

THE **POWER**
OF DIALOGUE
CONSORTIUM

Annual Plan 2024





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1. Introduction

This document outlines the 2024 Annual Plan for the Power of Dialogue (PoD) programme, that is being implemented under the 2021-2025 Strategic Partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in the framework of the 'Power of Voices' (PoV) grant instrument. The PoD Consortium is composed by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the Gorée Institute (GORIN), the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies (CEMI) and Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA). The programme, which is implemented in 15 countries¹ and includes regional and global components, carries the ultimate goal to 'contribute to peaceful democratic space, and inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels'.

2. Key context changes and programme impact

This section intends to highlight some key political or context developments that have happened over this year which has an impact on the PoD programming. These changes often result in changes to our 2024 annual plan, ToC, learning agenda and budget as compared to the multiannual plan. In the dedicated country sections there are more details presented on the plans.

Unrest in the Sahel

After the coup d'états in Mali in 2020 and 2021, in Burkina Faso in 2022, this year the Niger president and his government were overthrown. This trend can be seen in light of a new phase in decolonization whereby popular frustration about the fragile security situation, the lack of development and high levels of corruption are targeted towards especially France as former colonizer. Although these concerns are very legitimate, the resulting rule by the military in all three countries now of course is a huge setback for democracy and inclusive decision-making. The direct result of the Niger coup is that the programme had to adjust and tone down its operations directly following it. Nevertheless, it is telling that scheduled sessions of the democracy school could still continue and served as a safe space to discuss the situation amongst participants. For Niger the current situation means that the annual plan is tentative and not fully concrete in parts, as the situation is currently too volatile to plan ahead properly. The transition to constitutional rule is not clear yet, and also the security situation remains fragile, just as in the whole region, with regular deadly attacks.

Ethiopia: after the peace accord

The frequency of violent incidents in Tigray decreased in 2023 after the signing of the peace accord late last year that halted formally the Tigray war. But the

¹ Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Mozambique, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Colombia, Guatemala and Myanmar.



implementation of the peace deal remains challenging. Unrest in several regions also continues to destabilize the country, especially Oromia and Amhara. As was also confirmed by the country case study in the Mid-Term Review, the programme has so far managed to build trust between the key political actors and has started to work on the dialogue between the political parties. Although the peace deal has created more political space to implement the PoD programme, and allows it to invest in the inclusion of Tigray based/focused political parties, including Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the ongoing conflicts in Amhara, Oromia and other states do however remain a concern. In this fragile context, the country team is walking a tightrope to address mistrusts, lingering tensions and regular outbreak of fighting between armed groups often linked to political groupings. This means the team is continuously finding ways to engage in dialogue with political actors from the regions where conflicts are flaring up and to keep the dialogue going.

Guatemala's 2023 elections

In 2023, the regression characterized by unbridled corruption and impunity, and a politicized process targeting independent judges and prosecutors, as well as journalists critical of the regime, continued in Guatemala.

Whereas in the general elections of June 2023, the political landscape in Guatemala initially only saw some minor changes, with seats shifting between the mainstream parties, and a modest increase of opposition party seats, there was a surprise to come. As already in the run-up to the elections the expectations of a free and fair vote were dampened by clear attempts to manipulate the process, for instance by preventing several opposition presidential candidates from running on shaky grounds. However, Bernardo Arévalo from the *Movimiento Semilla*, initially polling in sixth place, was elected with around 60% of the votes in what was seen as a true landmark in the country's recent political history, which inspired again some hope for change and an end to the negative trend of impunity. However, immediately there were signs of the existing powers to undermine this result by attempts to prohibit his political party and frustrate the transition and inauguration scheduled for January 2024. As a result, the population that voted for Arévalo came out massively to protest these dubious interventions. The situation remains volatile, but at first sight it seems the chance for a proper presidential handover has actually increased.

The remaining weeks until Arévalo will be officially inaugurated as president will be tense still, and even if this process goes without major set-backs, the real challenge starts. As it remains to be seen that the new president can actually implement his campaign promises and change the political system, for instance with a very small minority in parliament. Nevertheless, the PoD programme plans to focus on supporting the transition and bring in the views of citizens, organize civic democracy education, and facilitate dialogue between the political actors.

Middle East conflict

Although the recent flaring up of conflict in the Middle East due to the Hamas/Israel war is clearly a major regional and international crisis, so far this has had no direct effect on the PoD programming. However, it is important to flag the (negative)



potential for spillover in the region, thereby in first instance potentially affecting PoD programming in Jordan and Iraq.

At this point there have only been some minor delays experienced in the Jordan programme in organizing activities. This seems to be due to some participants' pre-occupation with the crisis. There are also sentiments expressed on the perceived double standards by the West in their response to what is happening. In addition, there was a postponement of a training on Women political participation for the participants of Jordan School of Politics as the international trainers had to cancel their trips due to the uncertain security situation directly after the Al Ahli Arab Hospital attack. For 2024, we for now assume there is not going to be any major impact on the Jordan or Iraq programme, but this assumption is based on there not being a regional escalation of the conflict. Should that happen, we shall at that point analyse and reassess the approach in order to adjust, in close partnership with the Embassies and MFA.

Investing in Dialogue

Lastly, unrelated to any specific political context change, it is good to highlight the investments the Consortium is making in supporting dialogue and trust-building throughout the PoD network.

The setting-up of the new Baobab network consists of a representative group of PoD practitioners that will deepen the joint approach to dialogue based on their aggregated wealth of experience. Additionally, they will promote and share their insights actively within the PoD network.

3. Mid-Term Review

In anticipation of the formal response from the PoD consortium steering committee to the midterm review report. We already like to highlight the main recommendations and follow up actions here. The recommendations are to a large extent based on what the PoD programme is already doing but could be strengthened.

The first recommendation is to address gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against women in politics (VAW-P) more prominently in the PoD programme. As the evaluation found this a major barrier to political participation to the extent that many women decide to withdraw from the political arena. The evaluation suggests more concretely to engage male champions and initiate gender sensitive policies against GBV & VAW-P. This builds on the pilot on 'man championing' in Latin America.

Secondly to facilitate young and women political leaders connecting internationally with other national networks in other countries within the PoD-programme, so there is learning and sharing experience, as well as back-up support when the political situation in their respective countries deteriorate. This is already happening in the regional context of the Sahel, Horn of Africa and MENA regions, but the evaluation recommends deepening and extend the international connections.

Thirdly, the PoD work that is happening at national level is also relevant on the sub-national level (village, district, provincial, regional). In several countries the PoD-



programme support decentralized initiatives and sometimes a choice is made to work at the decentralized level (e.g., Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Myanmar...), if national structures no longer allow for the operation that the PoD- programme seeks, but it is not yet an explicit objective in the PoD programme.

Fourth, the outcome harvesting database of harvested outcome over the past 2,5 year is very rich but underused and limited in the usable for further analysis.

Further work on the quality of the outcomes and tools for analysis is recommended, including refresher training, tagging of outcomes, and creating a dashboard.

Lastly, the focus of LTO2 of the PoD is on the empowerment of individual women and youth leaders, which translates into increased self-awareness, amplified voices, improved learning, and support in formulating shared agendas and policy documents. It is uncertain, however, to what extent this individual capacity building also leads to enhanced organizational strengthening within the groups these individuals belong to. There are initiatives within PoD, such as the development of an alumni engagement strategy, that are aimed to embed individual change in more structural change. It is recommended the PoD program further explores ways to sustain that.

The concrete follow-up steps, that will start at the end of 2023 and roll over to 2024, are the following:

- For the PoD consortium steering committee, to develop a formal response to the PoD midterm review to identify, operationalize and prioritize the actions for follow up.
- For the PoD MTR steering committee to evaluate the midterm review process to draw learnings for the final evaluation
- For the the PoD secretariat to further analyse the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the MTR, to facilitate thematic knowledge learning within the consortium, including democracy education, dialogue, political responsiveness, inclusion (women political participation and youth) and adaptations (as a theme) and further programmatic learning
- For the PoD secretariat to follow-up on improving the quality and use of the outcome harvesting database, including refresher trainings, further tagging of outcomes and the creation of a dashboard (see also PMEL section below)

4. Country-level and regional plans

This section provides an overview of the priority outcome areas that will be targeted in 2024 in each programme country, as well as the results that the Consortium will strive to achieve under each Long-Term Outcome (LTO) of the contextualized country-level Theories of Change (ToC).

The tables listing the specific interventions planned in the programme countries, for each intermediate outcome of the contextualized ToC, is provided in Annex 2.

3.1 Sahel



3.1.1 Mali

Lead: NIMD Mali

The security situation in Mali has significantly deteriorated over the recent period, as shown by the resurgence of terrorist attacks against military bases and civilian targets, including the attack on the civilian boat Timbuktu, which killed more than 60 people. While MINUSMA is closing down operations in Mali, the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation has not prevented the resumption of hostilities between the Malian Armed Forces and the CMA (*Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad*). In this context NIMD Mali is facing increasing challenges in implementing activities in the Northern regions of the country and is therefore operating mostly in Bamako.

On the political side, the new Constitution of Mali was promulgated in July, despite a relatively low voter turnout to the referendum. Initially scheduled for March 2023, the referendum was postponed to June 2023, creating a gap in the electoral timeline defined by the transitional authorities. As a result, the government recently announced a "slight postponement" of the presidential election, which was due to be held in February 2024. The arguments put forward included technical reasons relating to the voter's registry, as well as the need to revise of the electoral law in line with the new constitutional provisions. The Political Party Charter review also remains on the reform agenda, despite the fact that political parties' influence is significantly declining in a highly polarized context.

To support this process, NIMD Mali will continue to work with the committee for advocacy and monitoring of electoral reforms (CPSRE) as part of LTO 3. Four thematic debates will be held by the committee in order to improve and harmonize the understanding of key actors on the reform legislation. These activities will help to establish a climate of dialogue between civic and political actors within the committee and to produce summaries of their discussions to feed into discussions within their respective organisations.

NIMD Mali will also collaborate again with partner OCGS (*Observatoire Citoyen sur la Gouvernance et la Sécurité*) to re-launch the PRGD-Mali (*Processus de Réflexion sur la Refondation de la Gouvernance de la Démocratie au Mali*) in order to finalise the validation of the provisional research report and to support reflection and advocacy for the reforms needed to bring the political system closer to societal values.

Support for the National Transitional Council (CNT) will also continue as part of LTO 4, within the framework of the support committee that has been set up to build the capacity of CNT members who will be called upon to table draft laws and/or monitor them. It is also an entry point for NIMD to strengthen relations with the legislative body and facilitate the mobilization of its members within the framework of the activities of NIMD and its partners.

With regards to LTO 2, NIMD will support the Consortium of civic and political youth and women's organisations in sharing its advocacy document in different regions of Mali and involve local youth in implementing activities to improve their access to



elected and appointed positions. NIMD will also scale up the project run by Vision Femme Mali for the women of the *tontines* in *Commune 1* to target women in the six *Communes* of Bamako.

3.1.2 Burkina Faso

Lead: NIMD Burkina Faso

Due to the suspension of political party activities by the transitional authorities, 2023 was relatively uneventful on Burkina Faso's political front, in a context of slowly shrinking democratic space. The transitional authorities have taken a number of measures mainly affecting the principles of freedom of expression and opinion, which have been strongly denounced by many stakeholders. These include the suspension of certain media outlets on the pretext that they have violated administrative and ethical rules, and the forced enlistment of citizens as *Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie* (VDP) or Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland.

As far as the security situation is concerned, it remains very worrying as many localities remain in the grip of terrorist groups. The number of internally displaced people has also increased up to over two million internally displaced persons (IDPs). This was confirmed by a report published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which indicates that according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Burkina Faso is the 1st African country and the 2nd country in the world most affected by terrorism. In this difficult context, NIMD Burkina Faso will try to support dialogue initiative at sub-national and national level, while continuing to focus on strengthening participation of women and youth, as described below.

Under LTO 1, NIMD Burkina Faso will work on building its own capacity through trainings and strategic retreats, while also working on strengthening the capacity of partners and local stakeholders on how to conduct multi-stakeholder dialogue. NIMD is also planning to follow up the recommendations of the study on women's political participation in elections, to train three women political leaders in collaboration with AMWA, and to carry out a study on the media and democracy in Burkina Faso.

Under LTO 2, activities are planned to amplify the voices of women and young people through digital platforms and campaigns aimed at ensuring that public decision-makers take greater account of women and young people. NIMD will also support the alumni network of its democracy schools (which are implemented with EU funding in 2024), for instance by supporting some of their citizen initiatives. A digital awareness campaign on democracy and social cohesion has also been launched, and political and democratic schools have been set up for around twenty young people from political parties and civil society organizations.

Under LTO 3, NIMD will continue to organize policy cafés gathering school alumni and public figures to discuss issues of national interest, both at national and sub-national level. NIMD will also continue the dialogue process begun in the commune of Bama, which has produced satisfactory results, and will aim to support the process of launching a multi-stakeholder dialogue process at national level. NIMD also plans to



set up a framework for dialogue between emerging political and community leaders, in collaboration with the Dutch Embassy in Burkina Faso.

Finally, under LTO 4, NIMD plans to conduct an advocacy campaign targeting political and civic actors, and then at national, regional and international organizations. This lobbying and advocacy campaign will focus on key issues such as inclusive democracy, the inclusion of a youth quota on electoral lists, the place of women in the management of public affairs, social cohesion, etc.

3.1.3 Niger

Lead: NIMD Niger

As described in section 2 above, the transitional period that has started in Niger means that the PoD programme needs to be adapted, based on continuous monitoring of the political context, including the roadmap drawn by the transitional authorities. Their behavior will most likely be influenced by the status of the sanctions imposed on Niger by the international community. The scarcity of internal financial resources combined with the suspension of all external aid will further complicate the daily lives of the Nigeriens, while the security situation will likely require increased financial resources. All these factors combined could lead the military to restrict public freedoms, particularly those of expression and demonstration.

As of now, NIMD Niger decided to focus on activities that are not sensitive, by working mainly on strengthening the role of women and youth, while aiming to engage with the transitional authorities when opportunities arise and keeping the programming flexible. Therefore, the plan presented below remains tentative and will be updated at a later stage.

Under LTO 1, NIMD Niger is planning on partnering with AMwA to develop a curriculum for a women leadership training programme. A study on the role of the media in this new context will also be produced.

Under LTO 2, the political and democratic schools will continue to be implemented in 2024, with less ambitious targets than in previous years due to the end of the co-financing from the Swiss Development Cooperation. While the *Présimetre* activities have been suspended, NIMD plans on using the existing digital platform to build a system of surveys to serve as a barometer of the transition process, through which young people will express themselves. The ambition is to host physical forums as a result of these surveys, where citizens will be able to ask questions to the transitional authorities.

Under LTO 3, NIMD Niger will explore opportunities to support multi-stakeholder dialogue initiatives to build trust between transitional authorities, political and civic actors while discussing issues of national interest.

Under LTO 4, the emphasis will be on supporting stakeholders in the various reform processes that will be initiated, for instance through public debates, since one of the declared objectives of the transition is to establish a new social contract. Eventually,



NIMD Niger also plans to engage the transitional Parliament or the legislative body acting in its place.

3.1.4 Regional Approach

Lead: GORIN

On the basis of the contextual changes in the wider Sahel described above, including the August 2023 Niger's coup, transitional delays in Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as deteriorating security situation all over the region, GORIN will start by updating its regional Political Economy Analysis (PEA) as part of LTO 1. The updated regional PEA will focus on the main drivers of political instability and the factors weakening civic space in the respective national and regional contexts.

GORIN will also step up the collaboration with the NIMD offices in the Sahel with regards to regional lobby & advocacy, specifically targeting ECOWAS. The Consortium partners will bring the recommendations of the jointly organized regional forum together with the findings of their respective research and analyses, in order to produce a joint advocacy document aimed at influencing ECOWAS, for example in revising its additional protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

In addition, GORIN will continue to produce regular policy briefs focusing on peacebuilding, conflict prevention, peace and security and the challenges of democratic governance in order to influence change among decision-makers. Policy briefs will include action-oriented recommendations for regional and national actors, with policy implications.

Under LTO 2, GORIN will continue to build on activities conducted in previous years, such as the Gorée Institute Youth Leadership Academy (previously known as the Gorée Institute Mentorship programme) targeting women and youth from the region, with the aim to strengthen their leadership skills as well as their participation in national politics. GORIN will also continue to work with women CSOs from the region, by holding another edition of its annual regional capacity-building workshop on women's leadership in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and political processes.

In addition, since general elections are expected to be held in the region in 2024 – at least in Senegal and possibly in Mali – and 2025, GORIN will also organize a BRIDGE (Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections) training, which is a modular professional development program with a particular focus on electoral processes, targeting staff from Electoral Management Bodies together with youth political and civic actors from the region.

Under LTO 3, GORIN will organize a regional youth forum on "Engaging women and young people as strategic partners in peace-building and political decision-making processes". The objective will be for participants to collectively reflect on how to resist national Governments' attempts to restrict civic space, freedom of association and freedom of expression, including by engaging in joint lobby & advocacy activities.



Under LTO 4, GORIN will continue to hold its Annual Symposium on 'Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention, Political Stability and Governance', bringing together different key stakeholders from the region, with a view to formulate context-specific recommendations for national governments and regional bodies. In addition, GORIN staff will continue to participate in regional events related to the programme and engage with relevant institutions in the Sahel.

3.2 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

3.2.1 Tunisia

Lead: CEMI

The national context remains marked by political and social instability coupled with economic stagnation since 2021. It is important to note that because of these challenges, some aspects of CEMI's interventions and the designated target groups have been adapted to the current context, without altering their core composition. Geopolitical instability is evident in various aspects of social and political life. For instance, the notably low voter turnout to the constitutional referendum earlier this year underscores the gradual erosion of trust in state institutions. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding access to basic food supplies hinders normal civic engagement.

In light of this situation, the regime has responded to appeals to dialogue with indifference. Moreover, it has swiftly eroded the institutions formed under the 2014 constitution, notably by dissolving elected municipal councils in 2018 and apprehending numerous political leaders on charges of plotting against the state.

The prospect of presidential elections and the conditions surrounding them are uncertain, given the authoritarian tone of the present administration and its dubious commitment to democratic principles. Equally unclear is whether political parties will persist with their boycott or, if they do participate, the terms under which they will engage in the electoral process.

Under LTO 1, CEMI will further strengthen and build its partners' capacities by providing its expertise in conceiving programs, curricula and procedures on Youth Political Participation. CEMI will persist in involving young and female political and civic leaders in capacity-building activities to promote their active participation in decision-making processes and support their efforts in advancing democratic values and skills. under LTO 2. It will continue to host Alumni on their *Freesh* YouTube channel to discuss political communication, leadership in youth and women's political participation. In 2024, CEMI will conduct Regional Academy sessions, with the first session concentrating on augmenting the knowledge and skills of youth and women in the MENA region. The second iteration will cater to participants from the Sahel-francophone region.

Moreover, building upon the youth product jointly developed by CEMI and NIMD in 2023, CEMI will host a youth learning event. During this gathering, participants will have the opportunity to examine the application of the knowledge product within



their specific country programs, delving into strategic considerations. This event will serve as a platform for discussing broader topics among themselves, facilitating valuable networking opportunities.

In 2022, CEMI suspended its activities on the *Nouabook* platform due to the dissolution of parliament. Following the election of the first chamber of parliament members in 2023, CEMI engaged with the newly elected MPs to present its work related to parliamentary activities and seek their endorsement to rejoin *Nouabook*. Under LTO 3 and LTO 4, the platform has been updated successfully according to the new configuration of the elected parliament, and its reactivation depends on the approval of the elected representatives for engaging with the platform to connect with the voters. Meanwhile, activities within the Multiparty Dialogue Platform (MDP) will remain on hold.

3.2.2 Iraq

Lead: NIMD and WEO

The state of democratic and civic space in Iraq presents a complex blend of challenges and opportunities. Recent developments have illuminated both progress and enduring issues. Throughout popular protests, the voices of Iraq's youth and women have gained prominence, echoing the call for political reforms to nurture an inclusive political system and society. Acknowledging the importance of empowering these aspiring youth leaders, our program aims to be a catalyst for political change.

Iraq has witnessed significant political transformations, including the establishment of a new government in 2022, sparking optimism for democratic reforms and increased civic participation. Civil society organizations in Iraq have grown more active and vocal, yet the democratic and civic space continues to grapple with obstacles. Ongoing security threats and political instability in certain regions hamper citizens' engagement in democratic processes. Marginalized groups, particularly women and minorities, still confront barriers to their full participation in civic and political life.

WEO will host two iterations of the School of Democracy in 2024 in collaboration with NIMD and the Dutch Embassy in Iraq. This platform will bring together politically inclined young individuals and emerging politicians from various political spectrums. The political economy analysis performed in the country earlier in the program underscores the necessity for a democratic education program that not only strengthens individual capacities but also fosters dialogue among diverse participant groups. This includes identifying common concerns and promoting cross-partisan advocacy coalitions to bolster their ability to drive meaningful change.

During the design phase of the School of Democracy, trainers will conduct a thorough review of the existing curriculum in close collaboration with NIMD and the Netherlands Embassy. The tentative curriculum of this program is divided into three modules, each addressing distinct yet interconnected aspects of governance, human rights, and political leadership. The first module delves into the theories underpinning the state and social contracts and the international mechanisms that safeguard rights



and freedoms. Subsequently, the curriculum shifts its focus towards the challenges and opportunities within Iraqi politics while providing guidance on leadership development, networking, and public speaking. Collectively, these elements foster a comprehensive understanding of effective leadership in a dynamic political landscape.

3.2.3 Jordan

Lead: NIMD

The adoption of the recommendations of the Royal Committee for Modernizing the Political System by the government and the parliament in 2022 has since led to a reduction in the number of political parties, and some increase in opportunities for youth and women to engage in the electoral process. In response to these developments in 2022 and 2023, NIMD already adapted its programming. Anticipating no significant alteration to the general context for 2024, NIMD activities will pivot towards the 2024 parliamentary elections, with prominence on building coalitions, campaigning and incorporating election-related topics in the Jordan School of Politics (JSoP) curriculum.

Under LTO 1, NIMD Jordan will continue to develop the team and its network in conjunction with the consortium. To achieve this, the emphasis will be placed on enhancing the skills and actions necessary to empower political parties and foster greater engagement in dialogue and inclusion. NIMD Jordan, in tandem with NIMD Headquarters and other PoD consortium partners, works to improve mutual learning, knowledge sharing, collaborative planning, and the utilization of complementary strengths within the network.

The curriculum is designed to prepare politically motivated youth and women from various civic and political backgrounds to participate effectively in politics through engagement with political parties. Within the JSoP framework, youth cohorts will develop proposals for reform, which will subsequently receive support for advocacy.

As NIMD resumed working with political parties in 2023 and will continue to do so in 2024, it will seize the unique opportunity the current situation presents for NIMD Jordan to engage with these political actors. In addition to the general education provided to all parties through the JSoP, NIMD will continue to target selected political parties, focusing on assisting them in becoming more responsive, inclusive, and capable of attracting and engaging various groups, particularly youth and women. This support will encompass areas like planning, outreach, electoral strategies, coalition-building, campaigning, and advocacy.

Given that Jordan is going through a new electoral process, it is important to monitor the developments in the democratic space, particularly about electoral campaigns. As part of LTO 3 and LTO 4, the team will organize dialogue sessions that aim to build trust, facilitate discussions, and formulate recommendations to strengthen the democratic space. Additionally, a study on the topic of freedom of expression during elections will be conducted. This research will be carried out in close coordination with government stakeholders and is intended for practical application rather than purely academic purposes.



3.3 Horn of Africa

3.3.1 Uganda

Lead: NIMD Uganda

Over the past year, national politics have revolved around the notion of "transition politics," which alludes to the anticipated political shift following President Museveni's tenure. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, President Museveni's son, has been actively promoting his political aspirations to the public, particularly targeting the youth demographic. His movement openly critiques the NRM ruling party. In contrast, dissenting voices from opposition parties, particularly those associated with the National Unity Platform, continue to face restrictions on their communication and activities.

The cooperation agreement between the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Democracy Party (DP) presents an opportunity to influence the constitutional review and media for the re-engagement of the National Dialogue processes. The DP's leader, Norbert Mao, has been a champion to build on the Interparty Organization for Dialogue process, and as Minister of Justice in the government is in a prime position to table potential reforms. At the same time the question is whether any meaningful reform is allowed by the NRM and that the DP leader is unable to 'change the system from within'.

Civil society still faces harassment, including office break-ins and fabricated charges. Moreover, the ongoing restrictions on political party assemblies, coupled with the amendment to the Computer Misuse Act of 2018, tighten control over social media and sustain a hostile civic environment, compelling numerous organizations to resort to self-censorship.

In 2024, efforts will be geared towards consolidating gains made in previous years on establishing multi-stakeholder platforms and supporting efforts that spur youth and women's meaningful participation in politics. With the ongoing restraint on the opposition and the competitive nature of capturing youth votes in line with a future political transition, NIMD has included in 2024 conflict sensitivity and dialogue as a tool for peaceful co-existence in one sub-national political hotspot.

Under LTO 1, NIMD will conduct roundtable sessions with political parties and civil society organizations to address issues related to political and civic space and guide consortium programming. Additionally, training will be provided to consortium and partner organizations to integrate the use of Political Economy Analysis (PEA) and conflict-sensitive programming, as well as institutional fundraising. Advocacy and network engagement will continue.

Under LTO 2, efforts will be made to strengthen the capacity of women and young politicians to conduct issue-based policy analysis and advocate for conflict-sensitive approaches. This will include facilitating learning and reflection sessions with Ugandan Democracy Academy cohorts and supporting the multi-party platform for women and youth to engage in evidence-based advocacy. The creation of sub-



national platforms and spaces for youth from different regions in Uganda to collaborate on peaceful coexistence and electoral reform.

Under LTO 3, leaders, particularly youth and women, will receive capacity-building to address grievances through dialogue and mediation. Furthermore, a national multi-stakeholder dialogue will be facilitated on an issue selected by youth platforms at both sub-national and national levels.

3.3.2 Kenya

Lead: Mzalendo Trust and NIMD Kenya

The development of this annual plan takes place one year after the new Ruto administration took office. This year has been characterized by varying socio-economic and political developments with civil unrest and protest following the disputed elections. These demonstrations were mainly organized by opposition leader Raila Odinga and his alliance, dividing society. This situation culminated in the establishment of a National Dialogue Process (NADOC), reached through a locally and regionally mediated process. The period has also been marked by different assessments of the administration's performance, including the bulging public debt, high cost of living and high unemployment rates.

Under LTO 4, the Mzalendo Trust will continue to track government election promises and parliamentarian performance using their Promise Tracker platform. Its focus is on shaping the legislative agenda through public participation, citizen engagement, and collaboration with media, regional, and international bodies. Reports, including the annual scorecard, are published to encourage citizen accountability demands.

NIMD Kenya, in collaboration with the Mzalendo Trust, will train select young members of county assemblies in practical dialogue skills. The training will target the leadership of Kenya Young Members of County Assembly Association (KYMCA). Additionally, KYMCA will receive a grant for multi-stakeholder events in different regions in Kenya to discuss policy issues and prioritize legislative agendas on issues affecting young people. These first activities of NIMD Kenya at the sub-national level are meant to pilot and deliver inputs to the design of a long-term youth dialogue at the county level.

Under LTO 2, the objective is to expand interventions to reach more youth across Kenyan counties. Mzalendo will accomplish this by establishing additional dialogue platforms and reinforcing youth movements. Continued advocacy for fair representation and capacity building for women in decision-making positions remains a priority. Moreover, Mzalendo will cultivate partnerships with caucuses and women's rights organizations to amplify women's voices and contribute to shaping gender and youth agendas.

Under LTO 1, Mzalendo aims to strengthen the consortium partnership through regular engagements, peer learning, information-sharing exchanges, and joint activities at both the country and regional levels. This will involve more cross-learning



opportunities and pooling of skills, expertise, and networks among consortium partners.

3.3.3 Ethiopia

Lead: NIMD Ethiopia

The end of the Tigray War has provided NIMD momentum to now also expand its interventions into the Tigray state and integrate Tigray political actors into its programming. Specifically, NIMD will ensure that all legally registered political parties in the region, including TPLF, are made part of interparty dialogue and other capacity-building activities planned next year and in the future.

Responding to increased demand for ethnic self-determination, three new states, comprising different ethnic groups were carved out of the former Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP). This has triggered protests on the clustering of diverse ethnicities within a single state, underscoring the sensitivities around state creation. Together with boundary demarcation, these are key agenda issues the National Dialogue Commission has selected for the national dialogue process. NIMD will support this endeavor through dialogues on state creation and boundary delineation under LTO 3.

To promote more politico-civic engagement in political and governance processes, NIMD is supporting Oromia state legislature (Caffe) develop a mobile application (due December 2023) that enhances citizen interaction with MPs in the policy making process, which is aimed for piloting in the first part of 2024. Subsequently, under LTO 3, NIMD will collaborate with the Caffe to evaluate user experience, with a view to draw lessons for improvement and assess replicability of the initiative to other regional states.

Under LTO 2, NIMD Ethiopia will broaden its engagement with Ethiopian political parties, the Ethiopian Political Parties Joint Council (EPPJC) women and youth wings, and other pertinent stakeholders to discuss the involvement of youth and women in politics, tackle the barriers they encounter, and underscore the significance of their contributions in shaping policies.

It is worth noting that during the Mid-Term Review process, NIMD Ethiopia's role in soft diplomacy and its commitment to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and inclusion, were highlighted. The evaluation acknowledged that NIMD Ethiopia has significantly contributed to national interparty initiatives, in particular through its support to the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). This achievement is particularly noteworthy given the context of civil war and the challenges posed by Covid-19.

3.3.4 Regional Approach

Lead: AMwA



As part of LTO 1, AMwA is committed to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of consortium partners and its extended network in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Joint interventions have been planned, including capacity building, peer learning, PMEL, planning meetings, and strategic mapping to influence change through the actor-based pathway of change. The organization will continue to build the capacity of its partners with a focus on Feminist and Transformational Leadership through the African Women's Leadership Institute (AWLI). This initiative aims to enable partners to effectively apply feminist principles and approaches in their leadership practices, program design, strategic planning, policy dialogues, and advocacy efforts. Additionally, AMwA will extend its engagement to partners in the Sahel region, building upon the Feminist and Transformational Leadership training offered in 2023. For instance, NIMD Mali is preparing for an AWLI program in 2024 with technical support from AMwA.

In support of strategic interventions under LTO 2, AMwA will continue to support the PoD network by conducting regional and national feminist and transformational leadership training sessions for legislators and consortium partners across the region. Furthermore, AMwA will facilitate reflection and learning spaces, fostering feminist dialogue and action in the realm of women and youth's political participation. Under LTO 2, AMwA will also play a role in facilitating the implementation of gender action plans within political parties and engage in policy and advocacy activities at national, regional, and global levels.

Under LTO 4, AMwA will collaborate with consortium partners on an as-needed basis to review common agendas, strengthen movement building, and develop research and policy briefs. Drawing from past experiences, such as jointly coordinating an agenda-setting meeting in Lusaka and collaborating on a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) leading to a policy brief with NIMD Kenya and Mzalendo, this approach aims to harness collective expertise effectively.

In the context of Kenya, the constricted civic space, limited media independence, and power consolidation present democratic threats. Therefore, AMwA will work closely with the Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA), Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK), and AWLI Alumni who hold senior positions in politics, civil society, and media. This effort will primarily focus on enhancing the capacity of newly elected women and other political and civic figures to act, organize, and mobilize collective voices and actions within political processes.

In Uganda, AMwA has established fruitful collaborations with various key stakeholders and partners, particularly through its AWLI Alumni. The organization aims to further solidify these relations in 2024, emphasizing the importance of mutual capacity building. This mutual exchange of influence aligns with intermediate outcome 1.2, which focuses on enhancing the capacity of CSOs, networks, and actors. Such reciprocity and shared influence are pivotal in shaping a common policy agenda and advancing inclusive dialogues and democratic governance.

In Ethiopia, AMwA will collaborate with NIMD Ethiopia, AWLI Alumni, selected members of the Network of Ethiopian Women's Association, and the Coalition for



Women's Voice in the National Dialogue, among other key partners. Their joint efforts will focus on increasing capacity for collective action in national and regional political processes.

Considering the ongoing civil war in Sudan, AMwA is exploring alternative approaches to create spaces for Sudanese individuals, particularly women and youth. The organization is actively communicating with the National Sudanese Women's Association and has been able to keep in touch with some 80% of the Sudan AWLI Alumni. It is also engaged in mapping out additional Sudanese women, political actors, and individuals who are currently in Uganda or Kenya. This mapping aims to facilitate alternative spaces for reflection, dialogue, and action-planning for the time the conflict reaches some sort of settlement.

3.4 Southern Africa, Latin America and Asia

3.4.1 Mozambique

Lead: IMD Mozambique

In 2024, IMD Mozambique will be primarily focused on the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. This follows the social and political unrest that stemmed from the municipal elections in 2023, leading to a tense political environment due to suspicions of electoral fraud and the non-acceptance of election results. These circumstances have prompted peaceful demonstrations to restore electoral justice and hold the Electoral Management and Administration Bodies accountable.

Within this electoral context, the objective is to promote the inclusion of women, young people, and individuals with disabilities in electoral manifestos under LTO2. IMD will host a Roundtable on Electoral Manifestos for political parties participating in the 2024 general elections. Building on this, a training program on gender- and youth-sensitive electoral manifestos will be conducted, alongside technical support to these parties. This process will result in an analytical report on gender perspectives in the candidacy lists for the 2023 Local elections, building upon the 2023 policy brief.

Furthermore, IMD will facilitate a dialogue session between political parties running for the 2024 general elections to present and discuss their electoral manifestos with civil society under LTO3. Civil society organizations will engage in discussions concerning human rights protection for women, young people, individuals with disabilities, children, and sexual minorities. Additionally, IMD will host intraparty Dialogue Sessions to encourage collaboration and dialogue among women from women's leagues and political party leaders, particularly those with parliamentary representation. The aim is to eliminate barriers to women's freedom of expression and explore strategies for adopting inclusive electoral laws. Key stakeholders in this process include parliamentary committees on Human Rights and Local Governance, the Parliamentary Women's Office, political parties, and civil society.

Under LTO1, IMD, in partnership with AMwA, will facilitate an exchange of best practices by gathering success stories from women leaders in politics and civil society.



Additionally, training on human rights will be organised for CSOs, both on civil and political rights.

Under LTO 4, IMD Mozambique plans to host an International Conference on Women, Governance, Peace and Elections through the Women's Political Academy. The conference aims to produce a report that will serve as a valuable tool for lobbying and political advocacy. Furthermore, IMD will continue to organise meetings between diplomatic entities and political leaders as part of their Strategic Partnership Program to promote the transfer of practical knowledge and strengthen the network of politically motivated youth and women.

3.4.2 Guatemala

Lead: NIMD Guatemala

The election of Bernardo Arévalo represents a window of opportunity regarding a new government led by an opposition party, not aligned with the vested interests of the elite that is marked by corruption and impunity. For actors like NIMD, this new government also presents an opportunity and space to facilitate capacity-building and spaces for dialogue that contribute to trust, confidence and collaboration between political actors and institutions.

Nonetheless, the ruling alliance has begun to criminalize the winning party and the Electoral Court itself, in the same way that judges, prosecutors and journalists have been criminalized. This has generated an unprecedented political scenario of utter uncertainty and a climate of instability and fear, affecting the normal course of the government's transition process.

Under LTO3, NIMD Guatemala will monitor citizen agendas resulting from dialogue sessions in 2023. The organization will act as a facilitator of dialogue platforms, fostering trust and collaboration among political actors, citizens, and social organizations, including the Dialogue Articulating Group and the Electoral Institute of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Additionally, NIMD will create social media content focused on civic-political education.

To further leverage this electoral context, the team will support lobbying and advocacy efforts for legislative initiatives and the development of public policies that align with a strategic government transition plan, specifically emphasizing transparency and accountability (LTO4). This involves the continuation of initiatives from 2022 and 2023, with efforts focused on incorporating previous products into the work agendas of new authorities, such as mayors and newly elected deputies in August 2023. This approach acknowledges the long-term nature of political change and aims to sustain initiatives that have been successful and strategic.

As part of LTO1, NIMD Guatemala will contribute to the capacity-building of its staff and partners through specialized training processes aimed at improving facilitation and political analysis skills in polarized contexts. Following a knowledge and attitudes assessment, it became apparent that there is a need to integrate gender, intersectionality, and human rights into the 2024 programming. This integration will



be reflected in capacity-building activities, emphasizing the pivotal roles these concepts play in planning, monitoring, and evaluation processes.

NIMD Guatemala will continue to run the School for Democracy, targeting both female political actors and youth within political parties under LTO2. The curriculum will build on previous years by enhancing the dialogue strategy and further developing the profile of alumni from the Young Politicians for Democracy programme.

The regional component of the programme will be downsized due to the collaboration between the Dutch embassy in Costa Rica that has recently commenced. As regional activities are deprioritized under the PoD umbrella, critical activities will still happen. It is proposed to follow up on processes that monitor and support Alumni from regional training processes to identify organizational actions to avoid the contraction of civic space and regional exchanges of women on democracy and environmental protection.

3.4.3 Colombia

Lead: NIMD Colombia

In 2023, Colombia witnessed significant changes in its socio-political landscape with the inauguration of a new government. This marked a shift in the country's political ideology, as it saw the emergence of a social and progressive left-leaning government led by Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez. Initially, they garnered substantial support in Congress through strategic alliances and introduced various social and economic policies aimed at reducing inequality in Colombia.

However, after their first year in office, the government's image and public approval ratings experienced a significant decline, leading to widespread discontent and a degree of delegitimization. This shift in public opinion was evident in the rejection of proposed reforms to the healthcare, pension, and labor systems, as well as in the emergence of numerous civil society-driven initiatives.

As part of LTO1, efforts will focus on establishing a Technical Secretariat for the Alliance for the Transformation of Congress, an initiative from the Colombian Innovation Network. This secretariat will coordinate actions across all areas and engage in lobbying activities to create an Institutional Understanding Agreement with the Congress, ensuring the Alliance's long-term operability in technical assistance scenarios. These actions will culminate in the development of a product of good practices on Innovative Networking.

Within LTO 2, the focus will be on monitoring the progress of young leadership candidates who participated in the Democracy Schools and Occupy Politics programmes. The goal is to identify areas for improvement and gather feedback on the program's content. This process will help pinpoint scenarios for the implementation of socially impactful projects led by young participants who play pivotal roles in their communities. Furthermore, the second and third iteration of the Schools of Open Democracy with members of Congress will be implemented throughout 2024.



As part of LTO 3, actions arising from the Alliance for Congress will focus on improving the overall trust of citizens in Congress' activities. This initiative will be based on open government principles and will involve opening new spaces for dialogue and collaboration to strengthen public trust in state institutions through systematic multi-actor engagement.

As a member of the Technical Implementation Table for Point 2 of the Final Agreement of Peace, NIMD seeks to establish strategic relationships between the Ministry of the Interior and other members of the Table under LTO 4. This aims to address identified needs and drive change scenarios with an impact on reform processes. Furthermore, it will seek to identify spaces for support and cooperation in the Special Peace Constituencies with Congress.

3.4.4 Myanmar

Lead: NIMD Myanmar

In the final two years of the PoD programme, NIMD Myanmar remains dedicated to ongoing engagement with stakeholders and fostering dialogue with the people of Myanmar. To further this commitment, the organization is planning to transition to primarily in-person activities for 2024. This shift is particularly ambitious in light of the current challenges, including a diminishing civic space in the country, the organization's remote operations, and the intricate political landscape. Notably, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) continues to face persistent challenges and disruptions. Despite its intention to foster peace, the ongoing complexities and influence by the SAC have disproportionately affected various actors within Kayin State, often leaving them marginalized and unheard.

The conflict situation in some regions has become more complex as various ethnic groups and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) strive to support their communities with resources and stability. This has reignited deep-rooted tensions between these ethnic groups. Notably, areas marked by heightened ethnic leadership and tensions, such as Kayin and Shan states, are where the demand for dialogue on everyday issues at the subnational level continues to rise, and NIMD remains actively engaged.

Under LTO 1, NIMD Myanmar plans to continue experience-sharing sessions with like-minded CSOs, emphasizing trust-building, democracy school establishment, multiparty dialogues, and conflict resolution tailored to CSOs' needs. Therefore, staff continue to be trained in dialogue methodologies, political analysis, and action research to guide interventions.

In alignment with LTO 2, the organization's focus for 2024 is empowering young, women, and ethnic leaders at the subnational level in Shan, Kayin, Kayah, and Mon states. Key outcomes include equipping these leaders with democratic skills and values through Democracy School training and online seminars. Most notably, NIMD Myanmar will organise in-person advanced-level training sessions and a digital engagement platform to further enhance Alumni's knowledge and capacities. Selected alumni representatives will become "Democracy School Champions," promoting dialogue and advocating for inclusive political processes. Next to these



activities, the MyDemocracy School App with discussion forum component, will continue to be rolled out and facilitate a safe digital space for democratic actors to engage and interact.

The activities under LTO 3 intend to foster dialogue, trust-building, and understanding among democratic political actors in Kayin and Mon states. This includes facilitating monthly dialogue meetings and providing capacity building support. This includes technical and resource support, and conflict resolution and mediation training.

4. Global level plan

The global work of the PoD Consortium is implemented and coordinated by NIMD The Hague. This global programming focuses specifically on the following aspects: 1) overall coordination of Consortium operations; 2) continuing the roll-out and operationalization of the planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning (PMEL) framework; 3) facilitating knowledge management and implementing the PoD learning agenda; 4) coordinating the capacity development component of the Consortium and; 5) continuing the implementation of the lobby & advocacy strategy focused on the international level.

4.1 Consortium coordination

NIMD, as consortium lead, continues to be responsible for hosting and coordinating the PoD Secretariat. Its staff in The Hague support the overall Consortium with administrative and logistical support, programmatic guidance, and coordination of the development of annual plans and reports. In 2024, the PoD Secretariat will to this effect, organize at least four formal Consortium Steering Committee meetings. There is the ambition to have at least one physical meeting, perhaps combined with a PoD themed side-event. The PoD Programme Management Team, consisting of programme staff of all Consortium members, will also continue to meet, in principle monthly, to discuss the latest programmatic developments, to share insights and dilemmas, and to discuss planning and reporting.

While a large PoD Partner Week, involving representatives from all partners and offices taking part in the programme, was successfully organized in June 2023, this will not be repeated in 2024. The Consortium Partners will instead aim to increase the visibility and positioning of the Consortium through a side-event in one international or regional forum. This will serve as an opportunity to showcase the results of the programme and relay relevant international level L&A messages, but also can host one live Steering Committee meeting. The details and set-up will be defined once the international agendas and participation opportunities also under the ILA approach are clearer.

4.2 Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation



Supporting the PME Framework from a global perspective is not only done related to accountability requirements to the funder, but also in order to support capacity and operationalization of PME on the country level. In that sense the interventions for this fall within the approach under LTO 1 'the PoD consortium, its network, local CSOs are effective enablers of change'. This is done by (mutual support of) collecting monitoring data, learning about what interventions work and using monitoring and evaluation data for making informed programmatic decisions to become more effective enablers of change. The key targeted actors are the PMEL focal points in the PoD programme countries and regions. The objective is to capacitate, motivate and create the opportunity for PMEL focal points to 1) facilitate adaptation and steering of the PoD programme based on M&E data, 2) provide accountability by reporting quality M&E data and 3) learn about what works and does not work by reflecting on M&E data.

In order to meet this objective in 2024 the PMEL team within NIMD Headquarters will focus on learning from and following up on the Mid-Term Review, as well as consolidating the current monitoring approaches. This means that the findings, conclusions and recommendations need to be packaged and further disseminated for concrete follow-up steps. The final report also highlights the shortcomings, but also the potential of the PoD outcome harvesting database. Moreover, the report praised the adaptive programming mindset, while the adaptive programming approach is further being refined and streamlined across PoD consortium, and a stronger link with the monitoring and evaluation data amongst others is envisioned to inform decisions on adaptivity. Some of the follow-up work will already commence at the end of 2023.

The PMEL team within NIMD Headquarters will continue to support PoD Consortium Partners, country offices and partners, as well as other programme staff in the Hague, through 1-on-1 support, conducting in-country visits, brown bag sessions, and organize learning session around the Mid-Term Review recommendations.

In 2024, one of the priorities is to develop processes and capacity to use monitoring data for adaptive programming. We will also implement recommendations from the Mid-Term Review, such as creating a dashboard to visualize Outcome Harvesting database trends. We'll also focus on quality indicator measurements and establishing PMEL capacity support between PoD consortium members and partners in a community of practice.

4.3 Learning Agenda

The PoD Learning Agenda consists of the learning questions related to the TOC and the LTOs, which directly relate to the thematic learning that is coordinated by each Consortium member as their thematic specialization: Feminist Leadership for AMwA, Youth Participation for CEMI, Conflict Prevention for GORIN, and Dialogue and Trust-building for NIMD. Next to these programming themes, NIMD also supports the work on Adaptive Programming for the Consortium.

4.3.1 Thematic learning: Dialogue and Trust-building



The first learning pillar in the Consortium relates to the overall objective of the programme and the four long-term outcomes of the ToC.

In 2024, NIMD's priority in its thematic lead on dialogue and trust-building will be outcome area 1.2, which is further contextualized to: "The PoD consortium builds each other's capacity to develop and implement dialogue trust-building interventions", culminating in the contextualized long-term outcome 1; "The PoD consortium are effective enablers of change by developing and implementing strong dialogue and trust-building interventions". This outcome directly feeds into and strengthens all the dialogue interventions across the PoD network under LTO 2, 3, and 4.

Over the past years, NIMD facilitated several south-to-south learning exchanges on dialogue, one of which in close collaboration with PoD Consortium partner CEMI. These were experienced as yielding very positive results by the dialogue experts from the PoD network who participated. The Consortium wants to further build on this, and continue to strengthen south-to-south learning and localization.

This is why it will continue to build in 2024 what is started in 2023; a more formalized southern-led peer learning structure, specifically for all the individuals in the PoD network and beyond that are directly involved in dialogue facilitation and design. This so-called "Baobab" initiative is led by 6 PoD network representatives, each from one region of the global PoD network; Latin America & the Caribbean, MENA (the director of the PoD Consortium partner CEMI), West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa and Asia.

The different learning activities that the Baobab will organize in 2024 will be fully co-created and developed by the 6 regional representatives in December 2023. This means the final list of activities is still to be decided, but current options tabled by the regional representatives include;

- Regional peer-to-peer exchanges for dialogue facilitators;
- Global peer-to-peer exchange for PoD regional representatives;
- Stories to study best practices of dialogue facilitation;
- Knowledge products and trainings to support dialogue facilitators, such as the Facilitators' Training Module, and a Facilitators' Toolkit.

NIMD will support in facilitating and organizing these south-to-south activities, as well as capture the learning processes of the individuals involved to make them accessible to others in the PoD network as well.

In addition, NIMD will continue offering the 'Introduction to Political Dialogue' online training, which is a beginners course in dialogue for all new staff in the PoD network.

The building and supporting of the Baobab initiative itself as well as the 'Introduction to Political Dialogue' training is most closely connected to learning questions related to LTO1, most notably;



- *How can we best strengthen our PoD/CSO network to be a pivotal enabler for our other outcomes?*
- *How have we been able to transfer expertise, across each Consortium partner, as well as between partner networks and local CSOs?*

The exchanges, knowledge products and trainings that will be co-created by the Baobab initiative will be most closely connected to the learning questions related to LTO3, most notably;

- *How have we supported political and civic actors to have access to spaces where coalitions can be built?*
- *What has worked in creating new and inclusive spaces, and using our networks to enable access to invited and closed spaces for civic and political actors, particularly for women, youth and other marginalized groups?*

4.3.2 Adaptive programming

- The MTR report praises the Consortium on many fronts related to the adaptability of the TOC and the actual changes being made by country teams in adjusting the programmes. There are also further recommendations to better document and harmonize reporting on these adaptations. It is good to see confirmation that Adaptive Programming is being increasingly applied in the Consortium and is at least fully engrained as concept and process throughout the program. Nevertheless, still more can be done to support this, especially in rolling out more formalized processes, tools and methods. For 2024, NIMD invests further in several ways to do this and ensure more data and evidence is not only gathered and captured, but also processed and analysed to inform programming and to close the learning loop:
- *Updating per country the approach to Political Economy Analysis (PEA).* Fixing per country the approach to updating of their PEAs, ranging from weekly staff reflection sessions on political context changes, to semi-annual sessions. In addition there are tailored PEA updating processes required when (suddenly) political contexts change significantly. *Scheduled guided interviews to reflect on adaptations on country and regional level.* These sessions dissect both intended and unintended outcomes, informing program adaptations seamlessly integrated into annual planning cycles.
- *Developing Adaptive Programming Case Studies:* In 2024 Cases will be made based on experiences and practices in Mali, Tunisia, and Ethiopia . Based on staff interviews and document analysis, the cases will distill critical insights on how these programmes have adjusted against significant changes in context.
- *Strengthening Adaptive Programming Capacity:* Training and hands-on support to bolster country teams' capacity will be given on Adaptivity, linking to Outcome Harvesting, and PEA.
- *Sharing of Knowledge and Learning:* NIMD will actively disseminate insights and experiences from program adaptations within the Consortium, fostering peer learning between countries, and as the MTR recommendations suggest, invest further in the Knowledge Hub. In addition, learning sessions with



global experts will inform the network with state of the art insights and evidence to inform programming. NIMD also engages with the international evaluation communities, the KPSRL, and Partos Community of Practice on learning.

4.4 Capacity strengthening

As the first LTO, capacity strengthening of the Consortium itself is an integral part of the PoD approach to enable increased quality and results. In relation to the global focus, the PoD Consortium bases itself on the following principles to guide the mutual capacity development agenda:

- Analyze gaps and build shared capacity for specific development approaches and tasks;
- Emphasize peer-to-peer learning between countries and regions, and at a global level, where participating teams are encouraged to both learn and teach one another;
- Build a culture within which there is tolerance, patience and acceptance of our differences;
- Promote a focus on capacity strengthening as an enabler of the successful delivery of our programmes;
- Allocate and create a global budget and structure for capacity strengthening to empower partners at a country level.

Capacity development is a means of empowerment and a strategy to create the necessary infrastructure to be able to deliver results, to empower the network to strengthen localization and to enable southern leadership. It also improves accountability to partners within the Consortium and to stakeholders in the countries where we implement the PoD programme.

In 2024, the concept of Open Leadership will be strengthened among country teams, both as guiding principle within the Consortium as well as a programme objective to support in the countries. It consists of providing leadership training and create a platform for country directors to exchange ideas on feminist transformational leadership and develop a more open HR approach.

In addition, we will continue to work on harmonizing human resource policies and procedures, improving the quality management system, and finalizing internal policies across the POD network.

Safety and security remain a major concern in most of the PoD countries. NIMD will assist more countries in finalizing their security and protocol manuals, as well as providing staff training and facilitating regional and cross-country exchange on addressing security challenges.

Lastly, a key focus in 2024 will be the continued awareness raising, knowledge sharing/training, and commitment to integrity, the related policies and practices, including the Sexual Exploitation Abuse and Harassment (SEAH) reporting mechanisms.



4.5 International Lobby & Advocacy

NIMD is the lead organization on International Lobby & Advocacy (ILA) within the Power of Dialogue (PoD) Consortium. As an important international player in the field of democracy support, the NIMD network and consortium partners have the responsibility, the means and the reputation to lobby and advocate for democracy support and to raise awareness. The plan describes two broad sets of instruments for the L&A work:

Firstly, to proactively engage with national, regional and international bodies that are mandated to support democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This is done together with the consortium partners, NIMD country offices and partners. Through a combination of activities, ranging from one-on-one meetings, speaking at conferences, and organizing thematic events to discuss political developments, we inform these bodies about the consortium's work and make them aware of different ways to support democracy. To enforce our L&A work, NIMD is a member of Partos (Dutch membership body for organizations working in international development), and Human Rights coalition (BMO) in the Netherlands; and the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) in Brussels. Through these networks, we present the work of the consortium and contribute to making a case for democracy support.

Secondly, to advocate through ongoing communication and outreach activities. NIMD has a solid online visibility and involves the consortium partners in communication where relevant. By continuously publishing blogs, opinion pieces, human interest stories and statements, the importance of inclusive democracy and our work is conveyed.

Important themes for 2024 will be:

- Youth inclusion in political decision-making. In most PoD programme countries youth forms over half of the population. They are, however, hardly represented in political decision-making. PoD will facilitate knowledge exchange on youth as power holders and intergenerational dialogue to ensure that the needs and demands of youth are sufficiently taken into account within the political parties and within the political and electoral system.
- Political leadership. NIMD is supporting broad discussions on inclusive, open and courageous leadership within the PoD consortium and the country offices. The objective is to stimulate inclusive leadership within the consortium but also with the political actors we work with.
- Attacks against democrats and democracies. Worldwide there are people, power structures and networks who continue to undermine democracy, the separation of powers, transparency and accountability in order to benefit themselves financially from corruption and abuse of power. This is a threat for inclusion and equal rights and for safety and security worldwide. The challenges the world is facing regarding inclusive development, migration and climate change need democratic decision making as this is the best way to guarantee that people are taken along and heard in the process.



The target audience for lobby and advocacy is very broad in principle and is specified depending on the context, the issue and the scope of the message. This can range from (European) governments and embassies, and multilateral institutions such as the EU and the UN.

In 2024, the PoD ILA work will continue to relay country level L&A, which focuses on enhancing democratic rules and practices and trying to halt (further) democratic deterioration, by targeting the following levels/actors:

- The Netherlands. NIMD is an active member of Partos and BMO. Both networks seek to sensitize political decision-makers and government officials on international cooperation and democracy and lobby for sufficient flexibility and human and financial resources.
- EU. NIMD shapes and aligns its ILA with the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) to influence EU policies and guidelines and financial resources for democracy support.
- Other regional, international and intergovernmental bodies. The PoD consortium will jointly decide which forum to focus on in 2024. Possible options are the UN Summit for the Future (September 2024), the 3rd Summit for Democracy, the General Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy (November 2024), the African Union Summit and coordination meetings and the Young African Leader Summit (December 2024).

5. Budget notes

Overall, the budget for 2024 increased with EUR 559,078.57 (9%) compared to the 2024 figures included in the multi-annual budget. This increase is mainly financed from the underspending on several budget lines from 2021 and 2022. These savings are related to delays in the startup phase of the overall programme and the COVID-19 restrictions.

Overall, the PoD Consortium now foresees a budget of EUR 6,957,386.18 of which 90% goes to programming, including 60% on direct programming costs (c.f. Figure 2 below, for the total budget allocation per main cost category).

Direct Staff Costs

The 2024 budget heading direct staff costs is slightly lower than foreseen (2%), due to cost-sharing with other grants.

Other Direct Programme Costs

On 'activity costs', there is a small increase realized from underspending on other lines (e.g. IIB2) and the underspending from 2021 & 2022 budgets.

On 'activity-related travel costs', there is an increase of 22% compared to the multi-annual budget, which is explained by the fact that more travel will be taking



place due to more learning and regional events, plus general inflation and increase of ticket prices.

On the budget line 'E. Equipment and investments', the Consortium is planning an increase of EUR 26,284.61 which is an increase of 143% for which several factors are at play. Indeed, more investments are foreseen within the Sahel region (GORIN, Burkina Faso and Niger), CEMI, Kenya (Mzalendo). For example CEMI will need to purchase new laptops and equipment for the research cell which will also be used for the new component of surveys and analysis which requires recruiting of new staff. On the other hand, the primary reason for the high equipment budget for Mzalendo is the introduction of in-house podcasting equipment, which was integrated into their programming this year. Finally, small investments in video conference materials is generally required to match the increasing numbers of online meetings, combined with investments in internet/mobile phone credit and airtime to support this. These costs have gone up due to the current inflation rates.

Overhead / indirect costs




Budget Heading III will stay approximately on the same level as originally estimated in the 2024 budget.

The foreseen budget, in summary is:

		Original Budget	Updated Budget	% Deviation
Direct staff costs	A. Staff costs	€ 667,719	€ 717,589	7%
	B. Local staff costs	€ 1,466,924	€ 1,381,664	-6%
	C. Consultants and advisers	€ -	€ -	
Other direct programme costs	A. Activity costs	€ 2,011,495	€ 2,457,519	22%
	B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	€ 486,256	€ 481,646	-1%
	C. Activity-related travel costs	€ 323,680	€ 394,484	22%
	D. Project office costs (if applicable)	€ 355,682	€ 380,086	7%
	E. Equipment and investments	€ 10,848	€ 26,385	143%
	F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	€ 390,587	€ 438,129	12%
Overheads / indirect costs	A. Costs of support staff	€ 255,505	€ 230,708	-10%
	B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	€ -	€ -	
	C. Other non-allocable costs	€ 429,613	€ 449,177	5%
Total		€ 6,398,309	€ 6,957,386	9%

Figure 1. Table of the budget allocation 2024 per main cost category

The figures below present a summarized overview of the allocation of the requested budget. For more information, please refer to the 2024 budget file for the Power of Dialogue programme, attached to this annual plan.





Description per cost category

Cost categories	Description
I. Direct staff costs	
A. Staff costs	Staff of lead Partner NIMD in The Hague, directly contributing to the PoD activities. The hourly fees per staff member are based on the 'productive hours' method, set out in the MFA manual for budgeting under the Power of Voices framework.
B. Local staff costs	Staff located in the PoD programme countries directly contributing to the PoD activities. These are the staff members of Consortium Partners and country offices. Costs are based on existing human resource management policies, salary scales and local labour law. Policies may differ per organization and country.
C. Consultants and advisers	N/A
II. Other direct programme costs	
A. Activity costs	The total sum of all activities directly contributing to the PoD ToC. For expected sub-contracting to partners, the total amount of the grant is included.
B. Costs of Consortium Partners	Costs for the coordination and strengthening of the PoD network. This entails, for instance, direct staff time of the Consortium lead linked to coordination, in addition to activities planned for this matter (e.g. Consortium meetings).
C. Activity-related travel costs	Costs for travel, based on the planned activities in-country and between countries. The impact on climate and of COVID-19 have been taken into account.
D. Project office costs	Office running costs required for the implementation of the PoD programme.



E. Equipment and investment costs	In year one (2021) most Consortium Partners will invest in required equipment. In some cases, additional (small) investments are done in the following years. Necessary internet connections and digital meeting facilities are included.
F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	Costs for lead Partner NIMD PMEL and financial control staff, trainings, and Mid-Term and Final Evaluations. This also includes annual audits for each Consortium Partner.
III. Overheads / Indirect costs	
A. Costs of support staff	Staff costs for Consortium Partners, to support the organization and management functions, based on time foreseen on said activities.
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	N/A The PoD Consortium does not distinguish between 'not directly allocable administrative costs' (III.B) and 'other directly allocable costs' (III.C). To ensure consistency and harmonization within the overall budget, the Consortium has decided to use only budget category III.C.
C. Other not directly allocable costs	Consortium Partner running costs that are not presented under category II.D. These could include rent, depreciation and other institutional costs. This also includes other costs like non-activity related travel, institutional costs related to the governance of the organization, cleaning and security costs, communication not directly related to activities, and general supplies.



6. List of annexes

Annex 1 – PoD Annual Budget 2024

Annex 2 – List of planned interventions in 2024 (country, regional and global level)

Annex 3 – PoD 2024 targets contribution to SRL - SCS indicator frameworks

Annex 4 - Overview of targets deviations per country

Annex 5 – Updated risk assessment