-up for behind the scenes influence by interest groups and individuals. As a result, the entire democratic fabric of the country comes under threat. The elections on October 08, 2016 where generally appraised by the international observers as free and fair, solidifying Georgia’s position of as a regional leader in democratic reforms. However, there are challenges that merit a closer attention: The inability of pro-democracy political parties (The Republicans and the Free Democrats) to clear the 5% electoral threshold weakened the democratic forces in the country. The rise of the ultra-nationalistic “Alliance of Georgian Patriots”, which was able to gain enough votes to clear the electoral threshold, is a clear sign of disillusionment by the Georgian voters with politics as usual and the increasing hold that the anti-democratic propaganda had taken root in Georgia. The polarization has deepened after the ruling Georgian Dream Party unilaterally voted for the new constitution (objected by the full spectre of the opposition parties, the President of Georgia and many NGOs) and adopted new local government legislation. This deepening polarization will become dangerous as the country undergoes the Presidential elections in 2018 and approaches a more significant general election in 2020. The local elections of 21 October 2017 will test both political parties and the political system itself. Increased efforts will need to be made to strengthen democratic political groups both within GD, major opposition parties as well as new and promising democracy groups and political parties. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update The Georgian political system suffers from chronic instability resulting from frequent major legislative reforms carried out by practically every government. The recent cases in view are the recently completed constitutional reform (The Georgian President Margvelashvili reluctantly signed it on October 19th) and the local government reform. Both were met with widespread criticism from the opposition and CSOs. These major shifts, affecting electoral systems, districts and the powers and the constitution of local governments, to name the few examples, create an instable situation. Political parties are being forced by the decisions of dominant parties to constantly operate in a state of flux that inhibits their ability to strategically plan the development of their organizational, policy and human capacities that would bring about more programmatic political parties and more sustainable democratic progress. The political actors remain overly dependent on personalities and their financial wealth. Perhaps due to the different reasons than in the past years but currently, Georgia is yet again confronted with a dominant party situation. The ruling Georgian Dream Party commands a supermajority in the Parliament and only faces largely fragmented, disorganized and disoriented opposition parties. In contrast to other cases, the particular danger in this situation lies in the informal power that the former Prime Minister Ivanishvili holds over the party he founded and over the Georgian Government. The asymmetry between the ruling and the opposition parties is amplified by the almost endless financial capacity of GD (via Ivanishvili) to outmatch the entire opposition altogether. This unmatched financial backbone of the GD and the inability of the Georgian opposition parties to articulate a new and appealing vision for their constituencies creates serious risks as to how and under what circumstances power can be shared, let alone alternated between competing powers peacefully and constitutionally. While on the surface the Georgian democratic progress may seem impressive, it has a deep and dangerous undercurrent running beneath it. This brings forward the need to support the democratic political parties and to try and work for the enhancement of the internal party democracy within the GD (and other parties) while also engaging with relatively small and weak but newly forming political movements that align with democratic ideals and show hope of future success. At the same time, Georgian society is being subjected to consistent anti-democratic and anti-European propaganda. The rise of ethno- nationalistic political parties and the inflammatory rhetoric they employ fuels the already deep divisions within the country. In this light the importance of sustaining and strengthening public trust in democracy, supporting democrats, democratic movements and citizen networks can not be underestimated. In what many call the “post-truth” fake news era, young and fragile democracies are particularly vulnerable to the malignant influence of carefully crafted anti-democratic messaging that utilizes the power of social media to micro target uninformed and unsuspecting audiences. Therefore, NIMD’s interventions that aim to facilitate constructive dialogue between parties, create a more transparent and representative political system as well as foster democratic culture and civic action are now increasingly necessary. 3. Programme outlook Political system In 2018, NIMD will support the discussion about political parties, their internal organization and their policy capacities. Facing a situation where anti-democratic political parties are gaining strength at the expense of liberal political movements, NIMD will initiate a strategic dialogue on general approaches in political party aid in Georgia but also in the wider region. Political actor NIMD will build on its achievements with implementing a strategic planning methodology that informs its decisions on what assistance and tools are needed to support political actors. It will continue to provide direct political party building assistance to parliamentary and non-parliamentary political parties with a special focus on strengthening democratic opposition. In view of the upcoming elections in 2018, efforts will be directed at capacity building on policy development and intra-party democracy: a. Membership data management and software development: To support political actors in better managing their organizations, EECMD developed membership data management software for political parties in 2017. In 2018 EECMD will further upgrade this tool with the integration of deliberation and decision-making software applications. b. Piloting digital strategic planning tool: In 2017, EECMD started to develop the digital tool for strategic planning, based on Strategic Planning Methodology for Political Parties developed in 2011. It will carry out a pilot program for the use of this digital tool with selected Georgian political parties in 2018. c. Bilateral support: EECMD will continue the bilateral technical assistance to political parties focusing on intra-party democracy, policy development and management improvement. Political culture In Georgia, both the political actors and the political system reflect larger trends, beliefs and norms of its society. Hence, addressing the issue of values, norms and behavior is important. EECMD Democracy Schools target this very important area of democratic transformation. a. Democracy Schools: The Democracy Schools ran by EECMD will continue to convene key-actors such as grass-root organizations, political parties and local authorities, including city councils, and provide them with tools and resources to actively engage in an open discourse and to advocate for knowledge-based ideas or policy proposals. It is intended that the two democracy schools currently funded by NIMD will be maintained but with altered focus due to fund limitations. EECMD will reorient the Democracy Schools in Telavi and Kutaisi from training centers to alumni networking centers aiming at facilitating relations and joint development of actions plans to support democratic development. Shall extra funding become available, EECMD will swiftly continue the training part. Additionally, the possibility of establishing a new democracy School in Tbilisi as well as in the Western Georgian town of Zugdidi (Bordering the de-facto border with breakaway Abkhazia) or in the areas with national minority population will be explored. b. Democracy boot camp learning material. In the past years, a significant amount of learning resources have been accumulated by EECMD through its Democracy Bootcamps which are organized annually as major educational and networking events for the alumni of Democracy Schools. These include a wealth of learning plans, lectures and reading material. See the dedicated website: www.democracybootcamp.ge (lectures in Georgian). In 2018, EECMD will go back to these past events and compile professional learning material from it (some of which actually have already resulted in the past in very popular publications, such as the one on Georgia-EU relations after the Association Agreement was signed). c. How to confront authoritarians - publication. In the context of democratic shortcomings in Georgia as well as the backsliding of democracy internationally, it is important that the belief that indeed democracy is the best way to govern is strengthened. A publication “How to confront authoritarian narratives: a practical guide for democracy leaders” will be developed feature a collection of responses to common totalitarian myths and the arguments for Why Democracy. Written by international and local experts, the collection of essays on different issues providing solid and rational justifications FOR democracy will be developed both as a hard copy publication but also as an interactive digital portal. d. Mediation training: A professional 6-day mediation training course for selected alumni of Democracy Schools will be organized to equip them with skills and knowledge on how to work on consensus and resolve political or other disputes peacefully. Gender & Diversity a. Gender ranking and publication: EECMD has carried out three consecutive studies on political parties to measure the intra-party, policy and electoral dimensions of gender equality across the political parties of Georgia. In 2018, upgrading Gender Ranking methodology into a more sophisticated and inclusive methodology is planned, which will also allow for its international application and easy adaptation. A subsequent book based on gender ranking results and personal stories of female politicians in Georgia will be published. b. Female political fundraising module: EECMD will create a training module and a toolkit on fundraising strategies for women politicians. It could be relevant not only in Georgia, but also other countries. c. Dialogue meetings: EECMD will continue to support the discussion on improving women’s participation in politics. This will be done through dialogue facilitation efforts to explore multiparty action on political or public policy levels. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 140000 Georgia budget 2018 local partner 14000 Disbursement Georgia January 2018 local partner 46150 Disbursement Georgia February 2018 local partner 33455 Disbursement Georgia April 2018 local partner 39275 Disbursement Georgia July 2018 local partner 10000 Disbursement Georgia December 2018 local partner End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-GHA16 NIMD GHANA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Ghana is generally seen as a development aid success story. In 2000 the first democratic transition of power took place after successful elections and in 2012 power changed hands again. In 2000 the NDC – the party of former dictator Jerry Rawlings – peacefully handed over power to another established party: the NPP. The NPP subsequently won but in 2012 lost again to the NDC. There are four parties in parliament. The NDC and the NPP are the largest. The parties, in comparison to other African countries, are quite established and ideological. Despite major improvements in education, food security and the economy, Ghana is currently facing serious economic challenges due to overpromising and underwhelming oil revenue and subsequent overspending as well as an energy crisis. At the same time, it is facing governance challenges related to the new activity of large scale commercial production of oil. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN GHANA NIMD’s programme in Ghana started in 2002 and the main focus has been on facilitating interparty dialogue. Political parties were extremely acrimonious towards each other. The attitude was: the winner takes all, if you lose power you lose everything. This blocked any serious political progress. Under the programme’s guidance political leaders met and debated publicly for the first time. This led to an interparty dialogue platform that includes the party leadership of all parliamentary parties. The platform is facilitated by NIMD and local implementing partner organization, the Institute of Economic Affairs. Currently, the platform mainly focuses on three areas: constitutional reform, electoral reform, and addressing excessive executive powers. The platform aims to move Ghana away from what they call ‘Winner takes all politics’ where whoever wins the election has all the power without enough checks and balances. Under the platform’s guidance a transition of power act was drafted and passed into law. This makes for a much better democratic transition. NIMD also supports the parliamentary parties to develop their policies. In Ghana we do this partly by funding a policy analyst post for each of the four parliamentary parties. Programme deviations/ToC update: Political developments took place as expected, as elections were held and the political opposition won the presidency. The new majority party (NPP) has traditionally been more open to interparty engagement, and the new dynamic suggests the new opposition (NDC) is more likely to be interested in working together. At the same time the two smaller parties in parliament have lost their seats, now all 275 seats are divided by the two largest parties. This may influence how the dialogue platform is constituted as previously it was for parliamentary parties of which there have nearly always been four. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 137460 7422 Programme monitoring 137.46 Budget local partner 30000 programme advise and support 68730 Disbursement Ghana June 2016 local partner Level = 1 Quantitative data # of youth leaders who have contributed to policy process The questionnaires provided the following quantitative data. 52% of the youth interviewed had contributed to a policy process before. Capacity in which youth leaders contributed to policy process 82% of those who had contributed to a policy process indicated that they had done so as part of a youth network or organization. 48% of this # said they had been invited to take part in the policy process by policy makers. Reflection of youth input in final policy For those who had contributed to a policy process, 8% thought their contributions to the policy process was well received. The remaining either had no idea whether their contributions had been received well, or thought the response had been discouraging. 18% of the # who had contributed to a policy process believed that their contribution had reflected in the final policy position. 82% thought it did not. 32% of the # that had contributed to a policy process before thought their contributions to the policy process had been effective. The remaining # thought their contribution had not been effective. Qualitative description The focus group discussion with youth leaders deepened the quantitative information gathered. The focus group discussion seemed to provide a higher degree of candidness than participants’ responses to the questionnaires provided. The following information emerged from the discussion: Characteristics of Youth Contribution to Policy Processes 1. High contribution of individual youth to policy processes In the estimation of youth leaders, individual youth had contributed to national development and policy making at the highest levels over the past three decades. Ghana’s military uprising in 1979 and eventual return to democratic governance was led by persons within the category of youth. The country’s second republic has seen several Ministers and Deputy Ministers of State within the youth bracket. There are many youth in the district assemblies. Parliament is seeing increasingly youthful membership. In the opinion of participants, “it is the youth who have taken us to the place and the state in which we are today”. The contribution of the youth in Ghana’s national development and in policy processes however remained at an individual level. As individuals, members of the youth were participating at the highest levels of national governance and policy development. However, they were perceived by the wider body of Ghanaian youth as playing those roles in their personal capacities, and not as representatives of a youth constituency to which they hold themselves accountable. The youth therefore perceive them as distanced from their reality. “The youth in government are too high and mighty…”.The youth in positions of government are further viewed by the youth as subservient to the policy positions and interests of the establishment. The contribution of the youth to national development and policy making is therefore characterized by individuals, who through personal effort and resources, have risen to positions in government. They are not viewed by the youth as representatives of the youth or accountable to them. 2. Insignificant contribution of formally educated youth to policy processes The contribution of formally educated youth (youth with secondary and tertiary education) in policy processes is considered largely insignificant. Youth of this category are active on social media, where vibrant discussions on policy issues are carried out. In the opinion of participants, their discussions have almost no effect on policy. They have minimal direct engagement with policy makers at national, district and local levels. Occasionally, some Ministers of State will respond to their discussions on social media, with posts and tweets buy direct engagement of this nature seems not to translate into policy action. Their need is for support to turn their contributions into collective influence with policy makers. 3. Ad hoc contribution of youth in local communities to policy processes Contribution of youth based in local communities to policy processes appears to be characterized by ad hoc spurts of vibrant mobilization and presentation of demands, which are taken seriously by their Assembly men/women and Members of Parliament, particularly as election periods draw close. Their contribution however remains at a very basic level of demands for physical infrastructure and facilities, and not analysis and input on policies that could address the fundamental challenges underlying their basic needs. The influence of the youth at this level derives from their voting power during election years. Assembly men and women, and Members of Parliament tend to take their demands seriously in order to secure their votes. There is a need is to educate them on the policy constraints underlying their needs and support them to demand policy changes/implementation to address those needs. 4. Constrained contribution of youth to political party policy-making processes Political parties indicate that they have mechanisms for youth input into party policy making processes. One party provides for the youth to make written statements where they wish to input into policy processes. Another party has provided its youth wing with the space to hold a Youth Congresses. The contribution of youth wings and their membership, to political party policy making processes, is however perceived by the youth as constrained and restrained. Youth wings perceive themselves as being restrained and held in check by political party leadership. They do not consider themselves free to express and act upon their opinions. A recent episode where the youth leader of a political party was reprimanded and disciplined for an enquiry he initiated into a party policy issue was cited as a reflection of the wider approach of political parties towards youth contribution to policy making processes. # of Public Collective Statements by the Youth Key policy issues that directly affect their present and future wellbeing have been discussed without their collective input or reaction; as for example the protracted policy discussion on the # of years that high school should entail. “We have not been able to influence any policy in Ghana to reflect youth interest”. Effectiveness of Youth Contributions to Policy Processes Based upon the above characteristics of the youth’s participation in policy processes, the youth consider their contributions to policy processes in Ghana as ineffective. They identify the following causes for their ineffectiveness. Causes of Ineffective Youth Contributions to Policy Processes The youth identify the following root causes of their ineffective contributions to policy processes. These are listed in order of importance surfacing from the focus group discussion. i. Underlying fear of the youth: The youth hold the opinion that members of government and political party leadership alike have an underlying fear of the youth, based on a perception of them as radical and lacking in restraint. Government and political party leadership have a fear of recognizing the youth as equal partners in policy making. In their opinion, this has resulted in government and political party leadership employing subtle mechanisms to constrain the youth from reaching beyond certain limits in mobilizing and presenting a youth position. They perceive an underlying fear that youth wings could break away from their mother party if allowed the space for policy discourse and influence. The youth therefore consider themselves to be held in check and stifled from expressing and pushing their opinions forward. They are however of the opinion that radical behaviors are in themselves a symptom of suppression and marginalization. It is important, in their view, that the youth are recognized as a marginalized group. The way to dissipate radical, unrestrained behaviors on their part is to offer avenues for their opinions to be expressed and addressed. ii. Antagonism between the Youth and Political leadership: The result of the above phenomenon is an underlying sense of antagonism between the youth and the leadership in government and political parties. This also affects the ability for constructive policy dialogue to transpire between them. It is inferred from the above that political party leadership may not, at present, experience the input of the youth as constructive, underlain as it is by antagonism on the part of the youth and fear and suspicion on their part as leaders. iii. Political polarization and divisions in the youth front: A factor of equal importance as the one above is the absence of a united youth front. The youth consider their front to be divided along political party lines and loyalties. They are therefore unable to present a united front. The youth have been affected by what they perceive as a developing political culture where self-interest, rather than national interest, drives the motivation of political actors. The youth are therefore unable to form a united front at community levels, within tertiary youth organizations/networks and as youth wings of political parties. iv. Apathy in the youth: The majority of the youth are in school and unaware or disinterested in policy issues affecting them. Their focus is narrowly focused on their grades. The social and educational culture within which they are located also does not encourage the challenging of authority or interjections into “adult conversations”. v. Absence of spaces for youth participation in policy dialogue: The youth hold the opinion that the space for their participation in policy dialogue does not exist. While platforms exist in principle, in practice, they are inaccessible to the majority of the youth. vi. Low capacity for policy analysis: Low capacity for policy analysis also affects their effectiveness in policy processes, confining their input to very basic levels of infrastructure provision. Quantitative data 41% Qualitative description The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is considerable trust in political parties in Ghana. This trust is somewhat higher in opposition parties (45%) than in the governing party (36%). Quantitative data Results Max C1 Commit and Act 4,1 5 C2 Deliver Results 4,3 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 4,3 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4,6 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 4,5 5 Results Max C1 Strategic planning 3,5 5 Leadership 4,4 5 Healthy financial position 4,3 5 C2 Human resources 4,0 5 Infrastructure 4,1 5 Efficiency 4,4 5 Effectiveness 4,2 5 Relevance 4,8 5 C3 Understanding Contexts 4,1 5 Flexibility 4,3 5 Adequate PM&E 4,4 5 Encourage learning 4,1 5 Up-to-date communication 4,7 5 C4 Alliances 4,6 5 Legitimacy 4,9 5 Integrity 4,8 5 Accountability 4,2 5 C5 Strategically coherent 4,3 5 Consistency 4,7 5 Balanced Stability 4,9 5 Inclusiveness 4,0 5 Qualitative description The BART scan indicates that the implementing partner in Ghana has the following strengths: Balanced stability: The organisation has a well-established network among political leaders. They have the convening power to organise regular inter-party dialogue meetings that are attended by party chairmen and sec gens. Overall the organisation manages to find common ground between the parties, by successfully navigating the interests of both ruling and opposition political parties. Integrity: Board, leadership and staff of the organisation are accepted by all relevant stakeholders and are generally considered sufficiently impartial. Leadership and staff of the organisation are also considered to be sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled by all relevant stakeholders. The organisation promotes high standards of integrity for political parties. Legitimacy: The organisation is capable of attracting the appropriate level of party representatives to ensure meaningful participation in its inter-party dialogue programme. The organisation is recognised as a knowledgeable partner for building bridges between political parties and other relevant stakeholders like government agencies, democratic institutions and civil society. The organisation is registered under the proper government regulation, applies its statutes and obeys national legislation. Relevance: The organisation is recognised by key democratic institutions and civil society actors as capable to contribute to strengthening democratic culture and systems through its work. The results delivered by the organisation meet the needs of the political parties and other external target groups that are collected through regular needs assessments. It is difficult to identify weaknesses in such a high scoring scan, if anything the following two elements could be indicated: Encourage learning: Overall staff consider the allocation of time for careful review and learning on the basis of PME or exchanges with peer organisations on common challenges and lessons learned no more than adequate. Strategic planning: Key democratic institutions and civic organisations are aware of the strategic plan of the organisation. Even when removing the outliers this element scores on the level of ‘developing implementation’ this suggest room for improvement. Further, according to the staff the political parties as represented on the board are not well aware of the strategic plan and do not monitor its implementation as well as they could. Accountability: This sections seems to be among the lower scoring, however after further review there is a zero score placed as one staff member had no opinion on this issue, causing the overall score to drop. If this zero score is removed accountability is placed among the higher scores. % of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with civic actors at least 1 time per month Quantitative data 8% of respondents indicated that there was interaction between political actors and youth leaders at least once a month. 60% of respondents indicated that there was interaction but on an ad hoc and infrequent basis. Qualitative description Frequency of Interaction with Policy makers There seems to be minimal to non-existent formal interaction between policy makers and civil society currently. Engagements of policy makers with the public are broad and not youth-centered. Policy makers therefore do not necessarily hear youth voices through these interactions. Although the youth are free to approach parliament with their input, they do not consider parliament accessible to them. Informal interaction between some Ministers of State and youth representatives transpires on social media. Much more regular interaction occurs at the community level between assembly men/women and youth. Youth in local communities participate actively in radio phone-in programs, where local authorities are called in to answer questions of importance to local people. The local authorities directly engage with the youth on these platforms. Youth in the northern parts of the country have a practice of gathering together in the evenings in what they refer to as the “ghetoses” and “base” to fraternize with each other. In these spaces, they regularly discuss community development issues, which will sometimes result in them calling on duty bearers and politicians to act on their concerns. These platforms have proven very effective in getting local authorities to act regarding the provision of services. These interactions are however ad hoc and unstructured. Action by political actors in response to youth demands is dependent on the influence of the said duty bearer or politician at the national level. Quantitative data (0) No collective policy statements have been made together by political and civil society leaders (political leadership and youth leaders) Qualitative description As indicated earlier, the youth consider their front to be divided along political party lines and loyalties. They are therefore unable to present a united front. The youth have been affected by what they perceive as a developing political culture where self-interest, rather than national interest, drives the motivation of political actors. The youth are therefore unable to form a united front at community levels, within tertiary youth organizations/networks and as youth wings of political parties. 64% of the respondents said they had made some form of public statement representing the position of the youth, as against 36% who have not done so. The table below represents # of public statements they had made that represented the position of the youth. 36% said they had made up to 5 such public statements, 8% said they had made 6 to 10 public statements and 20% said they had made over 10 statements. Six respondents (24%) said they had made these statements as leaders/members of a youth organization; 2 respondents (8%) said they had made those statements as leaders of a youth network; 14 respondents (56%) did not respond to the question; and 3 respondents (12%) responded as other. In the focus group discussion, the youth indicated that they have not made any public policy statements that represent the collective position of identifiable sections of the youth as far as they can recall nor have they made any public statements together with other political actors. Public statements made by the youth have been limited to threats by irate youth at the community level, regarding issues such as political appointments and infrastructure in their communities. NL-KVK-27189542-GHA17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Ghana has been considered the beacon of democracy in West Africa in recent years as it has experienced a number of years of political stability and economic growth. Yet over time cleavages in the socio political environment have arisen especially relating to political inclusiveness and responsiveness. Especially the youth feel disenfranchised in politics, while women are severely unrepresented. In 2016 political developments have centred on the parliamentary and presidential elections planned for December 2016. There are over 20 presidential candidates supported by a range of new parties. The incumbent and his party (NDC) is deeply unpopular. In late 2015 a number of corruption scandals, including one leading to the suspension of seven high court judges, and lavish government spending led to a number of large public protests in the capital early in the year. The perception among the population that the government mismanaged the recent sharp economic downturn and power crisis which led to steep increases in the price of energy and water, fuelled by the reality of a large budge assistance programme introduced by the IMF last April, has only made the ruling party even more unpopular. The main opposition candidate however comes from the second largest party (NPP) that has faced a number of internal party struggles recently regarding its presidential candidate. The party is also struggling with financing its activities. Despite these problems the NPP is expected to win the presidential election overwhelmingly. There also continues to be a lot of distrust in the Electoral commission and their ability to manage the elections is being questioned. To support the management of the elections an elections taskforce has been established, that includes the national police force, who are specifically working on preventing electoral violence, all the political parties also signed a communique urging people to not resort to violence. However trust in politics is at an all-time low and political actors will need to work hard to create a more inclusive environment that addresses the corruption and transparency issues they face. The new government will inherit a massive debt problem and an as yet unresolved power crisis. Meanwhile education and unemployment remain high on the political agenda. Political stakeholders will also need to review the way in which elections are managed to ensure more trust in the Electoral commission in the future. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The theory of change for the Ghana programme focuses on improving the political system, actors and culture through the inclusion of youth and women’s voices in policy making. This is still a very persistent issue in Ghanaian politics as the run up to the presidential elections show primarily an old guard political elite contesting for power. The programme this year has focussed on preparing youth leaders to engage in the elections in a productive manner and from next year once the elections have taken place the programme aims to develop a shadow dialogue platform that enables youth leaders to interact with each other and the political leadership to ensure inclusive policy making on topics that affect them. For this reason the changing political context supports the theory of change and the programme objectives even more deeply. Besides implementing programme activities in 2017 NIMD, together with our local partner, will also develop a plan to ensure the programme’s sustainability beyond 2018 (at which point MFA funding will cease). By early 2017 NIMD will have developed its vision for the future of the programme on the basis of possible scenarios and opportunities currently available. In the first quarter of 2017 NIMD together with its local partner will decide how this goal can best be achieved, including what resources and funding will be necessary. For the remainder of the year the plan will be implemented so that by 2018 a sustainable programme is in place. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 137460 Ghana budget 2017 local partner 6848 Disbursement Ghana May 2017 local partner 68730 Disbursement 2 Ghana May 2017 local partner 68730 Disbursement Ghana November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-GHA18 NIMD 2018 is the final year of NIMD funding support to the Ghanaian Political Parties Programme (GPPP). The focus of the programme remains very much on system in this final year. The GPPP continues to offer a political dialogue platform at party leadership level. The dialogue agenda will be oriented towards creating momentum and preparing the ground for a constitutional review. This review should allow GPPP’s policy development work on Ghana’s Winner-Takes-All politics to bear fruit and result in system reform. IEA pursues the lobby it intends to start late 2017, for the constitutional review process to gain momentum, and to convince the Government to follow a route allowing for political dialogue and exchange. In 2016 and 2017, GPPP brought youth leaders into the policy-making process and offers them opportunity to exchange with political party leadership. These youth leaders will be taken along in GPPP’s 2018 constitutional review efforts. Beyond this, IEA hopes that progress made and the demands of the constitutional review process help convince donors to support IEA’s dialogue efforts beyond 2018. The year 2018 will also be used to explore opportunity for peer-support, using the Ghanaian political dialogue model and experience in (and possibly beyond) the region. IEA may seek NIMD’s support in assessing opportunities. It intends to make a start in Anglophone countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia), before moving into Francophone territory. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 NL-KVK-27189542-GUA16 NIMD GUATEMALA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Guatemala is part of an area of Central America that is characterized by inequality. Even though it is a low middle income country, there are still a lot of people who live in poverty. This, together with very high crime rates and high levels of impunity is causing a lot of (young) people to emigrate. A large part of the population is indigenous and these people are particularly affected by a lack of employment opportunities and access to social services such as healthcare and education. These are issues that need to be addressed by politicians. However, political parties in Guatemala tend to be based on the personalities of their leaders rather than on a programme of policies. There is a high level of corruption and a lack of transparency. Politicians frequently move from one party to another and many political parties have short life spans. Guatemala is also affected by the increasing cost of electoral campaigns, which makes it difficult for people without access to large amounts of money to participate in national politics. At the same time there is a growing popular demand for change and a growing consensus to fight against corruption and change the political system. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN GUATEMALA Facilitating multiparty dialogue NIMD’s work in Guatemala started in 2002. NIMD’s first major project was facilitating multiparty dialogue, together with UNDP, between all the political parties over an 18-month period which resulted in the signing of a development plan for the country called the ‘shared national agenda.’ This was a plan for recovery following the armed conflict, which had continued in Guatemala for 36 years. Since that first project, NIMD has continued to facilitate interparty dialogue around themes of shared concern including political party reform, security, environmental governance and the inclusion in politics of underrepresented groups (such as women, young people and indigenous people.) In addition, NIMD has been working with Congress on facilitating interparty dialogue, especially on political party and electoral law, the rules and regulations of Congress and civil servant law. As a result of this work several changes have been made and other changes are pending. NIMD has also provided advice and training to Congress, including a training programme for Members of Parliament and their assistants, with the aim of increasing the quality of legislation drafting. Furthermore, NIMD works with several thematic commissions of Congress, making sure that demands and concerns of civil society organizations are known by the commissions and included in their legislative proposals. As well as working with Congress and political parties at a national level, NIMD has also been running democracy schools for young people, with special attention for the inclusion of women and indigenous people, in order to give more people the knowledge and skills to play a role in political decision-making. Political system reform In 2015, Guatemala faced a major political crisis, which led to the stepping down of the President, the Vice President, and several other high-level politicians who were accused of corruption. More transparency in political decision making was just one of the demands of the people who demonstrated. The newly elected Members of Congress, sworn in on 14 January 2016, responded to these public demands by reforming the Rules and Regulations of Congress. These changes include barriers for floor crossing (changing political parties and taking your seats with you), regulations that fight nepotism, and a reduction in the number of staff working in Congress. These reforms were made possible due to the consistent work of the Technical Commission of Congress, which was supported by NIMD in preparing and debating the different reform proposals. For more information, read this document (in Spanish). Raising gender issues on the national agenda in Guatemala Violence against women is one of the big problems Guatemala is facing. NIMD has contributed to a law against femicide by facilitating discussions between the different political parties and between civil and political society to enable a consensus to be reached on the content of the proposed legislation that was later adopted by Congress. The conservative ‘macho’ culture in Guatemala does not allow much space for women’s political participation. NIMD’s programme in Guatemala supports the Forum of Political Parties (FPP), a multiparty dialogue platform. Specifically, we have made resources available for the activities of the Commission on Full Citizenship for Women, or Women’s Commission, which aims to advance women in politics and leadership, independent of partisan ideologies. Women’s civil society organizations in Guatemala have long been pushing for a special law to punish the killing of women, or femicide. Guatemala has the highest femicide rate in Latin America: between 2000 and 2012 over 5000 women were murdered. With the support of NIMD’s political analysis and technical support, the Women’s Commission worked with civil society and women’s groups in the drafting of a law against femicide. After a long and intense dialogue process, the law was approved in 2008. It contributed to sensitizing Guatemala’s political culture to this important gender issue. Environmental dialogue NIMD also seeks to encourage a continuous and inclusive dialogue about environmental policy formulation. Additionally we aim to strengthen the capacity of women and other stakeholders to prevent and resolve conflicts related to environmental threats. This programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Programme deviations/ToC update: During the beginning of 2016, the Congress managed to play a significant role in the change agenda that was established after the 2015 mass demonstrations. However, at the end of 2016, the MP’s that represent the old way of doing politics, manage to regain the power in Congress, blocking the reelection of the more progressive Taracena as president of Congress. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD Guatemala Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 198000 61882 Disbursement Ghana August 2016 local partner 25000 Disbursement Guatemala Dec 2016 local partner 6345 Programme monitoring 20000 programme advise and support 198000 Guatemala budget 2016 local partner 63997 Disbursement Guatemala February 2016 local partner 50005 Disbursement Guatemala May 2016 local partner 52798 Disbursement Guatemala July 2016 local partner 2850 Disbursement Guatemala July-2 2016 local partner 51450 Disbursement Guatemala October 2016 local partner The 2015 demonstrations in Guatemala against corruption and impunity also called for political reform. Responding to these demands, the Congress initiated a series of consultations with civil society amongst others on reform of the Political Party and Electoral System. These consultation processes included the traditional, well established civil society organizations, but also the more loose network type organizations that came into existence in the summer of 2015. In September 2015 elections took place. This led to an outsider becoming president, whose political proposals and priorities were not yet clearly defined. The president does not have a majority in Congress. During the first half of 2016, the president of Congress, member of an opposition party, continued the legislative debate on the reform proposals demanded by civil society. Mistrust in politicians and the political system is high. People perceive politicians to be corrupt and thinking about their own well-being rather than that of the country. After the elections the public demonstrations diminished greatly. However, the population continues to be alert and is willing to voice their discontent if a new corruption scandal or political mismanagement arises. In this context, there have been several spaces for dialogue and discussion between civil and political society (especially Congress) on electoral reform and on Constitutional Reform of Security and Justice provisions. In these spaces, civil society organizations specialized in the issues have presented concrete proposals, given the importance of political reforms to change the system. Meanwhile, the Executive has invited civil society organizations and think tanks to develop proposals on issues that were not included in the last electoral reform, such as gender parity and ethnicity, internal democracy and models of representation. Quantitative Data Between 2012 - 2015, 6 processes for law initiatives existed in which civil society was consulted about the issues relevant for NIMD’s Central American program 2016 – 2020 that are political reforms, fiscal reform, climate change, and water management. Political Reform (4) - The Electoral and Political Parties Law was discussed in 2 consultation mechanisms established by the Congress of the Republic: Legislative Working groups and the working group convened by the Electoral Supreme Court. - The Organic Law of the Legislative Branch was developed through a series of seminars with CSO consultation. - The Civil Service Law was discussed by the working group consisting of civil society and political representatives convened by the Congress of the Republic. Fiscal Reform (1) The civil society consultation on fiscal reform was organized by the Commission on Finance and Currency. A variety of think tanks, foundations, and especially business associations participated in the seminars. Climate Change (1) The Commission on Climate Change organized a series of public hearings to identify gaps in current policy and legislation and to identify legal amendments and policy measures to strengthen the system to deal with the effects of climate change. Water Management (0) Qualitative data: Between 2012 - 2015, 6 processes for law initiatives existed in which civil society was consulted about political reforms, fiscal reform, climate change, and water management 1. The Electoral and Political Parties Law [Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos – LEPP]: Guatemala witnessed a year of political turmoil in 2015. The president and vice-president were accused of corruption and resigned after massive demonstrations by a wide variety of Guatemalan society. One of the demands of the demonstrators was the reform of the political system in order to combat corruption. As a result both the Congress and the Electoral Tribunal organized a dialogue with civil society on the reform of the political party law (4974). Civil society provided substantial input during these two consultation processes and their comments were incorporated into the reform proposals. 2. The Legislative Internal Regime Law [Ley de Régimen Interior del Legislativo – LOOL]: during the same period, fifteen (15) initiatives were presented in Congress on reform o fthe LOOL. These were analyzed by the Technical Support Commission supported by NIMD, but after that the process did not receive any attention from the MPs. Social pressure and the demands of civil society organizations for a more transparent and efficient Congress forced the new legislature to take up some of the recommendations and make changes to its internal regulations improve its legitimacy. 3. The Civil Service Law: from 2012 - 2015 only two (2) initiatives were submitted; one with a favorable opinion scheduled in the agenda and the other created in the framework of the workgroups that Congress established in 2015 in the midst of the political crisis. Congress received the input of almost 50 civil society organizations, including Trade Unions. However, there was no follow up of the process to ensure the initiative would become law. The new Congress has not included this issue in the legislative agenda as it was not one of the main demands of the 2015 "La Plaza" demonstrators. Furthermore, the issue of Civil Service Legislation is sensitive as there are several key actors and therefore diverse interests to be dealt with. 4. Water and environment: In Guatemala there is no Law on Comprehensive Water Management, this being a key issue to the country's development and environmental conservation. The interests at stake are high, given the economic model of the country. In this sense the issue of water management was almost nonexistent in the past 4 years, since there was not even a single law initiative submitted. 5. Regarding climate change, one law initiative was submitted and heard before the Plenary, but there was no opinion issued by the related commission. The Environment and Natural Resources and the Climate Change Commissions organized roundtables with environmental organizations to come up with proposals to amend the Forest Law. The lobby from civil organizations managed to include incentives for forest communities organizations and Municipalities in the new legislation. The following organizations participated: UtzChe, Association of Forest Communities of Petén [Asociación de Comunidades Forestales de Peten – ACOFOP], CALMECAC Foundation, Foundation for Eco-development and Conservation [Fundación para el Ecodesarrollo y Conservación – FUNDAECO], Environmental and Human Resources Organizations Association [Asociación de Organizaciones Ambientalistas y de Recursos Humanos], National Association of NGO’s of Natural Resources and Environment [Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente – ASOREMA]. 6. Tax reform was absent in the legislative agenda 2012-2015. The new president came up in August 2016 with a proposal for tax reform and that put the issue back on the agenda of Congress and of the civil society organizations. A bill of particular relevance in the Guatemalan context in light of the corruption scandals is the institutional strengthening of the Superintendency of Tax Administration [Superintendencia de AdministraciónTributaria – SAT].. The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in Guatemala. NIMD Guatemala was established in 2003. The office grew in size until 2013, while after that a reorganization process led to the reduction of staff. The office in Guatemala supported the setting up of country offices in Honduras and El Salvador and provided input for those programs. A new director is heading the office as of may 2015 continuing the process of strengthening internal communication and coordination. The country office works closely together with a # of other organizations and institutions, both national and international. During the first 10 years of working in Guatemala, NIMD focused on the strengthening of political parties, multi-party dialogue and political system reform. Nevertheless, in the last couple of years, given the “new” citizens' demands and the weakening of the political system, we identified the need for accompaniment and training in lobby and advocacy of civil society organizations and citizens collectives. Based on its broad political network and expertise, NIMD facilitates and supports dialogue tables between those civil society organizations and political actors. Working with civic and political actors, NIMD pays special attention to gender mainstreaming and the inclusion of those groups that are discriminated and that lack effective representation in the political system. During 2015 NIMD has worked with political parties represented in Congress, CSO´s and other key stakeholders related to the mandate of the Institute. Among them may be mentioned: 6. Legislative power: within Congress, NIMD works specifically with the Commissions of Electoral Reform, Climate Change, Hydric Resources, Youth, Women, Technical Support, Legislation and Constitutional Issues, Human Rights. 7. State organizations: Ministries of Environment and Natural Resources, Culture and Sports, and Energy and Mining; The General Planning Secretariat; The Public Management Institute; The Supreme Electoral Tribunal; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 8. Non-Governmental Organizations: CONAREP, MOLOJ, CONVERGENCIA CIVICO POLITO DE MUJERES, ASOCIACION POLITICA LA CUERDA, FUNDAJU/ASODEJU, JUSTICIA YA!, UUGT, ICEFI, FUNDACION ESQUIPULAS, FUNDAECO, CALAS, CONGECOOP, CECODE, COLECTIVO RIO, FUNDACION PROPAZ, 9. Academic institutions: “Rafael Landivar” University, ASIES, FLACSO, School of Political Science - USAC. 10. Development cooperation entities: Sweden Embassy, Norway Embassy, México Embassy, IRI, NDI, KAS, FES, USAID, UNDP and UN Women. 11. Regional Entities: PARLACEN. In this section an analysis of the Organizational Performance Scan of NIMD on each of its components is presented. The average rate for NIMD-Guatemala was 3.68 based on the self- assessment of staff. C1. Commit and Act: The transition between the PP2 and the SP program affected the organization due to the lack of a clear strategy. Furthermore, NIMD decided to finalize its programme with the Multiparty Forum of Political Parties that it had been supporting since its establishment in 2003. These developments and the decline in financial resources required the office to make important adjustments. C2. Deliver Results: There is a gap between administrative and program staff when it comes to the appropriation of the strategic objectives of the SP. Due to the change in strategy and limitations of financial resources, the presence of NIMD has decreased, mostly in the bilateral relations with political parties and outside the capital city. C3. Adapt and Self-Renew: NIMD is less present in social media than it issued to be. It is necessary to improve the communication about the programs and results of NIMD Guatemala, so public opinion, beneficiaries and donors are aware of the activities undertaken and the results achieved. Additional attention for communication on financial processes is important for headquarters and other donors. It is also important to establish and adequate process of Monitoring & Evaluation which is essential to monitor the programme implementation and to assess if the goals are being met. This is also important for NIMD as a learning organization. C4. Attract and Relate: NIMD has the versatility and ability to cooperate with other agencies, such as NDI, UN Women, Konrad Adenauer in order to create greater impact. On the other hand NIMD maintains the legitimacy of being a neutral partner to politicians and civil society organizations. A weakness is noticed in terms of attracting donors for long-term processes on strengthening democracy. C5. Balance Coherence and Diversity: NIMD is a coherent organization with the values of impartiality, inclusiveness, diversity, local ownership and long term commitment, which is noted by its partners in civil society and political parties. Guatemala has a system of dispersed political parties that are hardly institutionalized. The ability of political actors to negotiate and/or bring together different agendas does not revolve around a programmatic vision, but depends on interests and privileges of groups and actors involved in the issue. In this context, and given the absence of a government plan, the Congress has taken the initiative during 2015/2016 to define and further a political agenda for the country. The issues that are included in the agenda are determined by the following factors: the popular demands that were voiced during the La Plaza demonstrations; the CICIG-MP-US Embassy agenda (fight against corruption and security and justice); the interests of the traditional economic power. While UNE and FCN are the biggest parties in Congress, their interests are divergent. Political alliances with the smaller parties were established to determine the legislative agenda and its (partial) implementation. Multi-actor alliances were also established, including Congress, Social Organization and State Institutions. This allowed for progress on specific legislative and policy issues. Unit of measurement 2 active partnerships (on relevant issues for NIMD) among political stakeholders and/or among political and CSO stakeholders: Among political stakeholders 0 Among Political stakeholders and CSO 1. 1. Security and Justice workgroup. This is an initiative from the Congress Commission on Legislation and Constitutional Issues to promote the agenda of Justice, Security and Human Rights together with Civil Society. 2. National Workgroup on Climate Change. This mechanism is institutionalized through the National Climate Change Law and consists of representatives of Government, civil society and think tanks. Qualitative Data The Workgroup for Security and Justice [Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia] is integrated by the MPs, civil society, the Office of the Human Rights Solicitor, Public Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of the Interior, the Judicial Branch, Criminal Public Defense [Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal], UNICEF, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. During 2012-2015, the Workgroup prioritized the following topics: Reforms to the Judicial Career, Reforms to the Organic Law of the Public Prosecutor's Office, Reforms to the Civil Service Act of the Judicial Branch, age limit for marriage and Public Order Act. The National Workgroup of Climate Change [Mesa Nacional de Cambio Climático – MNCC] emerges when the State adopts a Law on National Climate Change. As a result of this law, the National Workgroup is established consisting of civil society organizations, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the National Woods Institute, the Ministry of Economy, the General Planning Secretariat and the Ministry of Finances. Congressmen from the Commission on Climate Change are observers in this workgroup. # of structural changes and new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors 3 new consultation mechanisms (Technical dialogue workgroups) with civil society were established in light of the 2015 events related to the Political Party and Electoral framework: 1. The initiative presented by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the Congress of the Republic with the participation and technical assistance of civil society organizations devoted to the subject. 2. The workgroup convened by the Congress of the Republic, where 168 civil society organizations participated. 3. The platform for State Reform, convened by the University of San Carlos of Guatemala, that became a multi-sectorial civil instance. Qualitative description: 1. The political party reform initiative presented by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to the Congress was made in consultation with civil society. Different CSO were heard representing a variety of views on electoral reform. 2. After the 2015 demonstrations, the Congress convened a workgroup on political and electoral reform. 168 civil society organizations participated and the workgroup gathered input on the following themes: 1) Political financing and access to media; 2) Organization and internal democratization of political parties; 3) Strengthening the Supreme Electoral Court; 4) Electoral Process, null vote vinculante (binding); 5) Sanctions regime; 6) Electoral system. 3. The University of San Carlos is heading a multiactor platform for State Reform. The platform includes universities, professional associations, research centers, churches, indigenous peoples, trade organizations, organized private sector, cooperations, student organizations, unions, women, youth, farmers, NGOs, environmental organizations, social forums and human rights organizations. Its main purpose is to reach agreements and present proposals regarding a comprehensive process of State Reform. Their recommendations were taken into account by the workgroup on Political and Electoral Reform of the Supreme Electoral Court Many studies have demonstrated that Guatemala lacks a democratic political culture, where the citizens are actively involved in political, social or community organizations and feel they can influence public decision making. Machismo and discrimination are manifest in Guatemalan society and become clear in power structures and relations. Furthermore, political parties, social organizations and citizens very often show these negative values in their way of treating other people but also in the way they organize their organization and take decisions. Quantitative data: 63% of political and CSO's stakeholders who in the monitoring period made reference to democratic values, rule of law and/or gender & inclusive politics, in their public statements and manifestos. 94% of politicians and civil society leaders believe that the rule of law is a sine qua non requirement for democracy strengthening. 56% of the interviewed people are sensitive to inclusive models for youth, women and indigenous peoples. Qualitative data: The study was carried out from July 12 to 27, 2016. Two instruments were applied: A survey conducted to the 5% of participants of the Democracy School and a Focus Group that addressed in depth the conclusions derived from the survey. The following variables were used: democratic values, the rule of law, and inclusion. These reveal qualitative information on how the person values and perceives the democratic situation in the country. From this perspective, the qualification on the democratic situation in Guatemala showed that 44% perceives that is regular, while 6% thinks that is good. However, 25% stated that it was bad and another 25% very bad. In the end it shows a pessimistic environment about the quality of democracy in the country. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the study evidences patterns of thought and analysis that have been, if not acquired, definitely strengthened, by the training programmes of the Democracy Schools. NL-KVK-27189542-GUA17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 The situation in Guatemala continues to be quite unstable. The president is weakened by a lack of support in Congress and by diminishing public support. He took the initiative for a further reform of the Electoral and Political Party Law and he proposed fiscal reform. Both initiatives did not have popular support and did not have support in Congress; so instead of strengthening his position, these initiatives rather confirmed its weakness. Overall it seems that the faith that people placed in the political outsider and former comic Jimmy Morales during the September 2015 elections, has not led to a new form of government. The pending trials and penal investigation against business representatives, MPs and (former) government employees deepens the sense of instability in the country. Within this context the Congress has become the center of political activity. However, the advancement and reforms have not been of the level and depth required by the countries. As a result of the mass demonstrations in Guatemala in 2015 that led to the stepping down of the president and vice president charged with corruption, there is a much higher level of civic involvement than what Guatemala was used to. Though some organizations have complained about the criminalization of their actions, the majority of the organizations are speaking up without fear. The socio economic situation of the people in Guatemala has deteriorated. Guatemala continues to face high levels of poverty, and discrimination and exclusion especially affect women and indigenous people. This exclusion is reflected in parliament. Only 11% of MPs are indigenous, 12 % are women. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The ToC continues to be valid. Due to the increasing importance of civil society organizations in the functioning of democracy, especially when it comes to diminish corruption and demand transparency and accountability in decision making processes, NIMD has more involvement with them than in the past. This is especially true for these organizations that initiated or participated in the 2015 demonstrations. With this broader focus, NIMD also responds to the demands of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Political parties in Guatemala continue to be weak. They lack a party programme and a defined support base. Despite of the 2015 events, in Congress there has not been a substantial change in the way politics is being done, though the current president of Congress, Mario Taracena, is trying to respond more appropriately to the pending demands of civil society. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 210000 58000 Disbursement Guatemala February 2017 local partner 210000 Guatemala budget 2017 local partner 48035 Disbursement Guatemala May 2017 local partner 51000 Disbursement Guatemala July 2017 local partner 27965 Disbursement Guatemala October 2017 local partner 7535 Disbursement Guatemala November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-GUA18 NIMD Guatemala is facing times of political turmoil. The president tried to expel the UN Commissioner against impunity and corruption. Both congress and government are doing everything possible not to be prosecuted for illicit party financing and other crimes. For the moment, they have impunity because of their functions. Civil society organizations, networks and youth platforms continue to raise the issue of impunity, corruption and the need for electoral and political party reform. The actions of government and congress did not lead to massive outrage in 2017. The question is, if a situation arises during 2018 where people massively are going to protest, like in 2015. Meanwhile, the judicial system can hardly cope with the workload. More and more investigations and trials are started. Recently the powerful politician Alvaro Arzú, mayor of Guatemala City, was charged with illegal financing of his political party. If this means weakening the powerful network of conservative entrepreneurs and (former) military officials is yet to be seen. It is however clear, that with going after Arzú, the prosecutor and CICIG are creating even more resistance towards their actions. The political issues high on the agenda for 2018 are (further) reform of the political party and electoral legislation, constitutional reform regarding the judicial sector and the election of the new prosecutor and state controller. Each of these issues will be a moment to measure the temperature of the country: are decisions taken in favour of impunity and self-enrichment, or in favour of transparency, justice and reform? 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update (max 2 pages) The problem analysis for the Northern Triangle of Central America continues to be valid. The three countries suffer from a lack of confidence in political actors. In NIMD’s view, to overcome this crisis, important changes are necessary in the political party system to make it respond to the needs and demands of the population. Furthermore, the countries need more resources to address issues of poverty, education, healthcare, insecurity and employment. The objectives that NIMD formulated in the MAP continue to be valid: 1. Inclusive and representative political party system; 2. Political inclusion of underrepresented groups with a focus on women and youth, including youth- and gender mainstreaming in policy and legislation; 3. Better linkages between politics and regional, national and local level; 4. Enhanced capacity of political parties to deal with environmental issues with a focus on water; 5. Technical assistance and facilitation of dialogue on fiscal reform. For NIMD an important angle for 2018 is to continue to support laws that ensure an equal level playing field in politics. This means supporting Congress and EMB in processes that reduce illicit campaign financing and political corruption and positive measures for inclusion of women and/or indigenous people. NIMD also continues to support the transparency commissions in congress and at departmental level. Like in El Salvador and Honduras, NIMD Guatemala is advancing with objectives 1 and 2, while less human and financial resources are available for the other three objectives. NIMD will include in the training curricula the issues of environment/water, regional integration and fiscal issues to sensitize future generations politicians on those issues. 3. Programme outlook (max 4 pages) Political system a) Technical assistance for civil and political actors Disseminate the proposals for the reform of the electoral and political party system and organize debates throughout the country. Accompany and support the Electoral Affairs commission of Congress and the EMB with analysis, best practises, facilitation of dialogue and the implementation of the reform. b) Facilitate dialogue between political and civil society on inclusion of underrepresented groups: Women, youth and indigenous people. Facilitate dialogue on measures to advance with political participation of youth, Women and indigenous people. c) Support Women politicians and Women organizations Support Women political inclusion through capacity building, building of networks and mentorship programmes and the institutional strengthening of women’s organizations. d) Representation Support meetings between MPs and CSOs and think tanks to prioritize issues for the legislative agenda and exchange views and opinions. e) Provide technical support to Congress and CSOs. Support the recently established Women’s caucus in Congress. Support CSOs in their political analysis and political lobby strategy. f) Support learning and debate on political party reform, fiscal reform and environmental Governance. NIMD will issue studies on these subject to feed the debate and present these in workshop and debates. Intermediate indicators for reform of the political party system: 1. # of proposals on electoral reform taking into account input from CSOs. 2. # of public policies proposals that take into account CSO input 3. # of L&A initiatives for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women / youth / minority groups) Political actors  Capacity strengthening of political parties in dialogue and consensus building. Support strategic planning processes of political and civil actors including democratic values and accountability.  Facilitate interaction between politicians at supranational, national and local level Address issues that affect all three countries together and share experiences between countries of northern triangle.  Technical assistance for civil society and political actor to define legislative agenda regarding transparency and anti-corruption. Support Congress Commission on Transparency with their work. Accompany Open Parliament processes.  Ensure sufficient financial Capacity to apply for funds Deepen network of experts that can contribute with project proposals for donors.  Share best practises in the region Continue to build internal Capacity of staff of programme and finance/admin staff. Facilitate joint learning in the region. Intermediate indicators for political actors: 1. # of representatives (male/female) of political actors who have been trained in strategy development, programmatic and/or policy development skills with a focus on developing a distinctive profile 2. % of plans implemented for organizational strengthening. Political culture  Democracy Schools Two democracy schools for young (indigenous) men and women. Intermediate indicator political culture: 1. # of alumni from democracy schools. Gender and diversity a) Facilitate thematic debates between civil society and political actors. Support for positive measures and interparty and intersector dialogue on inclusion. Technical assistance women’s caucus in congress. Intermediate indicators gender and diversity: 1. # of women in decision-making positions in congress. 2. # of proposals presented by women MPS in support of the legislative agenda of the Women Commission of Congress. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 210000 Guatemala budget 2018 local partner 21000 Disbursement Guatemala January 2018 local partner 21000 Disbursement Guatemala March 2018 local partner 48000 Disbursement Guatemala April 2018 local partner 51000 Disbursement Guatemala July 2018 local partner 37000 Disbursement Guatemala August 2018 local partner 30000 Disbursement Guatemala September 2018 local partner 1000 Advanced payment by HQ for GPMD fee 2018 local partner 65520 Disbursement Guatemala November 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-GUA19 NIMD Guatemala Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 250944 Guatemala budget 2019 50188 Disbursement Guatemala January 2019 168000 Disbursement Guatemala April and June 2019 1895 Expenditures Guatemala Q.2 2019 2105 Expenditures Guatemala Q.3 2019 56229 Expenditures Guatemala Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-GUA20 NIMD Guatemala Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 183038 Guatemala budget 2020 36607 Disbursement Guatemala January 2020 10767 Expenditures Guatemala Q1 2020 138389 Disbursement Guatemala July 2020 8042 Disbursement Guatemala October 2020 2186 Expenditures Guatemala Q4 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-HON16 NIMD EL SALVADOR’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND El Salvador is located in the northern part of Central America, and is part of the so called Northern Triangle together with Honduras and Guatemala. The three countries face a lot of similar challenges especially in the area of security. Socio economic situation Although the economy has steadily increased over the last decade in El Salvador, a large proportion of the population continues to live in poverty and the level of unemployment remains high. Young people and women are even more vulnerable to the socio economic situation. Furthermore, the country experiences some of the highest crime levels of the world. On top of that, climate change poses a serious challenge for El Salvador, because it is particularly vulnerable to extreme climatic events such as hurricanes, floods and droughts. As a result, tensions around sufficient clean water supply have built up. The country is dependent on Guatemala and Honduras for its water supply. Democratic system Over the last decades, the democratic system of El Salvador has been dominated by two parties : the conservative right-wing party ‘Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)’ and the ‘Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)’, which transitioned from a guerrilla movement to a leftist political party. After an initial domination of the political landscape by the ARENA party from 1989 until 2009, in 2009 the FMLN managed to win the elections for the first time and subsequently installed the first left-wing government in El Salvador. In February 2014, the FMLN won the elections again with a very narrow margin. In March 2015, elections took place for the Legislative Assembly, the Central American Parliament and the municipal governments. For the first time in history Salvadorans chose plural or multi-party municipal councils (before that the ‘winner takes all’ system was applied). These elections also had another new feature: for the first time a quota regulation of 30% for women was applied for the electoral lists. Despite a high perception of corruption and friction between the judiciary on the one hand and the presidency and legislative assembly on the other, the democratic institutions are perceived to be functioning reasonably well. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN EL SALVADOR NIMD’s work in El Salvador started at the end of 2012. As a result, the programme was focused on preparing the political parties for the changes in the electoral system for the 2015 elections. In light of the changes in the electoral law for the municipal elections, NIMD developed a ‘train the trainers programme’ for all political parties on dialogue skills and consensus building: important skills to have to ensure governability at local level. NIMD did this in coordination with other organizations. Inclusion of underrepresented groups In its work, NIMD pays special attention to the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics. The establishment of the quota regulations was an important step forward in Guatemala and resulted in over 30% of women elected in the Legislative Assembly. NIMD supports capacity building of women politicians through an intensive training course for women politicians from all political parties and from national and local level. Furthermore, NIMD seeks to contribute to a democratic culture where the rights of women and men are respected. We do this by investigating the barriers that hamper political participation of women and by exchanging best practices on gender sensitive policy and legislation. Capacity building of youth Young people tend to shy away from a career in politics, not seeing the possibilities that the political arena offers to positively influence important decisions about the future of the country. NIMD is in the process of establishing a Democracy School for young people from political and civil society to prepare them for their careers. At this school they will be able to practice democratic skills and behaviours and learn how to speak, listen and debate with mutual respect and focus on programmatic content. Environmental Dialogue NIMD also facilitates dialogue between civil society and political actors on issues related to environmental governance and security, such as water management. This approach is part of our Democratic Dialogue for Environmental Security programme. The programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in El Salvador, Colombia and Guatemala. Programme deviations/ToC update: The main bottlenecks and challenges experienced within the program were the lack of interest of political parties to initiate a debate on electoral reform during much of the year, due to the divergent positions of the main parties and the lack of willingness / consent to push for a platform for the dialogue; however, it was satisfactory that at least three of the political parties used the electoral reform proposals that were identified and worked with them during 2015(NIMD and NDI joint workshops). In addition, at the end of the year, a large multiparty meeting was held to exchange views on the electoral context and challenges (almost all party representations attended it), demonstrating that NIMD maintains the ability to convene on the issue and that there is at least willingness to sit down to dialogue, given the imminence of the electoral process in 2017. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD Honduras Canadian Embassy in Honduras NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 145000 2293 Programme monitoring 20000 programme advise and support 145000 Honduras Budget 2016 local partner 20000 Disbursement Honduras January 2016 local partner 21440 Disbursement Honduras February 2016 local partner 24000 Disbursement Honduras May 2016 local partner 27990 Disbursement Honduras July 2016 local partner 30126 Disbursement Honduras October 2016 local partner In Honduras, according to long-term researches of democratic political culture (LAPOP 2014), most of the population reveal attitudes of high or low support to the system and low support to some democratic values (such as tolerance to other people´s political ideas), which characterizes the country as one between authoritarian stability with tendency to democracy in risk (LAPOP 2014). Political analysts and key informants consider that there is also an important deficit of compliance to some of the basic elements of the democratic culture and its inherent values -rule of law, accountability, check-and-balances, tolerance, inclusion, participation…- among political actors (e.g.: political parties and its members). The recent sociopolitical history of the country, is proof of this: a coup d´etat in 2009, frequent bizarre decisions from Parliament and Supreme Court, tendency to models of authoritarian rule, corruption scandals and a high level of corruption perception (TI), social inequity, and low Human Development Index (UNDP) increasing levels of political discrimination or violence -including gender motivated. To understand how political actors do internalize democratic values (such as the ones mentioned above), a small survey of 36 participants was applied in July 2016 to young members of the main Honduran political parties (5) in the main city of the country (Tegucigalpa) to ask their opinions and perception about some democratic institution, democratic values and dialogue skills. Young politicians usually offer a good sample of the attitudes and beliefs prevailing within Honduran politics: most of them became part of these political organizations through spontaneous and volunteer registration or after being targeted and selected by recruitment campaign, therefore they have a deep commitment and sense of group belonging that make their internalized opinions about certain issues, highly representative of what other people alike them think. Political actors can be more or less aware of the values (democratic or antidemocratic) implicit in their opinions and actions. Specific trainings designed for political actors (like the NIMD Schools for Democracy) can provide tools and exercises to facilitate the internalization and practice of democratic values, rule of law and gender sensitive & inclusive politics, however it is necessary to measure how much these topics are internalized before and after the trainings. The data collected with the referred sample of young politicians will provide in the future a standard of comparison of this awareness. Additionally, data collected with similar questionnaires applied before and after each training of the School of Democracy, will offer evidence of any change in the awareness and internalization of such values. Related to this outcome and indicator, political actors are attendees (men and women) and alumni (men and women) of the School of Democracy, who are members of political parties and who in the measurement period include democratic values, rule of law and or gender & inclusive politics, dialogue skills, in their political actions, public statements and communications. Percentage (%) is referred to the 100% of young politicians who participated in the survey. Quantitative data: 77% of young politicians consulted expressed respect for inclusion (diversity) values 74% of young politicians consulted expressed acceptance of equal gender inclusion 56% of young politicians consulted participate in different organizational activities (besides politics) 50% of young politicians consulted supported basic elements of rule of law 81% of young politicians consulted support democracy as the best system of government 84% of young politicians consulted appreciate transparency as a value 56% of young politicians consulted responded showing some dialogue skills 42% of young politicians consulted expressed tolerance to political opponents. Qualitative description: A group of 36 young politicians (18 to 35 years old) from five (5) majority and minority political parties participated in a private survey of 24 questions (some of them of multiple items), performed by NIMD Honduras in July 2016, to know their opinions and perceptions about democratic values, rule of law and or gender & inclusive politics, dialogue skills. 53% were women, 47% were men. Most of the questions included in the survey were inspired in questions included in the famous research on democratic political culture performed in Honduras over the last 10 years (2004-2014) by Vanderbilt University (LAPOP), which covers many aspects and elements of the democracy by asking popular opinion in every Latin-American country. The questions included in the survey were focused on obtaining information about inclusion (respect of racial, gender and sexual diversity), participation in different organizations and community issues (not only politics), opinion and support of basic elements of rule of law and democracy (e.g. check-and-balances; support or not of coup d’état or reasons to oust a president); transparency and accountability; dialogue skills and tolerance to other ideas and opinions. Averages and percentages were obtained after tabulation of the answers -from sets of questions- intended to measure each value or characteristic. The values obtained can be compared to similar responses in 2014 LAPOP research (e.g.: tolerance obtained in Honduras a 50.1% and support to democracy got 69.7 in whole Latin America in LAPOP, 2014; compare with 42% and 81% of baseline survey, respectively) and provide data for a private baseline to identify weak or strong attitudes toward democratic values, not only from political actors who are potential participants of NIMD´s Schools of Democracy, but among final attendees of these trainings (at the beginning and after completion of their participation) to evaluate real impact and changes in their attitudes (if any). Under law making processes are included prior negotiations/consultations of laws / public policies and their discussion & approval in Parliament. The laws / public policies should be related to political reform, fiscal reform and climate change including water management. The Civil Society (CS) refers to civic actors like Civil Society Organizations, citizen/interest groups, social movements. Quantitative data: 1 active CS consultation of law making process in political reform (financing) 1 active CS consultation of law implementing process about women political participation: 50% quota & rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”). 1 active CS consultation of law making process (proposal phase) of fiscal reform 2 active CS consultation of law making process on climatic change and water management Qualitative description: 1. Political reform: there is one (1) law making process going on (related to politics/campaign financing) that includes CS consultation (1) due to the intervention of the OAS Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). MACCIH is advising and outlining a new normative framework on political/electoral financing, in close effort with the Electoral Affairs Committee, in consultation with political and civil society actors. 2. Women political participation: CS consultation has been effective in the process of formulation and proposal of legislation related to equal political participation of women: a joint proposal of effective regulation of the principle of alternation within the mandatory 50% quota (parity and zipper system) in voting lists in next primary and general elections (2017) has been prepared by the Gender´s Equity Committee of Parliament together with political and CS actors that will be decided up at the end of 2016. Consultation of CS is currently happening (1). 3. Fiscal reform: The Executive branch (Presidency) has prepared a new Tributary Code to reform fiscal issues, after seven (7) months of socialization with different stakeholders. This proposal will be discussed and approved by Parliament in the second semester of 2016. A platform of CS actors and Group for the promotion of Fiscal Dialogue (GPDF) has demanded (July 2016) an inclusive process of discussion within the Parliament before its approval (at the time of the preparation of this baseline is not clear if Parliament will assign this relevant fiscal instrument to the Budget Committee or if it is going to create a special Committee). 4. Climate change (includes water management): climate change and water management affairs had an important boost in 2014 with the enactment of Climate Change Act (Environment and Climate Change Committee was involved) and in 2013 with the approval of Water and Sanitation Sector Law (2013); both lawmaking processes were done by Parliament and included active participation and consultation of CS actors. Currently, there are not specific lawmaking processes going on, though, there are strong critics of the public policy process following the implementation of the act, led by the Environment Ministry (MiAmbiente), which apparently lacks enough CS participation and consultation. On the other hand, Water management legal provisions promote decentralization of water management to local governments and requires active CS consultation during their implementation at local level. Climate change Law (2014) making process included a process of consultation with civic actors, led by the Inter-Agency Technical Committee on Climate Change (CTICC), responsible for the development of the National Climate Change Strategy (ENCC) in 2010 (the Strategy had an extensive process of national consultation, which included different regions). % of LatinoBarometer respondents expressing trust in political parties Quantitative data: 18% Qualitative description: The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in Honduras. We understand # of structural changes and mechanisms as the # of changes in laws/bills, regulations, public policies and proposals, that rule or provide procedures for consultation, representation or direct participation (inclusion) possibilities of diverse political and civic actors in law and policy making processes. Political actors refer to political parties and political movements; civic actors (also known as Civil Society -CS) include Civil Society Organizations, citizen/interest groups, social movements. Quantitative data: • Laws, bills, regulations, public policies, proposals formulated 2 constitutional provisions for consultation and direct participation and they are: articles 5 and 213, related to plebiscite, referenda and “citizen´s law initiative”. 2 laws regulating citizen´s participation mechanisms (1 at national level, 1 at municipalities level). 0 provisions for mandatory public consultation in National Congress Organic Act. 0 Constitutional provisions for public policy making. 1 law for public policies framework. • Laws, bills, regulations, public policies, proposals implemented 0 Plebiscites or Referenda (national level) 0 Plebiscites (municipal level) 1 citizen´s initiative (law reform proposal) 7 public policies (national level) Qualitative description: There are two (2) constitutional provisions (art. 5 and art. 213) that allow direct participation of any group of citizens in the law making process and its regulation Act (Citizen´s Participation Mechanisms Act, 2013). A group of 3,000 citizens can submit a bill proposal to Parliament to be discussed and, if supported by parliamentarians, approved (“citizen´s law initiative”); this provision is part of a group of mechanisms for direct people´s participation (art. 5) which include plebiscite and referendum (2% of citizens registered in national electoral census can ask for it to Parliament). Citizen´s initiative has been used only once (1) since this mechanism was enshrined in Constitution (2011) and no national plebiscite and referendum has been organized ever (0). Plebiscite exists at municipal level since 1990 and proved to be effective to support some municipal decisions (such as banning alcoholic beverage sales); however, its usage diminished over the last decade mainly because of implementation costs (none during the last year-0). The lawmaking process established by the 1982 Constitution and regulations included within National Congress Organic Act (2014) DO NOT require parliamentarians, alone or integrated to Congressional Commissions, to consult civic actors during the discussion or approval of new legislation. Nonetheless, lately the selection and appointment of senior state officials and some lawmaking processes included more political and civic actors, especially if the law is potentially conflictive and if there is external cooperation involved in the issue (e.g.: public televised audiences and hearings during selection and appointment of candidates to high positions -like Supreme Court; or last year, regarding a new proposal of criminal code which has been under wide civic consultation: the technical assistance to this process has been provided by the Spanish International Cooperation Agency and the Agency demanded it as a condition to grant the assistance). Currently, there are 29 ordinary Congressional Committees responsible for many and varied issues of public interest. The Congress Organic Act establishes as mandatory the integration of representatives from all parties included in the Parliament in ordinary and special Committees, allowing multiparty participation within the committees (29 of the ordinary ones are multiparty integrated). Although the integration of committees and their internal debates are multiparty orientated, during debates and proposals enactments in Parliament ‘plenaries prevails the exclusion of opposition parties’ opinions and inputs, as a consequence of the influence of the ruling governing alliance between the National Party and the Liberal Party. There are no constitutional provisions established for public policy making (0). In 2013, the Parliament approved one (1) Act creating a public policy framework on social matters (Public policy framework law on social matters), which established -among others- procedures to guarantee inclusion and coordination as well as mandatory participation of all relevant social actors (civic actors) in areas of governmental social action (for example, social protection, social investment, social economy, social development, social integration). Before and after this law enactment, at least seven (7) public policies were discussed and approved with active participation of CS actors (among them -most relevant- 2nd Plan of equality and gender equality in Honduras 2010, Social Protection Policy 2012, Human Rights Public Policy 2013), though, according to key informants, on a regular basis social actors have little influence over public policy making due to fragmentation and reduced effective lobbying. In Honduras, political actors -from official and opposition parties- have currently limited capability to relate to each other and to CS. To overcome polarization and mistrust resulting from the 2013 general elections, the ruling National Party *(without a majority in Parliament)- managed to establish a governing alliance (1) with the Liberal party (27 seats and former main opposite party within the traditional bipartisan system), other minority parties and defectors from opposition parties, to take control of the legislative branch and the legislative process. This tactical alliance has proved to be fruitful for both parties: it helped them to enact laws, to approve Budgetary provisions, to control the board of the Parliament and decisive Ordinary Committees and as the pivotal base of the election of the new Supreme Court of Justice (together with other minority political forces). On the other hand, the governing alliance diminished the political influence and possibilities of the other two main opposition parties (Libre and PAC) However, in some relevant occasions Liberal party PMs did not follow this dynamic -blocking opposition parties- and voted together with Libre and PAC (against a constitutional reform and the appointment of a high state official) proving that the alliance with National Party has limits. The capability to attract and relate to CS actors for the enactment of legislation and its performance on policy goals is limited and it depends mainly on the issue. That is the case of relevant themes for NIMD. Active alliance means alliance on political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management, among political actor and/or between political actors and CS Stakeholders, which has been productive (visible or not) through publications, position papers, policy proposals, manifestos, meeting reports. Quantitative data: Alliances between political actors 1 governing alliance between National (ruling) and Liberal (opposition) party in Parliament to control legislative processes. Over the last year, political alliances between political actors have been mainly pragmatic: National Party (ruling) succeeded in maintaining the governing alliance with the Liberal party (opposition) within Parliament. The election of a new Supreme Court (15 magistrates in January-February 2016) represented a big challenge for both parties because a qualified majority voting was needed; however, both parties finally succeeded in getting the 2/3 of the votes (86 from 128 seats), by adding votes from minority parties and defectors from opposition parties. 0 active alliance between political actors to perform an integral political reform. 1 active alliance between political actors to support the enactment of politics/campaign financing law. 1 active alliance between political actors to implement 50% quota (gender parity) and rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”) (via regulation). 0 active alliance between political actors to approve new fiscal and tax reforms. 0 active alliance between political actors on climatic change and water management issues. Alliances between political actors and CS • 0 active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders to perform an integral political reform. • 0 active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders to support the enactment of politics/campaign financing law. In political reform (to July 2016), besides the reform on politics/campaign financing supported and technically assisted by MACCIH (1), there is no possibility for an active alliance (0), between political actors or between political actor and CS stakeholders to discuss nor approve an integral political reform. CS stakeholders did not produce relevant position papers showing joint opinions or alliances about political/electoral reform or campaign financing. • 1 active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders to implement 50% quota (gender parity) and rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”) in law reform Political actors and CS stakeholders have been very active (and proactive) in showing public joint positions (policy proposals and manifestos), between multiparty political actors (1) and between political and CS actors (1). The need of implementation of an important law reform that obliges to incorporate 50% women quota, in alternate positions, in electoral lists for the 2017 elections, provided an opportunity for women MPs, politicians and CS actors to work together and propose regulation. • 1 partial active alliance between political actors and CS stakeholders on fiscal and tax reforms. In tax (fiscal) reform, there is no evidence of a broad and permanent alliance between political and CS actors. However, the Executive branch introduced a bill into Parliament which had previous, partial, consultation with CS stakeholders; active alliances between political actors and between political actors and CS stakeholders are foreseen in order to have consensus for a new Tax Code • 0 active alliance between political actors and/or political actors and CS stakeholders on climatic change and water management issues. climatic change and water management, there is no active alliance between political actors nor relevant ones between political actors and CS stakeholders (0). Normally, in Honduras political parties have very little interest in consulting, collaborating and harmonizing their political behavior with other civic actors. This characteristic is a consequence of several factors, some historical, mainly related to the predominant bipartisan and patronage system of the last half century, as well as the prevailing authoritarian rule model, that prevented the development of a truly democratic arena within the country, which would have favored the strengthening of democratic political practices (like democratic dialogue and legitimate popular representation) among the main political institutions and other stakeholders. Civic actors (CS organizations, organized groups of citizens related to specific interests, social movements) gained access and influence to parliamentary representatives and executive officials during the first decade of 21st century, as a consequence of demands from international development cooperation to democratize the socio-political scenario in Honduras (Parliament used to negotiate a legislative Agenda with thematic CS sectors). Civic actors influence decreased substantially, mainly because of a diminished lobbying capacity, polarization after the 2009 coup d’état and the lack of support from a wide base of people (including social pressure), that became obvious to political actors. Sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors depend more on personal initiative and leadership of political and civic actors or their lobbying capacities. For example, stakeholders from private sector and from other economic and productive areas, show their influence by using lobbying strategies to consult and obtain collaboration from political actors which ease collaboration in harmonizing legislation and public policies. Actions of coordination, dialogue and consultation between political actors and between political actors and civic actors, related to political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management (not exclusive), usually happen through bilateral meetings, thematic debates, fora and encounters between political and civil society. • Political reform is facing obstacles, mainly because of lack of political consensus, interest and trust between political actors; this lack of collaboration extends its effects to the exchange of positions and harmonization efforts with civic actors. The only exception is the initiative for a new law on politics/campaign financing (supported by OAS-MACCIH), which has already produced opportunities for collaboration between the parties that participate in the Electoral Reform Committee and some SC actors involved in transparency and accountability issues (at least meeting 1 time per month). • About women´s political participation, consultation and collaboration among and between political and civic actors has increased during the last years, especially for the common goal of the 50% quota (gender parity) and rank ordering rules (“zipper shape”) effective implementation in the 2017 elections; all relevant parties and some feminist organizations have accomplished an important joint work in the revision and proposal of a “gender parity and rank ordering rules” (“zipper shape”) (on certain moments meeting 1 time weekly). • On fiscal reform, collaboration between political actors (ruling and opposition) has been evident in some tax reforms (within Parliament) in order to harmonize proposals and bills (specially tributary Code) and also between some political actors (ruling party) and private stakeholders, as well as some groups of interest (like the Promoter Group of Tax Dialogue, which has been able to meet and have conversations each 2 weeks with the main figures of government, ruling party and opposition parties and relevant MPs (Budget and Finance and External Cooperation Committee). • Finally, climate change and water management issues have become of increasing interest from some minority of the political actors (mainly ruling party), but with different approaches: Climate Change issues show limited consulting and collaboration among political actors and between political actors (in Parliament) and CS actors (sometimes null), mainly because the main actions respond to an external (international) demand, governmental formal actions and laws enactments from Parliament and have not produced a sense of trust and mutual understanding between political actors and CS actors, because of the absence or minimal comprehensive vision on environmental protection from the official sector. On the other hand, Water Management issues respond more and more to a decentralized and local perspective, where collaborative response and participation on the national level is progressively less relevant. % of political actors who indicate that collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. For purposes of the outcome indicator, political actors are political parties integrated in Parliament Committees whose representatives work or coordinate actions together with CS actors (also known as Civil Society -CS, include Civil Society Organizations, citizen/interest groups, social movements), or have interaction and encounters to dialogue about issues of common interest or disagreement. This actions of coordination, dialogue and consultation can be through thematic debates and encounters between political and civil society related to political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management (not exclusive). Quantitative data: 18% of members of Parliament´s Electoral Reform Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 67% of members of Parliament´s Gender´s Equity Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 36% of members of Parliament´s Budget´s Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 44% of members of Parliament´s Finance and External Cooperation Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. 14% of members of Parliament´s Environment and Climate Change Committee who collaborate with other civic actors at least once (1) per month. Qualitative description: Percentage (quantitative data) is built by dividing the # of relevant political actors related to each issue of public concern (political reform, women´s political participation, fiscal reform and climate change including water management) who collaborate actively with CS actors at least 1 time per month, by the total # of political actor’s time (100). In the current legislative year, there are different share of members of Parliament integrated to specialized Committees, who indicate that they consult civic actors at least one (1) time per month on imminent legislative debates. Highest percentage is related to women´s political participation (67%) issues and tax (44 and 36%) issues; lowest are political reform (18%) issues and climate change and water management (14%) issues. However, data for this indicator should be studied more and in detail. NL-KVK-27189542-HON17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Honduras is effectively governed by the National Party who made a strategic alliance with the Liberal Party – opposition, on most of the issues. The two new parties that were formed after the events that led to the coup d’etat in 2009, the party Libre that split from the Liberal Party and the Party Against Corruption – PAC, did until now not change the way politics is done in Honduras. Rather than being a force of innovation and change, they have adopted the traditional party politics and especially PAC is hampered in its functioning because of internal fights and power struggles. The demonstrations in 2015, that were sparked because of fraud with social security, put the issue of corruption and transparency high on the agenda. The government took then the initiative to negotiate with the Organization of American States (OAS) the establishment of a mission against corruption in the country, the MACCIH. This organization does not have the same level of popular support as CICIG in Guatemala, and civil society organizations have voiced their concern about the mandate of MACCIH. They do not know if this is sufficiently strong to be able to effectively fight corruption and strengthen transparency and the rule of law. The young people that formed the basis for the anti-corruption demonstrations did not manage to convert themselves in a more solid political movement. At the same time, the US is very active in prosecuting corrupt politicians and extradite drug activity-related VIP´s. People that were for long considered to be untouchable such as former president Callejas (involved in FIFA corruption scandal), high ranked policemen and members of the Rosenthal family (also bankers and business men) or the eldest son of former President Lobo, are now facing criminal charges in US territory. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The ToC continues to be valid. NIMD has been accompanying Electoral and Political Party reform for the past years. This continues to be a difficult process. Recommendations of the EU Electoral Mission and other missions are hardly followed up. The MACCIH is taking up the issue of transparency of political party financing and it is possible that they do manage to create the political momentum to move forward. If this would be the case, there might also be political space for NIMD to stimulate and accompany this and other political party reform issues. At this moment, issues high on the political agenda are the possible re-election of the president and the opposition claim to introduce a second round in the elections (ballotage). NIMD opts to move forward in those subjects where we can effectively work such as women political participation and democracy education for youth, while following the political developments to assess when we can play an effective role in the other objectives of the Multi Annual Plan i.e. fiscal reform, transparency, water management and regional integration. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 109000 7000 Disbursement Honduras January 2017 local partner 51357 Disbursement Honduras February 2017 local partner 109000 Honduras budget 2017 local partner 56433 Disbursement Honduras February 2017 local partner 27750 Disbursement Honduras October 2017 local partner 18752 Disbursement Honduras July 2017 local partner 30622 Disbursement Honduras July 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-HON18 NIMD 1. Political Update 2018 After four years of difficult and harsh political dialogue, the main Honduran political parties did not produce an integral electoral reform demanded by broad citizenship and recommended by Electoral Observation Missions after 2013 general elections. However, the involvement of illicit networks in national and local politics financing (linked to drug-trafficking activities), and the abuse in the use of public funds during the prior electoral cycle (2010-2014), led to the enactment of a law for the regulation of politics financing, which had technical assistance of the electoral division of MACCIH (the mission against corruption in the country, headed by the OAS) and relevant diplomatic support from important cooperation donors as the US. Approved with the support of all political parties in Parliament, it came into force in the end of May 2017, when its technical unit composed of three commissioners was easily appointed (it is a relevant detail that each of these commissioners was proposed by the three main political forces of the country, which means that political negotiations occurred). Although the unit has little time to do its work (general elections will be in November 2017), the mere existence of the law has had an impact on the reduction of propaganda in public spaces and media, compared to previous processes, especially the primary elections of March 2017. The elections of November will be disputed mainly between three parties: Nacional (ruling party), Liberal and Libre. PAC (the surprise party of 2013 elections) has weakened due to internal struggles, however, its founder -the sports chronicler and political outsider Nasralla- will be the candidate of a party alliance led by Libre (party created by Manuel Zelaya, the president deposed in a coup of state in 2009) and PINU-SD, whose one of its main proposals is the convocation to a constituent national assembly. The current President Juan Hernandez (Nacional) has good possibilities to be re-elected, amidst doubts and complaints of the other parties on the legal constitutionality of their participation. The presence of electoral observation to verify the quality of the elections will provide recommendations that will be inputs for an eventual dialogue for electoral reforms, which could be complex based on the (polarized) position assumed by the political parties after the result in the elections. Precisely, the parliament's integration and capacity for political dialogue after the November elections will determine, not only the margin of governance within the National Congress and the balance of power with the executive branch, but also the possibilities of political reform in the country. No significant increase in female political representation is expected due to the inappropriate regulation of “zippered lists” to implement the 50% quota. Another aspect -not less important- is that Honduran drug lords who have surrendered to US authorities or been extradited during 2015 and 2016 have revealed in their federal court judgments economic collaboration and close influence with important politicians of the country. Major US government pressures are expected due to these revelations (and others linked to acts of corruption), which could be investigated by MACCIH, with unpredictable impact on the traditional impunity of the national political class and the political-parties’ scenario for the coming years. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update (max 2 pages) Provide a narrative update on the problem analysis and the Theory of Change in light of the political update. Explain if the ToC as described in the MAP is still valid, or whether there is a need to adapt the Theory of Change, and if so, in what way. The ToC continues to be valid. NIMD has been accompanying Electoral and Political Party reform for the past years as this is crucial for a more democratic functioning of the political party system. This continues to be a difficult process because the parties have a vested interest in keeping things the way they are. Recommendations of the EU Electoral Mission and other missions are hardly followed up and -until now- there is no political pressure from civil society to advance on those issues. The enactment of the political party financing law and the appointment of the technical unit in charge of its implementation provide a good opportunity for parties’ transparency and accountability strengthening; this, together with the outcome of general elections in November 2017, could boost political dialogue chance in 2018. However, the narrow MACCIH electoral mandate (reduced to the technical assistance in the enactment of political party financing regulations) would diminish its recent positive influence. Some lobby among G-16 development cooperation representatives (specially OAS) should be tried to strengthen MACCIH role in the follow-up of electoral missions’ recommendations, as well with civil society representatives, to promote accompaniment and political pressure for their adoption. NIMD will stimulate and assist technically these lobbying efforts to advance on relevant electoral reform issues. Political culture in Honduras still faces challenges to shift a male oriented party culture. NIMD keeps working on improving this political culture through democracy schools for young people and political and candidate education for political women. NIMD opts to move forward in those subjects where we can effectively make a difference, while following the political developments to assess when we can play an effective role in the other objectives of the Multi Annual Plan i.e. fiscal reform, transparency, water management and regional integration. 3. Programme outlook (max 4 pages) During 2018, the NIMD Program in Honduras will focus on monitoring and follow-up of processes initiated in previous years under SP, adapting them - when appropriate - to the new political and social context. The opportunity provided by the creation and start-up of the Technical Unit responsible for implementing the Political Parties Financing Act (UTPL) will be used to provide technical assistance to the unit and, in coordination with it, with the political parties to strengthen their transparency and accountability. Capacities will be strengthened in political and social actors to follow-up on the recommendations of electoral observation missions (EU, OAS) and put pressure on the start of political and multisector dialogue leading to their adoption by political parties. As a result of the election decision on November 2017, NIMD ties with the parliament (National Congress) will be updated to strengthen the legislative process, accompanying Legislative Management and prioritized parliamentary commissions (electoral, budget and finance, gender equity, climate change and water, among others) to encourage dialogue and consultation with civil society actors. In particular, the knowledge, skills and abilities of women parliamentarians will be strengthened to give continuity to the Interparliamentary Gender Agenda built between 2014-2018 and to add more female MPs into different commissions (Parliamentary Academy). All this in synergy with the strengthening of women's and gender secretariats of political parties and coordinated with the caucus of Honduran MPs of PARLACEN to advance in the achievement of affirmative actions for the equitable political participation of women in the country. Technical support will continue to the Fiscal Dialogue Promoter Group (GPDF) for the promotion of multi-sectoral dialogue spaces for the achievement of a taxation for development. Likewise, NIMD will facilitate dialogue initiatives between different political and social actors about water and its sustainable management. Specific training programs and the Democracy School (EFD) will focus on strengthening capacities for democratic values and the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics (particularly women, youth and the LGBTI population). A national meeting of EFD alumni will be held during 1st trimester of 2018 and a regional meeting of EFD alumni will be organized in conjunction with other NIMD programs in the region (northern triangle C.A.). No less important is the capacity building of NIMD Honduras staff. In the planning of 2018 and for the different levels of intervention (system, actors and culture) the following results, indicators and interventions have been foreseen: Political system Four (4) result areas, each with their own intervention and intermediate indicator: 1.1 Political and electoral reform further strengthen the representation of democratic system and institutions • Intervention: Technical assistance and capacity building of civic and political actors in political and electoral reforms • Intervention: Facilitation of dialogue spaces/platforms between political actors and between political actors and civil society actors • Intermediate indicator: % participation by key stakeholder representatives (civic and political actors) in the dialogue initiative 1.2 Political framework lowers the barriers for political participation for currently underrepresented groups • Intervention: Technical assistance and capacity building to political parties´ women leadership in defining an agenda on how to ensure equal rights for men and women within their parties. • Intervention: Technical assistance on how to make changes in electoral law and other regulations related to effective women participation in politics and to reduce violence against political women • Intervention: Capacity building of women MPs • Intervention: Strategic planning processes and capacity building with Gender Equity Commission in Parliament • Intervention: Cooperate with the women’s caucus of Parlacen and other regional initiatives to create synergies and learn from best practices • Intermediate indicator: # of L&A initiatives for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women) 1.3 Better channels for coordination between democratic and civil society actors as supra national, national and local level. • Intervention: Facilitate thematic dialogue between supranational, national and local politicians • Intervention: Capacity building of candidates and elected politicians on prioritized thematic issues (fiscal reform, climatic change and water management) • Intervention: Support dialogue between political actors and civil society to reduce corruption and improve state incomes for development financing • Intervention: Provide technical assistance for MP's and CSO's • Intermediate indicator: # of ongoing NIMD supported dialogue initiatives 1.4 The political system offers channels for effective lobby and advocacy • Intervention: Creation and facilitation of spaces for interaction/ lobby, planning, between MP's and CSO's • Intervention: Provide technical assistance for MP's and CSO's • Intermediate indicator: # of agreements reached (reform agendas / policies / legal amendments) Political actors Three (3) result areas, each with their own intervention and intermediate indicator: 2.1 Developed capacity of politicians to reach consensus on issues of national concern • Intervention: Capacity building of political parties on dialogue and consensus building • Intermediate indicator: # of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g.: democracy schools) 2.2 Increased number of political parties and other political actors that develop proposals regarding Political and Electoral Reform (including women´s political participation), Fiscal Reform and Reform of environmental and water legislation, including citizens’ proposals and concerns. • Intervention: Technical assistance and training of members of Parlacen, MPs, party members and CS actors on the importance of CS dialogue and citizen´s consultation on Political reform and electoral system, the fiscal system, transparency and environmental policies and legislation • Intermediate indicator: Level of cooperation with other actors (political and civic) 2.3 Organizational core capabilities of NIMD Honduras strengthened • Intervention: Systematization of best practices and learned lessons within NIMD Honduras Program • Intervention: Sharing of best practices with other NIMD offices in the region • Intervention: Capacity building of NIMD human resources on relevant capabilities needed to be improved • Intermediate indicator: % execution of capacity development plans Political culture Two (2) result areas, each with their own intervention and intermediate indicator: 3.1 Internalization of democratic norms and values by political actors • Intervention: Democracy Schools • Intervention: Thematic follow-up meetings and forae for Democracy School alumni. • Intermediate indicator: # of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g.: democracy schools) 3.2 Increased awareness of the importance of coordination between political and civic actors • Intervention: Facilitation of thematic meetings, debates and formal/informal encounters between political and civic actors, involving MPs of thematic Parliament Commissions, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. • Intermediate indicator: % participation by key stakeholder representatives (civic and political actors) in the dialogue initiative Gender and inclusion will be approached as a cross cutting theme at the system, actor and culture level. • Intermediate indicator: # of L&A initiatives for making the political system more inclusive (in relation to women) Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 117000 Honduras budget 2018 local partner 11700 Disbursement Honduras January 2018 local partner 22246 Disbursement Honduras March 2018 local partner 30863 Disbursement Honduras April 2018 local partner 28690 Disbursement Honduras June 2018 local partner 21540 Disbursement Honduras August 2018 local partner 5160 Disbursement Honduras September 2018 local partner 1000 Advanced payment by HQ for GPMD fee 2018 local partner 32200 Disbursement Honduras October 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-HON19 NIMD Honduras Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 240829 Honduras budget 2019 48165 Disbursement Honduras January 2019 123376 Disbursement Honduras April and June 2019 1561 Expenditures Honduras Q.3 2019 69287 Disbursement Honduras October 2019 1500 Expenditures Honduras Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-HON20 NIMD Honduras Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 141757 Honduras budget 2020 56831 Disbursement Honduras February 2020 2153 Expenditures Honduras Q1 2020 30129 Disbursement Honduras April 2020 40000 Disbursement Honduras August 2020 -1255 Expenditures Honduras Q3 2020 14797 Disbursement Honduras October 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-ILA16 NIMD In the Strategic Partnership (SP) between AWEPA, NIMD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) forms a key component. The ultimate goal of the ILA efforts within the context of the Strategic Partnership Programme is to reinforce the in-country lobby and advocacy capacities and activities of implementing partners and (indirectly) civil society organisations in the countries that AWEPA and NIMD work in, with the aim to influence the enabling environment for effective policy influencing. By creating interlinkages between lobby and advocacy activities at the various levels (national, regional and international) and strengthening the policy influencing capacities of local actors, the impact of lobby and advocacy on issues that emanate from national policy agendas is sought to be maximised. Apart from strengthening the lobby and advocacy capacities of local actors, the SP sets out two broad agendas for ILA for 2016-2020: 1) to ensure that the importance of an enabling environment for lobby and advocacy is recognised, including the critical role of parties and parliaments to foster peace and stability and to reflect this in international and regional policy and legal and regulatory frameworks; and 2) to influence international and regional policies on political party support and parliamentary strengthening, including the allocation of sufficient donor funds. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 200000 80000 Disbursement EPD February 2016 local partner 32168 Programme expenditures NL-KVK-27189542-ILA17 NIMD In 2016, NIMD and AWEPA worked on the development of a draft International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) strategy. The ultimate goal of the ILA efforts within the context of the SP Programme is to reinforce the in-country lobby and advocacy capacities and activities of implementing partners in the countries that AWEPA and NIMD work in, with the aim to influence the enabling environment for effective policy influencing. By creating interlinkages between lobby and advocacy activities at the various levels (national, regional and international) and strengthening the policy influencing capacities of local actors, the impact of lobby and advocacy on issues that emanate from national policy agendas is sought to be maximised. In 2016 the focus of the ILA strategy was mainly on the ILA efforts towards the EU, in light of the current review of a number of EU funding instruments (EDF and EIDHR), which provide an opportunity under the SP to encourage greater funding to political parties and parliaments. A number of specific activities were implemented through the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), to promote a more political approach to development, and to gather input for and information on the review processes. In 2017 the ILA efforts towards the EU will be continued, with the aim to influence the funding review processes, and to create more awareness on the critical role of parties and parliaments in development. In order to identify possible entry points for ILA for particular countries, staff and local partners will be supported on an individual basis in their ILA efforts through EPD. Furthermore, in 2017 the focus will be on assessing the possibilities for targeted ILA efforts towards a number of regional organisations. To this end, NIMD and ECDPM will conduct a regional assessment, aiming to compare the policy issues emanating from the national policy agenda’s from NIMD’s partners with the policy priorities and influencing channels of the African Union (AU) and Eastern African Community (EAC), to identify potential entry points for an ILA strategy towards these regional bodies. In addition to that, potential entry points for ILA efforts in the Asian region will be explored. Lastly, in 2017 the focus will be on further developing the skills and capacities of local implementing partners to effectively engage in ILA, by focussing on their capacity to relate to, understand and influence relevant regional and international organisations, and by coordinating the various ILA efforts. In that regard, local implementing partners will be capacitated in terms of the policy priorities, programmes and activities of the EU, AU and EAC, and provided with an analysis of the policy influencing possibilities. In addition to that the Global Partnership for Multiparty Democracy (GPMD) will be supported to step up its lobby and advocacy efforts in 2017. The GPMD was formally launched in October 2016 to stimulate cooperation and coordination of ILA efforts by individual member organisations. In 2017 the GPMD secretariat will be supported to roll-out a joint ILA strategy and to organise the first set of activities. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 900 Disbursement Georgia March 2017 local partner 80000 Disbursement EPD May 2017 local partner 41130 Disbursement GPMD August 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-ILA18 NIMD The ultimate goal of the ILA efforts within the context of the SP Programme is to reinforce the in-country lobby and advocacy capacities and activities of implementing partners in the countries that AWEPA and NIMD work in, with the aim to influence the enabling environment for effective policy influencing. By creating interlinkages between lobby and advocacy activities at the various levels (national, regional and international) and strengthening the policy influencing capacities of local actors, the impact of lobby and advocacy on issues that emanate from national policy agendas is sought to be maximised. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 50000 Disbursement EPD March 2018 local partner 50000 Disbursement EPD October 2018 local partner 23452 Disbursement GPMD August 2018 local partner 25000 Disbursement GPMD August 2018 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-ILA19 NIMD International Lobby & Advocacy 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 100000 ILA budget 2019 50000 Disbursement EPD March 2019 37071 Expenditures ILA Q1 2019 1860 Expenditures ILA Q2 2019 24800 Disbursement GPMD May 2019 187 Expenditures ILA Q3 2019 25000 Disbursement EPD August 2019 606 Expenditures ILA Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-ILA20 NIMD International Lobby & Advocacy 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 27654 Expenditures ILA Q1 2020 75000 Expenditures ILA Q2 2020 50000 Disbursement EPD September 2020 100000 Disbursement GPMD and GI December 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-IND16 NIMD INDONESIA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 1999, Indonesia held its first democratic elections since 1955. Elections are popular in Indonesia. They are well managed by the Elections Commission (KPU) and have high levels of voter turnout. Indonesia has the second-largest one-day election in the world (after the USA) and since 1999 there has been a huge growth in the number of political parties contesting the elections, although the number of parties that actually meet the threshold for a seat in parliament is much lower. However, most political parties are based around the personality of their leader rather than having a programme of policies and there is widespread corruption. Governments are usually a coalition of many political parties and the politicians involved are usually more focused on gaining power than representing the people. Indonesia has a relatively young population. 43.3% of the population are younger than 24 and 85.6% are younger than 54. However, the political scene is populated by the same familiar faces which have dominated Indonesian politics for the past decades. They tend to still be representing powerful vested interests. There is a glimmer of hope, however. In 2014 a new president was elected who is a complete political outsider, a former governor of Jakarta who is known for his pragmatic reform-minded style. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN INDONESIA Until 2015, the core of NIMD’s programme in Indonesia was democracy education. By the end of 2014, the Democracy Schools had produced 1738 alumni in 8 regions. In the 2014 general elections, 179 Democracy School alumni ran for office and 16 were elected. 77 alumni were involved in the elections as officials. The alumni are organized in alumni organizations which engage in lobby & advocacy to address local issues like education, healthcare and pollution. In 2016, NIMD will be starting a new programme working with young politicians at the national level. Our aim is to equip young politicians with better political skills to fulfil their democratic role as elected representatives, as well as stimulating inclusive inter-party dialogue on democratic renewal. This programme will be implemented by Kemitraan – Partnership for Governance Reform. Programme deviations/ToC Update: The Indonesia programme started in April 2016 with signing a contract with our new partner in Indonesia, Kemitraan. Firstly, the baseline measurement of the outcome level indicators was done, followed by an induction workshop at NIMD HQ in The Hague. The results of the programme in 2016: 1.Secured commitment of the leaderships of 10 political factions in the House of Representative/Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR) on the proposal to establish a theme based inter-party dialogue forum for young Members of Parliament; 2.Availability of short videos on issues related to tolerance, diversity and counter extremism to be used as triggering materials/themes/issues for inter-party dialogue; 3.Established network of video makers in 15 cities who can produce video messages on local or national issues to be shared in inter-party dialogue; 4.Established engagement between Kemitraan with the alumni of Sekolah Demokrasi through Forum Demokrasi Nusantara; and 5.Trained selected civil society activists on web-scrapping skill for data collection and analysis from social media (Twitter) Unfortunately, the programme progress does not exactly match with the initial thought laid out in the annual plan 2016. This was because the contract was signed only in Q 2 of 2016 but also because engaging with politicians in Indonesia proved to be more difficult than initially thought. An important lesson learnt during 2016 is that engagement with political parties and politicians is not as easy as it was thought during the design of the program. Kemitraan’s experience in conducting advocacy in the parliament is different from the need to get the parliamentarians engaged in activities being prepared under INSPIRE program. There is a need for Kemitraan’s INSPIRE program team to really get itself familiarized and engaged with the “routine” of the MPs to get the program noticed and being prioritized. Establishing getting the buy-in of political leadership therefore took more time as anticipated (due to full parliamentary schedules). Because of this the originally planned IPD training has logistically also been postponed to 2017. However, one round-table was organised for young MPs and their staff to discuss priorities and expectations for the interparty dialogue platform. Due to conflicting agenda's and party priorities however, there were not so many MPS present, mostly their technical staff took part. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 190423 8653 Programme monitoring 37500 programme advise and support 190423 Indonesia Budget 2016 local partner 48801 Disbursement Indonesia May 2016 local partner The enabling environment for lobby & advocacy is obstructed by the closed nature of the political system. The formal political system in Indonesia is largely dominated by political elites and vested interests. It is nearly impossible for outsiders to enter into politics without doing so in the context of one of the established political parties. In addition to this, parties must win at least 3.5% of the vote in order to be eligible for seats in the DPR. As a result, it is very difficult for new parties to get a foothold in the political system. The parties that are able to contest the national elections are dominated by strong leaders, often with business ties, and provide few opportunities for new leaders or ideas. In addition to this, state subsidies for political parties are insufficient. As a result, the parties are largely financed by wealthy businessmen, giving them serious political influence. Members of parliament are organised into eleven commissions whose role it is to draft laws of its own as well as approve government initiatives. It is not uncommon for members of political parties to work together in parliament if they have common interests, even political parties in opposing coalitions. Parliament has extensive powers to scrutinise and influence the policies of the executive government, but members of parliament are often unprepared for the task at hand and little training is available. Political parties, even those in opposition, thus potentially play an important role in terms of policy influencing and the generation of alternative policies that reflect the views of all groups in society. Civil society organisations (CSOs) also play an important role in connecting citizens with political actors. However, in recent years the ability of civil society organizations to effectively influence policy and engage in constructive political activity has been limited. This is partly due to the closed nature of the political system and the influence of business interests. The youth (under 45) Parliamentary caucus has not started yet, hence the score of the baseline measurement is zero. The most recently available 2012 AsiaBarometer measures public trust in institutions in Indonesia. We choose the level of trust in parties as our baseline measurement, collapsing the categories “a great deal” and “quite a lot”. (Source: Zhang-Xu Wang, Institutional Trust in East Asia, Paper for the 2013 Asia Barometer Conference on Democracy and Citizen Politics in East Asia”.) Quantitative data: Kemitraan’s BART Scores 11 April 2016 Capabilities Results Max C1 Commit and Act 3.9 5 C2 Deliver Results 4.0 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 3.5 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4.1 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 3.7 5 Qualitative description: Kemitraan shows a relative balance in scores for each of the five capabilities. Such balance can be interpreted as a sign for a healthy organisation. The organisation seems to be strongest in the capabilities that are related to external capabilities, like “to attract and relate” and “to deliver results”. The organisation scores the weakest in the more internal capability “to adapt and self-renew”. Results of organisational scans of other organisations have shown that such slight imbalance of the capabilities is a sign of a transitioning organisation, one that is either expanding or contracting. Kemitraan staff in fact shared that the organisation over the past months of operation has been working on a decreasing # of projects, from 32 projects previously to 17 in 2016. The “spider web” diagram below provides a more detailed picture of where Kemitraan scores highest and where the organisation scores lowest. There is generally a low level of civil-political consultation in Indonesia. There are exceptions: a # of large NGOs are consulted on a regular basis by government agencies. However, political parties tend to be less responsive to civil society. This is cause for concern in a representative democracy where political parties should be responsive to citizens’ needs and interests. Likewise, citizens have few avenues to directly voice their concerns and opinions except by voting in elections, which, as discussed above, has little impact when it is always the same familiar faces running for office. Furthermore, the other available avenue for interest aggregatoin from the support base in the post-election such as the recess has not been maximally utilized by the MPs. One specific constraint in this regard is the geographical distance between politicians in Jakarta and their constituents which are dispersed across the enormous archipelago that Indonesia is. Another is that there is an utter lack of trust in the political parties. The general public views political parties as corrupt and ineffective and civil society actors are hesitant to engage with them, afraid to be tainted by association with the political elites. The gap between political parties and civil society is undoubtedly one of the largest obstacles to the development of a democratic culture characterised by responsiveness and accountability. This baseline indicator was measured on the basis of the definition of “collaborate” in the form of engaging with other political actors through consultation, implementation, in the form of meetings and/or joint action on social/economic/political/religious issues. It was also measured on the basis of how many times did this collaboration happen and how many times did something substantial come out it? From the interviews with 21 young members of parliament belonging to different parties, each one of them indicated that they had conducted at least 4 to 7 times of collaborative activities every month. Some of the interviewed members of parliament said that they conducted it in more than 10 times in a month. However, as already identified as possible limitation in the indicator reference sheets the risk for socially desirable answers is present. When asked in more detail it became clear that these monthly activities not necessarily resulted in concrete results. Only 1 to 2 substantial results came out from these monthly collaborative activities and the rest in some cases led lead to the formulation of follow up recommendations or proposals that would be presented to relevant stakeholders or in the parliamentary processes such as the plennary sessions and commission meetings. NL-KVK-27189542-IND17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Political elites and vested interests continue to dominate Indonesia's political system. Political outsiders can only join one of the established political parties and legislative election is dominated by individuals with political or business nexus thus providing limited opportunities for substantive reforms. The extensive power of the parliament to scrutinise and influence the national policies are often under-utilized due to lack of capacity of the Members of Parliament (MPs). Political parties invest little in training and education of their cadres to become good legislators that resulted in low policy initiatives and legislative products. In recent times, the youth has been invited to participate in politics but they are lacking in capacity and political power due to tight control of party oligarchs and absence of internal party democracy. The potentials within the youth as agents of change have not been maximally utilized and even those who are members of the political parties and MPs are given few opportunities or strategic positions thus becoming an obstacle to the development of an inclusive representative politics. The main reason for non-responsive political parties is related to their focus on power-gaining and power-sharing rather than serving the constituents. Engagement with their constituents is rare, except during elections. Coalitions between parties are mostly based on obtaining a share in power, mostly in the form of political appointments, and not on a trade-off of ideas and policies. Thus, the coalitions of parties is broad and fluid with little programmatic coherence. Furthermore, the virtually indistinguishable party programmes and ideologies, except perhaps between the Islamic and nationalist parties, makes it difficult for voters to hold parties and politicians accountable for their actions and potentially obstructs idea-based constructive political dialogue. On political culture, there is a low level of substantive civil-political consultations. The citizens also have few avenues to directly voice their concerns and opinions except by voting in elections which has little impact when it is the same familiar faces running for office and ineffective reses visits. Geographical distance between the politicians in Jakarta and their constituents which are dispersed across the archipelago and a lack of understanding among MPs as "people's representatives" added to the challenge. Additionally, there is an utter lack of public trust in the political parties that deepened the disconnect between the two that could further hinder the responsiveness and accountability of parties. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The programme outlook for 2017 is very much in line with the original INSPIRE programme proposal. The programme will remain to be focussed on setting up and facilitating multiparty dialogue amongst young MP’s on issues of shared concern. Capacity strengthening will be added to the programme to strengthen the capacity of the target group in their dialogue skills but also building capacity and providing (innovative) means to contribute to informed debates. Furthermore we will start with activities supporting the parties towards becoming more programmatic. In 2017 we will start actively linking the participating MPs with relevant civil society representatives, making use of Kemitraan’s wide network but also linking the politicians with a representative group of alumni of the former ‘democracy schools’ programme. The Theory of Change will remain unchanged in the light of the political update. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 162504 75000 Disbursement Indonesia February 2017 local partner 162504 Indonesia budget 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-IND18 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 has been a dynamic year for Indonesian politics. This is the third year in office of the current government and the politics of coalition has stabilized where the government received majority of support from parties in Parliament, a major shift from the 2014 – 2015 period and transitional year of 2016 where the coalition of opposition parties dominated the parliament. The next general elections will be held in 2019 where simultaneous national election of president, national parliament and local parliament will be held in the same day. The new system that will be adopted in 2019 will most probably give substantive impact on Indonesian politics at national and local levels. An interesting phenomenon that emerged during 2017 local election year, and will most likely to become key issue to be debated, responded and used in political competition in the next round of elections, is the issue of religion-based extremism. The 2016 data of Wahid Institute and LSI study on Radical Religious Movements in Indonesia showed 11 million of Indonesians are willing to take part in radical activities while more than 500,000 people admitted that they have been involved in religiously inspired extremism activities. These findings were amplified in series of politically motivated but religiously inspired anti-Ahok (Ahok is the popular name of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama), the candidate for 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, rally since November 2016 which involved millions of people from, not only Jakarta but also different parts of Indonesia and has resulted into the growing religious sentiments and tension throughout Indonesia. Eventually in the Jakarta election, the more popular Christian gubernatorial candidate, Ahok, and his moderate Muslim vice gubernatorial candidate, who had been known for their integrity and hard work lost the contest, Ahok was put in jail for his trial on blasphemy and Jakarta will have a new governor from mid-October 2017 who received massive support from Muslim voters where its main supporter is the firebrand clerics from Islamic Defender Group, a group who is known for its over-zealous religious activism that is so close to be grouped as religiously inspired extremism. In response to the rising phenomenon of extremism that seems to be locally rooted, policy makers, including the young law makers in the national parliament, have been discussing it as part of their policy dialogue among themselves and with different stakeholders, including the civil society. They perceived the religiously inspired extremism as a national phenomenon that influences different spheres of life, including in politics where it has been used as political strategy for religious-leaning political parties to win political contests. In its part, the Indonesian civil society has been working a lot on educating the public on the danger of religious extremism and the law enforcement agency has set its own strategy to uphold the rule of law to prevent and combat religious extremism. However, these processes have not yielded tangible result due to, among others, first, there is disconnect between actors (political actor, civic actor and law enforcement actor) in responding to the issue. Each entity works along the line of its own space with limited intensive and collaborative interaction. Second, there is an absence of comprehensive/umbrella national strategy/policy for both state and none state actors to work together to combat extremism. Hence, there is the patchy response to the issue of extremism. Third, there is an issue of capacity among state and non-state actors, especially the young MPs, their politically recruited Expert Staff, policy advisory unit of the parties and the civic actors, in building up comprehensive argument and evidence-based policy proposals. Besides, the political oligarchy that dominates Indonesian political landscape contributes to the poor performance of young MPs to spearhead change in the parliament Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 155700 Indonesia budget 2018 local partner 14042 Disbursement Indonesia April 2018 local partner 75000 Disbursement Indonesia April 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-IND19 NIMD Indonesia Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 149142 Indonesia budget 2019 29828 Disbursement Indonesia January 2019 1607 Expenditures Indonesia Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-IND20 NIMD Indonesia Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 175046 Disbursement Indonesia July 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-INN17 NIMD After the consolidation phase in 2016 using the existing knowledge and (re)capturing and updating this, the year 2017 will focus on developing several new tools and knowledge products. The start-up programmes in the Middle East will benefit from support to designing tailor-made instruments that will be based on the regular NIMD toolkit, while the FCAS approach will see deepening of knowledge in 2 of the 6 focus areas (conversion of (former) armed movements into political parties and fostering inclusive political settlements) combined with new communication products (animation and documentary). Under the innovating democracy programme two more pilots will be organised (most likely Myanmar and Georgia) plus a follow-up ‘hackathon’ in Colombia related to developing a democracy app. Moreover, building on the 2016 Innovation symposium, an expert network will be set-up that will link academia, civic-tech practitioners and politicians to focus on new forms of representative democracy and the role of political parties in this. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 18950 Disbursement Colombia August 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-ISRPAL16 NIMD Israel/Palestine exchange programme 2016 - exploration phase Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 50000 9097 Programme expenditures 23280 Programme advise and support NL-KVK-27189542-JOR16 NIMD Jordan programme 2016 - exploration phase Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 50000 30382 Programme expenditures 15440 Programme advise and support NL-KVK-27189542-JOR17 NIMD Jordan Programme 2017 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 25575 146660 Jordan budget 2017 local partner 12825 Disbursement Jordan May 2017 local partner 10640 Disbursement Jordan June 2017 local partner 10640 Disbursement Jordan July 2017 local partner 49805 Disbursement Jordan September 2017 local partner 25000 Disbursement Jordan November 2017 local partner 25000 Disbursement Jordan December 2017 local partner 12750 Disbursement Jordan March 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-JOR18 NIMD Jordan Programme 2018 NIMD 1 NL-KVK-27189542-JOR19 NIMD Jordan Programme 2019 NIMD 1 34183 Expenditures Jordan Q1 2019 42646 Expenditures Jordan Q2 2019 67645 Expenditures Jordan Q3 2019 51757 Expenditures Jordan Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-JOR20 NIMD Jordan Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 52433 Expenditures Jordan Q1 2020 40923 Expenditures Jordan Q2 2020 74035 Expenditures Jordan Q3 2020 96281 Expenditures Jordan Q4 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-KEN16 NIMD KENYA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Kenya has a multi-party system in place since 1992, and has seen a steady economic development into a regional power. However, the existing patchwork of ethnic groups has become over the years a significant political issue, hindering democratic progress and creating domestic tensions. The low point of this setting showed in 2008, when after years of stability and economic growth, the world was shocked to witness the unexpected and severe intercommunal violence in the aftermath of the general elections. Over 1,100 people were killed and more than 500,000 were displaced, severely staining Kenya’s democratic and peaceful reputation. This traumatic period highlighted that Kenya’s ethnic politics from the past was still very much alive, but it also influenced the then-ongoing debate on the need for constitutional reform and overhaul of the governance system. Eventually, in 2010 a new constitution was written and promulgated through a national referendum. It was hailed as a progressive and democratic benchmark that also serves as guarantor of a broad set of human rights. Moreover, it entailed a completely new governance system by establishing 47 new county governments under a system of devolved government, with a two-tier structure in the legislature (adding a Senate) and division of functions and services between national and county level. The 2013 general elections were a first test of this new system and resulted in a win for the Jubilee alliance and their presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta from the Kikuyu dominated TNA party, with William Ruto from the Kalenjin led URP party as Deputy President. The opposition block CORD alliance mainly represents Luo, Luhya and Kamba communities, causing the current political landscape to be very polarized and ‘ethnicized’ THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN KENYA NIMD has been active in Kenya since 2003, when we assisted the setting-up of the Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) as dialogue platform for all parliamentary parties. Since then, the NIMD programme has supported CMD-Kenya to host the interparty dialogue and to implement activities geared at supporting political parties and to strengthen their interrelation with broader society. By bringing parties together to find a common position, a joint solution can be advocated and lobbied for to ensure policy is changed. The recently set-up Leadership Institute contributes to changing perspectives and mind sets of the political class. Another important programme focus is strengthening the role of women and underrepresented groups in political life. Better functioning parties Although the new constitution guarantees certain human and political rights, a lot of changes still needed to be reflected in national legislation. The programme has worked with parties to comply with the new requirements in the Political Parties Act and the provisions in the constitution, and has collaborated with the Office of the Registrar for Political Parties to strengthen the party landscape by facilitating the development of party strategic plans. Leadership Training The NIMD programme has supported the establishment of the CMD Institute of Leadership and Governance that targets politicians and party cadre to build their knowledge and skills. There is no academic requirement to become a politician, but leadership and democratic values are essential for good functioning politics and governance. By training batches of (aspiring) politicians since January 2015, the Leadership Institute has ambitions to become a regional centre for learning as well. Read more… Women and youth The programme in Kenya has a long history of supporting the political rights of women, and especially in the run-up to elections where women candidates were supported and their agents trained. Since 2014 the Respect for Women’s Political Rights programme is implemented in Kenya, with the specific aim of changing perceptions and negative gender stereotyping around the issue of women political leadership. One of the key approaches in this is actually to find supportive men that act as theme ambassadors who can convince their fellow party members of the importance of removing gender barriers in Kenyan politics. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRACTICE IN KENYA In 2003, NIMD set up the Centre for Multiparty Democracy in Kenya (CMD Kenya) to implement its programme. CMD Kenya is a political party dialogue platform. Its activities range from advocacy to facilitating dialogue and offering direct support to the political parties who are a member. One of the key themes within the platform is the role of women in Kenyan politics. The CMD platform has initiated several proposals to reduce formal barriers for women. The most notable process was the development of the new Constitution in 2010, where the NIMD programme lobbied for the inclusion of an affirmative action provision for women. The lobby was successful: Kenya’s new Constitution includes a strong Bill of Rights, ensures the participation of ethnic minorities, and stipulates that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies can be of the same gender. The new Constitution was a major victory for the women of Kenya, especially for those aspiring to take up a political role. Programme deviations/ToC update: The party landscape in Kenya always turns volatile before the elections. New parties are founded and coalitions are formed. This manifested in 2016 in the merger of government coalition Jubilee into one party. The merger was planned by the leadership and it is yet to be seen how the merger will play out in the lower ranks of the parties. Reconciling some of the different interests and the always lingering ethnic tensions between the parties seems to be the biggest challenge ahead for the new party. For CMD this meant that because of the merger, there are less member parties. The seats taken up in the Oversight Board and committees by the different parties in the ruling coalition are now reduced to one seat for the newly merged party. This is problematic for the relevance of CMD since it diminishes the power of the ruling party in CMD and leaves room for parties that are less relevant in national politics to influence CMD. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. AWEPA CMD Kenya NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 389516 11244 Programme monitoring 37500 programme advise and support 389516 Kenya budget 2016 local partner 20000 Disbursement Kenya January 2016 local partner 46557 Disbursement Kenya February 2016 local partner 56278 Disbursement Kenya May 2016 local partner 54074 Disbursement Kenya July 2016 local partner 75616 Disbursement Kenya October 2016 local partner Quantitive description: CMD-K scores an average of 3.5 across all five measured capabilities. The specific scores are shown in the following table and figures. Results Max C1 Commit and Act 3,4 5 C2 Deliver Results 3,2 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 3,3 5 C4 Attract and Relate 3,8 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 3,8 5 Qualitative description: In general, the organization’s higher scores on strategic coherence, accountability, consistency, and relevance demonstrate a strong base for positively impacting Kenya’s democratic consolidation over the long-term, even with frequent and rapid shifts in the political environment. Moreover, healthy alliances with international organizations, domestic legal structures, civil society organizations, and political parties offer opportunities for information sharing and coordination on programming, fundraising, and communication. These are the strong points of the organization and although they need to be maintained, they do not need to be built up any further. The focus of the capacity building programme for the coming years will be on the weaker capacities. The lowest scores were given on the capability delivering results with an average of 3.16. This score was particularly low on qualified staffing, infrastructure, and effectiveness. A first conclusion is that this points at the lack of a human resource system, risk policies and training of staff. This could be a first point of attention to focus capacity building activities on: developing a strategic and functioning human resource policy which includes a training strategy for staff. A second conclusion is that the M&E system could be developed further at CMD-K. Activity plans need to be measured and lessons need to be drawn from past experiences. M&E could be a second focus point for capacity building under the SP programme the coming years. Finally, a low score can also be seen on the healthy financial position and in specific CMD-K scored low on the question on a stable income. This touches on the most immediate worry of the organization to become financially healthy again. The conclusion of this exercise is that the capacity building activities for CMD-K under the SP will focus on three aspects: 1. Increasing the financial sustainability of the organization. This means help with cost cutting for sustainability in the short term and increasing capacity to fundraise for sustainability and developing the organization in the medium term. 2. Creating a strategic human resources policy. Which includes a staff training programme. 3. Developing the M&E system and to learn as an organization from past experiences. Although interaction and trust among political and between political and civil actors takes place, it is not regular or institutionalized. Actors seek interaction dependent on the issues at hand and that are in their own immediate interest. The relations between the actors are not characterized by trust or a sense of mutual understanding but are opportunistic in seeking coalitions to further their personal gains. % of political actors who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors (including government actors) at least weekly = 50% Frequency of MP collaboration with other political actors Incidence as reported by MPs (n=10) Weekly 50% Bi-Weekly - Monthly 25% Quarterly 25% Every 6 months - Once a year - Other - The average frequency of inter-party collaboration over the past one year: 21 times a year, i.e. 0.4 times a week. Quantitative description: It emerged from the study that the level or frequency of interaction between political actors and government/other political parties was determined largely by the burning issue of the day. In light of the prevailing electoral reforms discussions, this topic has dominated the types and topic of interaction/collaboration between political parties and government. Feedback from the political parties indicated that there is a high level of interaction with the frequency of interaction dependent on the thematic issue. This would range from a frequency of daily with the current debate and controversy around electoral reforms to about quarterly for other issues such as internal dispute resolution. It however was noted that the level of interest and interaction for the political actors was largely determined by political economics i.e. will the party gain materially from the interaction and less by the interests of the citizenry. Although interaction and trust among political and between political and civil actors takes place, it is not regular or institutionalized. Actors seek interaction dependent on the issues at hand and that are in their own immediate interest. The relations between the actors are not characterized by trust or a sense of mutual understanding but are opportunistic in seeking coalitions to further their personal gains. Quantitative data: 25% Frequency party collaboration with other political actors Incidence as reported by MPs (n=10) Weekly 25% Bi-Weekly 12.5% Monthly 12.5% Quarterly 12.5% Every 6 months - Once a year 25% Other 12.5% The average frequency of party collaboration with civic actors over the past one year: 19 times a year i.e. 0.36 times a week. Qualitative description: Through the inter-party consultative forums organized by CMD as well as other civil society actors, most political parties reported to having regular interactions. Most of the interaction between political parties and CSs was skewed towards interaction with CSs that were in the democratic capacity enhancement space e.g. The National Democratic Institute (NDI), Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) among others where as CSs that were focused on governance oversight appeared not to feature in the list of collaborators mentioned. Over the past one year the political debate has been dominated with reforms around the electoral process and the body in charge of the electoral process. In the last one year, Three bills have been tabled in Parliament that touch on civil and political rights. These are; (i) The Elections Laws (Amendments) (No. 3) Bill 2015 No. 3; (ii) The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill 2016; (iii) The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Amendment) Bill 2016. The three bills were introduced by the Chair of the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee (JLAC) of the National Assembly Hon. Samuel Chepkonga, meaning that they are bills from the JLAC and hence bipartisan. JLAC has members from the following ruling Jubilee coalition parties: the National Alliance (TNA), United Republican Party (URP), and New FORD- Kenya (NFK). JLAC also has representation from the Kenya National Congress (KNC), and Federal Party of Kenya (FPK) which are opposition parties. The principal object of the first Bill was to amend the Elections Act, 2011 and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act, 2011, in order to address the concerns that resulted following the general election held on 4th March 2013, which was the first under the new constitutional dispensation. Central to the conduct of the elections are the constitutional role and responsibility of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), and the Judiciary. However the delivery of the 2013 elections, like many aspects of public administration and management involved interplay of several agencies, both State and non-state actors. It is these aspects that this Bill sought to redress. The principal object of the second amendment bill is to amend various provisions of the Constitution dealing with electoral disputes. It is based on experiential lessons obtained from the challenges previously experienced (particularly the presidential election petition of 2013) in the determination of electoral disputes. This amendment seeks to provide for mechanisms that will facilitate seamless determination of election petitions. Principally the bill seeks to extend the period of hearing a presidential election petition from 14 to 30 days. The principal object of the third bill is to amend the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act (No. 9 of 2011), in order to reorganize the procedure for appointment of chairperson and members of the Commission. The bill seeks to establish a Selection Panel that shall be drawn from parliamentary parties on account of their relative strength in the National Assembly. The bill aims to have the commissioners serve on part-time basis. It provides for the formation of a seven-member selection panel approved by Parliament to recruit commissioners. That would mark a departure from the current arrangement that gives the President leeway in appointing the commissioners. Assessment of literature from parliament and Kenya Law Reports indicates that there is a fair level of involvement from CSs in various legislative processes. Total # of bills with active CS consultation in 2015 and 2016: 21 out of 65. 6 of these 21 bills with CS consultation have been assented to by the President. The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is considerable trust in political parties in Kenya. This trust is considerably lower in opposition parties (46%) than in the governing party (61%). Discussions with political party leaders revealed that all of them have published documents in one way or the other to guide their operations. Of the 27 CMD member parties surveyed, each had at least 2 policy documents. However, it could with strong probability be established that only 15 of such documents had been arrived at through input from a defined support base. Interviews among select political parties indicated that most political parties have at a minimum one of the following documents with larger political parties have multiple while the smaller parties would have 1 or none. CMD-K Board gender composition is 6 male, 5 female Divided over 8 county workshops. 143 male, 99 female NL-KVK-27189542-KEN17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 With the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for August 2017, politics in Kenya are already heating up. Issues surrounding the integrity and partisanship of the electoral commission in Kenya, the IEBC, sparked large public protests during the summer especially among supporters of the opposition coalition Cord. The stalemate ended with a negotiated outcome between the government and Cord leaders and the IEBC members were finally replaced in October. With only months to go before the elections there are many important issues the new IEBC still needs to tackle to ensure free and fair elections which are accepted by the population and the political parties. The party landscape in Kenya always turns volatile before the elections. New parties are founded and coalitions are formed. Although this process is only just starting the biggest change in the party landscape is the merger of government coalition Jubilee. The merger was planned by the leadership and it is yet to be seen how the merger will play out in the lower ranks of the parties. Reconciling some of the different interests and the always lingering ethnic tensions between the parties seems to be the biggest challenge ahead for the new party. The formation of the Jubilee party further polarizes the political landscape where Kenya now has one big party going up against a large opposition bloc, Cord. Although it is known that Cord is also exploring the possibilities of merging the expectation is than Cord is too diverse to become one party. Expectations are that this polarization between the two blocs will increase in the run up to the elections and could possibly turn nasty reminiscing of the protests in the summer and further back the 2008 catastrophe. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The SP programme will focus on lobbying political parties, government bodies, civil society and the public in the run up to the elections to promote relations between them and to defuse the tension. Implementation will be at the beginning of the year to ensure that relevant actors participate in the activities and be in time to come up with results before the elections. WPR will focus on supporting female candidates by making the parties’ candidate nomination process more gender sensitive and by directly supporting high potential female candidates by providing them with capacity support. It is expected that in this final year, the WPR programme will be augmented with an extra UNWOMEN project executed by CMD-K. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 286026 286026 Kenya budget 2017 local partner 39030 Disbursement Kenya April 2017 local partner 26904 Disbursement Kenya June 2017 local partner 89219 Disbursement Kenya July 2017 local partner 75777 Disbursement Kenya November 2017 local partner 7602 Disbursement Kenya December 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-KEN18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018 2017 was an election year in Kenya with elections for six different levels of elected positions; presidential, national assembly, women’s representatives, senate, gubernatorial, and provincial assembly. Elections were highly contested in a polarized environment between the ruling coalition which recently merged into a single political party (Jubilee party) and the National Super Alliance (NASA), a coalition of eight political parties. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) has been under intense scrutiny, especially from the opposition who questioned the commissioners’ partisanship and capacity to lead the electoral process. This culminated in the high profile annulment of the presidential elections by the Kenyan Supreme Court. This decision has been hailed around the world as an unprecedented victory for democracy and an attest to the separation of power in Kenya. The decision incited a rerun between incumbent Jubilee candidate Kenyatta and his challenger Odinga. At the time of writing the rerun has not taken place yet, they are scheduled for October 26th. Although the court decision reflects the institutional strength of democracy in Kenya it has also deepened the distrust between the two opposing sides and trust in the IEBC has hit rock bottom. 2018 will need interventions on reconciliation between the two sides of the political divide and the start of a roadmap towards increased trust in the IEBC for the next general elections in 2021. Although the different levels of elections inevitably provide a mixed picture of the political landscape, on a meta level the results can be interpreted as a victory for the Jubilee party with a majority in both the National Assembly and the Senate and victories in territories that were previously aligned with the parties that are part of NASA. The new political landscape with one party being so dominant in the national parliaments asks for an in depth political analysis to see how CMD-K as a dialogue platform can remain relevant for a dominant party. Although there is still a huge gender gap in the elected positions in Kenya there was a major breakthrough in the recent elections with three women elected in governor positions, three women senators and 22 female MPs. Despite this victory for gender equality in politics, the political parties have signalled entrenched violence against female candidates. Violence against women in politics is a threshold keeping other women from running for office. CMD-K will come to a road map towards the next general elections of how to fight violence against women and strengthen mechanisms to battle violence against women. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update A thorough political economy analysis (PEA) is planned for the beginning of November where the new political landscape after the general elections will be analysed. The PEA will involve several experts that are not affiliated to CMD to ensure that new perspectives are taken along. The final day of the PEA will be used to discuss programmatic implications and update for the SP ToC. A brief update is provided below per intervention level: System Political parties are organized along ethnic lines and are frequently used as a vehicle to power for politicians instead of presenting policy alternatives. The power division coming from the previous election shows two major blocks across from each other. Actor Political parties have little individual capacity for lobby and advocacy, and where the largest parties have capacity this is mostly geared directly to the individual direction of its leader(s). The party landscape is very fragmented and only a few parties survive their leaders, as the tendency is for secession and merger of parties as vehicles for individual leaders. As a result, manifestos are interchangeable and often there is no clear ideology or basic adhering principle to discern one party from another. Culture Kenyan media are rated as free but are frequently on a confrontational discourse. Recently, with the surge in social-media use, there have been frequent reports of fake news insinuating politicians and political candidates in smear campaigns. The space for civil society has been decreasing steadily in the past years with an increasingly repressive NGO Coordination Board. This culminated in the deregistration by the Board of two civil society organizations that contested the elections process. The relationship between media, civil society, and politicians needs to improve for a vibrant environment for lobby and advocacy in Kenya. Gender Although the two-third gender is firmly entrenched in the constitution this has not translated into a more equal political participation for women in politics. Steps have been made with three female governors and an increase in female representation in both senate and national assembly. Violence against women is a major hurdle for more women from running for political office. 3. Programme outlook System: Formulation of, proposing to, and approval of jointly formulated policies in parliament securing civil and political rights Intermediate outcome: Common issues emerging from the interparty dialogue are presented to relevant parliamentary committees Interventions: 1. Facilitate broad cross-party dialogue on priority issues: Reconciliation after the election and gathering lessons learnt and determine a path to the next elections. After the turbulent electoral year 2017 it is necessary to look back at the lessons learned of the past elections. The dialogue sessions will be centred around first of all reconciliation between the parties. Once that has happened gather some of the lessons learned and start determining a path towards the next elections. Questions that come up will be what needs to change for elections to run smoothly in Kenya. 2. Facilitate broad cross-party dialogue on priority issues: Discussing the institutional setup of the dialogue platform. Looking at the institutional setup of CMD it can be seen that many political parties are represented in the organization, all on an equal basis, while Kenyan politics is currently dominated by two blocks. On one side of the divide the opposition coalition NASA and the Jubilee party, which has a majority in both Senate and National Assembly. CMD on the other hand is governed by around 30 political parties of which the majority do not have significant political influence. These dialogue session will focus on coming up with an institutional setup of CMD which will better reflect political reality. 3. Facilitate broad cross-party dialogue on priority issues: to be determined Intermediate indicators: vi. # of agreements reached (reform agendas / policies / legal amendments) Actor: - Political actors that voice and monitor citizens interests - Improved capability of CMD for bringing political parties together in the dialogue platform Intermediate outcome: - Political parties propose alternative policy proposals and ideas that are informed by their constituencies - Political parties have more capacity to jointly advocate for relevant development issues Interventions: 4. Organise Round-tables and support for political parties to formulate policy recommendations: Interparty policy formulation workshop/retreat Organize a retreat with the party members of CMD to have a capacity-building workshop on formulating policy and to harvest important themes to organize roundtables together with experts and civil society on. 5. Organise Round-tables and support for political parties to formulate policy recommendations: Thematic round table Round table with civil society and experts to inform parties’ policies. Exact theme to be determined during workshop/retreat. 6. Provide direct policy development support based on strategic planning reports: Take stock of and update the strategic planning of the political parties Take stock of the available strategic plans of the CMD member political parties. Where do we stand with implementation? Which ones need to be updated? Which parties need to develop strategic plans? Based on that provide with a strategic planning training if necessary. 7. Support dialogue platform secretariat to facilitate and host interparty dialogue as means for joint lobby and advocacy: fundraising training for secretariat Based on the updated BART executed in 2016, fundraising was identified as one of the weak points of CMD. Therefore organize a fundraising training for the programme staff. Intermediate indicators - x. # of representatives (male/female) of political actors who have been trained in strategy development, programmatic and/or policy development skills with a focus on developing a distinctive profile - xi. # of strategy development, programmatic/policy development training activities with a focus on developing a distinctive profile, that have included a gender focus" - xiv. % execution of capacity development plans Culture: Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors. Intermediate outcomes: - Relations between political actors, both on national and county levels are improved - Better linkages, knowledge/expertise sharing between political actors and civil society and the wider public - Relations between media and political actors improved Interventions: 8. Organise consultation meetings where thematic CSO’s relevant for the committee and party leadership interact: Organise meeting on civic space in Kenya One of the pertinent issues in Kenya is the space of civil society to operate. Organize a round table meeting with civil society and political party leadership to exchange views on the importance of space for civil society to lobby and advocate or their issues. 9. Organise outreach campaign for parliamentary select committee and political party representatives: Organize a meeting in several counties on thematic issue Select a pertinent issue and organize a meeting in several counties for a parliamentary committee and political party leadership to exchange with citizens and local civil society. 10. Facilitate meet the press forums: Quarterly forum where CMD parties present their dialogue work to the press Organize quarterly meetings where the press is invited to engage with the political parties represented in CMD. Intermediate indicators: [to be determined] Gender: political processes and policymaking includes the voice of women and minority groups and the gender equality agenda receives wider support in and out of parliament. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 259460 Kenya budget 2018 local partner 26000 Disbursement Kenya March 2018 local partner 74943 Disbursement Kenya April 2018 local partner 77159 Disbursement Kenya August 2018 local partner 59703 Disbursement Kenya November 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-KEN19 NIMD Kenya Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 275506 Kenya budget 2019 55101 Disbursement Kenya January 2019 9970 Expenditures Kenya Q1 2019 87639 Disbursement Kenya April 2019 20000 Disbursement Kenya April 2019 1040 Expenditures Kenya Q2 2019 80591 Disbursement Kenya July 2019 2244 Expenditures Kenya Q3 2019 18000 Disbursement Kenya September 2019 4919 Expenditures Kenya Q4 2019 74575 Disbursement Kenya October 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-KEN20 NIMD Kenya Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 300000 Kenya budget 2020 114468 Disbursement Kenya March 2020 4141 Expenditures Kenya Q1 2020 55500 Disbursement Kenya June 2020 1569 Expenditures Kenya Q2 2020 51811 Disbursement Kenya September 2020 67022 Disbursement Kenya November 2020 27022 Expenditures Kenya Q4 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-KNO17 NIMD After the consolidation phase in 2016 using the existing knowledge and (re)capturing and updating this, the year 2017 will focus on developing several new tools and knowledge products. The start-up programmes in the Middle East will benefit from support to designing tailor-made instruments that will be based on the regular NIMD toolkit, while the FCAS approach will see deepening of knowledge in 2 of the 6 focus areas (conversion of (former) armed movements into political parties and fostering inclusive political settlements) combined with new communication products (animation and documentary). Under the innovating democracy programme two more pilots will be organised (most likely Myanmar and Georgia) plus a follow-up ‘hackathon’ in Colombia related to developing a democracy app. Moreover, building on the 2016 Innovation symposium, an expert network will be set-up that will link academia, civic-tech practitioners and politicians to focus on new forms of representative democracy and the role of political parties in this. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 12198 Disbursement Ukraine November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-KNO18 NIMD DfS Knowledge programme 2018 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 44912 Disbursement Georgia March 2018 local partner 16604 Disbursement Georgia June 2018 local partner 19056 Disbursement Benin November 2018 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-KNO19 NIMD Knowledge Agenda 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 35522 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q1 2019 77420 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q2 2019 31416 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q3 2019 153110 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-KNO20 NIMD Knowledge Agenda 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 11045 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q1 2020 37615 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q2 2020 11161 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q3 2020 1718 Expenditures Knowledge and Innovation Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-KNOINN16 NIMD In the period 2016-2020, the NIMD country programmes will remain at the heart of NIMD’s work; NIMD is convinced that transformational change processes can only be realised and sustained through country programmes. To inform its programmes, and in particular to design effective strategies that respond to complex and rapidly changing political environments, NIMD will further deepen its knowledge base, invest in its skills-set and develop tools and instruments regarding interparty dialogue, capacity strengthening, political culture, gender equality & inclusion. As part of its knowledge agenda, NIMD will also specifically work on strengthening its strategies, skills and expertise tailored to working in fragile and conflict affected settings in recognition that working in such sensitive contexts requires a tailored approach. Furthermore, to embrace new thinking about participatory democracy and the effect of modern technology on citizens’ engagement in policy and political processes, NIMD will also invest in innovation. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 440000 23755 Innovation projects 87545 Knowledge & methodology development NL-KVK-27189542-KUR16 NIMD Kurdistan programme 2016 - exploration phase Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 50000 6508 Programme expenditures 23280 Programme advise and support NL-KVK-27189542-LEA16 NIMD In the Strategic Partnership (SP) between AWEPA, NIMD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), joint learning is a key priority. The learning agenda under the SP refers to the creation, documentation and transfer of knowledge in relation to the main subject of the SP: the role of political parties and parliaments in creating an conducive environment for policy influencing. The learning agenda for the SP intends to ensure that the experiences, knowledge and best practices that are accumulated in the programme countries are not only tracked and systematically documented, but also deliberately showcased and shared between the MFA, AWEPA, NIMD and their local implementing partners. This is achieved through research and development, monitoring and evaluation, sharing of best practices, peer learning and a continuous reflection on the programme interventions in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The learning agenda under the SP provides an unique opportunity to combine and capitalise on the individual experiences of the partners, with the aim to strengthen the country programmes and where applicable, the International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) agenda. Three general learning objectives have been identified for the SP Programme: Objective 1) To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes and the innovation of programme intervention strategies Objective 2) To strengthen country programmes by deepening our knowledge base on the following three themes: - the political party-parliament nexus - the shrinking democratic space - the role of parties and parliaments in the national budgeting and policymaking cycle. Objective 3) To maximise impact through peer learning, partnerships and networking Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD AWEPA NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 200000 94924 Programme expenditures NL-KVK-27189542-LEA17 NIMD Within the SP Programme, joint learning is a key priority. In the course of 2016, a learning agenda for the SP Programme has been developed and discussed with the local implementing partners and the MFA. For 2017, the following objectives can be highlighted: Objective 1) To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes and ensure the innovation of programme intervention strategies In 2017 the focus will particularly be on drawing lessons learned with regard to the main programme interventions and the identification of best practices that can be shared between programmes. To this end NIMD and AWEPA will organise strategic reflection meetings at least twice a year at a local level and at NIMD and AWEPA HQ level. At a regional level, in 2017 a strategic reflection meeting is foreseen in Africa. Besides programmatic reflections, these meetings provide an opportunity to staff and partners to provide input to, and inform themselves on new tools and knowledge products that have been developed. Objective 2) To strengthen country programmes by deepening our knowledge base Based on an analysis of the thematic issues that characterise the individual country programmes under the SP, three core themes have been identified and discussed with the NIMD and AWEPA partners: 1) The cooperation between parliament and political parties 2) The shrinking democratic space 3) The role of parliament and political parties in ensuring that the views and opinions of societal groups are reflected in policymaking and the national budget cycle Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 20000 Disbursement Zimbabwe October 2017 local partner 15000 Disbursement Georgia November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-LEA18 NIMD SP Learning agenda 2018 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 20000 Disbursement Georgia December 2018 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-LEA19 NIMD Learning Agenda 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 5550 Expenditures LEA Q1 2019 4930 Expenditures LEA Q.2 2019 87990 Expenditures LEA Q.3 2019 18315 Expenditures LEA Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-LEA20 NIMD Learning Agenda 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 34187 Expenditures LEA Q1 2020 9459 Expenditures LEA Q3 2020 26294 Expenditures LEA Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-LEB16 NIMD Lebanon programme 2016 - exploration phase Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 50000 28756 Programme expenditures 15440 Programme advise and support NL-KVK-27189542-MAL16 NIMD MALI’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Mali is one of the least developed countries in the world, ranked 176th out of 187 on the UN Human Development Index, with an average GDP per capita of $670. Located in the Sahel band, the territory is vast and landlocked (1.2 million km2) with little natural resources and a small domestic market. This challenging development context is exacerbated by an ongoing political and security crisis that affects the whole sub-region and most visibly since 2012. That year Mali encountered both an occupation of large parts of the country by rebel and jihadist forces, and a military coup d’état deposing two-term democratically elected president Touré. In 2013, after a military intervention led by France stopped the advance of jihadi forces, there was a formal restoration of constitutional rule with the election of new president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) and a new national assembly. In addition a UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) was deployed in 2013 to maintain peace and provide security for the population. The comprehensive Peace Accord that was signed between different armed groups and the Malian government in June 2015 opens new perspectives to improve the governance situation in the northern regions and to build peace in a fragile social-economic and multi-ethnic context. However, the weak state of the political system, characterized by a few opposition parties and weak linkages to people, combined with ongoing weak state capacity to deliver basic services such as health, food security and education cause the general population to disengage from the political process. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN MALI The NIMD programme in Mali started with exploratory visits and project through a local organisation in 2002/03. After several years of support and building relations and trust, NIMD facilitated the set-up of an independent political party dialogue platform in 2008: the Centre Malien pour le Dialogue Interpartis et la Démocratie (CMDID). Since then CMDID has been the main local partner and implementer of the NIMD programme, and the host of the interparty dialogue whereby all parliamentary parties are invited, plus representation of a large group of extra-parliamentary parties. Facilitate dialogue for political reforms The NIMD programme is focussed on supporting political reforms that improve the way political parties can operate and that ensures democratic elections and policy making can take place. Important issues have for instance been the need of one (rather than three) bodies that coordinate and organise the elections, the need for better rules around the rights of the opposition in parliament, and the need to update the political parties act. Strengthen links between parties and citizens In general the Malian parties are weakly organized and do not really represent the common interests of ordinary people. Moreover, also in policy making there is little formal role, as there is little opportunity to present changes to legislation as the presidential system ensures a powerful executive with a weak counterbalance from parliament. Our programme therefore works for better organized parties that better collaborate for policy change, and to link parties to citizens and civil society to better take up their issues and represent these on the national level. Build capacity for women and youth to participate Politics in Mali is dominated by older men, often the same men who were already politically active and involved at the start of the multiparty system back in 1992, and there is little room for women and youth to play a significant role. This is mainly due to conservative mindsets and cultural practices, as well as practical means; one needs resources to be active in politics. Therefore the NIMD programme has a clear focus on both building capacity (skills, knowledge) to empower women and youth, and on engaging with men to change these perceptions and practices. Programme deviations/ToC update: At the end of 2016 the platform held elections for its steering committee, according to the principles as set out in the statutes there should be an equal representation of parties, however the smaller parties grouped together and ousted the two largest parties from the committee, these two parties subsequently withdrew their support for and participation in the platform. As this happened towards the end of the year it will primarily influence the programmes ability to perform in 2017 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. AWEPA Malian Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMDID) NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 308959 7345 Programme monitoring 30000 programme advise and support 308959 Budget Mali local partner 67087 Disbursement Mali January 2016 local partner 147903 Disbursement Mali April 2016 local partner 99258 Disbursement Mali August 2016 local partner The prospect of the Algiers Peace Agreements has provided a new mechanism for co-operation between political actors and civil society to have exchanges and suggest proposals to make improvements to regional policies. Political actors and civil society have been highly consulted with respect to changes to the Agreement. Some points of convergence between certain politicians and civil society have been noted, although the actors from the two sides have been engaged separately. Consultations have also taken place between certain parties and CSOs condemning the institutionalisation of interim authorities, although generally speaking these points of convergence have not been the subject of reconciliation. The explanation for all of this would be how fragile co-operation is in the first place as well as the need for each actor to discuss the matter for visibility's sake rather than actually proving to be an influential factor on decisions The # of draft laws which have been amended as a result of dialogue between the parliamentary majority and the opposition Currently there have been no draft laws submitted to vote which were the result of a harmonisation of the various points of views held by parliamentarian groups and in support of government actions and the opposition. Additionally, no formal dialogue structure between groups within the National Assembly is in place. As part of the CMDID platform two draft laws have been submitted for debate since 2015 between the majority and the opposition: the electoral law and political party charter. The political parties have duly considered the content of the laws and suggested modifications, with the draft law having been submitted to the National Assembly for due amendment and voting on. The CMDID Foundation and AWEPA have succeeded in implementing a monitoring committee made up of MPs and political leaders, whose mandate involves advocating for due consideration of the proposed changes to the platform by MPs. Afrobarometer results are based on public opinion polls. The following questions were put forward to participants: "Are you confident in the party currently in power?" and "Are you confident in the opposition parties?" 59% of people who responded stated they were "Partially confident" or even "Very confident" in the party currently in power, with 43% saying they were confident in the opposition parties. All of the MPs interviewed said they did not see the political environment as conducive in terms of being able to produce laws, pointing to the following factors: - The power held by the executive branch versus that held by the legislative branch, with the former controlling what is on the agenda for parliamentary sessions as well as restricting parliamentary legislative initiatives. - The high rates of MP turnover after each legislative election, preventing the continuity needed to work on producing laws. - Problems tied in to the recruitment of parliamentary staff, which is based more on candidates' political affiliations rather than their actual skillset, resulting in staff who are not qualified to support MPs in their legislative mandate. - Practical problems concerning MPs: outside of members of the parliamentary Leadership and committee Chairs, MPs do not have actual physical offices where they can perform legislative tasks, nor do they have support staff, with parliamentary assistants being solely assigned to standing committees. Regarding parties outside of parliament, recent experience shows they have often played the role of catalyst for reform without actually initiating things in this respect owing to the above-mentioned difficulties in terms of proposing laws. Quantitative data: Results Max C1 Commit and Act 4.4 5 C2 Deliver Results 3.9 5 C3 Adapt and Self-Renew 3.5 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4.3 5 C5 Balance coherence and diversity 4.7 5 Results Max C1 Strategic planning 4.6 5 Leadership 5.0 5 Healthy financial position 3.5 5 C2 Human resources 3.9 5 Infrastructure 3.7 5 Efficiency 5.0 5 Effectiveness 2.9 5 Relevance 3.5 5 C3 Understanding Contexts 4.0 5 Flexibility 5.0 5 Adequate PM&E 2.3 5 Encourage learning 2.8 5 Up-to-date communication 3.7 5 C4 Alliances 3.0 5 Legitimacy 4.0 5 Integrity 5.0 5 Accountability 5.0 5 C5 Strategically coherent 5.0 5 Consistency 5.0 5 Balanced Stability 4.5 5 Inclusiveness 4.3 5 Level = medium Exchanges between MPs and civil society are frequent and occur mainly within the framework of the standing committees who invite CSOs to hearings for relevant legislation (e.g. the law on the creation of the National Observatory of Cities was subject to intense consultation between the Law Committee and civil society). Contact likewise also occurs via parliamentary thematic networks such as the Women Parliamentarians' Network (REFEP), who frequently consult with CSOs on gender-related matters and activities. Lastly this contact also occurs at the personal initiative of MPs, who are requested by CSOs on a daily basis to advocate for causes against other parliamentarians. Nevertheless, the quality of these interactions is not optimal as they remain quite formal and restrictive (as they are only for specific legal texts). Outside of Parliament co-operation between political and civic actors is difficult and almost non-existent. Relationships are not institutionalised and mutual suspicion and manipulation is common. It should be noted nevertheless that the CMDID has involved civil society organisations in all of its activities starting from 2013 and takes into account civil actors' contributions when considering political matters. This experience is behind the above statement that no sustained, organised co-operation is in place. Level = Medium (2) All of the MPs interviewed stated they regularly work together with governmental actors. Contact in this regard occurs as part of their work as parliamentarians, with government members being present during Parliament plenary sessions and frequently summoned by standing committees. The actual frequency with which this happens is down to the parliamentary schedule, with contact on a daily basis occurring when Parliament is in session. Moreover, this contact happens as a result of MPs' personal initiatives, who frequently meet with political actors from the government or from their own political parties. However, actors from political parties have noted that even though they regularly work alongside MPs, the latter do not always toe party line, with priority being given to their own personal interests. NL-KVK-27189542-MAL17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Since 2012 Mali has been facing a fragile political and security situation due to armed rebels and jihadi groups in the northern and central regions supporting various political agenda´s from independence to illegal trafficking. In 2015 a peace agreement was signed which opened up an opportunity for a political settlement of the crisis. However, violent attacks continue to occur as the United Nations multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) attempts to contain the conflict. The inability of the authorities to control the fighting led to the dismissal of the Minister of Defense this year. In 2016 mixed patrols, whereby Tuareg rebels and the government work together to prevent Jihadi groups from gaining control of geographical areas, have been established. However their existence has been hampered by the fact that interim authorities are still yet to take office, even though legislative provisions have been made. Also this year a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process is slowly being initiated, but here the weak levels of trust among the stakeholders including towards the UN are slowing down the process. At the same time the government and political parties continue to struggle to fulfil their political roles, this was highlighted when four leading member of the majority party joined the opposition in September after accusing the government of bad governance and incompetence. Also, local elections will be held on 20 November 2016 and this has raised questions concerning the areas in which the Malian government is not represented, not only logistically but also legitimacy of the chosen government thereafter will continue to be questioned. The elections also highlight displacement of the population in the north. Notwithstanding these challenges the peace agreement remains the backbone for stabilization of the country because it contains important reform initiatives for a redefinition of political governance in Mali. A national conference will take place in late 2016 to enable stakeholders to form a unified view on specific reform issues. In 2017 a review of the constitution is also expected to take place. Mali also recently adopted a law providing for a 30% representation of women in the general and local assemblies recently. The upcoming local elections will serve as the first application of the new law, this is a first step towards gender equality, and access to decision making, as other legislation and cultural norms continue to subjugate women. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The reform initiatives being undertaken for the peace accord offer important opportunities to ensure more inclusive participation in national processes. The challenges of inclusivity that Mali faces currently manifest themselves in the 'national accord conference´ and the constitutional review process, both of which are needed for effective implementation of the peace agreement, and both require ownership and acceptance by the broader population to be successful. However the government and the international community are struggling to implement these processes inclusively and this speaks directly to the work of our programme in Mali in 2017. The objective of the NIMD 2017 program is to help ensure inclusive participation in these national processes to formulate clear and broadly supported policies. This includes the use of advocacy and communications to express the different views and interests of the population as well as explain the content of political documents to political stakeholders. The theory of change remains valid as it focusses on creating democratic process for institutional and constitutional reform that guarantees inclusion so that the population recognizes itself in both the reforms and in the action of the political and ruling elite. Interventions will specifically focus on dialogue between the political parties and outreach to citizens to increase their participation in the above mentioned political processes. In addition special attention will be given to women and youth participation in these processes to ensure broad support for the outcomes. Furthermore, to ensure a broader funding base and more sustainable future for the local partner CMDID, capacity strengthening activities will focus on their fundraising abilities. NIMD will work with CMDID to develop the technical and strategic capacities as well as network to obtain funding from a range of donors. update. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 13685 Disbursement Mali January 2017 local partner 223420 Mali budget 2017 local partner 40000 Disbursement Mali May 2017 local partner 63025 Disbursement Mali June 2017 local partner 103193 Disbursement Mali July 2017 local partner 4187 Disbursement Mali November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-MAL18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018: Axis a- The Political System A large majority of Malians saw the 2012 crisis as an opportunity for major change in governance. The citizen mobilization observed during the draft constitutional revision illustrates the frustration of a large majority of Malians with the failure to meet its political expectations. Immense challenges have put the Malian state to the test since. And keep the country in a state of fragility that makes observers question the prospects of consolidation of the democratic process. The resolution of ‘the issue of the North’ and the return of peace and stability remains the main preoccupation for most Malians. The complexity of this situation creates doubt among many Malians. The upcoming general elections (mid 2018) will take place in a context of fragility and suspicion. That is, if we can go by the current accusations related to electoral register and the doubt over the integrity of the electoral authorities. The search for consensus on such issues is an important condition for peaceful and credible elections. Furthermore, the dissatisfaction of a large majority of the population creates a sense of openness of the electoral process. The political leaders consider that there is not clear favourite candidate. This situation leaves many candidates with a hope of winning the elections. Which in turn increases the possibilities for disputes and claims. In addition, mobilisation and voter participation will be an important issue in the upcoming electoral process. Traditionally, voter participation is poor. Ttoday’s level of disappointment can aggravate that. It is therefore important to work on this dimension. The government's willingness to organize local and regional elections is an important step inspiring confidence. On the other hand, recurrent territorial claims of the Tuareg populations have now created a sense of regionalist belonging throughout the country. This translates in growing demands of the populations of different cercles to turn their constituencies into regions, with the objective of acquiring a certain autonomy with regard to their administrations. Axis b- The actors The political context remains dominated by three actors: parties, civil society organizations and religious movements. After the 2013 presidential and legislative elections, the partisan context showed a democratic dynamic, with the emergence of a majority movement and political opposition. A flexible political polarisation has persisted over the past four years, and has allowed a certain animation of the political life after the decade of consensus. It helped raise interest of the population politics. This dynamic needs reinforcing by promoting genuine debates on national public policy issues. This with a view to ensure that expectations of different national currents get a voice and get taken into consideration. Moreover, social media brought new protesting dynamics. They offer an new outlet for the frustrations of the populations and occupy the political space, to the great displeasure of the parties. Young people, mostly non-militants of traditional partisan structures, took the centre stage. The evolution of religious movements on the political scene is also seen as a loss of credit in the political actors. However, religious leaders seemed to appreciate the challenges put up by the youth associations at their true value. These youth movements have warned religious leaders to refrain from venturing into the political field, at the risk of a systematic discredit. This situation must provide an opportunity to open discussions on the nature and the sphere of the religion and the political. This to assess the formers limits and evoke the principles and rules that govern the State. A reflective and self-critical relation on the basis of constitutional principles must exist between the two actors, in order to safeguard secularism and the Rule of Law enshrined in the 1992 Constitution. Axis c- Political Culture The political culture is characterized by the lack of appropriation of democratic principles and rules, both at the level of the actors and the population. Extreme poverty and low levels of education represent obstacles for citizens to take part in the political process. Moreover, political debate and balanced information is not always accessible. This because it takes place behind closed doors, for lack of means or linguistic reasons. Ever-increasing corruption and unfulfilled electoral promises have contributed to de-politicization and public disinterest in public affairs. This culture of resignation is reinforced by the fact that an important fringe of the political class is primarily in search of personal profit at the expense of meeting public expectations. Any change in this situation requires a fundamental work of education and citizen awareness. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update (max 2 pages) Provide a narrative update on the problem analysis and the Theory of Change in light of the political update. Explain if the ToC as described in the MAP is still valid, or whether there is a need to adapt the Theory of Change, and if so, in what way. - 3. Programme outlook (max 4 pages) a. Political system Objective - An institutionally and politically conducive environment for political stakeholders Results a.1 - An assessment of the current political system, with consensus on its conclusions The rejection of the draft constitutional revision does not mean that a majority of the combined political class and civil society remains critical about our political system and inadequacies. There is agreement that Mali needs system reform. Several attempts at constitutional revision have however failed, for reasons of procedure or substance. CMDID wants to draw inspiration from these failures, and open the debates on the shortcomings of our political system in order to define the weaknesses and to propose relevant tracks of reforms in connection with the socio-political evolution of the country. Interventions: A combined academic-political approach, in which CMDID sets-up an ad hoc think-tank, composed of political, institutional and civil society actors, and it will seek broad, national consensus on the conclusions. Result a.2 – Deepened understanding of the challenges of decentralisation to regional level, in relation with populations’ concerns The strengthening of the mandates and responsibilities of the regional councillors bring about the need to take into account aspirations of the populations, not at the central but at the regional level. The concerns and aspirations need to find translation in the regional development programs. CMDID wants to play a role at this level, with a view to strengthening the relationship between elected officials and the public. Intervention: pilot project facilitating exchanges on the prospects of collaboration between populations and elective bodies, based on experiences from other countries. Result a.3 - A political consensus on the conditions for the organization of elections The repeated modification of the electoral law and the fragmentation of decision-making and management in the electoral process form grounds for suspicion and contesting at each election. The fragility of the political context increases the risks of a political breakdown. This calls for stakeholders to dialogue on the shortcomings of the process (law and regulations, organizational structures, etc.) and agree on the mechanisms and organizational conditions of these elections. Intervention: the foundation offers its platform for political and institutional actors to agree on actions that can help to hold credible and peaceful elections. b. Political actors General objective - Actors are accountable and develop policies based on social expectations Result b.1 – Stronger capacity of political actors in electoral matters CMDID initiates training modules based on the electoral law and trains party resource persons, with particular attention for vote tallying monitoring. Experience from parties in the region (Ghana) will help to craft systems to compile and tally the results at political party level. The aim of the exercise is to support efforts to limit chances of electoral fraud, and enhancing the case for solving electoral dispute in court (rather than through violent protest). Intervention: CMDID develops a training module & trains party resource persons, combined with a short exchange mission to Ghana. Result b.2 - Political actors contribute to the mobilization of voters through sustained and programmatic communication The political space claimed by civil society and other actors through social media warrants that political parties rapidly catch-up in the use of digital tools. The use can primarily aim to better respond, and use them proactively as a support for their electoral offer. Intervention: CMDID initiates a training program on the use of social media, an on their integration in political parties’ global communication approach. Result b.3 - Political parties commit to peaceful elections The 2007 and 2013 Code of Conduct has proven useful in informing activists and voters and promoting a constructive attitude in the electoral process. The commitment contained in the Code of conduct is that parties opt for litigation rather than challenging elections on the streets, which is a good springboard to prevent electoral violence. Intervention: With support of other international partners, CMDID develops an updated edition of the Code. Result b.4 – Amendment of the Political Party Charter, based on reforms prepared through the CMDID platform Tightening the conditions for the creation of political parties and the capping of campaign expenses are among the measures proposed by the political class for the revision of the Charter. Moreover, the delicate question of CMDID access to public funding also requires an amendment. Intervention: CMDID works with the Government and the National Assembly so that the different proposals of the political class all well interpreted by these institutional actors and the parliamentarians take their considerations into account. Result b.5 – CMDID’s financial and technical capacity improves The sustainability of CMDID depends on the diversification of its funding sources and the adaptation of its status to the realities of the legal context. In this sense, CMDID is developing an organizational and institutional development plan that will serve as reference for initiating a reform of the foundation. The adoption of the Law on Foundations now frames the analysis of the structuring of the foundation and points towards pertinent measures of reform. Similarly, the search for the extension of the foundation's partnership base in order to increase funding opportunities remains a priority objective. Intervention: CMDID goes through a process of internal reform, sustains its fundraising efforts, and evaluates the organisational development goals. c. Political culture General Objective - Promoting democratic principles and values Result c.1 - Electorate mobilised and voter turnout increases compared to previous elections CMDID plans to undertake a civic education programme on the roles and responsibilities of the various actors in the electoral process and the need for voter participation. This program aims to equip community leaders and party activists with understanding of institutions, the rights and duties of citizens towards the latter, and the process of electing representatives and office holders. CMDID plans to undertake this campaign with support from other international partner(s), office holders and opinion leaders, and uses local radio and local languages to pass its messages and reach its audiences. Intervention: civic education programme. Result c.2. National election debates In parallel, political parties take part in political debate in the national media, addressing both bottlenecks in the electoral process and items from their political programs. This allows political actors to share their analysis and, in particular, present their programs. The opportunity will also be used to call upon the public to ensure the electoral process is peaceful. Intervention: national radio election debates. Result c.3 – Potential political leaders learn about democratic values and skills The entrenchment of democratic values and principles has failed since the start of the democratic process in 1991. CMDID intends to set up a Democracy School to offer political actors and aspiring political leaders the opportunity to familiarise themselves with democratic ground rules and acquire skills for their participation in the democratic political process. This specific process will take place in ad hoc training sessions with participants selected in collaboration with political parties. Intervention: creation of the Democracy School and an initial series of sessions. d. Gender & diversity General Objective - Improvement of gender participation and representation Result d.1. - Law No. 052 of 18 December 2015 establishing measures to promote gender in access to nominative and elective functions is known and applied CMDID works with Gender Watch Commissions and representatives of Party Youth Networks in five regional capitals. They benefit from institutional support to continue the lobby towards political party leadership, electoral bodies and State representatives of the State in the regions. The lobby focusses this year on wide dissemination of the law aiming at understanding and application of its provisions during the next elections. Intervention: lobby support to Gender Watch Commissions and Party Youth Networks in five regional capitals. Result d.2. – Women and youth participation and representation becomes a national issue Gender and youth are considered as a cross-cutting theme in CMDID’s approach. CMDID will dedicate radio debates, both at the regional and local level, to the issue. These debates allow zooming in on the bottlenecks. Intervention: technical advice and media support for Gender Watch Commissions and Party Youth Networks. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 305000 Mali budget 2018 local partner 30500 Disbursement Mali January 2018 local partner 153862 Disbursement Mali February 2018 local partner 60000 Disbursement Mali July 2018 local partner 59617 Disbursement Mali September 2018 local partner 50000 Disbursement Mali October 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-MAL19 NIMD Mali Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 513317 Mali budget 2019 259138 Disbursement Mali Programme 2019 21124 Expenditures Mali Q.1 2019 25103 Expenditures Mali Q.2 2019 28678 Expenditures Mali Q.2 2019 250000 Disbursement Mali July 2019 237000 Disbursement Mali October 2019 26138 Expenditures Mali Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-MAL20 NIMD Mali Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 493194 Mali budget 2020 98000 Disbursement Mali Programme 2020 61849 Expenditures Mali Q.1 2020 125000 Disbursement Mali Programme April 2020 12051 Expenditures Mali Q2 2020 194080 Disbursement Mali Programme July 2020 35838 Expenditures Mali Programme Q3 2020 67114 Disbursement Mali Programme October 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-MEN19 NIMD MENA region Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 1069 Expenditures MENA Q1 2019 712 Expenditures MENA Q2 2019 37245 Disbursement MENA June 2019 46771 Expenditures MENA Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-MEN20 NIMD MENA region Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 84277 Budget MENA 2020 54248 Disbursement MENA February 2020 570 Expenditures MENA Q1 2020 48 Expenditures MENA Q3 2020 31110 Expenditures MENA Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-MMR16 NIMD MYANMAR’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Since 2011, Myanmar has gradually been returning to civilian rule, cumulating in historic nationwide elections held on November 8th, 2015, and the subsequent installation of new parliaments 3 months later. Over the past few years, a series of social and economic reforms were launched in Myanmar, opening up the country to the global community after a long period of isolation. At the same time, the country is still trying to end conflict with some of its numerous ethnic groups. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN MYANMAR Together with Demo Finland, NIMD started working in Myanmar in 2014. The programme in Myanmar has two key aims. The first is to help the politicians from all the political parties to enhance their knowledge and skills for working in a democracy. The second is to develop the practice of collaboration. The programme works on both of these aims by running the Myanmar School of Politics (MySoP), an intensive retreat lasting up to one month, held at a secluded location. During MySoP, politicians from different parties discuss and learn together in a multiparty setting. During 2014 and 2015, these schools have been held in Shan State, Mon State, and Tanintharyi Division, with Kayin State and Kayah State added in 2016. MySoP is followed by activities for its alumni. These activities provide an opportunity for the politicians to keep coming together to learn and practice interparty dialogue. Bram Steenhuisen is Demo Finland’s and NIMD’s Country Representative in Myanmar. In an interview with Demo Finland he gives an insight into the school’s activities. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. Demo Finland Demo Finland NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 333197 54500 Disbursement Myanmar Nov 2016 local partner 10574 Programme monitoring 37500 programme advise and support 333197 Myanmar budget 2016 local partner 45834 Disbursement Myanmar February 2016 local partner 45026 Disbursement Myanmar March 2016 local partner 44019 Disbursement Myanmar June 2016 local partner 45123 Disbursement Myanmar July 2016 local partner The most recently available 2015 Asiabarometer measures public trust in institutions in Myanmar. A small portion of Myanmar citizens expressed a ‘great deal of trust’ in various political institutions, with a larger portion expressing the other positive category, ‘quite a lot of trust’. There was considerable variation in the trust of different institutions, with the executive, military, and NGOs receiving the highest trust, and police and courts the lowest level of trust across institutions. Cross-national comparisons of the trust in political institution showed Myanmar’s low trust levels in the executive, police, courts and military, while the low trust level of parliament was on par with other countries in the region. We choose the level of trust in parties as our baseline measurement, collapsing the categories “a great deal (7%)” and “quite a lot (36%)”. Quantitative data: On a scale from 1 to 4, the baseline measurement score is 2: political actors hearing the concerns of constituency, but not able to change policies. The values related to different scores are the following: 1- political actors not hearing the concerns of constituency; 2- political actors hearing the concerns of constituency, but not able to change policies; 3- political actors hearing the concerns of constituency, with some ability to change policies; 4- political actors hearing the concerns of constituency and able to change policies. Qualitative description: In Myanmar, political actors at state/regional level seem to experience that their concerns are heard however they are not able to change policies within their parties. This is mostly related to the quite hierarchical and top-down structure of political parties in Myanmar and in Myanmar society at large. Policies, as far as they exist, are written at headquarters and political actors do not have a lot of influence in this process. Quantitative data: 4 (out of a total of 26 documents studied) Qualitative description: In Myanmar the # of political documents is rather limited, many parties do not have a manifesto or election programme. Furthermore some political documents are classified or their location is not made public. Some political parties do not have websites or sometimes their websites cease to exist, making it even harder to access information. For that reason we have felt pressured to accept the fact that we could only include a limited # of official political documents and extended the way to measure this indicator meaning also to include (a limited # of) Facebook and media statements. For this desk research 26 political documents have been collected from 15 political parties in Myanmar. The political documents included in the research are election manifesto’s, party’s policies, stance and work programmes that are public declaration of principles, aims, organizational attitudes and planned activities, these account for 54 percent. The other 46 percent of the studies documents are other political documents such as proclamations or directives. The collected information from different sources was used to check against whether the party made reference to the party’s engagement with its constituencies through a consultation moment in order to gain inputs for producing such political documents. Documents have been selected from these parties: Zomi Congress for Democracy, Democratic Party (Myanmar), National Unity Party, Union Solidarity and Development Party, Pa-O National Organization, Kachin State Democracy Party, Lisu National Development Party, Wa Democratic Party, Kayin People’s Party, Lahu National Development Party, Kokang Democracy and Unity Party, National League for Democracy, Mon National Party, Arakan National Party and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. When studied, only 15 percent – 4 documents – of a total of 26 political documents suggest that they have inputs from particular constituencies through consultation moment for particular issues. These documents were issued by the Zomi Congress for Democracy, National Unity Party, Pa-O National Party and Kachin State Democracy Party. They all are in the category of election manifesto, policy, stance and work programmes. Obviously, the political documents issued by the political parties basically all show an interest in their constituencies. All the issues, sectors and social classes shown in the policy documents all address issues those common in any similar countries. The same is true of other political documents such as proclamations, directives and official requests that express public expectations and demands on their behalf. The rest of the collected political documents accounting for 75 percent – was made up of policy objectives, work plans and other forms of party’s statements. The 75 percent documents issued by both nationwide large/small Bama and ethnic based parties have a # of things in common: • The election manifesto declares a lot of issues to be addressed and a great # of sectors and social classes to be improved and social infrastructure to be developed. They include the promotion of democracy and human rights through constitutional amendment, establishment of federalism, improvement of legislative and judicial bodies and gender equality. Such sectors as agricultural, fishery, forestry, industrial, service provision, national defense and security, international relation, macroeconomic, investment and public administration are intended to improved, and also the document aims at narrowing the gap in socioeconomic conditions between urban and rural areas through the development of social infrastructure. In addition, the document focuses on the interests of workers and peasants through social welfare provision and the importance of preserving national characteristics. Even the USDP, military affiliated ruling party at that time, declares the amendment of the constitution and promotion of human rights. • The manifesto is general and vague. Despite the description of the issues to be addressed and things to be improved in its presented declaration, it lacks the discussion about how each issue has been brought to the party, how to achieve these goals, prioritization among them and timeframe. • When provided by some parties, the work plan along with policy ambition does not show how to achieve the particular aim, but more likely to be policy declaration again. Myanmar political dynamics are characterized by polarization and mutual distrust caused by recent history as well as unfamiliarity with the concept of multiparty dialogue. The levels of trust and engagement between political and civic actors are equally low, and the ruling party exerts a high level of control over the political arena. In general there is a general lack of inclusive consultative mechanisms, both party members as well as people from all parts of society are excluded from influencing policies. Furthermore there is no clear linkage between parties and their MP’s, leaving parties out of influencing the decision making process. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to make general surveys among party members in Myanmar. There is strong sense of superstition towards international (democracy) support actors for trying to influence the Myanmar transition it is difficult for an organization to ask about these matters, this needs to be carefully prepared well beforehand. As we did not want to jeopardize our emerging reputation of a trustworthy and impartial organization by asking all kinds of ‘delicate’ questions to party members without having ample time to prepare them, we chose to interview those political party members who were participating in our programme and to whom we could explain why we were asking those questions. It is for that reason the sample size is not too large. However, we do hope to broaden the # of participant for the mid-term measurement after three years. Less than 2 of the 17 participants of the Myanmar School of Politics-core course who indicate that they collaborate with other political actors (including government actors) at least once a month only 4 of the 17 participants of the Myanmar School of Politics-core course) who indicate that they collaborate with civic actors at least once a month 32 male and 20 female NL-KVK-27189542-MMR17 NIMD 1. Political update During 2016, U Htin Kyaw (NLD) was chosen by parliament to become the 9th president of Myanmar. He formed a cabinet consisting of 21 union ministers In addition to NLD affiliates, U Htin Kyaw’s cabinet features two union ministers from the former ruling party USDP as well as one from the Mon National Party. These were elected in the 2015 elections and were subsequently elevated to become union ministers. The new president also founded two new entities – the State Counsellor office and that of Ethnic Minister office. Democracy icon and NLD chairperson Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (barred from the presidency by a controversial clause in the constitution) became the first ever State Counsellor, a new position created to circumvent the constitutional restriction and in effect elevate her above the president. In addition to U Htin Kyaw, two vice presidents were chosen by parliament, one from the USDP (previously the largest party) and one from the NLD (currently the largest party following a landslide victory in the 08 November 2015 elections). The nature of this new cabinet is in stark contrast with that the cabinet of former present U Thein Sein, (2012 - 2016) which consisted of 38 union ministries, with all union ministers coming from his USDP party. Both vice presidents also hailed from the USDP. Pinpointing the achievement of a national ceasefire as the new government’s number 1 priority, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi took up the lead of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), inviting ethnic armed groups who didn’t yet sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The 21st Century Panglong Conference has started in August 2016, a highly anticipated gathering where parties are hoping to hammer out a peace agreement. In preparation for the Panglong conference, 17 out of 21 invited ethnic armed groups came together to discuss 4 issues: discussion and endorsement of the Panglong manual; adoption of basic principles regarding security and defence; and amendment of the framework for political dialogue. This kind of co-operation was unthinkable in the recent past. At the conclusion of the new government’s first 100 days in office it faces some criticism from analysts saying that parliamentary sessions lack substance, are dominated by the speaker’s tight control. Critics also claim that the new government has produced few clear policies (amongst them a nationwide ban on commercial logging), especially in regards to business regulations. June-July also saw two religious riots occurring in the country, a constantly lingering threat to stability and inclusive progress. Heavy rain also caused flooding in parts of Myanmar with newspapers accusing the new government of being slow to respond. Squabbles between ethnic political parties and between ethnic political parties and the NLD continue to bubble under the surface. Efforts and discussions between smaller (ethnic) parties to merge have not yet let to any concrete results. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The Myanmar School of Politics is a joint programme of NIMD and partner organisation Demo Finland and will in 2017 be focussed on the following elements: MySoP Core Course (MySoP-CC) – three core courses in 2017 The MySoP core course focuses on strengthening the democratic role of political parties in a cross-party setting by enhancing democratic skills, knowledge and praxis. MySoP in principle works with political parties at the region/state level. With the MySoP core course we aim to enhance regional politician’s capacities and constructive, policy oriented engagement in politics. By offering members of political parties the opportunity to meet and work together in a multiparty setting both during and after the training sessions, the core programme promotes the establishment of a political culture of multiparty dialogue. Alumni activities (MySoP- AA): two in 2017 After completing the MySoP core course, graduates are invited for regular MySoP alumni activities, mostly 3 day-sessions. Linking MySoP alumni with each other across regions furthers peer-learning by providing the space to discuss common challenges and opportunities By furthering cross-regional contact, these activities also nurture collaboration and help strengthen alliances between like-minded parties. By enabling party members from the same party to get to know each other across states and region also strengthens the national fabric of political parties. At least one of the planned alumni sessions will feature the issue of programmatic parties. Multiparty Dialogue Platforms (MySoP-MDP) After careful preparation and assuring buy-in in 2016, 2017 will see the start of the first MySoP Multiparty Dialogue Platform in Shan State. The platform will host and facilitate a cycle of meetings and initiatives aimed at exploring innovative cross-party approaches and solutions to economic, social or political challenges at the state/region level. The process towards setting-up an additional platform in another state will also commence in 2017. International learning agenda: In 2017 one exchange will be held between Myanmar politicians and Indonesian politicians as well as a representative group of the alumni of NIMD’s former ‘democracy schools’-programme in Indonesia. Most probably the topic of this exchange will be decentralised governance. The ToC that was developed is still valid. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 282399 74761 Disbursement Myanmar Febuary 2017 local partner 282399 Myanmar budget 2017 local partner 44858 Disbursement Myanmar June 2017 local partner 70000 Disbursement Myanmar July 2017 local partner 22500 Disbursement Myanmar November 2017 local partner 43000 Disbursement Myanmar December 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-MMR18 NIMD Political update 2018: The first 6 months of second year of the current NLD led government featured some hopeful signs alongside serious, remaining challenges to a peaceful and prosperous future of Myanmar. On the elections front: On 1 April 2017, bi-elections were organised in the country which were widely assessed to be free and fair. NLD secured 9 out of 18 seats, in contrast to its 79% overall victory two years ago. The party lost in three of the four ethnic areas it contested. The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) won six seats in Northern Shan State, USDP won two seats in Eastern Shan State and Mon State, the Arakan National Party (ANP) won a seat in western Rakhine State and the All National’s Democracy (AND) Party won a seat in eastern Kayah State. On the political parties front: Two new political parties registered with the Union Election Commission (UEC) in the first half of 2017, the Myanmar People’s Democratic Party and the Arakan League for Democracy. Both are nationwide political parties. A number of other new political parties are preparing for registration with the UEC, amongst them one that is led and coordinated by Ko Ko Gyi, a well known and respected key player of the 88 generation student movement. During the same period, two Kayah parties (Kayah Unity Democracy Party and All Nationals’ Democracy (AND) Party Kayah State) merged under the new name as “Kayah State Democratic Party”. On the peace and security front: The year started with the assassination on 2017 of, U Ko Ni, the long time legal advisor of the National League for Democracy and architect behind the creation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s State Counselor position. This assassination in broad daylight at the airport of one of the country’s best known muslim citizens caused a sense of insecurity amongst the progressive/academic/muslim communities. The serious security and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar’s troubled Northern Rakhine state, home to the country’s Rohingya ethnic minority, continued in 2018. A UN report published in February noted that the situation could amount to crimes against humanity and possibly ethnic cleansing, an allegation strongly denied by the Myanmar government. This back and forth of accusations continued throughout the first half a year in 2017, and is accompanied with protests on the streets in Rakhine around visits of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Ms. Yanghee Lee and her subsequent, highly critical statements to the media and UN human rights council. Apart from the human suffering, the ongoing Rakhine crisis continues to seriously harm both Myanmar’s image on the world stage, as well as complicating the reputation of the UN and international NGOs, especially those providing assistance to the Rohingya communities. The situation deteriorated dramatically during late August, September and October. The alleged killing early August of at least 59 innocent people resulted in 20 political parties lead by the USDP to make an announcement urging immediate action on Northern Rakhine violence. After the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked police posts late August the Tatmadaw retaliated forcefully, causing over half a million people in the region to flee to Bangladesh amidst reports of serious human rights abuses, with the UN’s top human rights official calling the operation a ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’. State Councellor Aung San Suu Kyi drew intens international criticism for her perceived silence on the crisis and failure to criticise the army operation. The crisis also unleased a new wave of nationalism with practically all national media outlets towing the official line on the Rakhine crisis. The majority of the public appears to support to support the army’s operations in Rakhine State or at least the government’s official stance, and feels misunderstood by the international community, which focusses its attention on the faith of the half a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and unknown numbers in the North of Rakhine, not on the few thousand non-Rohingya IDP victims of the conflict (the opposite is the case in the national media). This has led to a heightened suspicion amongst the general public that international humanitarian organisations and NGOs are ‘supporting the terrorists’, as alleged in the media and even the government itself. The strain of the ongoing instability, compounded by the perceived lack of a grand economic strategy of the new government has become visible in the economy as well, with the world bank publishing data showing real-term economic growth in 2016 at 6.5%, down 1.3 percentage point from a year earlier. The same report revised downward the expected economic growth for Myanmar in 2017 from 8.4% to 6.9%, with a slowdown in exports and FDI being the main causes. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 170600 Myanmar budget 2018 local partner 75018 Disbursement Myanmar January 2018 local partner 105000 Disbursement Myanmar March 2018 local partner 35656 Disbursement Myanmar May 2018 local partner 72000 Disbursement Myanmar July 2018 local partner 4100 Disbursement Myanmar August 2018 local partner 92118 Disbursement Myanmar September 2018 local partner 90158 Disbursement Myanmar November 2018 local partner 4099 Disbursement Myanmar Consultant fee August 2018 local partner 4162 Disbursement Myanmar Consultant fee October 2018 local partner 3030 Disbursement Myanmar Consultant fee November 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-MMR19 NIMD Myanmar Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 435500 Myanmar budget 2019 87100 Disbursement Myanmar January 2019 4734 Expenditures Myanmar Q1 2019 59802 Disbursement Myanmar April 2019 10823 Expenditures Myanmar Q.2 2019 188871 Disbursement Myanmar Q.3 2019 5927 Expenditures Myanmar Q.3 2019 63348 Disbursement Myanmar October 2019 17976 Expenditures Myanmar Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-MMR20 NIMD Myanmar Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 239514 Myanmar budget 2020 9768 Expenditures Myanmar Q1 2020 66104 Disbursement Myanmar April 2020 8016 Expenditures Myanmar Q2 2020 165154 Disbursement Myanmar August 2020 4026 Expenditures Myanmar Q3 2020 67600 Disbursement Myanmar November 2020 -289 Expenditures Myanmar Q4 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-MOZ16 NIMD MOZAMBIQUE’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND Mozambique became independent in 1975. After a long and bloody civil war between rebel movement Renamo and the Frelimo government, a Peace Agreement was signed in 1992. With the Peace Agreement, Mozambique adopted the system of multiparty democracy. For a long time, Frelimo and Renamo dominated the political arena in Mozambique, with Frelimo being overwhelmingly dominant and holding an absolute majority in parliament. In 2009, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) entered the political scene and presented itself as a new political force. Despite more than 20 years of peace and relative stability, the civil war between Renamo and Frelimo still shapes the political reality of today. The ruling and main opposition parties still tend to see each other as enemies. This can be seen in the political discourse and makes it difficult for them to reach consensus. Since 2012, the political tensions between ruling party Frelimo and former rebel movement Renamo have been rising, resulting in low-intensity confrontations between the government and the opposition. Mozambique’s rapid economic expansion over the past 20 years, which is mainly a result of the booming natural resources industry, has had only a moderate impact on poverty reduction and the distribution of wealth. This has led to increased social discontent and political confrontations. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN MOZAMBIQUE NIMD’s work in Mozambique started in 2000. The programme activities mainly focus on trying to reduce the tensions between the parliamentary parties and tries to create space for dialogue and constructive collaboration. The programme facilitates training on dialogue skills for the members of the parties and stimulates the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders (civil society organizations, church leaders and the international community). Capacity strengthening The programme furthermore aims to contribute to a safe environment for elections by facilitating dialogue sessions between the political parties and the electoral management body (CNE), In order to enable the political parties in Mozambique to contribute in an effective way to electoral activities, NIMD supports the parliamentary political parties to strengthen their organizational and programmatic capacities. The basis for these activities are the multi-annual strategic plans of the parties that were developed with support of NIMD. Democracy Schools In the current tense political climate and economic situation, the voice of the citizens in Mozambique often remains unheard. Citizens, local authorities, and political leaders often have insufficient capacity and incentives to initiate and maintain constructive and inclusive dialogue and interaction. To foster democratic behaviour and facilitate the creation of space for dialogue and cooperation between citizens and local authorities, NIMD facilitates democracy education programmes at provincial level. The democracy schools in Mozambique promote active citizenship and strengthen citizen engagement in local governance through practical leadership training programmes. By doing so, NIMD aims to contribute to the creation of a new generation of young politicians with democratic values and with the skills to act as agents of change. Programme deviations/ToC update: In 2016 Mozambique the critical situation the country has been experiencing in the recent years continued. This had to do with political events, which were made worse by the public debt situation which has lead the country to a historical financial crunch. These events have influenced the implementation of several of the activities in the programme. The political parties, particularly those not involved directly in the military political conflict, were proactive in the discussions during the programme events and brought proposals to the table as solutions to the political situation. Despite a great deal of momentum in regards to political dialogue, in practical terms, no tangible and concrete results leading to the creation of a climate of closer rapprochement or political stability between the parties has been produced. The evidence of this is the fact that during one of the negotiation breaks (8 October) one of the members of the negotiating team from Renamo party was shot dead. The atmosphere of political tension abated following telephone conversations between the President of the Republic and the President of the Renamo at the end of December when they decided to give truce in the armed conflict during the festive season and later extended it for further 60 days (to the end of February 2017). The issue of public debt dominated the public debate and had a strong impact on the activities, as the government institutions marked as key partners in the activities were showing some fear of interacting with political parties. Nevertheless, it was possible to include them in some activities as demonstrated in the matrix. Some thematic activities did not take place as planned due to the tense political environment the country is going through. Instead the theme of the activities was changed to other relevant, less contentious issues. In this period, we can conclude that the relationship between the political parties and civil society has improved significantly due to a consensual national agenda that consists of re-establishing political and democratic stability. Here it is important to highlight that in the previous government, there was strong interference from political parties in the midst of civil society. This situation created great mistrust on both sides. However, because of the political crisis, there has been a convergence of opinion, with both political parties and civil society calling for a sustainable peace solution. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. AWEPA NIMD Mozambique Demo Finland NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 319878 37500 programme advise and support 8891 Programme monitoring 319878 Mozambique budget 2016 local partner 53315 Disbursement Mozambique March 2016 local partner 79769 Disbursement Mozambique June 2016 local partner 153494 Disbursement Mozambique September 2016 local partner Quantitative data: 0% for opposition parties and 100% for civic actors Do not see as partners See as partners All Political actors Who consider governing party as partner All opposition parties (n=6) 100% (2) 0% (0) RENAMO (n=4) 100% (4) 0% (0) MDM (n=2) 100% (2) 0% (0) Final result of the indicator for opposition parties 0 All CS stakeholders (n=7) 0% (0) 100% (7) Final result of the indicator for CS stakeholders 7 Qualitative description: The political actors have a problem of trusting each other. This is particularly complicated when it comes to establishment of working partnership between RENAMO and FRELIMO. The two parties recognize that their political history has had a major effect on developing an effective working relationship. RENAMO members interviewed stated that FRELIMO was not open and interested in promoting democratic policy dialogue within the country, and was not prepared to accept outside FRELIMO policy inputs, especially when it came from the opposition party such as RENAMO which they consider to be a long term enemy. The information collected reveals that despite the mistrust between the two parties, during the time of President Joaquim Chissano administration the political environment was significantly conducive for the opposition parties’ collaboration with the ruling party/government in many important policy processes. They understand that during that time the two parties were always able to find common ground and interests in order to work together for the benefit of socio-political and economic development of the country. They consider that this good political working environment deteriorated since President Guebuza and continued with the new elected President Mr. Nyusi. Additionally to the current political and economic and governance problems which Mozambique is experiencing, this started during the second term of President Guebuza. The political environment for the opposition parties to operate freely and collaborate on common developmental policy have become structurally and systematically limited. An example was the arrest of a senior member of RENAMO, Mr. Antonio Muchanga, just after the meeting of members of the State Council at the presidential office. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Muchanga was both an MP and a member of the state Council, which in fact gave him political immunity, but this was immediately removed in that meeting. The political actors interviewed from RENAMO believe that been the two major political actors in the country an eventual collaboration in policy making and implementation is critical. But eventually collaboration would be possible after the two parties have reached an agreement on the political and military national conflicts causes, such as the decentralization/provincial autonomy process, and the Joaquim Chissano Conference Center conversations (which was stopped after the outbreak of the military attacks by government forces and opposition parties). Contrary to the perception of RENAMO, the political actors from the FRELIMO perception is that the political environment is conducive for the political actors to collaborate in policy making and implementation process and, Mozambique have all legal-framework to allow the opposition parties to operate freely since they political actions are based on the national constitution. The FRELIMO Political actors also said that they always open to receive new policy ideas and inputs from all national political and developmental stakeholders. However, they highlighted that the problem is the opposition parties who are not prepared and also do not have the capacity to actively participate in national politics using democratic means. The MDM on the other hand indicated that their relationship with FRELIMO is not healthy. Further their relations with FRELIMO are often complicated, especially at local, provincial, district and municipality levels were the MDM is in power as such as Nampula, Quelimane and Beira. In terms of working relationship between MDM and RENAMO, the MDM members interviewed revealed that their relationship with RENAMO is at lower level but does not necessary have a great impact on political activities of the both parties. Although political parties recognize the gains of collaboration in Mozambique, not all political actors see each other’s as partners in the process on development and implementation of legislation. Data reveled political actors from the opposition do not perceive the ruling political party and MPs as their partners (67% RENAMO, 33% MDM). Only FRELIMO (100%) consider other parties and MPs as partners. Political actors (mainly MPs) and civic actors see each other as important partners in the process of policy making and implementation, with 100% of both actors seeing each other as partners in process of policy making and implementation to enhancing a national inclusive and sustainable socio-political and economic growth and development. There has been some successful policy collaboration and partnership between civic political actors. The civic actors were able to strongly influence the processes. Some laws that have been passed in the parliament and enacted by the executive which were proposed by civil society, for Instance, the Law against Domestic Violence (2009) and the new Family Law (2004) were both suggested by the civil society. Although the civil society views political actors as partners they are aware that challenges still exist and improvements are required, especially when it deals with issues of trust and partnership with the MPs from the ruling party and the government. The civic actors revealed and criticized the ruling party’s MPs and government because of some cases in which laws and policy formulation were approved and adopted by the government based on top-down approach, ignoring all possible inputs from the civil society. The interviewed civic actors also revealed that their participation in policy making and implementation has deteriorated since the period the opposition parties stated (the second terms of the President Guebuza and continue to President Nyusi government). Since then they perceive that the government and national parliament often does not respect the existing mechanisms of policy dialogue among government and civil society. The room given to civil society for contributing in policy making and implementation is getting limited; the time usually allocated to them is not enough to provide sound inputs. For instance, the scholars interviewed in this baseline study feel that in significant cases they were consulted for a practically policy making process but most of their inputs were not integrated into the final product in the form of implemented policy. The civic actors revealed that they relationship with government becomes challenging after the civil society national agenda had shifted from simple humanitarian developmental services delivery organization but also to extend their interests in economic and governance agendas. This was mainly significant in increasing social inequalities and poverty while the wealth of the country is continually concentrated in the minority (political elite of FRELIMO). With the discovery of natural resources, the civil society have significantly increased their demand for good governance, inclusive and sustainable resources development and management policy which would allow the government and state to be transparent and accountable to its citizens. Quantitative data: 0% Not Enabling Partially Enabling Enabling All SC actors (n=7) 71% (5) 29% (2) 0% (0) n=5 n=2 n=0 Academics 100% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0) NGOs 50% (2) 50% (2) 0% (0) Final result of the indicator 0% (0) Qualitative description: The collected information reveals that the government of Mozambique recognizes civic actors as key partners in the process of building inclusive and sustainable political and socio-economic development and this is reflected in the national constitution. Furthermore, they recognize that civic actors’ have the right to participate in democratic policy dialogue with government. However, in spite of an existing national comprehensives legal-framework and formal mechanisms to promote civic actors’ participation in the policy making and implementation process, the level of trust and collaboration has deteriorated significantly in the past years. The civic actor understanding is that the political environment for their participation is very limited and that there is an increasing level of political intolerance and intimidation of different actors who think differently to government or the ruling party. Civic actors and academics feel that they are consulted in order to legitimize the process. However the government does not necessary take their input into a consideration within the policy making process. Additionally, the civic actors believe that the government is not interested in communicating and promoting a dialogue about key aspects of the national development policy. Some of the individuals who were interviewed revealed that the reason for this deteriorating relationship is mainly because of the current economic and political governance challenges that are ongoing in the country, specifically the prolonged political-military conflict (involving RENAMO armed-men and the government military-forces). The recent economic financial public scandals, such as the public debit, EMATUM and unclear military material deals have been some of the main reasons for the conflict. Other aspects on which civic actors and academics believe that government has become more intolerant in the last few years include the contention regarding the possible decentralization of government, the attempt of prohibiting civic protests related to social discontent such as socio-economic grievances, corruption and the exclusion of citizens within a democratic process, and the increasing cases of kidnappings and unexplained assassinations (Professor Gilles Cistac, Persecutor Marcelo Vilankulo and the recent shooting of the scholar and TV political commentator, Prof. Jaime Macuane). This data reveals that despite the achievements of the recognition of civic actors in the political process within the national constitution, the level of political engagement and collaboration between government and civil actors, is still low. Furthermore the political environment is characterized by fear and insecurity, which creates a context of distrust between the actors, further fuelling a tradition of non-collaboration between various stakeholders in the political process. Quantitative data: 40% Not Enabling Partially Enabling Enabling All Political actors (n=10) 50% ( 5) 10% (1) 40% (4) n=8 n=1 n=1 FRELIMO 0% (0) 0% (0) 100% (4) RENAMO 75% (3) 25% (1) 0% (0) MDM 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) Final result of the indicator 40% (4) Qualitative description: Both FRELIMO and RENAMO acknowledge that the working environment between them has deteriorated over the years, more so since the last presidential and legislative elections. In order to restore the positive working relationship between RENAMO and FRELIMO there are many important aspects that would need to be addressed first at a high political level by the two parties and government. These aspects include the causes of political and military conflicts (such as decentralization/provincial autonomy) and reaching a security and peace agreement on the Joaquim Chissano Conference Center conversations. The MDM also indicated that its relationship with both RENAMO and FRELIMO has not been healthy. Further the relation with the ruling party has often been complicated, especially at local, provincial, district and municipality levels. The collected information reveals that there is also a lack of trust among the opposition parties (MDM and RENAMO), for instance only on a few occasions have they been able to reach consensus in parliament. An example of this is the case of 2012 where the two parties were able to join forces and vote against a government/ruling party law proposal regarding the Public Probity Law. Quantitative data: 3.7 (5C average) Commit and act 3.7 Deliver results 3.3 Adapt and self-renew 3.6 Attract and relate to external stakeholders 3.9 Balance coherence and diversity 3.9 Qualitative description: The results of the organisational assessment scan demonstrate that the IMD Mozambique is perceived to be relatively strong organisation with a broad range of capabilities thanks to the transference of experienced staff and fundamental resources from NIMD country office. The organisation scores particularly high on the i) ability to relate to external stakeholders, with 3.9; ii) balance coherence and diversity, 3.9 and iii) Capable to commit and act with 3.7. The relatively lower scores, although not bad, corresponds to the i) capability of adapting and self-renewing with 3.6 and capability of delivering results with 3.3. In general, the strengths of the organization reflected on the high score of the many dimensions were inherited from the NIMD-CO performance. More specifically, the participants indicated that the IMD Office is considered to be a strategically effective organization with consistent programs, has good leadership composed by national board members, develop and implement relevant programs and integrity political situations and challenges. Based on the previous NIMD office, the staff have proven to be able to deliver results according to the plans. These qualities also became clear in a recent appraisal done by the Finnish Embassy for another programme which classified IMD has having strong HR capacities for the program implementation, although some improvements has to be done on HR policy. Besides these strengths, a # of points for improvement were also mentioned. E.g. the approval of an adequate HR policy, the organisation has to put in place sufficient risk policies, more encouragement of learning, the source of funds has to be diversified; simple and participatory M&E system; more flexibility on the decisions of the NIMD-HQ related to the resource mobilization. With regard to external communication it was pointed out the need to give more visibility of IMD as an autonomous Mozambican organization although always important to advertise the natural partnership with NIMD. It was also given the suggestion to move forward with the previous idea of creation of a communication plan and media strategy. In that regard in the coming months IMD will have to create its website to profile its activities and intensify relations with media. # of types of collaborations between MPs and political actors or CS stakeholders that are perceived as being active Figure 1.2: Types of collaboration between different actors according to the qualitative information collected in the interview Different actors Not active Partially active Active Ruling party/opposition parties ● Opposition parties themselves ● Opposition parties/ Civil society ● Ruling party/Civil society ● MPs /Civil society ● Qualitative description: The political actors that were interviewed identified three mechanisms of collaboration between them, namely: (i) Sharing of information, (ii) Consulted meetings and (iii) joint activities. The civil society organizations that were interviewed identified five mechanisms of collaboration among them and with political actors, namely: (i) Development of laws; (ii) Participation in debates, (iii) Participation in consultation sessions, (iv) Provision of capacity to some parties and through (v) Providing inputs to the electoral manifest for some politic parties. All of the respondents (politics actors, MPs and civil society stakeholders) stated that they collaborate with each other. These actors have a similar perception about the level of collaboration between with each other, for instance 70% of political actors view their collaboration with civic actors as being active and 30% of them as being partially active. Likewise, 71% of civil stakeholder’s have an active collaboration with political actors, while 29% think that their collaboration is partially active. Although evidences from the field indicate there is active collaboration between civic and political actors, this collaboration does vary between actors. In the current legislative term, most MP’s from RENAMO and MDM indicate that they consult civic actors mainly on imminent legislative debates, meaning that frequency of this collaboration varies from occasion to occasion. While there are peak periods such as during the electoral season, when laws proposals are under discussion, both political and civic actors tend to collaborate more intensively. However, there are times when collaboration is required but challenges arise which prohibit effective collaboration. Most representatives from the opposition political parties and civil society pointed out several challenges that limit their collaboration with the government. These challenges were traced back to 1994. The main challenge identified includes the claim that the process of peace building, democratization and decentralization was imperfect which mainly benefited the ruling party and excluded other key political actors such as RENAMO. The representatives interviewed believe that this is the reason for of the current socio-political and economic inequalities as well as military conflicts in Mozambique. Furthermore, despite the progress made in some areas no political space for government, political and civil actors to work together has been established in the country. The Mozambican state and government has not yet consolidated an adequate system of checks and balances in governance processes; within the decentralization process of power and institutions this has also not been completed yet. Participants also regard the judiciary system as not being totally independent from government interests. Furthermore, the lack of a culture of sharing information and the lack of skills of most political and civil actors was considered to be a key barrier to greater engagement between various stakeholders. Although Political actors stated that they have a close collaboration with civic actors, civic actors claim that such collaboration is conditional on the interest coming from the political parties. Whereas collaboration tends to be more difficult when it is requested by civil actors. Civil society organizations indicated that they faced challenges of having their plans or request for information accepted by politic parties which shows certain levels of mistrust, even though their request may be accepted at a later state. They also stated that they often used informal channels to access information from political actors. Thus one conclusion that can be made is that civil society organizations may be serving the interests of specific political parties. Despite the above mentioned challenges civil society organizations have collaborated with political actors in the development of many laws such as the law against domestic violence (2009); Family law (2004); revision of the criminal code (2014) as well as participating in debates, consultation sessions, collaboration through capacity building of party members and have also given inputs to the electoral manifesto of some politic parties. On the basis of the information that was collected, it is concluded that the collaboration between the political parties, as well as that between civil society and political parties, still needs improvement. Further, more space for formal dialogue and for the increased inclusion of civil society stakeholders needs to be established or used effectively in order to allow for better collaboration in the process of policy development and implementation. Quantitative data: 0 Qualitative description: The collected information reveals that there is no political document, such as a manifesto, election program, position paper or policy proposal approved or adopted by political parties based specifically on the inputs from a defined support base (such as women and youth league party representatives). The key finding is that the three political parties (FRELIMO, MDM and RENAMO) despite the fact that both their youth and women members are of the opinion that they are significantly included in political party activities through formal mechanisms, such as through youth and women leagues. However, they believe that their inclusion is still not sufficient to ensure that their particular interests and demands are met. Political activity is still regarded as man’s activity and age is a key determinant for assuming political leadership. Furthermore, women and youth believe that their participation in critical decisions processes of their political parties is still weak. These groups did not indicate whether their parties had policies in place aimed at enhancing effective political participation of women and youth. In addition to the lack of policy, it was also revealed that the process of inception and implementation of women and youth political inclusiveness takes a linear form which is developed at a central level and cascades to their leagues, with their role being to follow up and implement orders coming from the central level. The women interviewed also revealed that their parties’ strategies and documents inceptions and implementation was not reflective of what had been discussed with them and their inputs. NL-KVK-27189542-MOZ17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 The first half of 2016 saw continued deterioration in Mozambique’s military and economic crisis, with increased attacks on the road which links the North and South of the country. Increasing public debt contributed to the country’s financial and economic crises. Parliament has been actively involved in discussions on the political and economic situation, with those holding seats in their provincial assemblies appealing to their constituents to end the violence. A parliamentary commission was established to deal with the public debt issue and it has called upon government to explain how this debt was contracted without Parliament’s approval. There have also been several civil society protests calling on government and the main opposition, RENAMO, to end the military attacks. Intimidation of civil society activists has been on the rise with reports of murders and attempted murders. While attacks continue, the situation is improving amidst internationally mediated negotiations brought in at RENAMO’s request. The hope is that the parties involved in the negotiations reach consensus as soon as possible. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update There has been no obvious cause for deviation from the programme and ToC. If anything, the developments in the country have re-enforced the need for the programme and demand for support from programme partners has increased. Civil society is being further marginalised, as evidenced by their exclusion from the negotiation processes where they are not allowed to participate even as observers. Together with partners, the programme will be better positioned to closely assess the programme’s relevance within the context of the ToC at the start of the second year of implementation. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 100000 Disbursement Mozambique March 2017 local partner 90677 Disbursement Mozambique October 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-MOZ18 NIMD Mozambique Programme 2018 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 137256 Mozambique budget 2018 local partner 137256 Disbursement Mozambique April 2018 local partner 68628 Disbursement Mozambique September 2018 local partner 21242 Disbursement Mozambique October 2018 local partner 46256 Disbursement Mozambique November 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-MOZ19 NIMD Mozambique Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 574000 Mozambique budget 2019 75000 Disbursement Mozambique Programme February 2019 96493 Disbursement Mozambique Programme February 2019 1288 Expenditures Mozambique February 2019 163098 Disbursement Mozambique Programme May 2019 1592 Expenditures Mozambique Q.3 2019 166686 Disbursement Mozambique October 2019 10284 Expenditures Mozambique Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-MOZ20 NIMD Mozambique Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 542000 Mozambique budget 2020 75000 Disbursement Mozambique Programme February 2020 3027 Expenditures Mozambique Q1 2020 200000 Disbursement Mozambique Programme July 2020 196292 Disbursement Mozambique Programme November 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-PEE17 NIMD DfS Peer leaning programme 2017 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 4494 Disbursement Ukraine November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-PME16 NIMD Measuring concrete results of programmes aimed at strengthening capacities of political actors and democracy has over time shown to be rather challenging. Despite substantive investments made in the last decades, instruments and methodologies remain limited. NIMD attaches great value to Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) and continuously invest in developing and refining tools and innovative approaches to improve their ability to measure results. Trial-and-error is needed to strengthen the measurement of the results of our programmes because the work we do is, due to the many external (political) factors that influence it, not easily planned or measured. NIMD will carefully follow innovations in the field and invest in research and development of new ways to capture change brought about by their programmes. In addition to that, NIMD will invest in the capacity building of local partners for PME and the development of new tools and instruments for data collection. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 99900 17009 PME activities - SP 40000 PME advise and support - SP 27873 PME activities - DfS 40000 PME advise and support - DfS NL-KVK-27189542-PME19 NIMD PME DfS Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 15118 Expenditures DfS PME Q1 2019 24006 Expenditures DfS PME Q2 2019 1833 Expenditures DfS PME Q3 2019 12742 Expenditures DfS PME Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-PME20 NIMD PME DfS Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 9914 Expenditures DfS PME Q1 2020 19697 Expenditures DfS PME Q2 2020 8080 Expenditures DfS PME Q3 2020 9934 Expenditures DfS PME Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-POS17 NIMD In 2017, NIMD will continue to leverage the current programme (results) to attract new funding. The new fundraising strategy identifies key donors to target including United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada and Switzerland, while the ongoing efforts aimed at the EU will hopefully result in the submission of a successful proposal for the expected EU global call for support to political parties. The increased focus on positioning NIMD in Brussels will continue, but expand to the aforementioned donors. Also, research will be done into potential non-Western donors, for NIMD programmes in South East Asia. The target will be to generate 28% of the NIMD funding income from other sources than the Ministry. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 5000 Disbursement Ecuador August 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-POS19 NIMD DfS Positioning 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 9310 Expenditures Positioning Q1 2019 9587 Expenditures Positioning Q2 2019 8889 Expenditures Positioning Q3 2019 13124 Expenditures Positioning Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-POS20 NIMD DfS Positioning 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 53060 Expenditures Positioning Q1 2020 14382 Expenditures Positioning Q2 2020 10053 Expenditures Positioning Q3 2020 55553 Expenditures Positioning Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-SAH20 NIMD Zimbabwe Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 380499 Sahel budget 2020 76000 Disbursement Sahel February 2020 1636 Expenditures Sahel Q1 2020 208851 Disbursement Sahel July 2020 95648 Disbursement Sahel October 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-SAL16 NIMD EL SALVADOR’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND El Salvador is located in the northern part of Central America, and is part of the so called Northern Triangle together with Honduras and Guatemala. The three countries face a lot of similar challenges especially in the area of security. Socio economic situation Although the economy has steadily increased over the last decade in El Salvador, a large proportion of the population continues to live in poverty and the level of unemployment remains high. Young people and women are even more vulnerable to the socio economic situation. Furthermore, the country experiences some of the highest crime levels of the world. On top of that, climate change poses a serious challenge for El Salvador, because it is particularly vulnerable to extreme climatic events such as hurricanes, floods and droughts. As a result, tensions around sufficient clean water supply have built up. The country is dependent on Guatemala and Honduras for its water supply. Democratic system Over the last decades, the democratic system of El Salvador has been dominated by two parties : the conservative right-wing party ‘Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)’ and the ‘Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)’, which transitioned from a guerrilla movement to a leftist political party. After an initial domination of the political landscape by the ARENA party from 1989 until 2009, in 2009 the FMLN managed to win the elections for the first time and subsequently installed the first left-wing government in El Salvador. In February 2014, the FMLN won the elections again with a very narrow margin. In March 2015, elections took place for the Legislative Assembly, the Central American Parliament and the municipal governments. For the first time in history Salvadorans chose plural or multi-party municipal councils (before that the ‘winner takes all’ system was applied). These elections also had another new feature: for the first time a quota regulation of 30% for women was applied for the electoral lists. Despite a high perception of corruption and friction between the judiciary on the one hand and the presidency and legislative assembly on the other, the democratic institutions are perceived to be functioning reasonably well. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN EL SALVADOR NIMD’s work in El Salvador started at the end of 2012. As a result, the programme was focused on preparing the political parties for the changes in the electoral system for the 2015 elections. In light of the changes in the electoral law for the municipal elections, NIMD developed a ‘train the trainers programme’ for all political parties on dialogue skills and consensus building: important skills to have to ensure governability at local level. NIMD did this in coordination with other organizations. Inclusion of underrepresented groups In its work, NIMD pays special attention to the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics. The establishment of the quota regulations was an important step forward in Guatemala and resulted in over 30% of women elected in the Legislative Assembly. NIMD supports capacity building of women politicians through an intensive training course for women politicians from all political parties and from national and local level. Furthermore, NIMD seeks to contribute to a democratic culture where the rights of women and men are respected. We do this by investigating the barriers that hamper political participation of women and by exchanging best practices on gender sensitive policy and legislation. Capacity building of youth Young people tend to shy away from a career in politics, not seeing the possibilities that the political arena offers to positively influence important decisions about the future of the country. NIMD is in the process of establishing a Democracy School for young people from political and civil society to prepare them for their careers. At this school they will be able to practice democratic skills and behaviours and learn how to speak, listen and debate with mutual respect and focus on programmatic content. Environmental Dialogue NIMD also facilitates dialogue between civil society and political actors on issues related to environmental governance and security, such as water management. This approach is part of our Democratic Dialogue for Environmental Security programme. The programme is implemented together with Cordaid and is being carried out in El Salvador, Colombia and Guatemala. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD El Salvador NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 143000 15200 Disbursement El Salvador Dec 2016 local partner 20000 programme advise and support 2115 Programme monitoring 143000 El Salvador Budget local partner 19949 Disbursement El Salvador February 2016 local partner 34338 Disbursement El Salvador May 2016 local partner 25378 Disbursement El Salvador July 2016 local partner 3128 Disbursement El Salvador July-2 2016 local partner 48471 Disbursement El Salvador October 2016 local partner Quantitative data: There are 4 new mechanisms for greater engagement by political and civic actors. Qualitative description: From the research undertaken, the 4 new mechanisms identified are: 1. A Multiparty and civil society youth dialogue platform functioning in El Salvador as result from the youth training course developed by the NIMD in 2015. Youth from four out of five political parties represented in the National Parliament are represented in this platform: ARENA, GANA, PDC and PCN, and there are two civil society youth platforms represented: National Youth Assembly (ANJ) and the Intersectoral Coordinator Pro Youth of El Salvador (CIPJES). The platform’s main goal is to coordinate, plan and execute actions and/or joint strategies to promote the strengthening of youth structures within the political parties and youth civic platforms and to provide training and support the political decision making process towards youth. It is currently defining its mode of operation and its work program. 2. A National Committee for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 from United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security. This mechanism was created in 2014 by Executive Decree No.74. It is an interministerial and multi-actor working group to make policies and rule proposals entitled to ensure compliance with R1325 and its subsequent resolutions. The National Committee is composed by three main structures: a Board of Directors, a Technical Monitoring Committee and the Standing Advisory Group. The Board of Directors is made up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Ministry of National Defense; Attorney General's Office (FGR), Public Prosecutor’s Office (PGR), National Institute for Women Development (ISDEMU) and 3 non-governmental organizations, including Prudencia Ayala Feminist Coalition. Currently the National Action Plan is being developed with NIMD and UN Women support. 3. Management Group for the Multiparty City Councils (CMP by its Spanish name). It is currently composed of the Under Secretary of Governance, the National Development Foundation (FUNDE), the Central American University Jose Simeon Cañas (UCA), Social Initiative for Democracy (ISD), the Foundation for Local Development and Municipal Strengthening of Central American and Caribbean (FUNDEMUCA) and the NIMD. Its goal is to coordinate actions for the effective implementation of multiparty city councils that exist since 2015 as a result of a change in legislation. Currently an assessment of the CMP’s first year of implementation is being developed. 4. Electoral Evaluation Workshop. First held in 2015 by the Electoral Supreme Court, with the participation of political parties’ representatives, civil society organizations, government agencies and universities. It was supported by NIMD and other organizations such as the OAS, A-WEB and International IDEA. They were organized in 11 working groups for two days. The objective is to organize an evaluation seminar after each electoral event. Quantitative data: There are 4 published political documents. Qualitative data: From the research undertaken, the 4 published political documents identified are: 1. A draft treaty on transboundary waters between Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (policy proposal). ACTOR: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This policy proposal has been prepared by Salvadoran environmental organizations led by CEICOM, who are working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other political actors such as the Environment and Climate Change Commission, Salvadoran Deputies from the Central America Parliament, and other political and civil actors from Guatemala and Honduras. 2. A General Water Law proposal is under review at the Environment and Climate Change Legislative Commission. There are 3 proposals as input for the study: One has been made by the Water Forum (environmental NGO’s network), one submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) and one by the Association of Irrigators from Atiocoyo (representing the private enterprise interests). 3. Women Parliamentary Group has agreed a Consensus Agenda for the 2015-2018 Legislature, and it has been built including inputs received from different actors, such as: ISDEMU, women's organizations, Attorney General's Office (FGR), UN Women and UNDP. The Agendas’ validation process was supported by NIMD. 4. Memory built for the 2015 Electoral Evaluation Workshop, which includes the main findings and recommendations proposed during that process. All of these published political documents have been supported by NIMD. The most recently available 2015 LatinoBarometer measured public trust of respondents in political parties overall. Collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is very low trust in political parties in El Salvador. In El Salvador NIMD operates a small country office since 2013. The office is currently represented by a staff of three people, composed of the country director, a programme manager and an administrative official. This team is supported by a political analyst with elaborate experience and a broad network of contacts in El Salvador´s political society. The country office works closely together with a # of other organizations and institutions, both national and international. During 2014 and 2015 NIMD has worked to build relationships with all political parties, especially those represented in the Parliamentary Assembly. It has also fostered relationships with other key stakeholders related to the areas of work of the Institute. Among them may be mentioned: 1. State institutions: Legislative Assembly, especially the Commissions of Environment and Natural Resources and of Women and Children, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Institute for the Development of Women (ISDEMU), Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (INJUVE), Association of Municipalities of the Republic of El Salvador (COMURES), National Institute of Municipal Development (ISDEM), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2. Non-Governmental Organisations: ASRPODE, Water Forum, El Salvador Environmental Alliance, GAIA, CEICOM, CEPRODE, ISD, FUNDE, FUSADES FEPADE and FUNDEMUCA. 3. Academic institutions: UCA, Universidad de El Salvador (UES) and Evangelical University of El Salvador. 4. Development cooperation entities: EU, AECID, USAID, GIZ, Canadian Embassy, Embassy of Chile, Embassy of Mexico, UNDP and UN Women. 5. Regional Entities: SICA y PARLACEN. Due to the diminishing attention for Central America, it is hard for the NIMD office to obtain additional funding. NIMD has established relations with the main donors and will continue to pursue additional funding opportunities. The SP budget is small, and that means that the activities are quite limited in scale as an important part of the budget is spent on operational costs. Quantitative Data: 4.1 (5C average) Capabilities Results Max C1 Commit and Act 4,3 5 C2 Deliver Results 3,9 5 C3 Adapt and Self Renew 4,1 5 C4 Attract and Relate 4,2 5 C5 Balance Coherence and Diversity 4,2 5 Qualitative Description: The office is well established and managed in a short period of time to estaliblish a good reputation with the political parties and national and international organizations. Currently the office is in the process of getting its national registration. This registration will broaden fund raising possibilities. The office is small. That means that it can easily adapt to changed circumstances and it is flexible in its way of working and responding to emerging needs. At the same time the size of the office is also vulnerability. Much depends on the ED and with the limited amount of staff it is hard to attend a surge in activities which for example happened after the office got additional financing from the Canadian Embassy. One of the measures that have been taken is to establish a network of experts and consultants that can be called upon. However, this means depending on external factors, the office itself has only limited possibilities to reorganize its work. The budget does not allow for elaborated human resources policies. Security of staff, information and the office is important. It was not easy to find an appropriate office in San Salvador. There has been an attempt of theft and as a result additional safety measures have been taken. Quantitative Data: 1 active alliance has been identified during the measurement period Qualitative Data: From the research undertaken 1 active alliance has been identified: 1. Alliance between political actors has been established regarding the electoral and political reform, specifically for the effective implementation of Multiparty Municipal Councils in 10 municipalities included in the “El Salvador Safety Plan” elaborated by El Salvador´s Government. The members of this alliance are: the Under Secretary of Governance, ISDEM, COMURES and 10 municipalities prioritized in that referred Plan. This alliance is being supported by UNDP, AECID-FUNDEMUCA and NIMD. Their main goal is to provide technical assistance and training to municipalities for the proper functioning of the local government working together with the opposition parties within the councils with emphasis on policy dialogue and consensus negotiation skills. The survey covered representatives from the 4 parties that NIMD regularly works with. Of the 9 political actors consulted, 78% indicate that they work regularly with others The Transborder Basin Treaty Proposal The interparty youth table, representing the 4 political parties with parliamentary representation at a national level, 4 male and 1 female. Foucs on youth topics. In 2016 3 interparty meetings were organised: 1 interparty youth table meeting to prepare a communication campaign to promote youth participation in politics, 1 interparty meeting to create a network of political women, 1 with the Comision de Medio Ambiente y Cambio Climático de la Asamblea Legislativa to compare Latin America's Water Laws as a support to create and approve a Water law in El Salvador 1) Transborder Basin Treaty Working Group, consisting of 3 CSO's and NIMD, 3 male and 1 female 2) Municipal Councils Support Committee, consisting of 3 political actors, 2 development cooperations and NIMD, 3 male and 5 female, focussing on the implementation of the multiparty municipal councils in the municipalities prioritised by the Plan Safe Salvador 3) Multiparty and civil society youth table, consisting of 4 political parties, 1 CSO and 1 CSO Youth Platform, 13 male and 4 female. 126 women and 136 men This includes 334 female, 230 male, 1 LGBTI, 498 political actors and 67 CSO representatives. The capacity building activities consisted of: 1) democracy schools (36 graduates) 2) legal warranties for women political participation workshop (39 women), 3) training of trainers workshop (22 women) 4) compared experiences on water management workshop (28 men and 14 women) 5) workshop on political communication without gender stereotypes (9 men and 16 women) 6) workshop on political communication with MP's, Gender Unit of the Congress and Congress Advisors (1 men, 31 women) 7) Workshop on political communication for young political actors (33 men, 5 women), 8) Workshop on political communication with women politicians (67 women) 9) dialogue training in the municipals councils framework (39 women, 56 men) 10) dialogue training to 10 municipal councils (50 women, 79 men), 11) dialogue and negotiation moduel within the women politicians training (40 women) Of the 8 civil actors that we work with within the SP, 6 of them qualify the willingness to interact of political actors on a 10-point scale with a 6 or higher. The average score is 6.37 11 women. 24 men, 1 LGBTI NL-KVK-27189542-SAL17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 The political situation in El Salvador is quite stable. Two main political parties (Arena and FMLN) dominate party politics. The difficulty is that they do not reach consensus on the most important issues the country is facing: lack of security, and the state financial and economic situation. The parties make these issues part of party politics and fight each other over them in detriment of the country. In El Salvador there is no popular/youth movement or demonstrations like in Guatemala and Honduras that are demanding greater transparency and the fight against corruption. There is however a substantial part of the population that has fallen out with national politics and do not believe in the system anymore. In El Salvador the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court issues sentences on a regular basis denouncing the violation of the constitution. This has led to important changes in legislation and policy, also in the political party and electoral legislation. It is however a missed opportunity for the political parties and the Electoral Tribunal that they do not take the initiative themselves to propose changes in the political system in order to enhance its representation; at this moment they only do so responding to the sentences of the Constitutional Chamber. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The ToC for El Salvador is still valid. NIMD continues to support the implementation of the multiparty municipal councils, working effectively in a coalition with the State and with other national and international organisations. It also keeps working on reducing the barriers for female political participation, with special attention for the position of women in politics at local level. Furthermore, NIMD supports the Strategic Agenda of the Women Parliamentary Group in its efforts to enhance gender sensitive legislation. As El Salvador has a very young population, NIMD continues to train youth from political and civil society on democratic knowledge, skills and culture through the democracy schools. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 113500 16223 Disbursement El Salvador February 2017 local partner 113500 El Salvador budget 2017 local partner 41118 Disbursement El Salvador May 2017 local partner 30949 Disbursement El Salvador July 2017 local partner 15985 Disbursement El Salvador November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-SAL18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018In March 2018, Assembly elections take place in El Salvador and in 2019 presidential elections. The fact that the parties are in campaign mode influences all political developments and debates. This is enforced by the fact that for the first time in history, political parties are organizing internal elections. The two main political parties, FMLN and Arena, are unable to come to agreements about the most important issues affecting the country, the looming fiscal crisis and the situation regarding retirement benefits. Furthermore, there exists a lack of clarity on financing of political parties. The parties are unable or unwilling to be accountable for the money they received for the previous elections and the way the spent it. This fuels debate about political corruption. All this negatively influences the way people feel about political parties and congress. The confidence in these institutions is below 15%. The preelectoral time made it difficult for NIMD to advance on some of the issues that we had envisaged in the Multi Annual Plan such as environmental and water Governance and fiscal issues. NIMD also revised the curricula for the Democracy Schools, because participants indicated they could not be available for so many weeks as they were out campaigning. The Theory of Change for El Salvador that NIMD has formulated continues to be valid. NIMD is showing positive results on building the capacities of underrepresented groups mainly women and youth. NIMD is actively engaging youth to take on an active role in society with the campaign “Become involved”. Furthermore, it continues to provide technical assistance to advance with a treaty on transboundary water legislation. It has more difficulties with advancing on fiscal reform, regional integration and political party and electoral reform. During meetings with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), they reiterated the importance for politicians to know the fiscal basics. Therefore, NIMD will continue to include this in the Democracy Schools, and assess the possibilities to offer, together with specialized organizations, advanced training for alumni. The regional meeting on financing of electoral campaigns and related questions in Honduras in August 2017 was a success and showed the participants from El Salvador the importance this issue has in the other countries, thus showing a regional angle. Interparty dialogue and consensus building continues to be difficult in El Salvador. The two main parties managed to come to agreement on a reform of the pension scheme. At local level, NIMD is supporting a selected number of municipal councils with dialogue skills, as the councils are now multiparty. This is paying off. In the municipalities where NIMD together with others is active, the councils manage to reach agreements. This to the surprise of political analysts who had foreseen a deadlock in local governance. It goes without saying that the multiparty councils are still a very new phenomenon that benefits from continued support. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update (max 2 pages) The problem analysis for the Northern Triangle of Central America continues to be valid. The three countries suffer from a lack of confidence in political actors. In NIMD’s view, to overcome this crisis, important changes are necessary in the political party system to make it respond to the needs and demands of the population. Furthermore, the countries need more resources to address issues of poverty, education, healthcare, insecurity and employment. The objectives that NIMD formulated in the MAP continue to be valid: 1. Inclusive and representative political party system; 2. Political inclusion of underrepresented groups with a focus on women and youth, including youth- and gender mainstreaming in policy and legislation; 3. Better linkages between politics and regional, national and local level; 4. Enhanced capacity of political parties to deal with environmental issues with a focus on water; 5. Technical assistance and facilitation of dialogue on fiscal reform. In the region, NIMD is advancing well with objective one and two, building on its experience before the start of the SP. Important regional organizations are based in El Salvador. With its assistance for the Trinational Treaty on Water Basins, El Salvador manages to promote a better integration between regional, national and local politics and shape the strengthening of regional bodies. They make use of the expertise and contacts NIMD acquired during the four years of the Reconstruction programme. Though NIMD is not well placed to facilitate dialogue on fiscal reform (financial organizations are playing that role, as El Salvador has the lowest credit rating), it will continue to play a role in sensitizing (young) politicians on this issue. As the country can only advance on education, security, employment and healthcare if there is sound economic environment. NIMD continues to support dialogue skills at local level with the multiparty municipal councils. Furthermore, it will also facilitate dialogue between political and civil actors so that they can jointly establish priorities, promote the inclusion of underrepresented groups in politics, and support the lowering of barriers that make their participation difficult at this moment. At culture level, NIMD supports democratic culture through the democracy schools and other training programmes. 3. Programme outlook (max 4 pages) During 2018, NIMD will continue to support dialogue processes at local levels, facilitate the building of networks of youth and Women, and specific thematic networks such as on National Action Plan 1325. Furthermore, NIMD will follow up on the recommendation for political party and electoral reform that came out of a conference the EMB organized on this issue. Together with the Central American Regional Integration System (SICA0, NIMD supports with technical assistance the progress son transboundary water basins. It will assess the possibility to work more closely with SICA to Exchange best practises and include regional integration in Capacity building programmes. Intervention at system, actor and culture level takes place in the following way: Political system a) Political and electoral reform further strengthen the representation of democratic organization. - Facilitate dialogue between youth of political parties and between youth of civil and political society. - Support multiactor platforms on relevant topics (Regarding the implementation of the National Action Plan of UN resolution 1325). - Deliver input and expertise on democratic system reform Intermediate indicator: % participation by key stakeholder representatives (civic and political actors) in the dialogue initiative. b) The political system offers channels for effective lobby and advocacy. Through: - Technical assistance for political actors (political parties, governance subsecretary, COMURES, ISDEM and Grupo Gestor por los Concejos Municipales Plurales) to come towards joint proposals for electoral reform especially regarding multiparty municipal councils. Intermediate indicator: Level of cooperation between actors (political and civic). c) Increased level of coordination between democratic actors at supra national, national and local level. NIMD’s intervention consists of: - Facilitation of dialogue between political and civil society (CEICOM and others) actors on the Treaty on crossborder basins. - Facilitation of an interparty and intersectorial dialogue platform to jointly formulate policy proposals. Intermediate indicator: # of ongoing NIMD supported dialogue initiatives. Political actor NIMD formulates the following results for actor level: Political actors develop proposals regarding Political and Electoral Reform (including women´s political participation), Fiscal Reform and Reform of environmental and water. Support for lobby activities of CEICOM and other CSO's for a Treaty on transborder basins. - Technical assistance to the Environmental Commission of Congress to analyse and discuss the various Water Law proposals. Intermediate indicator: % participation by key stakeholder representatives (civic and political actors) in the dialogue initiative. a) Increased dialogue capacity of political actors. To obtain these results, NIMD will: - Provide dialogue and negotiation training for the political and civil society youth (within the Democracy School). - Actively participate and coordinate in the working commission (Comisión Coordinadora Interinstitucional o CCI) that was established in support of the Multiparty Municipal Councils (Governance Subsecretary, ISDEM, COMURES, UNDP, FUNDEMUCA, AECID y NIMD). Intermediate indicator: # of political actors who have been trained on the importance of CS dialogue. - Assistance and technical support to enhance gender equity in politics. Capacity building Women candidates and MPS elect. - Capacity building of political parties and civil society on political reform regarding digital democracy Intermediate indicator: # of representatives (male/female) of political actors who have been trained in the use of oversight instruments. b) Increased organizational capacity of NIMD El Salvador. This is foreseen through the following interventions: - Strengthening office capacity and skills through training and capacity building. - Identify fundraising opportunities and prepare proposals. - Drafting of manual for internal oversight and human resources. - Exchange of experiences and development of knowledge tools. Intermediate indicator: % execution of capacity development plans. Political culture The following results are defined: a) Increased awareness of the importance of coordination between national and supranational level to address the Central American challenges. Through: - Technical assistance and support for the activities proposed by the interparty youth network and the youth network of political and civil society. Both networks were formed by alumni of the Democracy School - Awareness raising activities on relevant topics with ES Alumni (Central American Integration, transparency, accountability etc.) - Dialogue and cooperation platform on relevant topics with TN-CA DS Alumni ( "bootcamp" exchange with alumni from Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador.) Intermediate indicator: # of ongoing NIMD supported dialogue initiatives. b) Internalization of democratic norms and values by political actors. Through: - Training through Democracy Schools on democratic knowledge, values and skills - Exchange of experiences and development of knowledge tools (systematization EFD). Intermediate indicator: # of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g. democracy schools). Gender and inclusion will be approached as a cross cutting theme at the system, actor and culture level. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 165000 El Salvador budget 2018 local partner 16500 Disbursement El Salvador January 2018 local partner 55858 Disbursement El Salvador March 2018 local partner 78939 Disbursement El Salvador August 2018 local partner 1000 Advanced payment by HQ for GPMD fee 2018 local partner 12703 Disbursement El Salvador November 2018 local partner 37775 Disbursement El Salvador December 2018 local partner 27241 Disbursement El Salvador December 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-SAL19 NIMD El Salvador Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 250000 El Salvador budget 2019 50000 Disbursement El Salvador January 2019 4845 Expenditures El Salvador Q.1 2019 9093 Expenditures El Salvador Q.2 2019 71578 Disbursement El Salvador April 2019 9198 Expenditures El Salvador Q.3 2019 87342 Disbursement El Salvador Q3 2019 10808 Expenditures El Salvador Q4 2019 49129 Disbursement El Salvador October 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-SAL20 NIMD El Salvador Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 182350 El Salvador budget 2020 92255 Disbursement El Salvador March 2020 9285 Expenditures El Salvador Q.1 2020 9292 Expenditures El Salvador Q2 2020 97103 Disbursement El Salvador July 2020 8731 Expenditures El Salvador Q3 2020 17992 Disbursement El Salvador July 2020 12512 Expenditures El Salvador Q3 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-SP-Programme NIMD The Strategic Partnership aims to contribute to a conducive environment in which political and civic actors can effectively lobby and influence political and policy processes to advocate for inclusive and equitable social change. The partners concentrate jointly on a selected number of countries in Africa: Benin, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe and other African countries under the flexible fund. Within this broad overarching goal, the partners jointly contribute to three specific goals: i. To improve the enabling environment for effective policy influencing on inclusive and equitable development in 10 countries in Africa and South-East Asia and 1 region (Central America) (system level change). ii. To strengthen the policy influencing capacities and responsiveness of political parties, parliaments, parliamentarians and civil society actors as drivers for inclusive social change through trust building, gender-sensitive agenda setting and inclusive dialogue in 10 countries and 1 region (actor and culture level change). iii. To develop the organisational capacities of a selected number of southern partner organizations (implementing partners, political parties and parliament) to autonomously and effectively advocate for effective policy influencing in partnership with civil society (actor level change). The themes of gender equality and inclusiveness are identified as important crosscutting themes for all proposed country and regional programmes. System level: An enabling environment exists at national, regional and international levels for political and civic actors to interact and play their roles in inclusive policy making. - A level playing field, for all political actors and civic actors wanting to influence politics - Safe (and institutionalised) space for dialogue between all relevant political and civic actors - Formulation of, proposing to, and approval of jointly formulated policies in parliament securing civil and political rights - (Parliamentary) political parties having equal access to state media and state funding Actor level: Political actors are embedded in society and responsive to citizens. - Political actors that voice and monitor citizen interests - Improved capacity of local partners (based on adapted 5 Core Capabilities of NIMD's scan) - Improved capability to attract and relate of political actors - MPs understand the legislative process and have increased capacity to develop and formulate policy ideas into legislation - MPs have increased capacity to scrutinize government legislation, policy and performance. - Influencing policy control and domestic accountability by political and civic actors (including interest groups on gender and inclusion) - Distinctive programmatic profiling - internal, public and in parliament- in relation to electorates and support bases of political actors Culture level: A culture of accommodation and consultation between political actors and with civic actors exists that also facilitates system and actor level change. - Interest in consulting, collaborating, harmonizing, being responsive and a sense of trust and mutual understanding among and between political and civic actors - Political actors are more aware of and have internalised democratic values, rule of law and gender sensitive&inclusive politics - (Political actors advocating for) Gender and inclusion are part of political consultation processes Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 5631190 Funds received March 2016 NIMD 1000000 Funds received December 2015 NIMD 6631190 Commitment NIMD 6540286 Funds received March 2017 NIMD 6540286 Commitment NIMD 6721769 Funds received June 2018 NIMD 6721769 Commitment NIMD 5480227 Funds received June 2019 NIMD 5480227 Commitment NIMD Result 2016-2018 Result 2016-2018 NL-KVK-27189542-SP16 NIMD Strategic Partnership NIMD-AWEPA-MFA Conducive environments for effective policy influencing: the role of political parties and Parliaments The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has introduced a new funding framework for civil society organizations for the period 2016-2020. Under this new framework, a selected number of partners entered into a “Strategic Partnership” (hereinafter referred to as SP) with the MFA. In 2014, NIMD and AWEPA teamed up to prepare an application consisting of a Theory of Change and a Track record with input from in-country staff and partners. At the end of January 2015, the Dutch MFA announced that the NIMD/AWEPA alliance had been selected as one of the 25 organizations under the Strategic Partnership funding window and that the alliance would be entitled to a maximum of €6.410.250 per annum for a period of five years. In March this year, following the kick-off meeting organised by the MFA with all selected organizations to provide the framework for shaping the Strategic Partnership programme document, NIMD and AWEPA engaged with their counterparts from the Ministry to jointly formulate the strategic goal(s) for the partnership. This resulted in a document that defines the mutually agreed goals and geographical and thematic focus for the partnership which guided the preparations for the underlying programme document. The strategic goals and programme rationale and geographical focus for the partnership that follows from this agreement are briefly summarised below. Partnership goals The Partnership between NIMD, AWEPA and the MFA aims to contribute to a conducive environment in which political and civic actors can effectively lobby and influence political and policy processes to advocate for inclusive and equitable social change. Within this broad overarching goal, the partners jointly contribute to three specific goals: i. To improve the enabling environment for effective policy influencing on inclusive and equitable development in 10 countries in Africa and South-East Asia and 1 region (Central America) (system level change). ii. To strengthen the policy influencing capacities and responsiveness of political parties, parliaments, parliamentarians and civil society actors as drivers for inclusive social change through trust building, gender-sensitive agenda setting and inclusive dialogue in 10 countries and 1 region (actor and culture level change). iii. To develop the organisational capacities of a selected number of southern partner organizations (implementing partners, political parties and parliament) to autonomously and effectively advocate for effective policy influencing in partnership with civil society (actor level change). The themes of gender equality and inclusiveness are identified as important crosscutting themes for all proposed country and regional programmes. Chapter 3.3 outlines how NIMD and AWEPA plan to operationalise their strategy to enhance gender equality and inclusiveness in their programme activities. This general strategy is subsequently translated into country and region specific approaches as part of the country and regional programmes presented in chapter 6. Programme rationale The departing points for the NIMD-AWEPA Programme Document are a joint NIMD-AWEPA Theory of Change and the existing country programmes of both organizations (based on the DAC list of lower- and lower middle income countries, as stipulated by the Subsidy Framework). These country programmes –underpinned by an country specific ToC and baseline– are embedded in strong local political networks; are underpinned by a deep rooted knowledge of the local political economy and have a solid institutional infrastructure for programme implementation. To acknowledge the importance of cross-border themes and regional interdependencies that increasingly shape national policy agendas and to stimulate peer learning and exchange, dedicated strategies and instruments for peer learning, knowledge and innovation and PME will be developed as part of the strategic partnership. Furthermore, to maximize opportunities for regional and international lobby and advocacy on issues that emanate from national policy agendas, the programme foresees in the development of dedicated strategies for potential upstream policy influencing at regional and global fora and bodies. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 6631190 333333 Disbursement AWEPA December 2015 local partner 100000 Disbursement AWEPA March 2016 local partner 1891515 Seocond disbursement AWEPA March 2016 local partner 210501 SP Annual Report 2016 - FINAL 01052017 Annual financial report SP AWEPA NIMD final Annex 2 Human Interest Stories NL-KVK-27189542-SP17 NIMD See 8 page narrative Annual Plan Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 2236691 Disbursement AWEPA March 2017 local partner Annex 3 Human Interest Stories Annex 4 Financial Report 2017 SP Annual Report 2017 NL-KVK-27189542-SP18 NIMD Strategic Partnership 2018 NIMD - Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 SP Annual Report 2018 Annex A - Financial Report SP 2018 Annex B - IOI measurements 2018 Annex C - SPDD indicators measurement 2018 Annex D - OI measurement SP 2018 Annex E - Human Interest Stories NL-KVK-27189542-SP19 NIMD Strategic Partnership 2019 NIMD - Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 SP Annual Report 2019 Annex A - Financial Report SP 2019 Annex B - IOI measurements 2019 Annex C - SPDD indicators measurement 2019 Annex D - Human Interest Stories NL-KVK-27189542-SP20 NIMD Strategic Partnership 2020 NIMD - Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 SP Final Evaluation Report 2020 SP Annual Report 2020 Annex A - Financial Report SP 2020 Annex B - IOI measurements 2020 Annex C - SPDD indicators measurement 2020 Annex D - OI measurement SP 2020 Annex E - Human Interest Stories NL-KVK-27189542-SPPME19 NIMD SP PME 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 13402 Expenditures SP PME Q1 2019 14263 Expenditures SP PME Q.2 2019 19342 Expenditures SP PME Q.3 2019 16358 Expenditures SP PME Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-SPPME20 NIMD SP PME 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 14615 Expenditures SP PME Q1 2020 55105 Expenditures SP PME Q2 2020 26199 Expenditures SP PME Q3 2020 90424 Expenditures SP PME Q4 2020 NL-KVK-27189542-TUN16 NIMD TUNISIA´S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 2011 the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ took place which ended years of dictatorship in Tunisia and started the country on the path to democracy. This path has not been easy. There were two political murders which led to a stalemate in parliament for a while, and the process of drawing up and agreeing a new constitution took much longer than expected. Nevertheless, the new constitution was finally agreed and has been widely praised as one of the most progressive in the Arab world. In 2014, Tunisia held free and fair elections that resulted in a coalition government consisting of a party which had associations with the previous regime, working together with a party that had previously been declared illegal. So a democratic system is developing but there are still many challenges. For example, the political parties tend to be based on the personality of the leader rather than on a programme of policies, levels of trust between the politicians are quite low and the people working in politics tend to lack the skills and knowledge that they need to work effectively in a multiparty democracy. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN TUNISIA NIMD started working in Tunisia in 2012 and the core aim of NIMD’s programme has been building the capacity of the parties and politicians to work effectively in this new democracy and as part of that to encourage interparty dialogue. To achieve this, NIMD set up a School of Politics together with its local partner, Centre des Études Méditerranéennes Internationales. Here politicians work together in a multiparty setting to learn the skills and knowledge that they need to work together in a multiparty democracy. By learning together, they also get to know each other and get used to talking together which can help to increase trust and encourage interparty dialogue. By the end of 2014, 6 cohorts of politicians, approximately 180 people, had completed a programme. TSoP graduation NIMD has also set up an informal multiparty dialogue platform called ‘Couscous Politique’, where politicians informally discuss political issues while eating traditional Tunisian couscous. Mentoring programme Together with Demo Finland, NIMD is running a mentoring programme which pairs up regional and national politicians. This aims to help national politicians to learn more about issues at a regional level and vice versa. It also aims to improve multiparty dialogue at the regional level. Women’s Political Rights Programme Tunisia is also one of three counties where NIMD is running the Women’s Political Rights Programme. This programme is aimed at increasing the political participation of women in Tunisia, Colombia and Kenya. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. Centre des Etudes Mediterraneennes et Internationales (CEMI) Demo Finland International IDEA NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 332045 5291 Programme monitoring 30880 programme advise and support 73396 Disbursement Tunisia February 2016 local partner 80100 Disbursement Tunisia July 2016 local partner Quantitative data: 2 (on a scale of 1-4) 1 - no voice and no influence on policy making 2 – able to take part in debates over policy making but do not necessarily feel their voice is being heard or that they exercise influence on the government 3 – able to take part in debates over policy making and sometimes feel or establish that their views are taken into account by the government 4 – fully able to participate in the political debate and exercise influence over the government Qualitative description: The participants of the focus group discussion were the leaders of seven political parties represented in parliament. They agreed that political actors, both those that are part of the ruling coalition and those that are part of the opposition, enjoy an acceptable margin of maneuver to influence public policy. However, this margin depends strongly on their individual position in the political scene, rather than on their status as elected representatives. As a result, the score was established as at the higher end of 2: ‘able to take part in debates over policy making but do not necessarily feel their voice is being heard or that they exercise influence on the government.’ All of the leaders present during the focus group discussion acknowledged that alumni of the Tunisian School of Politics have played an important role in drafting and influencing new public policies, thereby contributing to improved policy-making and increased influence on the government. The leaders of the political parties believe that the country has progressed from the strong political instability which characterized the early years after the Jasmin Revolution. Political tensions do not threaten the stability of the country or democratic progress as much as they used to. They agree that it is now necessary to invest in safe spaces for dialogue between all relevant political and civic actors, to create an enabling environment for political actors to engage in inclusive policy making. The dialogue platform which was established in 2016 is one way to address this. Another is investing in capacity strengthening of political parties and individual politicians. Quantitative data: 1 (on a scale of 1-4) 1 – No influence 2 – Some of the discussions in the dialogue platform lead to policy initiatives, but whether these are successful depends on factors outside the sphere of influence of the platform 3 – The dialogue platform is in a position to address key political issues with policy initiatives and some of these are successful 4 – The dialogue platform is able to propose and implement policy initiatives autonomous of external factors Qualitative description: The participants in the focus group discussion were members of the dialogue platform established by CEMI. This included representatives of eight political parties represented in the Tunisian Parliament. The consensus was that the dialogue platform does not currently have influence on policy formulation. It was only established in 2016 and has not yet engaged in policy initiatives. Its role in the political spectrum has not yet been defined. However, the participants are full of ambition and are working on an agenda for the coming years. One of the key objectives of the programme will be to strengthen this platform and equip it with the skills needed to exercise influence on public policy. The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is considerable trust in political parties in Tunisia. This trust is considerably lower in opposition parties (30%) than in the governing party (49%). One of the key objectives of the programme is to promote collaboration and consultation between political actors and between political and civic actors. The figures clearly show that such collaboration is present to a limited degree in current participants of the Tunisian School of Politics. Around half of them indicated that they regularly collaborate with other political or civic actors. Since this is a major focus of the programme, we hope and expect for this percentage to rise in future measurements. This expectation is confirmed by research among alumni of the Tunisian School of Politics. In order to determine the quality of such collaboration, additional research would be needed to assess what kinds of collaboration exist, e.g. political initiatives, joint projects, dialogue etc. Quantitative data: Current participants: 48% Breakdown: < 1 times monthly: 52% 2-3 times monthly: 18% 4-5 times monthly: 13% >5 times monthly: 17% Qualitative description: The survey was carried out among both current participants and alumni of the TSoP programme. The question was how often they collaborated with other political actors outside of TSoP activities. 48% of current participants indicate that they frequently collaborate with other political actors. For the sake of comparison, the same survey was also conducted among alumni of the TSoP. Among this population, a much higher percentage (88%) indicated that they frequently work together with other political actors. During their training within the TSoP, they are sensitized to the importance of collaborating with other political actors and gained experience learning and working in a multi-party setting. As a result, we would expect this percentage to rise for the current group of participants when measured again in 2018 or 2020. Results of the same survey carried out among alumni: < 1 times monthly: 12% 2-3 times monthly: 44% 4-5 times monthly: 14% >5 times monthly: 30% NL-KVK-27189542-TUN17 NIMD Tunisia Programme 2017 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 179346 79597 Disbursement Tunisia February 2017 local partner 179346 Tunisia budget 2017 local partner 37656 Disbursement Tunisia July 2017 local partner 13753 Disbursement Tunisia November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-TUN18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018Tunisia, widely regarded as the only country to have emerged from the Arab Spring with a genuine democracy, experienced setbacks in 2017. Cabinet reshuffles in 2016 and 2017 demonstrate the inability of the government to address socio-economic issues and fight corruption. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the 2014 constitution, which was considered the crowning achievement of the revolution, should be revised to expand the executive power of the President. This would be a major democratic setback. The first municipal elections to take place since 2011, scheduled for December 2017, were once again postponed and are now expected to take place in March 2018. This will allow more time to revise the electoral code, but the repeated delays also lead to concerns among Tunisian civil society organizations who consider the municipal elections a test for the viability of Tunisia’s democratic transition. • Outlook for 2018 The inter-party dialogue platform that was established in 2016 has become increasingly relevant and will continue to play a major role in supporting the democratic transition in 2018, especially in the discussions between political parties about the upcoming municipal elections. To improve the level of discussion, the dialogue platform will be supported with policy papers. To strengthen the capacities of key political actors, NIMD’s implementing partner CEMI will experiment with a new activity in training members of parliament on technical skills related to their work in parliament. In addition to this, in 2018 it will be crucial to maintain the commitment of both the political elites and the public to democracy especially in light of the municipal elections. At the level of democratic culture, the programme will continue to generate political and public debate on issues relating to democracy with lectures and debates. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 240824 Tunisia budget 2018 local partner 28000 Tunisia budget 2018 - addendum local partner 24000 Disbursement Tunisia January 2018 local partner 62446 Disbursement Tunisia March 2018 local partner 28000 Second disbursement Tunisia March 2018 local partner 71085 Disbursement Tunisia September 2018 local partner 1000 Advanced payment by HQ for GPMD fee 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-TUN19 NIMD Tunisia Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 259000 Tunisia budget 2019 51800 Tunisia Disbursement 2018 January 2019 30244 Tunisia Disbursement January 2019 61614 Tunisia Disbursement June 2019 328 Expenditures Tunisia Q3 2019 47138 Disbursement Tunisia October 2019 3143 Expenditures Tunisia Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-TUN20 NIMD Tunisia Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 223000 Tunisia budget 2020 102606 Tunisia Disbursement February 2020 614 Tunisia Expenditures Q1 2020 18 Tunisia Expenditures Q2 2020 73681 Disbursement Tunisia October 2020 -565 Tunisia Expenditures Q4 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-UGA16 NIMD UGANDA’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND In 1986, Yoweri Museveni became president. Under his reign, an end was put to a violent period of political instability and the economy slowly improved. Museveni also introduced a new political system, whereby political parties were not allowed and politicians were elected on personal merit, not party affiliation. In 2005, the majority of Ugandans voted in a referendum for re-introducing multiparty politics. This was followed in 2006 by the first multiparty elections in twenty years. Despite this, Uganda is de facto a one-party state and still has a polarized political system. Opposition parties only have a limited ability to influence the political reform agenda. So the country’s political system remains very fragile and political parties themselves face several challenges. For example, the parties largely rely on the appeal of their leaders rather than policies, face internal divisions, lack accountability and internal democracy and are not strongly organized. As Uganda nears the run-up to the 2016 general elections, concerns heighten over shrinking space for legitimate political activities. For example, the Public Order Management Act, which was introduced at the end of 2013, places restrictions on public meetings. One consequence is that opposition parties find it increasingly challenging to organize rallies. The much needed constitutional and electoral reforms are also not coming off the ground, despite a large public outcry and concerted efforts by a plethora of stakeholders including political parties for reforms. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN UGANDA NIMD’s overall objective in Uganda is to help foster a well-functioning, strong and vibrant multiparty democracy. We do this by focusing both on facilitating an inclusive political dialogue between the parties and helping the parties to develop into mature organizations with a sound organizational structure and a distinctive programmatic identity. In 2010, the six parliamentary parties, with NIMD’s support, established an informal interparty dialogue process (IPOD). Establishing this marked a turning point in multiparty politics in Uganda as both the ruling party and opposition committed to regularly engaging with each other in a dialogue process aimed at addressing challenges facing Uganda. This process is facilitated on behalf of the six parties by NIMD-Uganda, a registered organization in the capital Kampala. Party Capacity Strengthening In 2014, NIMD also established the Political Party Capacity Strengthening Facility (PPCSF) in Uganda for member parties of IPOD. In NIMD’s experience, ruling parties are more willing to engage with opposition political parties who act programmatically and have a clear constituency. This also allows them to play ‘more on the ball and less on the adversary’. Through strengthening the capacity and internal democracy of Ugandan political parties, the PPCSF facilitates Ugandan political parties to become more effective players in Uganda’s multiparty system. For example, Project Implementation Committees have been set up by some political parties to define the strategic priorities for the party. It is run by a Project Management Unit located at NIMD’s Uganda office. Outlook As tensions rise ahead of 2016 elections, the NIMD programme in Uganda focuses its efforts at three levels: Keep the interparty dialogue process going and to secure agreement on electoral reforms and build alliances and support for these in the wider stakeholder community; Prepare the parties for the 2016 elections and beyond by strengthening their organizational and programmatic capacities; Contribute to the peaceful conduct of the 2016 elections by investing in de-escalating mechanisms that enable looming political tensions to be spotted early on and provide an informal platform in which political parties can let off steam. Programme deviations/ToC update: The 2016 elections ended with two developments that have implications on the operations of IPOD and implementation of the SP. First the composition of parliament changed from six political parties initially to four. This implies that IPOD membership reduced from six to four parties. In terms of programmatic delivery however, there are no implications foreseen to emerge from the changes in parliamentary composition. Secondly, contestations over the conduct and outcome of the elections continue to exist among the ruling and opposition parties. On the one hand this has perforated embryonic trust and relationships among political actors. On the other hand, the state has tightened restrictions on political activity in the public sphere given a high proclivity of politically motivated violence. These conditions have undesirably affected commitment to interparty dialogue whilst impacting negatively on the enabling environment. Third, existing fractures within the main opposition party—the FDC—affects the ability of its leaders to seamlessly engage in IPOD processes. In 2016, the party withdrew from the platform for a two months period. These differences also extend to relations between the FDC and other opposition parties The ToC nevertheless remains valid given that it was developed on analysis of related conditions. Implementation of the SP is, however, starting with rebuilding bridges among political actors who have come to be increasingly sceptical of each other. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. AWEPA NIMD Uganda Democratic Governance Facility NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 419567 45000 programme advise and support 419567 Uganda budget 2016 local partner 60000 Disbursement Uganda March 2016 local partner 7480 Programme monitoring Quantitative data: 100 percent of opposition political actors interviewed indicated the political environment does not enable them to influence policy making. This figure is contrasted by political actors from the ruling party who find the environment enabling. Therefore baseline = 0 Qualitative description: Parliament remains a key institution for influencing policy given its legislative power. The possibility to table private members’ bills is a policy window through which political parties can present law and policy proposals. Civil society actors can also cooperate with members of parliament to sponsor policy proposals under this window. There are, however, limitations: First, with less than 15 percent of the seats in parliament, opposition parties require the buy-in of the ruling party to pass laws. Second, official procedure requires sponsors of parliamentary bills to first obtain a certificate of financial implications. The required certificate is given by the ministry of finance thereby providing the executive with a strong leverage over what makes it to the parliamentary agenda. During interviews and focus group discussions, political party representatives indicated that the possibility to influence law and policy making is limited to topics that are “not politically contentious” or where (sic) “the ruling party has no embedded interest.” Outside parliament, the political parties especially those in opposition do not enjoy a conducive space to engage in policy debates due to challenges with access to vital information and capacity of the political parties to conduct research. Quantitative Data: 50% Qualitative description: There are generally low trust levels in the political processes in Uganda. The most recently available 2013-14 Afrobarometer measured public trust of respondents in the ruling party and in opposition parties separately. Combining these responses and collapsing the categories of “somewhat” and ”a lot”, we see that there is trust in political parties in Uganda. This trust is considerably lower in opposition parties (30%) than in the governing party (71%). According to other Afrobarometer data only 39 percent of Ugandans are “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in the country. In the interviews, political actors expressed that the ruling party and its leader have the ability to and often have exercised undue influence on political processes. The president, who is leader of the ruling party, appoints members the Election Management Body (EMB). Thus, several actors especially those on the opposition side consider the EMB as partisan. The leading opposition party has also repeatedly expressed mistrust in other organs of political arbitration including the courts. This was advanced as a key reason why they did not seek to challenge the results of the 2016 presidential election in the Supreme Court, as provided by the Constitution. Mistrust is also reflected in the very modest hopes for impactful political dialogue. A previous unsuccessful quest for political reforms which had been agreed upon between the ruling party and the opposition (with the support of civil society) breeds scepticism over the commitment to dialogue positions by the ruling party. There is an operational Interparty Dialogue Platform (IPOD), which was founded in 2010. All the four parliamentary political parties subscribe to IPOD. In the past legislature period, IPOD had an agreed agenda aligned to the critical concerns such as the pursuit of a level playing field through proposing electoral reforms and negotiating modalities for political party financing. Whenever need arose, key relevant civic actors provided expert input to IPOD work. During the period, the IPOD membership also commenced discussions regarding institutionalisation of the platform, which are still ongoing. There is one interparty dialogue platform—the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). Its membership includes the four political parties represented in the current (10th) parliament namely: Democratic Party (DP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Business in IPOD is steered by a Council of Secretary Generals (SGs), where each of the member parties has three representatives including the SGs. In the previous legislature period, the IPOD Council held meetings once every month. Representation in IPOD processes can be ranked on a scale of 1 – 4, where: 4 = representation by party presidents and chairpersons 3 – representation by secretary generals 2 – representation by party official with mandate of SGs 1 – representation by party officials In view of the above scale, the current level of representation lies between 2 and 3. All parties have representatives mandated by the SGs while some of the parties have their SGs participating regularly in IPOD council discussions. Qualitative description: IPOD is growing as a preferred space for dialogue among the political parties. However, it faces commitment issues and low trust levels among political actors. The IPOD Council of SGs is functional but the Summit of Party Presidents has not met. There are concerns about the effectiveness of party representatives on the IPOD council: some do not have the necessary mandate to commit their political parties during IPOD negotiations. Furthermore, the inclusion of civil society and special groups in IPOD business is still weak, although sub committees have been set-up to engender this. Quantitative data: There is one interparty dialogue platform—the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). Its membership includes the four political parties represented in the current (10th) parliament namely: Democratic Party (DP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Business in IPOD is steered by a Council of Secretary Generals (SGs), where each of the member parties has three representatives including the SGs. In the previous legislature period, the IPOD Council held meetings once every month. Representation in IPOD processes can be ranked on a scale of 1 – 4, where: 4 = representation by party presidents and chairpersons 3 – representation by secretary generals 2 – representation by party official with mandate of SGs 1 – representation by party officials In view of the above scale, the current level of representation lies between 2 and 3. All parties have representatives mandated by the SGs while some of the parties have their SGs participating regularly in IPOD council discussions. Qualitative description: IPOD is growing as a preferred space for dialogue among the political parties. However, it faces commitment issues and low trust levels among political actors. The IPOD Council of SGs is functional but the Summit of Party Presidents has not met. There are concerns about the effectiveness of party representatives on the IPOD council: some do not have the necessary mandate to commit their political parties during IPOD negotiations. Furthermore, the inclusion of civil society and special groups in IPOD business is still weak, although sub committees have been set-up to engender this. Qualitative data: IPOD presented to the legal and parliamentary affairs committee joint positions on electoral and constitutional amendment bills. It included 43 proposals for political and electoral reforms. There were also some unsuccessful efforts to present joint position to the committee of defense and internal affairs on the NGO bill. Qualitative description: Outside the informal arrangements of political parties, there was yet another attempt in 9th Parliament by a coalition of MPs and CSOs to sponsor Private Member’s Bills. The coalition of MPs was composed of NRM, Opposition and independent MPs. Efforts of this coalition were unsuccessful because NRM MPs silently withdrew from the activity due to pressure from the party. The failure by IPOD to present joint positions to Parliament led the passage of clauses in the bills, especially the NGO bill that are unfavorable to operations of CSOs and unleveled the playing field for political parties. Quantitative description: The composition of committees in Parliament follows strict gender sensitive criteria of including a mandatory 1/3 (one third) of women committee members. In 9th Parliament the minimum # of women MPs on every committee was 6/20 (six out of twenty) MPs. 1/3 (One third) of the entire committee leadership of session committees was women. The Speaker rejected any proposals for composition of committees that violated this criterion. Quantitative data: During the time of the 2016 elections a total four political parties (CP, FDC, NRM and UPC) under the IPOD framework each developed a manifesto document. The two parties (DP & JEEMA) did not publish individual election manifestos as they had joined election alliances and therefore subscribed to group manifestos. Nevertheless they were able to develop specific position papers on topics such as agriculture, education, and employment. DP developed three papers while JEEMA had eight. Qualitative description: In the last legislative period, there is evidence that political parties involved women and youth as well as workers and PWD groups to feed into their policy and election manifesto development processes. NRM and FDC, for example, had extracts of the voice of the women in their respective manifestos. Baseline description: An organizational scan of IPOD was conducted in June 2015. The assessment was done based on the five capabilities. These were Capacity to: commit and act; deliver results; adapt and self-renew; attract and relate; and balance coherence and diversity. NIMD Uganda showed a relative balance in scores for each of the 5 capabilities. It was noted that the organisation was stronger in the capabilities on external relations. The assessment further revealed the need for clarity on the identity of the organisation and to develop a mechanism for internal learning. Quantitative data: 100 percent of political party manifestos include proposals for promoting democracy, rule of law and gender equality. Qualitative description: Political actors compete to demonstrate their commitment to democracy, rule of law and gender equality as reflected in their manifestos and policy documents. However, translating these policy pronouncements into action remains a challenge and raises questions on commitment. IPOD is the interparty organization for dialogue in Uganda. In 2016 it represented 4 political parties at a national level. 4 out of the 11 IPOD council members are women. The interparty dialogue in 2016 mainly focused on political and electoral reforms and the functioning of political parties. 1) Platform for women and youth groups: 27 participants who included representatives of political party youth and women leagues as well as women and youth civic actors, focussing on the involvement of marginalised groups (particularly women and youth) in policy making processes and particularly internal party processes) 2) IPOD Café: 4 political parties and citizens NL-KVK-27189542-UGA17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 The 2016 General Elections remain significant for the 2017 political landscape. The elections maintained a dominant political party with weak polarised opposition parties. With the power balance in favour of the ruling party and the realization that the parliamentary configuration makes it even more challenging for reforms, calls for political protagonists to engage and dialogue have been widespread. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update These calls for dialogue have increased demand on the NIMD and IPOD to spearhead some constructive engagement. In 2017 the programme will continue to build on the reconstituted IPOD council and aims to implement the revisions in the IPOD MOU to build stronger commitment to a political reform agenda. The need for more significant political and electoral reforms remains, as observed by Elections Observer missions. However change can also be ignited from below if political parties become better organised and better able to articulate policy alternatives. The strategic planning process for political parties foreseen in 2017 intends to assist political parties to better position themselves and be able to define their capacity development needs. The programme intends to build on increasing trust and relationships among political parties as key actors in the process of political bargaining. It further builds linkages between political and civil actors to realise a shared agenda for dialogue. This multipronged approach is anticipated to increase the space for diverse actors to influence the process so as to contribute to the realisation of an enabling environment, responsive political parties and a culture of inclusive and accommodative politics. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 308273 100000 Disbursement Uganda February 2017 local partner 308273 Uganda budget 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-UGA18 NIMD Political update 2018. Following the 2016 general elections, there have been sustained calls for an inclusive dialogue to resolve issues which arose from the highly contested elections as well as the broader political, economic and social questions that the country is grappling with. The afro barometer report – 2017 indicates that 84% of the survey respondents acknowledge the need for a national dialogue to resolve the issues arising from the 2016 general elections. As such, there is an initiative spearheaded by the Rt. Hon, Prime Minister – Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, to bring together key stakeholders who work on issues of dialogue to champion the idea of and organise a national dialogue. Beyond organising the national dialogue, the proposed framework is expected to allow for coordination, harmonisation and reinforcement of efforts by the various stakeholders who work on dialogue. The process of the National Dialogue has been kick started with the foundational activities underway. The main national conference is planned for October 2018. Alongside the calls for a national dialogue, parliamentary political parties have albeit at a slow pace taken interest in the interparty cooperation and dialogue under the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). The interest is evidenced by the committed participation of the political parties in: the review and ratification of the rules of engagement (Memorandum of Understanding) for the platform (for the first time since inception of the IPOD MoU was signed off by the party principals – including that of the ruling party who is also the Head of State), as well as the intense process of negotiating a realistic and shared agenda for the platform for the current legislature period, among others. Over the eighteen months following the general election, fractures - especially within the opposition political parties continued to deepen – unchecked due to lack of, weak or non-functional conflict management structures/mechanisms within the parties. The tensions and conflicts to an extent eroded the gains which had been made in party cohesion pre the highly contested 2016 election, and provided fertile ground for further entrenchment of the already dominant ruling party, NRM. More still the intra party conflicts translated into a slow pace of activities and engagement at the interparty dialogue table for processes such as the review of the IPOD MoU as well as negotiation and consensus around the IPOD agenda, among others. There has been notable poor performance of opposition political parties in national political processes such as by-elections. Out of the eighteen by-elections conducted since the general elections, only one was won by an opposition party (Democratic Party) while the NRM and independents on the other hand won 15 and 2 constituencies each. This has been largely attributed to the intraparty conflicts which led to failed efforts to field strong joint opposition candidates, and contested party primaries from which dissatisfied candidates later contested as independents. There continues to be an evident threat to the existence and relevance of political parties through the rapid growth of the independents movement in parliament as well as civic activism. The increasing number of independents contesting for elective positions as well as mass support for causes championed by individuals rather than political parties raises numerous questions around capacity of political parties to effectively organise, engage and present relevant agenda to the electorate. While the argument that many of the independents are in fact specific party leaning, questions around the strength on intraparty democracy, responsiveness of political parties to the aspirations of citizens, among others are very evident. There is a renewed call by the various stakeholders including the Speaker of the Parliament of Uganda, for comprehensive electoral as well as general constitutional reforms through a consultative and inclusive process. Again, the afro barometer report 2017 reported that 96% of its respondents support reforms to improve Parliament and elections. While there was initial hope that government would deliver on its promise to name a constitutional review commission to conduct a consultative comprehensive review of the constitution, this hope has to a large extent been shattered by the tabling of the controversial private member’s bill to amend article 102 (b) –seeking to among others lift the presidential age limit cap (in September 2017); and the government bill to amend Article 26(2) (b) (i) of the Constitution – to provide for compulsory land acquisition by government (July 2017). The two controversial constitutional amendment proposals have put Parliament in the spot light and on test in relation to among others: - the extent to which parliamentarians represent the aspirations of the electorate, the independence of parliament – following the invasion of parliament by the presidential security officers). Other questions raised include decision making processes in political parties and the extent to which they reflect on the parliamentary debate. The narrowing of operating space for political actors – especially from the opposition; as well as civil society is evident. Freedoms of assembly, expression have been under attack. There has been excessive use of force to quell peaceful demonstrations, and brutal arrest of political as well as civil society actors. Some civil society organisations have been threatened with closure following the heated advocacy against the removal of the presidential age limit cap in the constitution. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update There are dropping levels of trust and relations – intra and inter party - from the highly divisive 2016 election, as well as the recent political developments around contentious constitutional reforms, involvement of security operatives and institutions in partisan politics, among others. There is a wave of intolerance and use of violence as exhibited in parliament during the debate around the constitutional amendment of article 102(b) and harassment as well as destruction of property of political actors who are believed or perceived to hold political views contrary to the perpetrators of the harassment. While the Interparty dialogue platform - IPOD has over the years provided space for the political parties to mend broken relations as well as build and rebuild trust, the lack of/ weak/ non-functional conflict management structures across the parliamentary political parties has to a great extent eroded the gains hitherto made in relation to party cohesion as well as intraparty democracy under the platform. The intra party conflicts slow down the operations of the interparty dialogue (IPD) platform. Capacity of political parties to present viable policy positions in line with the aspirations of the citizens leaves quite a lot of room for improvement. While some political parties may make an attempt at engaging the public policy processes and propose alternative policies, these remain on paper as the political parties are not able to effectively design and run advocacy campaigns around their policy positions. This capacity gap coupled with the spill over of internal party conflict to the public perhaps explains the partial re alignment of the citizens with the platforms presented by some of the independents. The independents movement is steadily growing. Independent members of parliament are the second biggest block of representatives in the House. Many of these representatives are aligned and inclined to political parties with representation in parliament. They, in most cases are election losers in party primaries. This state of affairs is perhaps indicative of – especially failed or mismanaged intra party elections because of the ill capacity of party election management officials in election management. These mismanaged electoral processes in turn breed conflict. Moreover, political parties do not have functional and effective conflict management mechanisms and strategies to deal with the disgruntled election losers. On the other hand, there are fast rising levels of civic activism through non-conventional individual actors as well as strategies for organising citizens around key specific issues of national or community specific interest. Some of these actions and campaigns have prompted questions around the relevance of institutions such as political parties in articulating citizen concerns. The ability by individuals to put up effective, spirited campaigns around issues pertinent to the citizens has enhanced interest and support for individuals who seek election outside the conventional political party organisations. The disconnect between political parties and the citizens is still existent. Whereas the shrinking space for political party operations may be part of the reasons that nurture this situation, political parties – especially those on the opposition have not fully exploited the available opportunities to set up and maintain functional party structures in the districts or regions across the country. NIMD previously supported some political parties to set up party offices in selected districts of their choice. There is evidence that these offices enhanced the visibility of the respective political parties in the districts. The electoral environment is still heavily punctuated with contested election results at all levels. This is to a large extent due to an unlevel political playing field which is premised on a repressive legal framework relating to elections as well as other aspects which impact on governance and democracy. Laws such as the Public Order Management Act, the NGO Act among others contribute to the shrinking democratic space and uneven political playing field. While political parties and civil society actors have over the years engaged in electoral and broad constitutional reform advocacy, these efforts have been disjointed and often lay ground for competition between political and civic actors. The lack of a shared agenda and strategy for advocacy may be one of the reasons for the insignificant gains registered with the call for electoral and constitution reforms. There are also still numerous challenges to the participation of women and youth in political party as well as national political processes, and high monetisation of politics. The Theory of Change (ToC) is still valid as the initial conditions which informed the design of the programme interventions are still the same. The few changes in these conditions relate to the increased prevalence of independents in politics and the impact of this on parliament, political parties and multi-party democracy in general in Uganda. Consideration has also be given to the new rising wave of civic activism woven around and championed by individuals. On the other hand, the ToC will be revised to cater for the priorities and interests under the prospective funding by the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 201221 Uganda budget 2018 local partner 10122 Disbursement Uganda February 2018 local partner 70000 Disbursement Uganda August 2018 local partner 66733 Disbursement Uganda November 2018 local partner 71468 Disbursement Uganda November 2018 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-UGA19 NIMD Uganda Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 428668 Uganda budget 2019 2064 Expenditures Uganda Q1 2019 122097 Disbursement Uganda May 2019 3969 Expenditures Uganda Q2 2019 100000 Disbursement Uganda August 2019 -1026 Expenditures Uganda Q.3 2019 113888 Disbursement Uganda October 2019 -33 Expenditures Uganda Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-UGA20 NIMD Uganda Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 497364 Uganda budget 2020 37 Expenditures Uganda Q1 2020 99473 Expenditures Uganda Q1 2020 82335 Disbursements Uganda April 2020 120000 Disbursements Uganda July 2020 181708 Disbursements Uganda December 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-UKR16 NIMD In 2016 -2020 NIMD will launch a new intervention in Ukraine. In 2016 NIMD - through its Eastern European Neighbourhood office based in Tbilisi - will set first steps by establishing its presence in Kyiv, securing its network among stakeholders and donors, commissioning baseline studies, initiating preliminary capacity-building activities with receptive beneficiaries, and exploring other avenues of cooperation. In this way, NIMD is building on the yet existing capacity and valuable lessons learnt from working in Post-Soviet countries. NIMD will assess this piloting phase (January-December) by the end of 2016 and gain insights in the windows of opportunities in that rapidly changing political climate. On this basis, it will deploy a full-fledged multi-year intervention for 2017-2020 focused on inclusiveness for political processes and legitimate and responsive actors in Ukraine, for which the Dialogue for Stability instrument of Dutch MFA and other funding will be used. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD Eastern European Neighbourhood NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 137082 3606 Programme monitoring 23280 programme advise and support 87000 Disbursement Ukraine May 2016 local partner 8500 Disbursement Ukraine September 2016 local partner 66443 Disbursement Ukraine October 2016 local partner In spite of the consolidation of some spaces for inter-party exchange (for example the Euro-Optimist platform), the mechanisms for dialogue and trust building continue to be established fundamentally on an inter-personal level. A well-oiled culture of transactional politics seems to be dominant, while a genuine culture of structured political dialogue and compromise is much more elusive. Here the multiplication of “ad-hoc dialogue spaces” and the influence exerted by international actors and domestic civil society, whereas helping to advance the agenda of legislative reforms, may pose additional challenges to the consolidation of a culture of political dialogue. Key definitions: Relevant issue: Issues of national importance. The questionnaire focused almost exclusively in policy making at the national level. In particular around the key policy and institutional reforms, which have been taking shape in the country in the aftermath of the Dignity Revolution. Institutionalized dialogue setting: Regular multiparty dialogue meetings Political parties: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. Qualitative description: Political party members were asked to identify which amongst the 12 most important reforms approved in the last 2 years had been discussed in multi-party fora. They were given the option to mark as many as they deemed necessary. They could also mark the box all of them or none of them. According to the results of the questionnaire and the interviews, all the 12 reforms were addressed in one form or another in a multi-party dialogue platform. Whereas elements of a well-oiled culture of transactional politics are easy to find, a culture of structured political dialogue and compromise is much more elusive in current Ukrainian politics. This is so for the following observable reasons: Firstly, the multiplication of “ad-hoc dialogue spaces” in recent times represents a significant challenge for the establishment and consolidation of true multi-party dialogue efforts, which can yield a much needed consensus around a broader agenda of reforms for the country:  It disincentivizes political actors when it comes to the development of their own knowledge generation and knowledge management structures and serious sustainability challenges for dialogue efforts;  It exacerbates dynamics of competition amongst potential “facilitators”, thus limiting the overall capacity of the system to generate the incentives for true consensus-building activities.  It extends a rather limited understanding of what multi-party dialogue and consensus-building really entails. Thus, preventing the possibility for further development of a truly party-based dialogue platform on issues of relevance for the future development of the country. Secondly, whereas the ability of international actors and domestic civil society in bringing actors around the table to pass specific reforms remains one of the key drivers of change in current Ukrainian politics, it may be hindering the development of a more endogenous culture of compromise and political dialogue. Taking into consideration the extent of international pressure exerted in order to achieve some of the key reforms (particularly in the anti-corruption area), one can question the real weight that the process of inter-party and inter-faction dialogue played in all this. Score # of relevant issues discussed 1 Functioning of mechanisms for individual cooperation and dialogue 1 Culture of compromise -1 # of spaces for policy debate -1 Functioning of structures for inter-party dialogue -1 Total score for policy dialogue in institutionalized settings -1 Enabling environment: Legal, political and cultural conditions that impact the capacity of political actors to influence policy Political actors: Political parties and cross-party caucuses. The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. Inclusive policy-making: All parties are involved and participate in policy making at the national level. Even if the participants in the questionnaire and the interviews included parties, which main institutional roles unfold at the local level, the questionnaire focused almost exclusively in policy making at the national level. In particular around the key policy and institutional reforms, which have been taking shape in the country in the aftermath of the Dignity Revolution Quantitative data: 0  None of the political actors currently experience an enabling environment in which they are involved in inclusive policy making;  Average score for polarization is 3 in a 1-10 scale where 1 represents maximum level of polarization Qualitative description: Parties qualify the political environment as a competitive arena rather than one in which political and social actors are enabled to work together in order to address the country’s significant challenges. Similarly, most actors perceive a process of deterioration of the political environment as compared to the political situation in the immediate aftermath of the Dignity Revolution. The political process remains to a large extent driven by key personalities and the capacity of special interests to influence and accommodate the policy process to their own priorities. The dominant political culture continues to be one of short-termism, behind-the-closed-doors-deal-making and quid pro quo. A culture of compromise remains largely absent. Coalitions are not structured around clear party axes or ideological cleavages. The positions of individual politicians fluctuate across the whole range of options almost on an issue-by-issue basis so that party representatives who may adopt a progressive position on a certain policy area, may become, the staunchest defendants of the status quo on another. The resulting environment is one where the mechanisms for dialogue and trust building are established almost on a personal level, with political parties and party factions in parliament or the adscription to government or opposition camps playing a limited or no role at all in defining the policy positions. Nevertheless, as noted by our interviewees there are exceptions to the above-mentioned dynamics. These include:  The Euro-Optimist group as a multiparty platform for advancing reform;  The Inter-faction Union for Gender Equality;  The ad-hoc (albeit limited) multiparty discussions taking place in the context of specific initiatives by the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR).  The work carried out in the Parliamentary Committees.  The spaces facilitated by the international community in order to support the process of adoption of specific legislation. Score Experience of an enabling environment -1 Polarization and perception of general evolution of the political environment -1 Functioning of mechanisms for individual cooperation and dialogue 1 Culture of compromise -1 Existence of spaces for inter-party dialogue 0 Total score for enabling environment -2 Key definitions: Political actors: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level.  “Attitudes Towards Women’s Political Participation in Ukraine” National Democratic Institute - February 2016. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI%20Gender%20Research%20FEB%202016%20-%20ENG%20vf.pdf Quantitative data: 0  0/8 - Parties do not have specific policies in place to facilitate women participation, beyond the compliance with the 30% gender quota recommendation established in the Law. Furthermore:  For the last parliamentary elections, 2/8 (Samopomich and Batkivshchyna) adjusted its candidates lists to comply with the recommended threshold in legislation of at least 30% minimum gender quota.  For the local elections 75% of the lists presented by all the parties in the country complied with the 30% quota Qualitative description: Women still face constraints in practicing their political, economic and social rights. Yet, political parties, across the political spectrum do not seem to consider gender equality a pressing issue or one in which they would think reform is necessary (whether at the statute or party policy level) or urgent. Low participation of women in party lists or party decision-making bodies is not particularly socially sanctioned, nor it seems to be specially rewarded by voters when more women are included. At the social level, there is not a very significant level of explicit opposition to women participation in politics (only around 13% of respondents to a recent survey). But just about 38% of the population would express their preference for equal participation of women and men in politics. The prevailing vision of the role of women in politics is constructed over an implicit dominant association of women with the private sphere and the perception/assumption of women’s lack of interest in politics, which would ultimately explain why they are less involved. Women MPs interviewed for this baseline study did not distance themselves greatly from this analysis, even though they were able to identify instances of sexism in their interaction with male MPs and gender based discrimination in some practices of political parties. Yet, generally, parties are not perceived by women politicians as blocking the entrance of women into the political sphere. This speaks volumes of how ingrained gender inequality is in the societal mainframe and also about the difficulties to move parties beyond the current status quo on this issue. As noted by many of the experts interviewed for this baseline study, one positive aspect, which may favor greater women participation in politics is the linkage established between parties’ access to public financing and the compliance with minimum gender quotas recommendations. This type of positive incentive seems to be slowly transforming the practice of parties. Score Perceptions of women in society -1 Policies developed to address gender imbalances -1 Compliance with 30% minimum gender quota 1 (partial compliance but positive impact) General role of party structures 0 Willingness of political parties to address gender imbalances -1 Total score for women participation -2 Political parties continue to endure a bad reputation in Ukraine, with trust rates hitting a historical low score in 2015. Nevertheless, 70.2% Ukrainians consider political parties and important factor for the adequate functioning of a democratic regime in the country. Mistrust in political parties is rooted in the perception of the political parties as lobby structures for the interests of their leaders (37% of respondents) and their financial donors (58% of respondents); rather than as organizations defending and articulating both the policy views of their voters and the national interest (only 11% agreed that parties represent citizens’ interests). Quantitative data: 12% of Ukrainians reported to trust in political parties Furthermore: 79% of Ukrainian citizens do not trust political parties Qualitative description: Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, political parties continue to endure bad reputation in Ukraine, with trust rates hitting a historical low score in 2015. Nevertheless, 70.2% Ukrainians continue to consider political parties and important element for the adequate functioning of a democratic regime in the country. Mistrust in political parties is rooted in the perception of the political parties as lobby structures for the interests of their leaders (37% of respondents) and their financial donors (58% of respondents); rather than as organizations defending and articulating both the policy views of their voters and the national interest (only 11% agreed that parties represent citizens’ interests). 63% of Ukrainians believe that political parties do not follow democratic standards in their activities. Similarly, the parties’ failure to adhere to their programmes and a lack of effective communication with citizens are both named as factors contributing to the overwhelming mistrust to political parties among the public. Legislation reforming party financing (opening parties to receive public funds for the first time in history and enhancing the levels of accountability and transparency on the public and private funds and donations received by parties) has not translated yet in a change in the long established mistrust vis-à-vis political parties. 77% of Ukrainians would never consider supporting a political party financially. The majority of Ukrainians also seem to oppose the idea of parties receiving any public funding (only 15% supports this measure). Citizens also show their opposition to the parties receiving funds from oligarchs (only 14% in favor). Finally only one third of the population (31%) believes that parties should be financed directly by their supporters. There is an overwhelming demand for a new breed of political parties in the country (71% of respondents consider new political parties as the only hope for the country’s future). Yet, the field seems to remain quite evenly split between those who see general differences in the political parties emerging after Maidan (42%) and those who do not see any difference (35%). What is more, when it comes to trust levels pre and post-Maidan parties enjoy very similar levels of trust (12% for pre-Maidan vs 15% for post Maidan). Leadership renewal is a top priority for Ukrainian citizens (55% considers that the country needs new leaders). In this regard, all parties competing in the early Parliamentary elections in 2014 headhunted for liberal professionals and individuals with a track record in civil activism to show a renewed face. Yet, an important share of people included in the parties’ lists continue to be cadres from previously existing political structures, thus contributing to a extending perception of business as usual. Score Trust in political parties -1 Capacity to communicate, represent and articulate interests -1 General willingness to support to parties (financially) -1 Democratic standards and transparency in parties -1 Perception of the importance of political parties in democracy 1 Total score for perception of political parties -3 Secondary sources  “Perception of Ukrainians on political parties and sources of their funding,” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, November 2015, Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/2015_Partiyi_8_ENG-1.compressed.pdf Key definitions: Political documents: Manifestos, statutes, position papers, policy proposals etc. Real inputs from a defined support base: Known support base for a PP such as CSOs, NGO’s and public in general Political parties: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level.  “Perception of Ukrainians on political parties and sources of their funding,” Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, November 2015, Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/2015_Partiyi_8_ENG-1.compressed.pdf Quantitative data: 3  In 3 cases (Batkivshchyna, Syda Lyudey and Democratic Alliance) party manifestos developed in consultation with other actors.  None of the parties included in the study have published relevant sectorial policy documents, which have been developed in consultation with a support base. Qualitative description: The progressive loss of importance of the policy and ideological component has been a characteristic of Ukraine’s party system for a long time. In the aftermath of the 2014 elections, parties have continued to ignore the need to develop party programmes and policy documents. In addition, there has been a significant process of simplification and, to a higher degree, a unification of the content of the electoral programmes of all political parties. The result of this process is that between 59% and 74% of the population (depending on their adscription to various sociological groups) would not feel their interests represented by any of the political parties competing in the 2014 elections. Party ideology/vision rarely influences the public activity of politicians and MPs. Policy directives, when they exist, seem to be established as a combination of political opportunism and the vision of the political leader of the party/faction. This results in parties not developing specific units in charge of policy development, beyond the legal support department. Similarly, MPs also find it difficult to install capacity for policy analysis in their own offices due to the lack of economic resources available to hire supporting personnel. In this context, civil society and international experts (sponsored by international actors) have come to play a key role in providing policy expertise for the development of specific policy proposals and legislation. This is creating powerful disincentives for parties to engage in a more consistent approach to programmatic development, notably when it comes to the development of their own research and analysis sections/departments. New parties established after the last Parliamentary elections have shown a predisposition to look at some of these issues differently. According to the results of our interviews and the survey conducted for this baseline study, those parties seem to better understand and value the importance of having a clearer policy and ideological stance as a means to communicate with voters. Also, due to their origins in civil society, the integration of civil society expertise in the party structures is much more organic than in other parties. Score Capacity to differentiate themselves through their political manifestos 0 # of sectorial policy documents produced -1 Structures within the parties/parliamentary factions in charge of policy development -1 Consultation processes with party’s base 0 Mechanisms for consultation with policy experts -1 Total score for development of policy positions -3 Key definitions: Trust in political leadership of rival parties: Trust whether they will keep their word. Political actors: The study includes all political parties represented in Parliament and important parties and platforms not present in Parliament but which hold seats at the local level. The activities of cross-party caucuses are also examined for this indicator. Quantitative data: 2 The average score of trust in a scale between 0 (no trust) to 10 (total trust) is 2, which lies right in the middle of our scale for very limited trust (1-3); Please see methodology for specific considerations about the validity of this indicator. Qualitative description: To measure trust between the political leadership of other parties, we asked party representatives to define their trust levels to other political parties politicians in a scale of 0 to 10. This question was included also in the on-line questionnaire, where respondents could attribute specifics score to each political party (again between 0 and 10). Figures were distributed across five categories. The distribution was as follows: 0 = no trust at all; 1-3 = very limited trust; 4-6 = limited trust; 7-9 = trust; 10 = complete trust The results of this indicator are consistent with the levels of perceived political polarization and the overall characterization of the current political juncture as one dominated by competitive dynamics. This raises our confidence in the accuracy of this indicator in spite of the limitations in the process of data collection. As mentioned in previous indicators, trust seems to be generated on a personal level, through specific interactions in the fora enumerated in indicator S2.1. Many party representatives have highlighted the importance of the work in Parliamentary Committees, but also the interactions in the fora established by international organizations and civil society to discuss and address specific reforms. Score Total score for trust amongst parties -3 (See methodology for an explanation of the way in which scores have been adapted) NL-KVK-27189542-UKR17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 The momentum for political and institutional change and the energy generated by the Euromaidan has continued to wane in 2016, giving way to a much more sobering reality in which transactional politics and personalism - both markers of “old-school” Ukrainian politics - seem to continue to dominate the political scene. Two years after Ukrainian citizens’ mobilization astonished the world, uncertainty about the country’s future continues to dominate. And the hard-won space for the development of a more pluralistic and democratic polity seems to be, once again, at risk. The current overall situation is very unstable and impacts on the political system. On the one hand, because of the ongoing war, priorities have often gone to more urgent issues. On the other hand, as an effect of the EuroMaidan protests and regime change, significant opportunities appeared for political parties to emerge as promising forces to draw a new agenda for Ukraine. Corruption in Ukraine remains endemic, with politics’ dependence on the pervasive influence of oligarchs. As a consequence, the level of political representation is very limited as is the level of legitimacy. This situation also affects the ruling coalition, which is affected by tensions, rivalries and total lack of experience in conducting dialogue. The Parliament has little power and is very fragmented. Most of the political parties are heavily sponsored or owned by oligarchs and thus do factually not lack financial resources. The new political party law establishes a new mechanism for providing public funding to political parties, which have reached the 5% threshold to enter the National Parliament. Similarly, it establishes new templates, which oblige parties to report on their finances. However, there is not much clarity as to how this new law will work as parties struggle to address the new requirements in terms of funding reporting and transparency. The most prominent feature of Ukraine’s political culture is the gap between a strong civil society and a weak political society. The spirit of Maidan is still there and civic activism is vibrant, having become a force to be reckoned with by politicians. The volunteer movement to help the soldiers in the East illustrated the capacity of citizens to mobilize themselves and organize services the government used to provide for. In this regard, political parties leaders and MPS tend to perceive CSOs as useful partners, which can fill some of their organizational and legitimacy gaps. The relationship between CSOs and political parties is therefore evolving towards a more utilitarian approach, particularly at the individual level. However, this doesn’t translate in an overall increase in the levels of trust between political parties and CSOs. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update Hence, transforming the way in which political parties articulate political competition and institutional cooperation is a critical step in order to consolidate a sustainable path for institutional reform and democratization, which for the time being seems to elude the Ukrainian polity. The NIMD will therefore continue its efforts to address the capacity of political actors, further improve the political and electoral playing field and to enhance democratic political culture. This will be done through bilateral support programs to political parties but, taking in account the volatility of the political party landscape in the country, NIMD will also set out to support individual, reform minded political actors in the Ukrainian parliament and local councils after the local elections of 2017. It will open two democracy schools to support the emerge of a new class of democracy activists and the enhancement of the accountability of political parties towards the society. Through targeted, tailor made trainings, NIMD will support the capacity building of women politicians in the run-up to local elections as well as promote democratic reform in both existing and newly established political parties. Special emphasis will be put on trust building efforts and the inclusion of women and youth. Finally, NIMD will continue to address other salient issues of Ukrainian politics, namely political finance and political party regulation, via a series of public debates and publications. 1. Political update 2017 The momentum for political and institutional change and the energy generated by the Euromaidan has continued to wane in 2016, giving way to a much more sobering reality in which transactional politics and personalism - both markers of “old-school” Ukrainian politics - seem to continue to dominate the political scene. Two years after Ukrainian citizens’ mobilization astonished the world, uncertainty about the country’s future continues to dominate. And the hard-won space for the development of a more pluralistic and democratic polity seems to be, once again, at risk. The current overall situation is very unstable and impacts on the political system. On the one hand, because of the ongoing war, priorities have often gone to more urgent issues. On the other hand, as an effect of the EuroMaidan protests and regime change, significant opportunities appeared for political parties to emerge as promising forces to draw a new agenda for Ukraine. Corruption in Ukraine remains endemic, with politics’ dependence on the pervasive influence of oligarchs. As a consequence, the level of political representation is very limited as is the level of legitimacy. This situation also affects the ruling coalition, which is affected by tensions, rivalries and total lack of experience in conducting dialogue. The Parliament has little power and is very fragmented. Most of the political parties are heavily sponsored or owned by oligarchs and thus do factually not lack financial resources. The new political party law establishes a new mechanism for providing public funding to political parties, which have reached the 5% threshold to enter the National Parliament. Similarly, it establishes new templates, which oblige parties to report on their finances. However, there is not much clarity as to how this new law will work as parties struggle to address the new requirements in terms of funding reporting and transparency. The most prominent feature of Ukraine’s political culture is the gap between a strong civil society and a weak political society. The spirit of Maidan is still there and civic activism is vibrant, having become a force to be reckoned with by politicians. The volunteer movement to help the soldiers in the East illustrated the capacity of citizens to mobilize themselves and organize services the government used to provide for. In this regard, political parties leaders and MPS tend to perceive CSOs as useful partners, which can fill some of their organizational and legitimacy gaps. The relationship between CSOs and political parties is therefore evolving towards a more utilitarian approach, particularly at the individual level. However, this doesn’t translate in an overall increase in the levels of trust between political parties and CSOs. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update Hence, transforming the way in which political parties articulate political competition and institutional cooperation is a critical step in order to consolidate a sustainable path for institutional reform and democratization, which for the time being seems to elude the Ukrainian polity. The NIMD will therefore continue its efforts to address the capacity of political actors, further improve the political and electoral playing field and to enhance democratic political culture. This will be done through bilateral support programs to political parties but, taking in account the volatility of the political party landscape in the country, NIMD will also set out to support individual, reform minded political actors in the Ukrainian parliament and local councils after the local elections of 2017. It will open two democracy schools to support the emerge of a new class of democracy activists and the enhancement of the accountability of political parties towards the society. Through targeted, tailor made trainings, NIMD will support the capacity building of women politicians in the run-up to local elections as well as promote democratic reform in both existing and newly established political parties. Special emphasis will be put on trust building efforts and the inclusion of women and youth. Finally, NIMD will continue to address other salient issues of Ukrainian politics, namely political finance and political party regulation, via a series of public debates and publications. 1. Political update 2017 The momentum for political and institutional change and the energy generated by the Euromaidan has continued to wane in 2016, giving way to a much more sobering reality in which transactional politics and personalism - both markers of “old-school” Ukrainian politics - seem to continue to dominate the political scene. Two years after Ukrainian citizens’ mobilization astonished the world, uncertainty about the country’s future continues to dominate. And the hard-won space for the development of a more pluralistic and democratic polity seems to be, once again, at risk. The current overall situation is very unstable and impacts on the political system. On the one hand, because of the ongoing war, priorities have often gone to more urgent issues. On the other hand, as an effect of the EuroMaidan protests and regime change, significant opportunities appeared for political parties to emerge as promising forces to draw a new agenda for Ukraine. Corruption in Ukraine remains endemic, with politics’ dependence on the pervasive influence of oligarchs. As a consequence, the level of political representation is very limited as is the level of legitimacy. This situation also affects the ruling coalition, which is affected by tensions, rivalries and total lack of experience in conducting dialogue. The Parliament has little power and is very fragmented. Most of the political parties are heavily sponsored or owned by oligarchs and thus do factually not lack financial resources. The new political party law establishes a new mechanism for providing public funding to political parties, which have reached the 5% threshold to enter the National Parliament. Similarly, it establishes new templates, which oblige parties to report on their finances. However, there is not much clarity as to how this new law will work as parties struggle to address the new requirements in terms of funding reporting and transparency. The most prominent feature of Ukraine’s political culture is the gap between a strong civil society and a weak political society. The spirit of Maidan is still there and civic activism is vibrant, having become a force to be reckoned with by politicians. The volunteer movement to help the soldiers in the East illustrated the capacity of citizens to mobilize themselves and organize services the government used to provide for. In this regard, political parties leaders and MPS tend to perceive CSOs as useful partners, which can fill some of their organizational and legitimacy gaps. The relationship between CSOs and political parties is therefore evolving towards a more utilitarian approach, particularly at the individual level. However, this doesn’t translate in an overall increase in the levels of trust between political parties and CSOs. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update Hence, transforming the way in which political parties articulate political competition and institutional cooperation is a critical step in order to consolidate a sustainable path for institutional reform and democratization, which for the time being seems to elude the Ukrainian polity. The NIMD will therefore continue its efforts to address the capacity of political actors, further improve the political and electoral playing field and to enhance democratic political culture. This will be done through bilateral support programs to political parties but, taking in account the volatility of the political party landscape in the country, NIMD will also set out to support individual, reform minded political actors in the Ukrainian parliament and local councils after the local elections of 2017. It will open two democracy schools to support the emerge of a new class of democracy activists and the enhancement of the accountability of political parties towards the society. Through targeted, tailor made trainings, NIMD will support the capacity building of women politicians in the run-up to local elections as well as promote democratic reform in both existing and newly established political parties. Special emphasis will be put on trust building efforts and the inclusion of women and youth. Finally, NIMD will continue to address other salient issues of Ukrainian politics, namely political finance and political party regulation, via a series of public debates and publications. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 42000 Disbursement Ukraine February 2017 local partner 51000 Disbursement Ukraine March 2017 local partner 177532 Ukraine budget 2017 local partner 54532 Disbursement Ukraine August 2017 local partner 30000 Disbursement Ukraine November 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-UKR18 NIMD 1. Political update 2018 During the first half of 2017, politics in Ukraine was characterized by very active anti-corruption bodies who filed charges against high officials and members of the parliament. The parliament stripped immunity of four MPs, all of them are accused of economic crimes, bribery and misfeasance. Meanwhile, new political parties have been created and existing parties and movements have merged. Nevertheless, the confrontation between the President and the opposition deepens in Ukraine. Former president of Georgia and governor of Odessa Region, Mikheil Saakashvili, was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship by President Poroshenko in July, but came back to Ukraine without the permission of authorities in September. This was preceded by clashes between activists and police, and a group of Ukrainian politicians and MPs from different factions welcomed and accompanied Mr. Saakashvili. Also, according to a new law, the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) distributed the public funds for Ukrainian political parties, and started review parties’ financial statements. First reports indicate that political parties are experiencing substantial difficulties with these new financial regulations and some try to hide big donations. • Outlook for 2018 In 2018, NIMD will continue to address the systemic problems of the political system in Ukraine by exploring reform opportunities and finding areas of potential political consensus. Several policy studies on relevant topics for democratic reform, such as political finance and women political participation, will be published. A series of round tables will be organized around these subjects and engage political parties, NGOs and other stakeholders in the debate about the reform of the political system and political parties in Ukraine. NIMD will target these interventions on the most receptive elements of the Parliament, namely the so-called “Euro-optimists” caucus that represents four parties. Peer exchange for thematic support between Georgian and Ukrainian politicians that started in 2017 will continue in the coming year. In general, most resources will be devoted to the running of the two Democracy Schools in Odessa and Lviv, and the setting up of a new school in the East of the country. Considering the weakness of political parties, these schools aim to empower a new generation of change agents to achieve change bottom-up. Lastly, to promote women political participation, NIMD will identify a core group of (female) politicians that will follow specific trainings and experience sharing activities. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 201000 Ukraine budget 2018 local partner 20100 Disbursement Ukraine January 2018 local partner 69550 Disbursement Ukraine February 2018 local partner 34940 Disbursement Ukraine April 2018 local partner 33425 Disbursement Ukraine July 2018 local partner 42985 Disbursement Ukraine November 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Score out of ten Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-UKR19 NIMD Ukraine Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 289000 Ukraine budget 2019 67800 Disbursement Ukraine January 2019 53989 Disbursement Ukraine July 2019 126000 Disbursement Ukraine August 2019 430 Expenditures Ukraine Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-UKR20 NIMD Ukraine Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 203000 Ukraine budget 2020 35800 Disbursement Ukraine February 2020 44750 Disbursement Ukraine April 2020 74583 Disbursement Ukraine July 2020 39249 Disbursement Ukraine December 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result NL-KVK-27189542-ZIM16 NIMD ZIMBABWE’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND The contested 2008 presidential elections led to an upsurge in political violence and a five-year period of power-sharing between the main political parties. Since the 2013 elections, relations between the former liberation movement ZANU-PF and opposition parties have remained polarized. THE APPROACH OF NIMD IN ZIMBABWE The focus of NIMD’s programme in Zimbabwe is to try to build trust and dialogue between the parliamentary parties. It also looks at the political participation of women and young people. NIMD works in Zimbabwe together with strategic partner, DIPD (Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy), and implementing partner, Zimbabwe Institute. Programme deviations/ToC update: Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social context continues to be fragile. On the economic front, the country continues to face a debilitating liquidity crunch resulting in the government being unable to pay civil servants on time; limited cash in the banks and the introduction of a new quasi currency called “bond notes". The beginning of the year was characterised by citizens’ protests, emergent social media based movements and “national shutdowns”. The response by the state was a violent clampdown, which has reduced the spirit of consensus and consultation, which had prevailed since the inclusive government period. Zanu PF remains riven by internal struggles, while the opposition parties continue to be fragmented. The divisions in the political parties are mainly over leadership renewal processes. These divisions make it difficult to build consensus on how to resolve the myriad of problems facing the country on all fronts. Even with elections on the horizon, substantive moves towards consensus have been limited. The programme had foreseen to implement several activities relating to the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). However, Parliament held initial public consultations on the National Peace and Reconciliation (NPRC) bill that resulted in the bill being withdrawn for re-consideration and re-drafting to ensure that all the clauses are aligned to the constitutional prescripts that provide for an independent NPRC. The bill is expected to be re-gazetted early in 2017 and taken through the public consultation process again. This means that these interventions were moved to 2017. This fragile situation and ever changing context demands for flexibility in the programme. It is necessary to be able to implement if there is a political opening and to be able to adjust activities to suit the ever-changing context. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. AWEPA Zimbabwe Institute (ZI) Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 236600 22166 Disbursement Zimbabwe Nov 2016 local partner 18635 Programme monitoring 30000 programme advise and support 41500 Disbursement Zimbabwe August 2016 local partner Qualitative description: In analysing the Hansard over the last twelve months, there are no recorded Private Member Bills (PMBs) in this period. In corroborating with Veritas, there was also no information listed of PMBs moved in this period. The period was pushed back to January 2015 and there were still no listed PMBs. There were none adopted. Quantitative data: Table 2: ZI BART Scores 31 May 2016 Capabilities Results Max C1 Commit and Act 3.5 5 C2 Deliver Results 3.3 5 C3 Adapt and Self Renew 2.9 5 C4 Attract and Relate 3.8 5 C5 Balance Coherence and Diversity 3.4 5 Qualitative description: ZI is relatively balanced in three of the five capabilities; however, discrepancies are to be found in the two capabilities at either end of the scale. These fluctuations indicate an organisation in transition and are in line with ZI's transition from a fairly large organisation under the JOMIC project, to a more modest one at present. The Ability to Adapt and Self-Renew, which at 2.9% is the lowest scoring - indicates that ZI is weakest in its internal capabilities. In particular, suggesting that ZI needs to put more focus on its communications policies in order to better establish its identity and mission in the public imagination. Moreover, it was noted that the organisation needs to develop an effective mechanism for internal learning - for staff advancement but also for documenting and learning from the lessons derived from its operations as an organisation. The financial health of the organisation was prioritized for improvement, with the indicator scoring 2. The Ability to Attract and Relate, at 3.8, was scored the highest. One of the biggest strengths of the organisation is the leadership (including the Board) of ZI, which was scored the highest under this capacity. ZI has also been successful in creating a vision and mission, and translating those into objectives and action. The “spider web” diagram below provides a more detailed picture of the overall scores on each of the key issues. The six highest (blue) and lowest (red) were highlighted in the diagram. Total of 65 participants (25 men, 40 women) The Zimbabwe Political Parties Dialogue (ZPPD) held 2 meetings in 2016 around peacebuilding issues. NL-KVK-27189542-ZIM17 NIMD 1. Political update 2017 Zimbabwe’s political, economic and social environment is increasingly fragile. Zimbabwe’s problems – economic, political, social, policy and infrastructural - are well documented. The country is currently facing a debilitating liquidity crisis which has led to the government’s inability to pay civil servants on time prompting protests which have been violently crushed by the state. Government is struggling to pay civil servants resulting in frequent changes to pay dates while industry is currently operating at below 30% of its capacity. The threat of the government introducing government bond notes as a surrogate currency is causing a run on the banks and both business and public is converting as much credit into cash as possible. There is no consensus on how to resolve the socio-economic and political problems facing the country. This situation is further exacerbated by the lack of cohesion in developing national responses aimed at economic recovery and building lasting peace. While the government and ruling party ZANU PF struggles to meet its election promises, opposition parties and civil society have been debilitated by the result of the elections, they are currently fragmented and not able to coalesce as the watchdog of political actors; this makes the role of Parliament as the house that represents national constituencies ever more important. 2. Programme & Theory of Change Update The SP programme is divided into three parts: a programme focussed on the Zimbabwe parliament together by ZI, AWEPA and NIMD The Zimbabwe Political Parties Dialogue (ZPPD) programme implemented by ZI and co-funded by NIMD, DIPD and the EU (EU funding to be secured). An ILA component of the programme together with the Zimbabwe Europe Network. This programme feeds into the results framework of the NIMD/AWEPA International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) agenda. 2017 will be the start-up of the € 500.000 per year ZPPD programme funded by the EU. This programme will fit in the current ToC for the programme but will need an updated results framework to capture the results for the entire programme. Also the decision is made to focus more on ILA due to the big role the EU can play in creating space for civil society to operate in Zimbabwe. This programme will be developed jointly with ZEN. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 65329 Disbursement Zimbabwe Feburary 2017 local partner 116331 Zimbabwe budget 2017 local partner 25501 Disbursement Zimbabwe June 2017 local partner 75000 Disbursement Zimbabwe July 2017 local partner NL-KVK-27189542-ZIM18 NIMD Since 2017; the leadership succession processes have intensified in the ruling party. Two clear factions have emerged. One faction is popularly known as the ‘Lacoste’ faction with the support of war veterans and securocrats is campaigning for Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa to succeed President Mugabe; while ‘G40’ with the support of the First Lady Grace Mugabe and the President Mugabe. While no clear candidate has emerged from this faction indications are that the First Lady is wishes to succeed her husband; although there is also speculation that current Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi would also be preferred by this faction. As the infighting has intensified; the Vice President Mnangagwa has been publicly humiliated by the President, First Lady and other leaders associated with the faction including Jonathan Moyo who has used the twitter platform to incessantly attack him. Moyo also gave a detailed presentation to the Politburo of Zanu PF accusing Vice President Mnangagwa of plotting remove President Mugabe. On the other hand; the War Veterans have also publicly attacked First Lady Grace Mugabe and Other leaders from the G40 faction. The public attacks on the First family is unprecedented. The First Lady and her faction are using their proximity to the levers of power and seem to be on the ascendency. They have since pushed for Special Congress in December this year where it appears that they will push for a candidate from their faction to the post of Vice President. It is highly likely that this will result in First Lady Grace Mugabe rising to this position placing her in prime position to take over as President. There is also speculation that the Special Congress could result in Vice President Mnangagwa losing his position. In a recent cabinet reshuffle his key allies lost their portfolios; while key figures from G40 were appointed to strategic Ministries. Therefore; the succession process in Zanu PF appears to be inching towards its conclusion. In the short term this is likely to force the leaders within the party to be internally focused and extremely cautious in taking part in programmes that will likely result in them losing political capital. Therefore; interparty processes are likely to be slower than normal. The upcoming elections in 2018 will also likely slow down programme implementation as the parties’ fight for political survival in elections where tensions soar. The saving grace however is that this programme is being done under the auspices of Parliament. This makes it possible to undertake cross party programming with minimum risk to impact the political capital of the participating leaders. The opposition parties continue to be riddled by splits and infighting over leadership succession; though in the last year concrete steps have been undertaken by the parties to build alliances to build a united front in the upcoming elections. Clear progress has been recorded in this regard; although three alliances have emerged with a no clear path to a united front; and leaders continue to bicker on who should lead the coalition. Given that the stakeholders will be internally focused in the run up to the elections; the SP programming will focus on programmes that support electoral activities such as the popularisation and capacity building on the Women’s Manifesto. Other activities that don’t require the participation of the political stakeholders such as ZI and parliamentary staff activities will be undertaken in the 1st and 2nd quarter when the political stakeholders are still focused on their parties and elections. After the elections; there will be capacity building of the new Parliamentarians and other activities that involves the political stakeholders. 2. Problem Analysis & Theory of Change Update (max 2 pages) Political system Zimbabwe has been dominated by one party since independence in 1981, except during the period of the 2009 – 2013 Government of National Unity (GNU) when power was shared between Zanu PF and the two MDCs, with the country driven by a politics of consultation and consensus building that resulted from the SADC mandated dialogue. Following the July 31, 2013 elections, Zanu PF won a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The new dispensation has returned the country to polarisation between the ruling party and its supporters on one hand and the opposition and the civil society groups pushing for democratisation. The country holds regular elections; which however, have been contested on the grounds of rigging and manipulation by the state machinery amidst incidents of intimidation and electoral violence. Calls for electoral reforms remain unanswered. The next elections are scheduled for 2018 using the new Biometric Voter Registration system (BVR). The country has a new constitution adopted in 2013 after a consensus driven national process and an overwhelming yes majority in the referendum. This new constitution and other reforms brought to bear under the unity government such as independent Commissions have given rise to opportunities for engagement and advocacy for democratic reforms. It includes a progressive bill of rights and advances women’s rights, including specific clauses on women political participation. The Zanu PF government seems determined that reforms must be undertaken on its own terms as it remains pre-occupied with power retention and is cautious not to help the opposition to recover. Parliament seems much more open to facilitate reforms and continues to work with stakeholders in civil society and international partners to train staff and members of parliament to strengthen their legislative making and oversight roles. This creates the opportunity and space for advocacy. Parliament also has a mandate to carry out public consultations on key bills. Parliament has been very open to local and international partners to support these public consultations. Political actor Currently, Zanu PF has well over a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The party has increased its representation in Parliament following the decision by the opposition to boycott all by-elections including those that arose as a result of the recall of 21 parliamentarians from the august house after a split of the MDC T. Despite its dominance in Parliament, the party continues to be divided over its internal leadership succession processes. Since its Congress in December 2014 which was envisaged to end the internal succession battles; it appears that the succession battles have intensified as the party is increasingly concerned about the President’s advanced age and health. What makes the Zanu PF internal battles dangerous for the country is that Zanu PF has a symbiotic relationship with the country’s security sector. The conflation of roles from parliament, political party and government often poses a challenge, especially for Zanu PF. Meanwhile, the opposition has severely weakened through splits and fragmentation over party leadership renewal. The parties in Parliament are informally engaged in a platform called the Zimbabwe Political Parties Dialogue (ZPPD), where they engage national issues such as ending political violence; economic recovery; implementing the national constitution and increasing the participation of women in political processes. This platform represents potentially a much more amenable opportunity for engagement than parliamentary sessions where parties are concerned with points scoring. There is growing recognition, as demonstrated by engagement through the ZPPD and Parliamentary Committees, that parliament and political parties are inherently connected and one cannot function without the other. Parliamentary committees also present a scope for cooperation. Recently the political parties represented in Parliament collectively worked with Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) on a code of conduct for political parties. Political culture Levels of trust among the political players remain low despite the period 2009 to 2013 under the GNU which went a long way to reduce the levels of mistrust with the parties working jointly with civil society to produce a new constitution, working together in (Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) and forming the Zimbabwe Political Parties Dialogue. This experience creates the opportunities for openness to engagement. While the opposition have always had a positive working relationship with the civil society, Zanu PF has to a large extent remained highly untrusting of them; believing they are there to push the agenda of the opposition and imperialists. The constitution making process provided a platform and opened new opportunities for engagement between political actors and CSOs. Inclusiveness & gender equality Before the new constitution, the representation of women in Parliament had never risen beyond 16%. The new constitution, with a new provision of 60 seats awarded on proportional representation, has ensured 34% women representation in Parliament. In political parties and other key institutions such as Cabinet and independent commissions women representation remains below 25%. These figures remain below the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol (2008) goal of 50/50 representation across all sectors by 2020. Women from across the parties and in Parliament through the Women’s caucus have agreed to work together on strategies to extend the constitutional provision beyond 2023 and also to work on joint strategies to increase women’s participation in key decision-making processes. Opportunities exist in the form of lobbying and advocacy at party level for the implementation of voluntary party quotas by Zanu PF and MDC-T, which have thus far, have not been systematically applied. Under this project’s support, the Zimbabwe Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (ZWPC), a cross-party platform has worked on a women’s manifesto aimed at increasing the number of women members of parliament. The theory of change (ToC) remains valid. However, there have been no activities and none are planned under the culture section and would amend the ToC to remove the section on culture. 3. Programme outlook (max 4 pages) o Political system Zimbabwe remains highly polarised with the main political parties not cooperating on important national issues. As a result; key national programmes such as the country’s economic recovery programme Zim-Asset continue to face challenges as there is no consensus among the political leaders. Consensus among political leaders would result in a unified message to the international community which would result adequate investment to support the programme. Previously, consensus led processes have led to clear successes such as the making of a new constitution through the cooperation of the parties resulting in a constitution that was received over 95% support in a referendum in 2013. Similarly; cooperation by the parties led to a period of sustained peace as the parties worked through the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to monitor the implementation of the Global Political Agreement signed by the parties in 2008. The cornerstone of this programme was peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The programme will work with the political parties in Parliament to foster the formalisation of the interparty dialogue platform to enable it to effectively facilitate the cooperation of the political parties in resolving national issues. This will be done through continuous dialogue on national issues that the parties have chosen. Owing to the upcoming elections in 2018; the political parties have prioritised joint engagement with Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission(ZEC) on issues that will enhance the electoral environment resulting in elections results that are accepted by all the parties. The parties hope to make joint submissions on key issues relating elections such as the political parties code of conduct; voter registration, voter education, capacity building work of the national and provincial liaison committees and election observation/monitoring. Consensus among the parties will enhance the chances of proposed changes being accepted and implemented by ZEC. In addition; where consensus is reached; the proposed changes can efficiently be implemented through Parliament where all the parties are represented. Secondly, the first NPRC Bill was withdrawn in 2016. A new Bill has been brought back to Parliament and Public Consultations were undertaken in March 2017. This programme supported the public consultations and learning visits to Kenya and South Africa for the committees responsible for the oversight of the NPRC’s work. The programme will support the advocacy and awareness raising activities to enhance the acceptability of the NPRC Act once it comes into effect. The consensus building platform of the parties will be also be used enhance the acceptability of the Act by the key stakeholders. o Political actor To enhance the skills on procedures on public engagement; the programme will support the training and capacity building of the following categories: a) Orientation and training for the new Parliamentarians after the 2018 elections on their roles; Parliament procedures, etc b) Capacity building training for Parliament staff on M and E to enhance their ability to measure the results and impact of public engagement activities c) Peer to peer learning for senior Parliamentary staff on best practice on stills and procedures for public engagements and consultations. d) Training for ZI staff on the key areas of financial management and M and E to increase ZI’s capability to build lobby and advocacy capacity of political and civil society actors. o Political culture o Gender & Diversity The representation of women in political parties and Parliament remains extremely low in Zimbabwe. The programme will support programmes aimed at increasing the participation and representation of women in political parties and Parliament. To achieve this the programme will support Women MPs and Women in national leadership of parties in Parliament to develop joint/cross party lobby and advocacy strategies to enhance representation of women in 2018 elections and within their political parties. In this regard the following activities will be undertaken: a) Women’s Manifesto Having supported the development of a women’s manifesto in 2017, the programme will support the popularisation and capacity building training for women candidates using the manifesto. This will hopefully result in increased number of women that get elected into the next Parliament while raising the awareness of the parties on the need to increase b) Orientation of new Women MPs To increase the effectiveness of the newly elected women MPs; the programme will support their capacity building training. c) Strategic Planning The programme will support the development of the Strategic planning process for the Women’s caucus for the 9th Parliament to help clearly outline their strategies and priorities. d) Lobby and Advocacy on Identified Priorities The programme will support the lobby and advocacy programmes of the leaders of the political parties’ wings and the women’s caucus on identified priorities such as the 2023 clause in the constitution. ICT training will be given to the women to enhance their lobby and advocacy skills. Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 28448 Disbursement Zimbabwe April 2018 local partner 33514 Disbursement Zimbabwe May 2018 local partner 60519 Disbursement Zimbabwe May 2018 local partner 97806 Disbursement Zimbabwe October 2018 local partner 16293 Disbursement Zimbabwe October 2018 local partner 66000 Disbursement Zimbabwe December 2018 local partner Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result scale 1-5 Mid-term result scale 1-3 Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result 2= no / 1 = yes Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result Mid-term result NL-KVK-27189542-ZIM19 NIMD Zimbabwe Programme 2019 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 11391 Expenditures Zimbabwe Q1 2019 829 Expenditures Zimbabwe Q2 2019 143796 Disbursement Zimbabwe July 2019 1436 Expenditures Zimbabwe Q3 2019 107646 Disbursement Zimbabwe October 2019 1934 Expenditures Zimbabwe Q4 2019 NL-KVK-27189542-ZIM20 NIMD Zimbabwe Programme 2020 Political actors are defined as the combined main target group of the Strategic Partnership: - (representatives of) political parties - politicians - (Members of) Parliament and its Committees - Other elected representatives at local levels. NIMD will primarily focus on political parties. NIMD NIMD info@nimd.org http://www.nimd.org NIMD, Passage 31, 2511 AB The Hague, The Netherlands 1 331000 Budget Zimbabwe Q1 2020 10000 Expenditures Zimbabwe Q1 2020 66860 Disbursement Zimbabwe Q1 2020 150000 Disbursement Zimbabwe July 2020 93807 Disbursement Zimbabwe December 2020 End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result End-term result