

THE **POWER**
OF DIALOGUE
CONSORTIUM

Annual Report 2022






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1. Introduction

This document outlines the 2022 Annual Report for the Power of Dialogue (PoD) programme, that is being implemented under the 2021-2025 Strategic Partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in the framework of the 'Power of Voices' (PoV) grant instrument. The PoD Consortium is composed by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the Gorée Institute (GORIN), the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies (CEMI) and Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA). The programme, which is implemented in 15 countries¹ and includes regional and global components, carries the ultimate goal to 'contribute to peaceful democratic space, and inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels'.

In the second year of programming, the PoD programme accelerated its implementation and overall managed to achieve noteworthy progress towards its objectives. This progress was not all across the board though, as severe challenges caused by the still deteriorating state of democracy around the world also stifled progress or even caused regression. Nevertheless, after a first year of inception, baseline and setting-up activities during the pandemic, the year 2022 was characterized by a solid implementation and functioning Consortium that increasingly acts in a complementary fashion also aided by the possibilities of face to face meetings.

On a geopolitical level, the violent invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February and the subsequent war, was a major event that resonated globally. Next to the direct negative effects, such as inflation, food shortages and increased tensions between countries, the war also catalyzed a process that was ongoing already of a more divisive, multipolar and fragmented world order. At the same time, these negative effects caused a reappraisal of the democratic society as a critical factor that deserves, and requires, to be actively defended and supported. This meant foreign policies and initiatives such as the Global Summit for Democracy by the Biden Administration put the issue of supporting democratization again back on the global policy agenda.

The direct impact of this context on PoD is not directly discernable, but demand for the work of the Consortium partners is increasing, with PoD playing a clear leveraging role for other initiatives funded by international development partners in PoD programme countries. In return these extra attention will bring also greater impact for the objectives of PoD in the longer run.

This PoD Annual Report first provides an overview of key developments that occurred in 2022 in programme countries (Section 2) and then presents the results achieved in each country and region targeted by the programme (Section 3), as well as at global level (Section 4). The report further reflects on other monitoring questions (Section 5) such as how the programme is addressing the issue of localization, and

¹ Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Mozambique, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Colombia, Guatemala and Myanmar.



on how the identified risks that materialized were mitigated. Finally, this reports provides a narrative overview of the financial report (section 6), for which the details are provided in Annex 1, including justification for deviations from the approved budget. Annex 2a provides an overview of the contribution of the PoD results to the Security, Rule of Law and Strengthening Civil Society frameworks. While annex 2b provides an overview of actual vs. targeted results per country. Annex 3 compiles the links to all the PoD-related Human Interest Stories produced during the course of 2022.

2. Key developments in programme countries

This section intends to highlight some of the main contextual changes that have had an influence on our programming in 2022.

Difficult transitions in the Sahel

In Mali, the year was marked by the six-month embargo imposed by ECOWAS on Mali. To obtain the lifting of the sanctions, Malian authorities defined an electoral timetable after extending the duration of the transition by 24 month, planning for municipal and parliamentary elections to take place in 2023, and presidential elections in 2024. The ECOWAS embargo has had an impact on the implementation of the programme, particularly in the first half of the year. In addition, the civic space was also highly polarized between those who supported the transition and those who called for a return to constitutional order, coupled with growing distrust between national authorities and regional and international actors.

Despite the difficulties, NIMD Mali, through the Advocacy and Monitoring Committee on Electoral Reforms (*Comité de Plaidoyer et de Suivi des Réformes Électorales - CPSRE*), was able to contribute to the work of the National Transition Council, notably by providing input to the revision of the Electoral Law.

In Burkina Faso, the year started with a coup against President Kaboré, justified by the inability of his regime to respond to the security crisis. During this period, despite the difficulties, the PoD Consortium was able to contribute to strengthening political participation of women and youth, while finding ways to contribute to the national transition agenda.

However, these efforts were halted at the end of September when a second coup occurred, this time perpetrated by army captain Ibrahim Traoré, opening a new transition phase for the country and preventing the programme from yielding concrete results at national level.

Shrinking space in Uganda

The civic space continued to shrink in Uganda last year, resulting in self-censorship among political and civic actors due to the heightened threat of state-instigated violence. The year also marked the end of Democratic Governance Facility, after over a year and a half of the Government of Uganda suspending the activities of DGF over



suspicions of subversive actions. This mechanism was extremely important for the operations of many CSOs (including AMWA and NIMD) and is credited for very impressive results in the areas of democratic governance. It is expected that a lot of the activities that were undertaken by these CSOs will stall or completely stop with serious implications to the furtherance of the democratic governance agenda in Uganda.

The situation is not better with regards to the political space, as opposition parties' activities continued to be obstructed by State security agencies, and the restricted political environment continues constrain the ability of political parties to organize and compete effectively for state power. In this context, several opposition parties have been reluctant to continue engaging with the ruling party in the framework of the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD). This has led NIMD to suspend its support to the IPOD secretariat in 2022, shifting its programmatic focus from national interparty dialogue to supporting youth inclusion in decision-making and multi-stakeholder dialogue between civic and political actors.

Tunisia's new constitution

On 25 July, Tunisia held a Constitutional Referendum, giving the president sweeping powers while largely limiting the role of the parliament. In addition, civil liberties no longer enjoy the safeguards that had been firmly anchored in the previous Constitution, while the independence of the judiciary has also been weakened.

The opposition parties boycotted the referendum and almost 70% of Tunisian voters stayed home. While the low voter turnout casts serious doubt on the popular support for this new Constitution, President Kais Saïed was determined to push ahead, claiming that "Tunisia has now entered a new phase." A few months later, he amended the electoral law by decree, without any form of consultation, altering the functioning of the Tunisian democracy by drastically reducing the role of political parties. This prevented the Multi-party Dialogue Platform (MDP), facilitated by CEMI, from playing a meaningful role in 2022, despite the efforts summarized in Section 3.

Election results creating opportunities in Colombia

2022 was marked by the elections of the new Congress of the Republic and new President and Vice-President. There was a significant change with respect to the direction of the National Government and the majority composition of Congress, which historically has been mainly to the right of the ideological spectrum, and will now be led by center-left parties. At National Government level, the opposition candidate Gustavo Petro and his running mate Francia Márquez, both from the Pacto Histórico party, were elected. Their election results are, in part, a reflection of the 2021 mobilisations in which young people from all over Colombia participated. The new national government and the Congress of the Republic have demonstrated their willingness to implement the Final Peace Agreement signed with the former FARC, as well as their willingness to resume the work on the peace agenda.



This has provided an opportunity for NIMD Colombia to re-engage on the peace process after several years of hiatus, through its work with the Peace Commission of the Senate of the Republic by the NIMD, which is an international accompanier for the follow-up of the implementation of Point 2 of the Final Peace Agreement.

3. Country-level and regional results

This section provides an overview of the results achieved during 2022 in each country targeted by the PoD programme Theory of Change (ToC), which focuses on four mutually reinforcing Long-Term Outcomes (LTOs):

- **LTO 1 - Consortium, partner networks and local civil society organizations are effective enablers of change:** Consortium partners will strengthen each other, their partner networks and local CSOs by capitalizing on complementarity. This is an enabler for the other LTOs.
- **LTO 2 - Aspiring young and women political and civic leaders are influential actors of change:** investing in aspiring young and women leaders, both to fulfil their civil and political rights and catalyze their ability to spur political change.
- **LTO 3 - Political and civic actors collaborate peacefully on the basis of trust:** focusing on facilitating and enabling trust-building, dialogue and collaboration, and ensuring shared access for all civic and political actors to inclusive spaces.
- **LTO 4 - Political and civic actors strengthen democratic space:** allowing civic and political actors to jointly advocate for the interests of their constituents, either at national level, or through the creation of external pressure point at regional and global level.

3.1 Sahel

3.1.1 Mali

Lead: NIMD Mali

LTO 1: In order to continue strengthening the complementarity between PoD consortium partners, NIMD Mali joined forces with GORIN and the other NIMD offices in the Sahel to initiate a regional lobby and advocacy initiative, starting with a **regional forum** on 'Democratic transitions and political stability in the Sahel' (see section 3.1.4 below).

The programme also benefited from the support of CEMI with regards to best practices around democracy school alumni tracking tools and mechanisms.



LTO 2: NIMD Mali supported the youth and women leaders who graduated from its democracy schools in setting up **an alumni network called GRADI** (*Groupe de réflexion et d'action pour la démocratie et l'inclusivité*), with the objective to maintain interactions and collaboration around their respective civic and political engagement within their organisations and/or communities.

Specific alumni projects aiming at increasing the number of exchange and information frameworks for citizens to have a better understanding of the transition process were also supported by NIMD. One example is the "**DJEMU exchange space**", which is **targeting young high school students aged between 14 and 18**. The leadership of the four high schools that have hosted these DJEMU spaces have welcomed the initiative, as it strengthens the civic education curriculum and raises political awareness among students.

In addition to supporting the alumni network, NIMD also organized workshops for Malian youth and women leaders on key pieces of legislation such as the Charter of Political Parties, but also on lobby and advocacy strategies for better representation of youth and women in decision-making bodies, in particular around the **law on quota for access to elected and appointed positions**. These activities contributed to broadening the actions of the Consortium of Civic and Political Youth and Women's Organisations (COCPJF).

LTO3: The most notable result relates to the work of the *Comité de Plaidoyer et de Suivi des Réformes Électorales* (CPSRE), a cross-party electoral reform advisory board supported by NIMD for the past three years. In 2022, this committee worked with the political parties, civil society and authorities to ensure that an electoral law reform would increase inclusivity in the Malian political landscape and instill democratic values. The CPSRE was invited to present their work by the CNT's Law Commission and the new electoral law, adopted by the National Transition Council in June, **contained three recommendations from the CPSRE**, including the creation of an independent electoral management body in Mali.

NIMD Mali continued to collaborate with The Citizen Observatory on Governance and Security (*Observatoire Citoyen sur la Gouvernance et la Sécurité* - OCGS), as well as the organization of multi-stakeholder exchanges in Bamako, Sikasso, Ségou and Mopti aiming at **reducing tensions and building trust between political actors**, civil society and the national authorities (including the Minister of the *Refondation* of Mali). NIMD also supported OCGS in the production of analysis papers on topics related to the transition (i.e. "*Quelle constitution pour le Mali?*"; "*Renouer le dialogue et reprendre en main la transition*"), which found exposure in national and international media.

3.1.2 Burkina Faso

Lead: NIMD Burkina Faso

LTO 1: NIMD Burkina Faso also took part in the regional forum organized jointly with GORIN (also see section 3.1.4 below). This forum is a first step in a process of regional dialogue between national actors and regional organisations such as ECOWAS.



LTO 2: Following a training workshop organized jointly with Burkina Faso Coalition for Women's Rights (*Coalition burkinabè pour les droits de la femme* - CBDF), political women leaders in the Tenkodogo department have kicked off **a mentoring scheme** to provide support and advice to young women wishing to enter politics. Through a WhatsApp group, the cross-generational group of political leaders and aspiring politicians have daily contact in a bid to strengthen their political participation and share experiences. NIMD will continue to support this mentorship process as it develops.

NIMD was also able to train **a new cohort of 40 young people** from different regions and various social and political background within the framework of the democracy schools. After two years of implementation, the democracy schools are beginning to establish themselves as a key vehicle for young people who aspire to become politically active. National political figures and renowned academics are also taking part in the sessions, to share their experience and knowledge. The graduates of the school are also starting to organize themselves and have initiated discussions around the establishment of **a national alumni network**.

LTO 3: The ambition of NIMD to support the national transition process could not materialize due to the second coup. Therefore, no significant results were achieved on this LTO at national level. Despite this difficult context, NIMD and its partner ARGA continued to organize increasingly successful **political cafés**, providing space for exchanges between political and civic actors.

NIMD also worked at sub-national level, organizing **local political dialogue sessions** in partnership with *Balai Citoyen*. The session organized in the locality of Bama provided an opportunity for local actors to exchange on the management of the local health centre, leading the public administration to become more transparent and accountable.

LTO 4: In 2022, NIMD Burkina Faso strengthened its relations with EU diplomatic missions established in the country, as well as local and international organisations. The NIMD country director participated in various activities organized by PAX, the University of Ouagadougou, the CGD, the Balai Citoyen, the Association of Bloggers of Burkina, Promediation, etc.

3.1.3 Niger

Lead: NIMD Niger

LTO 1: Similarly to NIMD Mali and Burkina Faso, NIMD Niger also took part in the regional forum, organized jointly with GORIN (see section 3.1.4 below).

LTO 2: NIMD Niger trained a total **156 young leaders** (including 70 women) through the democracy schools in 2022, and supported some alumni follow-up initiatives. These include activities aiming to improve the internal governance of their political parties or organizations, to organize restitution sessions, to create discussion spaces in fadas (youth meeting places), schools and social media.



NIMD also supported **a coalition of six youth associations** in their advocacy initiative on a draft law establishing quotas for young people in decision-making bodies, connecting with Members of Parliament and representatives from the Executive. Unfortunately this initiative did not succeed in 2022, as the youth organization were going through changes of leadership during the course of the year.

LTO 3: NIMD Niger implemented **the Présimetre project**, a system of collecting feedback on the policies of the President of Niger. Alongside an online survey, young Accountability Ambassadors were trained to carry out face-to-face surveys across all of Niger's regions, also reaching people without internet access. The project culminates in **interactive Accountability Platforms**, a space where citizen representatives can meet in person with their elected representatives to discuss the implementation of public policies and how these uphold the population's rights.

LTO 4: NIMD provided support to the Youth Parliament of Niger, as well as **Parliamentary Gender Network** of the National Assembly. The latter succeeded in developing an action plan and gaining more visibility within Parliament. NIMD supported the implementation of the plan by organizing a training on gender and leadership and awareness-raising initiatives on gender issues targeting MPs.

3.1.4 Regional Approach Sahel

Lead: GORIN

LTO 1: In September, GORIN and the NIMD offices in the Sahel jointly organized a **Regional Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Forum** on Gorée Island entitled 'Democratic transitions and political stability in the Sahel' which brought together political and civic actors from across the Sahel Region. It created a space for exchange, discussion and reflection on the growing threats to political stability and development. As such, the Forum was an opportunity for the participants to take a more regional approach, working together to reach consensus and a shared plan of action. Participants of Forum included members of civil society, political actors, representatives of state and non-state institutions, and MPs from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal.

Following the Forum, these participants have released **a call for action**, setting out their recommendations to tackle the region's multifaceted governance and security crises. The call is addressed to the countries' transitional authorities, civil society organizations, political parties and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It takes into account recent coups in the region and aims to safeguard the fragile transition processes that will define the future of these countries and the region. In particular, the appeal highlights the importance of involving all stakeholders in the resolution of political and security crises in the Sahel, and the important role ECOWAS and other regional organizations can play towards successful transitions and political stability in the Sahel.

The regional participants made three specific demands:



- They asked sub-regional and regional organizations to mobilize and pool their efforts to bring peace and stability back to the region.
- They called on ECOWAS to find ways to put an end to the escalation of violence, and encourage political parties to engage in dialogue towards lasting peace.
- They asked the transitional authorities in Mali and Burkina Faso to adopt an inclusive and participatory approach in the implementation of political reforms during the transitions.

The call also included specific recommendations to ECOWAS, the transitional authorities, civil society organizations and political parties. Among them, was the call to parties to take part in constructive political dialogue and to promote training and awareness raising among citizens, as a step towards free and transparent elections at the end of the transition.

LTO 2: GORIN organized a series of **capacity building activities for women and youth** from the Sahel region in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and political decision-making, as part of an effort to enhance their role in advocacy and to influence policies. They have helped to increase the participants' abilities to conduct conflict mapping and analysis to identify local-level conflict issues and their unique drivers; convene inclusive conflict prevention processes in line with the international frameworks and; electoral conflict management.

LTO 3: GORIN formalized a partnership with *École de Maintien de la Paix* in Bamako to jointly organize a **youth forum** on the theme: "Engaging Youth as Strategic Partners in Peacebuilding and Political Processes in the Sahel". This created an avenue for young people to exchange experience with other youth from the Sahel region with respect to challenges they face towards accessing social, political and economic opportunities in their respective countries. It also provided the opportunity for them to interact with authorities, experts and representatives of international institutions, and to collectively advocate for an increased participation of youth in political processes.

LTO 4: GORIN organized its 7th Annual Symposium on the theme "Security Challenges and Political Dynamics in the Sahel; Stakeholders' Engagement", with active involvement of representatives from ECOWAS and Sahel G5. The aim was to trigger a discussion on new developments such as democratic deficits resulting in unconstitutional change of governments, the expansion of some Islamist groups to coastal states in West Africa, as well as trends and opportunities related to the transitional roadmap of Mali and Burkina Faso. An **outcome document** reflecting the common position of participants with respect to challenges and how to influence peaceful political transition was produced and disseminated with policy-makers and non-state actors at regional and national levels.

3.2 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)



3.2.1 Tunisia

Lead: CEMI

LTO 1: CEMI continued to provide its expertise on youth political participation throughout the PoD network (also see section 4.1 - Learning Agenda). Moreover, CEMI also supported several democracy schools in the PoD network, such as in the Sahel, in Iraq and in Jordan.

LTO 2: The implementation of the Tunisian School of Politics (TSoP) also continued in 2022, with a 'mixed' class composed by participants selected both from political parties and civil society. In light of the political context, the focus of the class was on the consolidation of democratic values, pluralism and mutual respect through coaching sessions along the training cycle, with the aim to strengthen the cohesion between the participants and identify common core values (i.e. freedom, human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, social justice, the rule of law etc.).

CEMI also continued the training sessions of the **Youth Council**, which targets young Tunisians who have not yet taken the step to engage in political parties, as well as its support to the YouTube channel "**#Freesh**", producing content topics related to economy, elections, youth engagement and participation. The channel aims to attract young people who are disengaged from politics, using humor and a sarcastic style. The channel reached a total number of **112.2K followers** on social media (14.7K on Instagram, 72K on Facebook and 25.5K on YouTube), with 122 videos broadcasted by the end of 2022.

CEMI also organized a new edition of the regional academy, involving young civic actors from the MENA region. They worked together in different training sessions (i.e. political communication, negotiation, change management, etc.), with the support of CEMI experts.

LTO 3: In the context of the constitutional referendum (see section 2 above), CEMI took the initiative to bring together a group of constitutional experts to present a draft revision of the 2014 Constitution, which aimed to address some of the issues while preserving the democratic gains and guaranteeing the stability of the political regime. This initiative was presented to all relevant political and civic actors, including the CEMI's Multiparty Dialogue Platform (MDP), which did not succeed in reaching an agreement on the proposal.

After several meetings with representatives of the UGTT (*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*), CEMI was invited to participate in the work of their administrative committee, the highest decision-making body, which eventually adopted the proposed draft revision with a view. Unfortunately, this initiative did not succeed as the space promote alternatives to the President's new Constitution became non-existent.

In parallel to these efforts, CEMI managed to organize 14 dialogue activities, 5 couscous Politiques & 9 debates on topical issues related to the national context, engaging close to 500 TSoP alumni, experts, ambassadors, public figures, etc.



LTO 4: Within this LTO, CEMI is focusing on capacitating political and civic actors, youth and women, to advocate for and to strengthen democratic space. In this context, the organization tried to repeatedly draw attention on the **democratic backslide taking place in Tunisia**, through dialogue activities, media statements and publications. CEMI's research cell produced 13 policy papers and 41 policy briefs addressing topical issues related to the national context dealing with the thematic of youth political participation, its constraints and challenges, analyzing and criticizing the decrees announced by the president which therefore defending, strengthening and raising awareness about the importance of inclusive dialogue and spaces and democratic achievements preservation.

3.2.2 Jordan

Lead: NIMD Jordan

LTO 1: NIMD Jordan delivered a training on gender for all staff members and some of the alumni from the **School of Politics (SoP)**. The training focused on the general concept of gender, its relevance in the Jordanian context, especially politics, and how to conduct gender-sensitive programming.

LTO 2: The recommendations of the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System opened a new opportunity for the NIMD program in Jordan to work with political parties, with the government's blessing. Based on that, a project to build their capacity in the areas of **manifesto development, strategic planning, and designing executive plans** was implemented in cooperation with Politics and Society Institute during the second half of 2022. In addition, as foreseen in the annual plan, NIMD Jordan organized a new round of the SoP in 2022, including 8 training sessions and involving 30 youth from political parties.

LTO 3: NIMD Jordan organized political dinners, with a strong focus on women in political parties and their role in political life. In addition, NIMD supported the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA) in implementing two workshops on the importance of Political Parties and the outcomes of the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System. These workshops targeted university students, and also addressed the issue of allowing political parties to operate within Jordanian universities for the first time.

LTO 4: NIMD Jordan keeps monitoring the democratic space in Jordan by observing the situation, periodic meetings with different stakeholders. In addition to that, SoP participants are invited to develop policy papers to reflect on issues related to democratic space and political participation. A total of **four papers** were developed in 2022, on topics related to women's political participation, democratic education in schools, and PPs expected activities in Jordanian universities. These policy papers are presented, published, and available to be used by young activists, political parties and CSOs.

3.2.3 Iraq

Lead: WEO



No activities were implemented in Iraq as part of the PoD programme in 2022. However, following the successful Democracy School pilot implemented in 2021, NIMD and WEO worked with the Dutch Embassy in Iraq to plan the official launch of the new School in 2023, with a focus on building a strong alumni network.

3.3 Horn of Africa

3.3.1 Uganda

Lead: NIMD Uganda

LTO 1: NIMD collaborated with AMWA and other local partners to successfully champion a **court petition** that challenged the arbitrary actions of the Financial Intelligence Authority to freeze the bank accounts of various CSOs under unclear circumstances. In addition, there were mutual support initiatives between NIMD Uganda and AMWA to strengthen each other's capacities in areas of dialogue facilitation and feminist transformative leadership respectively.

It is also worthwhile to note that NIMD Uganda has formed **new partnerships** with local CSOs as part of the programme, such as the Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs (UPFYA), Faraja Africa Foundation, National Youth Council (NYC) and the Uganda Youths' Network (UYONET) among others. NIMD and AMWA are continuing to work with these organizations to strengthen their capacities in dialogue, feminist transformative leadership and resource mobilization.

LTO 2: NIMD Uganda facilitated the formation of **Multi-Party Youth Platform (MYP)**, a forum that brings together all the youths' leagues of all political parties with representation in Parliament. This Platform was launched by the Leader of Opposition in Parliament at a function that was attended by Secretaries General of all the participating political parties and the Government Chief Whip. The main objective of the MYP is around the development of a minimum agenda that should guide actions around influencing young people's political participation in governance processes in Uganda.

LTO 3: As already reported above and in the PoD Annual Plan 2023, in 2022 NIMD Uganda halted the hosting of the IPOD Secretariat. After the 2021 elections and the ongoing political rift between the ruling party and the largest opposition party caused a stalemate also at IPOD level. Without the participation of all main political forces, NIMD could not continue hosting the platform. Instead, NIMD facilitated **dialogue between the Electoral Commission and Women leaders** from the Political parties on effective participation of all political parties in the national Women Council elections. This dialogue enabled women in political parties to appreciate the road map to these elections and understand how to effectively participate in these elections. Unfortunately, the Uganda Electoral Commission later announced the indefinite postponed of the women councils' elections citing lack of funds. Despite all the efforts, the Elections for national women council were postponed to later date due to lack of funds by the government of Uganda



LTO 4: A policy brief on women and youth representation/ participation in politics was developed by NIMD during the course of the year. The policy recommendations from this brief were later adopted and included in the **State of the Youth report 2022** which was debated by the Parliament of Uganda.

3.3.2 Kenya

Lead: Mzalendo Trust and NIMD

LTO 1: There were quite a number of positive results from the collaboration of the consortium partners in making them effective enablers of change. As an example, Mzalendo collaborated with AMwA and NIMD to launch a Policy Brief titled 'Exploring Opportunities to Advance Women and Youth's Political Leadership in Kenya's 2022 Elections.' The Policy Brief highlighted the drivers and challenges of women and youth's political participation and made policy recommendations.

Ahead of the August 2022 elections Mzalendo and NIMD also collaborated in the development of an online **Vote Compass** to raise awareness on candidates and political parties and allow Kenyan voters were able to have a more in-depth interaction with political parties and their priorities and identify those that were more aligned with their key policy issues.

LTO 2: To ensure electoral preparedness, Mzalendo facilitated a **university dialogue forum** in March 2022 based on the theme: Youth and Political Parties. The session aimed to strengthen the capacity of youth to organize and mobilize in political processes and created a peer learning, open dialogue and mentorship exchange forum between young people and political parties in Kenya. In addition, Mzalendo ran a large **public campaign** to persuade youth to vote in Kenya's 2022 general elections, responding to low voter registration among young people. Using the hashtag #Gtokeze ("Show Up"), Mzalendo worked with community influencers to engage young people online. The campaign also targeted misinformation around elections, providing a place for young people to access relevant impartial data

Mzalendo, together with other partners, also convened a **National Dialogue on the Two-Thirds Gender Representation** in the 2022 General Elections. The result was a candid, focused, timely, broad-based, inclusive political dialogue on gender diversity and inclusiveness in the 2022 elections as candidates. A joint press statement was released to strengthen advocacy efforts

Following the elections, Mzalendo hosted an Induction Forum for Youth MPs, under the aegis of the Kenya Young Parliamentarians, and this provided an opportunity for the young members of Parliament to review past engagements, identify priority youth issues as well as set the agenda for action in the 13th Parliament.

It is worth noting that late 2022 also saw the opening of NIMD's new office in Kenya, with the recruitment of a Country Director and Finance Officer. NIMD Kenya will complement the work of Mzalendo and focus more on working directly with the political actors and in 2023 will set-up Democracy Academy, bringing together newly



elected politicians from across the political spectrum, and through this is leveraging the PoD work in a EU funded project on Strengthening Inclusive Democracy and Political Actors in Kenya (SIDPAK).

LTO 4: As part of the work on accountability, Mzalendo released a compendium looking at the institutional performance of Parliament. This included individual **scorecards of Members of Parliament**, which gave citizens time to reflect on the impact achieved over the span of five years by their elected leaders as they plan to re-elect or elect new MPs. In 2022, the scorecard drew a lot of interest from main media outlets in Kenya resulting in requests to have Mzalendo take part in media panels and one-on-one interviews to further analyze the report. The importance of our Parliamentary scorecard was affirmed by the new President when meeting his party's Parliamentary Group. He urged MPs to make an impact through plenary and avoid bringing disrepute to the institution of Parliament by exhausting five years in office without having uttered a word.

Together with other partners under the National Integrity Alliance, Mzalendo also generated the **Red Card List** that named and shamed politicians who lack integrity and were seeking elective office. The list which was a culmination of an integrity campaign in the 2022 elections received wide media coverage that also led to Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission releasing their list of blacklisted politicians due to integrity questions. To a certain extent, the Red Card campaign elicited a national conversation on integrity. The end-result of the campaign was mixed, as 56% of the red carded candidates were elected.

3.3.3 Ethiopia

Lead: NIMD Ethiopia

NIMD-Ethiopia is implementing activities both at the Federal and state levels. It works with stakeholders, such as HPR, the NEBE, the EPPJC, and the Caffee Oromia.

In 2022, NIMD Ethiopia achieved results across three LTOs:

LTO 2: With support of NIMD, 30 individuals selected from the Secretariat of Oromia Regional state and the General Attorney Bureau and standing committees of Caffee Oromia received two **trainings on legislative drafting and the legislative role of the council**, as well as on policy formulation and law-making process. As a result of the training, the participants came up with monitoring tools to check that sector offices are implementing the laws adopted by Caffee.

LTO 3: NIMD Ethiopia facilitated a meeting of the **Ethiopian Political Parties Joint Council** (EPPJC), a coalition of legally registered political parties, where 44 political parties participated. As a result of the meeting, EPPJC established three wings: Youth, Women, and Persons with Disabilities. NIMD specifically supported the establishment of the Women wing, aiming to improve political inclusion of women and to enhance the representation of women in politics. It is worth noting that three of the seven members of the executive committees selected to lead the wings were alumni of the Ethiopian Democracy Academy (EDAC) implemented by NIMD.



After the announcement by the government of Ethiopia of a National Dialogue process, the role and status of all political parties in this process was both unclear and sensitive with diverging views on the process and road ahead. This is why NIMD proposed to facilitate a dialogue retreat to discuss these issues and agree on a mutual position between the main political forces. The retreat brought 10 leaders of parties, including two representatives of the EPPJC, together in The Hague in October and in the end delivered a jointly agreed action plan on the way forward in relation to the National Dialogue process.

In December, NIMD also facilitated a first **multistakeholder dialogue** session on 'Transitional Justice and Democracy for Successful National Understanding'. The session involved more than fifty participants, including representatives from civil society organizations, the Ministry of Peace, EPPJC, political parties, and other organizations.

LTO 4: NIMD Ethiopia supported the development of the Human Resource Strategy for the House of the People's Representatives (HPR) in order to strengthen its secretariat. This document is expected to help attracting, developing and retaining high performing employees. It is also useful in driving organizational change through effective human resources management. NIMD also organized a validation workshop of the strategy, involving more than 80 staff members.

Furthermore, NIMD supported the development of M&E system and training on organizational planning, monitoring, and evaluation skills for the leadership of the HPR Secretariat. The support was intended to increase the understanding of practical approaches to the use of planning and M&E data in a decision-making and strengthening the basis for managing results, fostering learning and knowledge generation. The M&E System will be in place from mid-January 2023.

Finally, following a request from the Ethiopian Authority in charge of regulating CSOs, NIMD organized a half-day **briefing session** for political parties on the peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

3.3.4 Regional Approach Horn of Africa

Lead: AMwA

LTO 1: In 2022 AMwA and NIMD Uganda developed a joint **Lobby and Advocacy Strategy** which was used to conduct a lobby & advocacy training for 30 young political and civic leaders in Uganda. As a result, the participants developed collective action plans to lobby and advocate for increased meaningful participation and engagement of the youth and women in their political parties. Lobby and advocacy action plans included a demand for a 20% budget allocation to youth and women's leagues by June 2023 within the NRM party; at least a 40% budget allocation to women league activities and enactment of a strategic plan for the women's league in UPC.



LTO 2: AMwA continued to provide regional **feminist and transformational leadership trainings**, as well as coaching and mentorship of alumni from the African Women's Leadership Institute (AWLI). These activities led to the following results:

- In November 2022, the 5th East African Youth Parliament recommended that the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) should pass the East African Community (EAC) Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) Bill. The motion was led by Julia Muhumuza and supported by Michelle Carol Kharono, two Alumni from the October 2022 AWLI cohort, a powerful demonstration of political actors becoming effective change agents through enhanced feminist and transformational leadership skills.
- In 2022, AWLI Alumni in Uganda also steered changes in their respective political parties, including: **the establishment of the Women's Desk within the Peoples' Progressive Party**; increased funding for International Women's Day (IWD) in the FDC political party and took initiative to chair and ensure a gender-responsive approach in all deliberations in the youth league after undergoing the October 2021 AWLI. The Women League Leader of the Democratic Party facilitated the development and adoption of a Sexual Harassment Policy and Gender Equality Policy in the DP Party after undergoing the March 2021 African Women's Leadership Institute (AWLI).
- In February 2022, women leaders from nine Ugandan political parties established the **Inter-Party Women's Platform**. This includes 5 AWLI alumni who agreed to establish this platform as part of their joint action plan. The women's league leaders signed an MOU and agreed to collectively advocate for measures that can boost women's meaningful engagement and leadership in political parties and national processes. The nine parties include the Alliance for National Transformation (ANT), National Unity Platform (NUP), Justice Forum (JEEMA), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA), Ecological Party of Uganda, Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) and the National Women's Council.

Furthermore, AMwA supported the development of the 2022 – 2026 **Strategic Plan of EALA's Women's Caucus**. The Plan articulates the vision and roadmap that will achieve an integrated East Africa where all women participate in the decision-making processes, enjoy and fully exercise their rights to achieve sustainable political and socio-economic development, and program implementation of the regional integration. It sets a shared political agenda for women and women political leaders in EAC and advances gender-transformative policies and legislation.

3.4 Southern Africa, Latin America and Asia



3.4.1 Mozambique

Lead: IMD Mozambique

LTO 1: IMD, through the Political Academy of Women, established a **Women's Agenda** in Mozambique in partnership with Mozambican and foreign CSOs (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé a Príncipe), political party women and youth leagues, Parliamentary Women's Cabinet, Government, through the Ministry of Gender, State Representative Bodies, and Provincial Assemblies. This agenda aims to influence political parties and other decision makers to improve the quantity and quality of the presence of women and young people, as well as to take into account the interests of these groups in the agenda of national development.

LTO 2: IMD organized training sessions on **Gender Road Map for Inclusive Political Parties (GRIP)** in Lobby and Advocacy for each of the three main political parties (Frelimo, Renamo and MDM). The aim was to contribute to strengthening the capacities of women and men members of political parties, in leadership and decision-making positions on matters of promotion of gender equality in parties. It should be noted that Renamo and MDM have since appointed women as their general secretaries, as a direct result from the implementation of the GRIP.

LTO 3: the **Women's Political Academy**, through advocacy and dialogue sessions, attempted to influence political actors and civic actors to become involved in system-level reform to allow greater inclusion of women in elected positions. As a result, the women's leagues of the political parties affirmed their commitment to engage in intra-party advocacy for the establishment a quota system for women and youth in elections.

In addition, the *Academia Política da Mulher* organised a dialogue session with political actors (political parties and government) and the National Elections Commission on the need to adopt quota systems (*Zebra* lists) in electoral processes.

3.4.2 Guatemala

Lead: NIMD Guatemala

LTO 3: In Guatemala, multi-stakeholder political dialogue processes (including opposition parties and CSOs) have been implemented in four regions and in the capital, with a view to identify local development priorities ahead of the 2023 general elections.

Furthermore, NIMD continued to provide technical assistance to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in different areas, including on initiating a dialogue with representatives of political parties on their training needs during election year. This support was provided in partnership with *Asociación Política Caminemos* and *Universidad Rafael Landívar*, through **three dialogue sessions** involving 11 political parties.



Technical assistance was also provided to Legislative Commission of Indigenous Peoples of the Congress, to undertake **an investigation on any gaps regarding compliance with the Peace Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples**. The report identifies limited institutional progress, breaches in terms of progress on human rights, and a small number of setbacks which substantially affect the quality of life and opportunities for indigenous peoples. The final document is now available, and will be presented to the Committee, for their further action to rectify these gaps.

At the regional level, NIMD Guatemala has collaborated with the offices in Honduras and El Salvador to organize **regional interactions with young activist** from the three countries, with the objective to exchange on how to counter democratic backslides in Central America.

LTO 4: In 2022, NIMD Guatemala produced analysis on relevant topics, such as the operationalization of the concept of Inclusive Democracy, but also on how the indigenous peoples could better structure themselves politically. In addition, the three NIMD offices in Central America have conducted research on issues related to political inclusion of marginalized groups, which will be used as a basis for citizens roundtable to be organized in Guatemala ahead of the general elections.

3.4.3 Colombia

Lead: NIMD Colombia

LTO 1: NIMD worked with the Alliance for Open Democracy (AXDA) on promoting a strategy to modernise and strengthen the House of Representatives. This Alliance brings together 17 national and international civil society organisations, whose objective is to coordinate actions and common territories in order to facilitate collaborative Policy Making spaces, based on multi-stakeholder dialogue and public innovation, through four axes: Participation, Transparency, Training and Communications. The implementation of the Alliance's activities began in November and will fully take-off in 2023.

LTO 2: in 2022, more than **700 youth and women** political and civic leaders participated in various capacity building processes led by NIMD. First, through the Democracy Schools implemented in Cauca, Caquetá, Tolima and Valle del Cauca (Buenaventura), which are aiming to strengthen the knowledge, skills and democratic capacities of young social and political leaders to participate in decision-making. Secondly, through the **Youth Dialogue Processes** (PDJ) targeting women and men in the departments of Cauca, Caquetá and Tolima, who belong to the Youth Councils (CMJ) and/or the Municipal Youth Platforms (PMJ), with the objective of strengthening their knowledge of the public policy cycle and deliberative democracy. Third, with the development of the **Open Government School** (EGA), implemented by NIMD with the support of the Office for Transparency in Public Management of the Government of Valle del Cauca and the *Participa + Yumbo Programme*. This initiative arose in



response to the needs of the Colombian state in terms of public innovation and the strengthening of a non-violent democratic political culture in the country. Finally, with the implementation of the School of Open Democracy (EDA), within the framework of the Alliance for the Modernisation Plan of the House of Representatives, and specifically in the area of Training, NIMD developed a school with the aim of improving the knowledge of 50 officials and members of the Legislative Technical Units of the House of Representatives on issues relevant to their legislative work.

Most notably, in the run-up to the presidential elections, NIMD Colombia and partners launched the **Occupy Politics** project. The objective was to provide training and support for candidates, particularly those from traditionally under-represented groups. These candidates were selected based on their outstanding profiles and potential, as well as their existing commitment to inclusive democracy. As well as sharing campaigning skills, the training focused on innovative ways to increase transparency, accountability and citizen participation, knowledge that the successful candidates could take forward into their new decision-making roles. **Of the 81 people trained, 23 were elected** to Parliament

LTO 3: Territorial Dialogue Initiatives were carried out in the departments of Córdoba, Cesar, La Guajira and Valle del Cauca (Yumbo and Buenaventura). The aim of these initiatives was to contribute to the improvement of public management in different municipalities through the empowerment of civic and political actors. This allows increasing the effectiveness of citizen participation, through cooperation scenarios between civic and political actors for the development of public policies that respond to the challenges of local development.

3.4.4 Myanmar

Lead: NIMD Myanmar

LTO 1: To underline the need for flexibility and adaptive programming, the 2022 annual plan indicated that the PoD programme will be implemented in Myanmar through a phased approach, starting with the registration of NIMD Myanmar as an INGO regional branch office in Thailand. The rebuilding of the programme team enabled the resumption of a democracy school amidst an extremely complex and dynamic conflict situation.

2022 was a year of **constant adaptation** to a new living a working environment for the NIMD Myanmar team. There were also many considerations of safety and security that needed to be made when reaching out to find trusted networks of like-minded individuals in Myanmar. Despite these challenges, some staff members have successfully completed trainings on M&E and Political Economy Analysis during the course of the year.

LTO 2: In the face of heightened political volatility, the NIMD Myanmar successfully relaunched **virtual and in-person the Democracy Training School** programme for youth, women and ethnic leaders from Myanmar, and organized a successful networking event for women political leaders.



In addition, the team launched the **MyDemocracy School App**, a mobile and web-based application that aims to provide online and offline accessible, comprehensive democracy education materials to marginalized groups in Myanmar. To offer an interactive and engaging experience to users, the content within the application takes the form of both articles and audio files. There is also a forum – currently available exclusively to Democracy School alumni – at the end of each chapter, where users can anonymously discuss their takeaways and key lessons in order to engage in meaningful dialogue around the topics presented. The application features and the content supports bilingual capabilities, both in Burmese and English.

LTO3: Although the 2022 annual plan foresaw that a conflict resolution and mediation training would be implemented as part of this objective, targeted participants indicated during needs assessment interviews that creating safe space to begin to reconnect with other stakeholders would be a necessary first step. Therefore, NIMD Myanmar organized a first meeting in Kayin State, in which stakeholders agreed on the need to re-engage in dialogue to address key issues pertaining to the State.

In addition, key planning steps under LTO3 were also undertaken, including hiring an experienced team member from Myanmar as project focal for conflict resolution and dialogue trainings, actor mapping and identifying of target regions, and conducting outreach to potential resource people to participate in the upcoming training.

4. Global level results and learning

The global work of the PoD Consortium is implemented and coordinated by NIMD The Hague. This global programming relates closely to the Consortium learning agenda that is designed around the four LTOs. Next to the support for the learning agenda with specific thematic focus on dialogue and trust building, NIMD leads on ensuring adaptive programming and the overall PME system.

4.1 Learning agenda

As part of its coordination role, NIMD facilitates and supports the implementation of the Consortium's learning agenda. The learning agenda is structured around thematic learning linked to the four LTOs, and to each Consortium member's area of expertise. Each LTO has specifically formulated learning questions that operationalize learning and that guide the work of NIMD The Hague. Below are descriptions of contributions made to each of these learning questions: :

For LTO 1: To what extent and how are Consortium, partner networks and local civil society organizations effective enablers of change?

- *How have Consortium partners been able to strengthen each other, our partner networks and local CSOs by capitalizing on complementarity?*
- *What has been each PoD Consortium partner's unique expertise in complementary areas, gained through in-country and regional experiences?*



As emphasized through several examples in section 3 above, the collaboration between PoD consortium partners has significantly increased in the second 2022, enhancing **mutual learning**. As an example, CEMI has supported several NIMD offices (i.e. NIMD Myanmar, Mali, Jordan) with regards to their work on youth political participation and democracy education. AMwA (feminist leadership) and NIMD Uganda (dialogue) were also able to mutually strengthen each other, while GORIN (regional level) and the NIMD offices in the Sahel (national level) attempted to make use of their complementarity through regional lobby and advocacy. Similarly, experiences between different democracy education interventions were shared during several webinars and practical exchanges, (Colombia, Burundi, Ethiopia) including also using the expertise of former NIMD partner in Georgia.

This increased collaboration is a direct result of the **physical Consortium Partner meeting** that took place in The Hague in April 2022, which provided an opportunity to re-connect after a two-year period of (strictly) online interactions. Evidently, enhancing mutual learning was a key topic of conversation, and the meeting ended with clear action points on how each member organization can better play their respective regional and thematic roles, and as such support the PoD network better in line with the TOC objectives and the learning agenda.

One concrete example of this mutual learning and support is the **Gender Audit** conducted by AMwA for NIMD Headquarters in The Hague. The aim of the audit was to assess the extent to which NIMD's systems, policies, management and staff are equipped and are capable of delivering gender sensitive and responsive programmes, but also to identify gender parity gaps that exist in NIMD's structures, processes and procedures, organisational culture, management of human resources; as well as in the development and application of policies, knowledge products and tools.

Following completion of the audit, the management team of NIMD has committed to work on bridging the gaps identified by the auditor in relation to the institutional culture and ways of working of the organization, the organizational policies and processes, resources, capacity and gender mainstreaming.

Through this LTO, NIMD has also worked on **strengthening the capacity** of its **country offices** taking part in the PoD programme. A big step was taken in this direction in 2022, as the first ever physical NIMD country director council meeting was organized in The Hague. This provided an opportunity for directors to learn from each other on key areas of intervention, but also to benefit from a training on safety and security. This is a topic that came out as a clear common capacity gap for most NIMD offices in the scans that were conducted in 2021.

In addition, NIMD The Hague also provided bilateral capacity support to several country offices in various areas, such as development of office manuals of procedures, or the improvement of financial systems by conducting internal audits.

Finally, it is important to note that throughout the year, consortium partners and country offices have also effectively collaborated with **local CSOs** that bring complementarity expertise, research capacity, or that are able to effectively mobilize key target groups.



For LTO 2: To what extent and how are aspiring young and women political and civic leaders becoming influential actors of change?

- *How can we best invest in aspiring young and women leaders is so that they fulfil their civil and political rights and catalyze their ability to spur political change?*
- *What works, given the heterogeneity of women and youth demographics, in further developing their capacities to lobby and advocate for their diverse political goals and rights as legitimate leaders?*

Next to the bilateral support provided to the network by CEMI in terms of youth political participation, and by AMwA in terms of women political participation, NIMD The Hague rolled out a **tracer survey among Democracy School alumni** around the world. The survey was meant to generate lessons about the effectiveness of democracy education as an intervention by taking a more longitudinal stance to document where the school alumni ended up working, how they are working and how the schools have contributed to that. The survey also included alumni from PoD funded schools, including Guatemala, Colombia, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Jordan, Tunisia, Myanmar.

Some of the main take-aways from the preliminary finding are that there is an overall appreciation for democracy education, in particular NIMD's unique emphasis on trust building with its target groups continues to have a very strong positive influence on the results of the democracy schools. The quality and results of our democracy education work is crucially dependent on the quality of the support given to alumni networks, additional funding for follow-up activities with alumni, including their ability to build trust with their organizational leadership, and each other after the schools are over. Also there is still a need to decipher further what factors determine how alumni continue to influence their organizations and the democratic institutions in which they engage in their later careers.

Moreover, NIMD invested in capturing and **compiling all youth related interventions** from around the world from over the past 5 years, and presented this in a practical manual that was shared in the network to be used when designing interventions.

For LTO 3. To what extent and how are political and civic actors collaborating peacefully on the basis of trust?

- *How can we best support civic and political actors to overcome existing barriers to collective action (i.e. grievances and root causes of exclusion and conflict) and form legitimate coalitions with sufficient power and sustainability?*
- *To what extent does this support lead to more peaceful political contestation and change?*

In 2022, NIMD The Hague continued to invest in developing knowledge around dialogue and trust-building. In this context, NIMD organized a **dialogue approaches, lessons and learning exchange** in Tunisia for francophone NIMD



country partner staff from Mali, Burkina, Niger and Benin, in collaboration with CEMI. This expert meeting addressed several topics, including conducting effective political dialogues in times of serious political turmoil; choosing the dialogue intervention that is appropriate in the context ; selecting the right participants in the policy dialogue process ; discussing the required qualities of a dialogue facilitator and; brainstorming on the future of dialogue processes in the Sahel.

As a result of the exchange, each country team produced an action plan for introducing effective political dialogue in their respective countries, analysing various factors such as the relevance, the end-goal, the position of NIMD and partners within the dialogue process objectives, the related risks, etc. A similar exchange for anglophone directors is foreseen to take place in 2023 in Ethiopia.

In addition webinars on the basics of dialogue, and follow-up of the 2021 Just Talk analysis report, were organized in order to strengthen the Consortium's capacity on dialogue and trust. A specific highlight of how to apply this in practice was during the **high level dialogue retreat** for 10 leaders of Ethiopian political parties. This retreat was organized by NIMD in close partnership with the Embassy in Addis and aimed to iron out the tensions between the opposition parties and the government in relation to the role that political parties would play in the National Dialogue process the government was about to start. During the retreat the principles of interparty dialogue were presented and applied to the Ethiopian context. A concrete action plan was mutually agreed, and the self-dubbed Hague group continued regular exchanges back in Ethiopia after the visit.

For LTO 4: To what extent and how have political and civic actors strengthened democratic space?

- *How has the PoD Consortium been able to (keep) open civic space and strong democratic rules, crucial in shaping enabling environments?*
- *How can PoD use regional and international lobby and advocacy to protect civic space and strong democratic rules?*

While section 3 above provides an overview the specific interventions implemented and results achieved under LTO 4 at country and regional level, this section highlights the lobby & advocacy initiatives led by NIMD The Hague at the international level.

While 2022 did not provide much opportunity to engage at the level of the UN, several initiatives were conducted in The Netherlands. In October, NIMD teamed up with PAX for Peace to organize a public event in The Hague on **relations between the Sahel and the Netherlands** in rapidly changing contexts. The aim of the event was to unpack what the region's new developments mean for Dutch policy, starting with understanding the perspectives of people within the region. NIMD country directors from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso explored how people look at new political and social developments in the region, and how they value the response from national and international actors.

Furthermore, NIMD continued to organize regular **Democracy Drinks** in The Hague, at the initiative of Defend Democracy, which launched its first monthly informal



networking event in Brussels in 2018. Since then, Democracy Drinks have taken place around the world, including in Washington DC, Berlin, Kathmandu and, since 2021, The Hague. These events have attracted a mixture of people from NGOs, international institutions, think tanks, national governments and representations, academia, public affairs consultancies, social businesses and other active citizens. The role and value of whistleblowing for democracy and human rights, as well as the threats posed by violent extremism on democracy were amongst the topics addressed in 2022.

NIMD has also made use of its various communication platforms (i.e. website and social media) to **raise awareness on democratic backslides in PoD programme countries**. This was for instance the case following the [constitutional referendum in Tunisia](#), or the [rising political tensions in Uganda](#). This was also the case for non-programme countries that have global repercussions, such as the [Ukraine invasion](#). NIMD's Executive Director Thijs Berman also took the opportunity of a meeting with the Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra in April, as part of a delegation of the Breed Mensenrechten Overleg (BMO), to urge him to ensure that strengthening democracy worldwide remains a top priority for the new Dutch government.

Finally, NIMD hosted ambassadors accredited in The Hague, foreign dignitaries, and Dutch diplomats at a **Spring Reception** dedicated to the functioning of effective democracy at a time of global upheaval and uncertainty. Guest speaker René Paas, the King's Commissioner in Groningen, used his keynote address to examine how regions can make their voices heard in national capitals, and why listening to all citizens is crucial for an inclusive democracy to flourish.

At the level of the European Union, NIMD continued to work through the **European Partnership for Democracy** in raising awareness on the objectives of PoD, and to present findings from the countries. The Team Europe Democracy (TED) initiative, and the new funding framework for women and youth in democratic processes are concrete results from the ongoing lobby efforts.

4.2 Adaptive programming and PME system

In 2022, NIMD The Hague has continued to support adaptive programme management practices in PoD programme countries. As an example, country programme reflection workshops were organized at mid-year with the country teams to update the PEA strategy notes based on the latest political developments, and draw programmatic implications where necessary. In addition, the majority of PoD partner and country offices have gradually started to integrate adaptive programming in their own practices, for instance by regularly organizing internal reflection days to assess the relevance of the programme in light of contextual changes.

The work on adaptive programming also related to the effective use of monitoring data for learning and adaptation (see section 4.2 below on Monitoring & Evaluation), as well as regularly sharing learning and programme adaptation experiences in wider networks such as KPSRL, DGIS and Partos, as well as PMEL communities of practice.



For the global Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation processes, the main focus was on strengthening further the Consortium capacity and the related systems. Since most travelling restrictions related to Covid 19 were lifted in 2022, NIMD The Hague was able to organize face-to-face **regional PME trainings** with the programme staff and PME focal points of the PoD network. In total three regional face-to-face trainings were held:

- 1) From 21st-25th of February in Bogotá (Colombia) including the Spanish-speaking PoD countries (NIMD Colombia and NIMD Guatemala)
- 2) From 22nd-26th of August in Nairobi (Kenya) including the English-speaking PoD countries (NIMD Myanmar, NIMD Uganda, NIMD Ethiopia, IMD Mozambique, AMwA, Mzalendo Kenya)
- 3) From 21st- 26th of November in Dakar (Senegal) including the Franco-phone PoD countries (NIMD Mali, NIMD Burkina Faso, NIMD Niger, CEMI Tunisia, Goree Institute Senegal)

On the one hand the trainings served as a refresher of the PMEL systems used as part of PoD programme. On the other hand, the trainings aimed to take the monitoring data further by digging deeper into the so what questions and thereby training to use monitoring data for adaptive programming.

The regional trainings had very good reviews by the participants. The exchange on best practices around M&E was found very useful and in some instances led to exchange of data management tools. Participants also appreciated learning from each other's feedback on the monitoring data, as well as the programmatic learning. As a result of the training we could also see an improved reporting and reflection on indicators and outcome harvesting, in the annual plans 2023 and annual reports 2022.

Moreover, in preparation for the **Mid-Term Review (MTR)** of the PoD programme in 2023, the Terms of Reference for has been developed and published at the end of 2022. A steering group has been established for the evaluation, consisting of M&E focal points of the consortium partners supplemented with NIMD's PoD consortium coordinator and DSH counterpart.

Last year also saw a consolidation of the regular PMEL work, after a year that was heavily focused on the inception phase deliverables, including technical support and reflection around the Annual Reports 2021 and the Annual Plans 2023, the use and design of NIMD's project management system (ProjectConnect), and fine-tuning our IATI reports in relation to reporting on the SCS/SRL result frameworks.



5. Other monitoring questions

5.1 Challenges and lessons learned

While most of the challenges reported in 2022 were context-specific, a general difficulty can be observed at overall programme level, linked to the deteriorating political context in the majority of programme countries. This relates to our ambition to engage national political actors at the highest level and increase peaceful collaboration between them, as well as with civil society, through dialogue and trust-building activities.

The **democratic backsliding** witnessed in many countries since the start of the programme have led us to adjust our ambitions with regards to the third LTO of our contextualized country-level ToCs. In countries such as Tunisia (difficulties to convene the Multiparty Dialogue Platform in the current crisis), Uganda (withdrawal from IPOD secretariat) or Myanmar (operating from outside the country, without involving the military government in our activities), this has led to a temporary shift of focus to other types of interventions within LTO 3 (issue based multi-stakeholder dialogue, dialogue and trust-building at sub-national level, etc.) or a stronger focus on LTO 2. Despite the difficulties, PoD partners are still trying to play a meaningful role in extremely unfavorable contexts, as shown for instance by NIMD Mali's efforts to influence the work of the National Transition Council or CEMI's attempt to work with UGTT on an alternative Tunisian Constitution (see programme update section above).

This **shrinking democratic space** also poses concrete difficulties regarding the positioning of PoD partners that are maintaining a non-partisan approach, engaging all actors across the political spectrum, while trying to promote an inclusive democracy agenda. In concrete terms, the democratic backslide pushes us to more actively advocate for our visions and missions, sometimes by taking position against the actors that are responsible for it, but at the same time trying to bring them at the dialogue table through a constant balancing exercise.

Next to this, the PoD consortium has also faced **challenges in shaping regional approaches** in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, MENA and Central America. While significant progress have been made in 2022, there is still need to increase the synergies between the national and regional level work of Consortium Partners, but also to better create better linkages between national lobby and advocacy initiatives and regional bodies. Sometimes this is hindered by practicalities, such as the challenge to keep all relevant stakeholders informed on planning, changes in programming, or lack of (physical) meeting spaces. Other times this is caused by a lack of understanding or appreciation of what other organizations can offer, or a (perceived) difference in style or approach, for instance related to tackling issues in a direct, activist manner or a more diplomatic, indirect manner.

5.2 Local ownership



During the past year, the PoD partners continued to work in collaboration with **local CSOs**, not only as 'implementers' but also as partner in programme design. This is for instance the case for the NIMD offices in the Sahel, that work with a variety of local organizations as part of PoD, ensuring their ownership of the programme by co-creating the specific intervention strategies and approaches. They are also often involved in monitoring of programme results, for instance by participating in Outcome Harvesting exercises.

Another aspects of local ownership was the **involvement of direct target group in programme design**. This started with their involvement in the participatory PEAs conducted in 2021, not only through the validation of research findings, but also by jointly drawing programmatic implications. Over the course of 2022, PoD partners further supported interventions that were initiated by the actors targeted by the programme. As an example, NIMD Uganda facilitated meetings with the leadership of the political parties, at the request of the Multi-Party Youth Forum and the Inter-Party Women Forum. Consortium Partners GORIN and AMWA also involve youth and women networks (in the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions respectively) in designing regional level activities.

It should be noted that the work of the PoD partners cannot be exclusively driven by the target groups' demands, especially when it comes to political actors in increasingly challenging contexts, in order to maintain a non-partisan approach and to ensure contribution to the objectives of the programme ToC.

5.3 Risk management

A number of risks identified in the 2022 annual plan ended materializing over the year, some of which have affected programme implementation. This is true for contextual risks related to political instability that have occurred in many countries, for instance in Tunisia where the increased polarization prevented CEMI from facilitating meaningful political dialogue to exit the crisis, but also for shrinking civic space threatening the work of CSOs.

In Uganda, this materialized in the form of stringent laws on rights to association, opinion, and expression was experienced through restrictions on public gathering, arbitrary arrest of dissident voices, the enacting of the Computer Misuse Act, or the fact that the Non-Government Organizations Bureau continued to enforce the NGO Act (2015) in a manner that constrained the free operations of NGOs. Institutional risks have also occurred, for instance in relation to resignation of key staff members.

Assessing whether or not the mitigation measures identified in the annual plan have proven effective is a difficult exercise, especially when it comes to contextual risks. Embracing **adaptive programming** proved to be the main response, though not fully mitigating the impact of democratic backslides on our programming.



New risks have also been identified during the course of the year, including the **increased security threats** for CSOs and NGOs in the Horn of Africa and Central America, or the threat to limit the ability of PoD partners to operate with **foreign funding**, particularly from 'Western' countries, such as in Mali, Burkina Faso or Tunisia.

5.4 Collaboration with Dutch embassies

In 2022, the PoD partners have reported an increased collaboration with the 15 Dutch embassies involved in the programme, though the intensity and strategic nature of the interactions differ very much per country. The different types of collaboration can be grouped as follows:

- Inviting each other to participate in activities: the embassies are regularly inviting the PoD partners to participate in partnership meetings (i.e. security and rule of law thematic meetings, PoV/SCS-wide alliances meetings, etc.), or to engage with Dutch officials and diplomats visiting the country (for instance, thematic and regional Ambassadors / special envoys). Equally, PoD partners are often inviting embassy representatives to take part in programme activities (i.e. democracy school graduation ceremony, report launch, dialogue meeting, etc.). Such participation occurred in various countries last year, including Tunisia, Jordan, Senegal, Niger, Kenya and Mozambique.
- Sharing each other's networks, particularly with regards to the identification of high potential young and women political and civic leaders. The Democracy School alumni have also been taking part in some of the activities organized by the embassies, for instance in Burkina Faso and Tunisia.
- Strategic bilateral discussions, including mutual sharing of analysis on the latest political developments. Such meetings have been occurring on regular basis in several countries last year, including in Uganda, Guatemala (Costa Rica embassy), Jordan, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Myanmar and Colombia. Some embassies have also consulted PoD partners on various matters, such as the development of the new Multi-Annual Country Strategies (i.e. Niger, Burkina Faso) or the need for third party monitoring of Dutch funded projects (i.e. Mozambique, Iraq).
- Funding partnership: in a few countries, the Dutch embassy is financing PoD partners to run projects that are complementary to the interventions implemented as part of PoD. In 2022, this was the case in Tunisia, where the embassy supports CEMI in various areas (i.e. second level TSoP class, parliamentary academy and work at municipal level), and Ethiopia through the NEED project. This will also be the case in Iraq in 2023, as the School of Democracy will be funded from both PoD and the embassy.



6. Notes on the financial report

Overall, the total costs for 2022 are **EUR 6,648,482**. The updated budget for 2022 was estimated at EUR 6,797,611. This means there is a 2% underspending i.e. EUR 149,129 compared with the approved budget. This limited overall under-expenditure is mostly driven by NIMD headquarters and its offices in the Sahel, as well as Consortium partners CEMI and GORIN. The specific reasons for deviations between the approved budget and the actual costs are explained below:

	Original Budget 2022	Updated Budget 2022	Actuals 2022	%
I. Direct staff costs				
IA A. Staff costs	€ 667,719	€ 699,024	€ 651,163	-7%
IB B. Local staff costs	€ 1,443,170	€ 1,347,701	€ 1,389,361	3%
IC C. Consultants and advisers	€ -	€ -	€ -	0%
I Subtotal I	€ 2,110,889	€ 2,046,724	€ 2,040,524	0%
II. Other direct programme costs				
IIA A. Activity costs	€ 2,218,114	€ 2,252,961	€ 2,203,717	-2%
IIB B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	€ 486,256	€ 513,190	€ 485,465	-5%
IIC C. Activity-related travel costs	€ 350,745	€ 450,131	€ 417,053	-7%
IID D. Project office costs (if applicable)	€ 349,060	€ 337,663	€ 355,402	5%
IIE E. Equipment and investments	€ 23,689	€ 54,729	€ 66,893	22%
IIF1 Staff	€ 296,267	€ 330,940	€ 300,640	-9%
IIF2 Interventions	€ 92,649	€ 122,247	€ 99,975	-18%
IIF F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	€ 388,916	€ 453,186	€ 400,615	-12%
II Subtotal II	€ 3,816,780	€ 4,061,861	€ 3,929,145	-3%
Total of I and II	€ 5,927,669	€ 6,108,586	€ 5,969,669	-2%
III. Overheads / indirect costs				
IIIA A. Costs of support staff	€ 254,199	€ 260,132	€ 259,126	0%
IIIB B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	€ -	€ -	€ -	0%
IIIC C. Other non-allocable costs	€ 429,594	€ 428,894	€ 419,687	-2%
III Total of III	€ 683,793	€ 689,025	€ 678,813	-1%
Total of I, II and III	€ 6,611,462	€ 6,797,611	€ 6,648,482	-2%
Contingencies (max. 5 %)	€ -	€ -	€ -	
TOTAL	€ 6,611,462	€ 6,797,611	€ 6,648,482	-2%

Figure 1: Budget vs. actuals 2022 per cost category

IA Staff costs: Slight under-spending due to staff turnover within NIMD Headquarters (i.e. gap between departure of staff member and recruitment of a replacement) and a few sick leaves.

IB Local staff costs: The over-expenditure overall is triggered by higher staff costs than foreseen within the NIMD Uganda country office (by 57%) due to the termination of the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF - see section 2 above), which was contributing significantly to the HR costs of the office; AMwA (by 26%) due to unforeseen temporary staff support needs (maternity leave cover); NIMD Burkina Faso (by 22%) due to the recruitment of a Programme Manager during the last quarter of 2022 (instead of early 2023 as initially foreseen); and NIMD Myanmar (by 21%) due to relocation of the Country Director to headquarters.



IIA Activity costs: Overall, there is a slight under-spending due to the fact that no activities have been carried in Iraq in 2022, despite an amount being budgeted in the annual plan (see section 3.2.3 above).

IIB Cost of consortium partners and local NGOs: The underspending is driven by lower activity costs than foreseen, as only one combined physical meeting of the Consortium’s Steering Committee and Programme Management Team took place in 2022, instead two physical meetings initially foreseen for each body.

IIC Activity-related travel costs: While international travel significantly picked up in 2022, a number of PoD partners and country offices seemed to have over-estimated the share of their activity budget dedicated to travel in the 2022 annual plan.

IID Project office costs: The overall deviation of this budget line is mainly due to the overspending by NIMD Uganda (by 54%) again due to suspension of DGF; and by NIMD Ethiopia (by 26%) due to the need to cover a financial gap linked to delays in signing new donor contracts.

IIE Equipment and investments: NIMD Niger overspent on this budget line (approx. by EUR 9.000) due to the unforeseen need replace laptops and purchase extra office furniture, but also NIMD Ethiopia (approx. by EUR 2.000) due to purchase of additional office furniture.

IIF Monitoring, Evaluation and Auditing: The underspending occurred on both M&E staff (less time written than foreseen by M&E officers from NIMD The Hague and GORIN) and activity budgets: the regional M&E trainings could all be implemented physically (see section 4.2 above), therefore a large portion of the costs occurred ended being reported under IIC “Activity-related travel costs”.

IIIA Costs of support staff: This budget line is fully spent

IIIC Other non-allocable costs: Consortium Partner CEMI has underspent on this budget line by 16% compared to what was foreseen in the 2022 annual plan.




Figure 2: Actuals 2022 per country




Figure 3: Actuals 2022 per Long-term Outcome



7. List of annexes

Annex 1 – PoD Financial Report 2022

Annex 2a - Overview of the contribution of the PoD results to the Security, Rule of Law (SRL) and Strengthening Civil Society (SCS) frameworks

Annex 2b – Overview of deviation from targets per country

Annex 3 – Human interest stories