


THE **POWER**  
**OF DIALOGUE**  
CONSORTIUM

Annual Plan 2023





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## 1. Introduction

This document outlines the 2023 Annual Plan for the Power of Dialogue (PoD) programme, that is being implemented under the 2021-2025 Strategic Partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in the framework of the 'Power of Voices' (PoV) grant instrument. The PoD Consortium is composed by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the Gorée Institute (GORIN), the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies (CEMI) and Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMwA). The programme, which is implemented in 15 countries<sup>1</sup> and includes regional and global components, carries the ultimate goal to 'contribute to peaceful democratic space, and inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels'.

The coming year will mark the midpoint of programme implementation, providing the PoD network with an opportunity to look back at the results achieved and challenges faced, but also to reflect on the change-steps required to increase our contribution to our common goals. In particular, the Mid-Term Review of the programme, which will be conducted during the second and third quarter of 2023, will help generate insight into the achievement of PoD for the first two-and-a-half year of implementation, and develop recommendations resulting from the findings that can help further operationalize PoD's strategies and priorities for the remainder of the programme period.

Furthermore, the Consortium is planning to organize the first ever physical PoD partner event in 2023. This event, which has been postponed several times due to COVID-19, will be a timely occasion for all partners and offices involved in PoD to exchange experiences around the key thematic priorities of the programme, complementarities between the different country, regional and international levels, and create a new momentum for the remainder of the programme period.

Such mutual learning and cross-fertilization exercises are much needed in contexts that continue to deteriorate. Since the start of the programme, a large number of PoD countries have been moving in an authoritarian direction. These setbacks have been materialized by restrictions of civil liberties, military coups, and even armed conflicts. The root causes of this global democratic backsliding are not only socio-economic, but are also linked to a growing disconnect between citizens – who are often excluded from political decision-making- and their elected representatives – who often fail to be responsive, inclusive and accountable. This is why the work of the PoD consortium is becoming increasingly important moving forward.

The PoD Annual Plan 2023 starts with an overview of the main programme adjustments foreseen for next year (section 2), before diving into the specific country and regional level annual plans (section 3). The subsequent chapter provides an

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<sup>1</sup> Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Mozambique, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Colombia, Guatemala and Myanmar.



overview of the interventions foreseen at global level (section 4), coordinated by NIMD Headquarters, followed by the notes on the 2023 budget.

The 2023 annual budget is presented in annex, as well as the list of specific interventions planned at country, regional and global level. A matrix with the adjusted annual targets for 2023 for the basket indicators, as well as an overview of deviation per country is also provided in annex, together with an updated set of risk assessments and mitigation plans.

## 2. Main programme adjustments

This section intends to highlight the main changes foreseen in our 2023 annual plan, ToC, learning agenda and budget as compared to the multiannual plan or based on significant (political) developments.

### *Need to update the analysis and programme approach in Burkina Faso*

Burkina Faso went through major changes during the course of 2022, that have evidently had an impact on the PoD programme. The year started with a coup against President Kaboré, justified by the inability of his regime to respond to the security crisis. During this period, despite the difficulties, the PoD Consortium was able to contribute to strengthening political participation of women and youth, while finding ways to contribute to the national transition agenda.

However, these efforts were halted at the end of September when a second coup occurred, this time perpetrated by army captain Ibrahim Traoré. This opens a second phase of transition in Burkina Faso, with a newly established government and a new transition roadmap seemingly in the making. Besides being an initial set-back in the return to civil rule, the second coup also constitutes an opportunity for the Consortium to support the political transition with the newly emerging civil and political actors in the country, but this will require our analysis to be updated.

The annual plan for NIMD Burkina Faso presented in Section 3 below is therefore tentative. It will be finalized in December 2022, following a PEA update and review of the intervention strategy, including assessment of the existing partnerships with local CSOs. The results of this exercise will be presented during the first quarter of 2023.

### *Withdrawal from the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD) in Uganda*

The refusal of the National Unity Platform (NUP), the leading opposition party, to join the IPOD, and the reluctance of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) to sign the IPOD Memorandum of Understanding for 2021-2022, has caused a serious reflection by NIMD Uganda on the possibility to continue to support hosting the IPOD secretariat. Since 2009 NIMD has operated as the secretariat based on the MOU that was signed always between all the parliamentary parties. The current MoU is however signed now only by four out of the seven parties that have representation in the national Parliament. One of the core principles for NIMD is the concept of



inclusiveness, so to include all voices around the table. The absence of at least the major opposition party and possibly the second largest opposition party does not fit with this principle. There can only be a meaningful dialogue when all parties are recognized partners and treated as such. The situation in the run-up and aftermath of the 2021 elections shows the political space is actually only shrinking, and opposition party supporters have been kidnapped, tortured and sometimes have just disappeared. Others, including elected members of parliament have been arrested and are still incarcerated. The absence of IPOD means that there is going to be increased polarization among the political actors and their supporters.

The shrinking space is also illustrated by the process for CSOs to renew their operating license, which has been tightened with heavy involvement of security organs. In addition, the Parliament has recently voted provisions to increase government's control on social media platforms. This forces many organizations to self-censor, while political parties' efforts to mobilize citizens are curtailed. After extensive reflection and talks with all political forces, NIMD has now decided to not continue to support the third iteration of IPOD.

This context requires NIMD Uganda to shift its programmatic focus from national interparty dialogue to supporting youth inclusion in decision-making and multi-stakeholder dialogue between civic and political actors, as presented in Section 3 below. NIMD will keep the door open in case new opportunities to support national level interparty dialogue arise.

### *Overhauled Political System in Tunisia: New Constitution and Electoral Laws*

The new President of the Republic, who established himself as the main actor on the political scene since July 2021 - alienating all other political actors by concentrating both executive and legislative powers in his hands - has continued in the same unilateral direction by seizing his newly found constitutional powers in order to set up a hyper-centralized system of governance. The new constitution adopted by a superficial referendum in July 2022, increases considerably his powers, while reducing checks and balances. This worrisome autocratic trend seems now to be further continuing.

In anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary elections, planned for December 2022, the President amended the electoral law, creating a new division of single-seat constituencies and establishing new conditions for candidacy. This includes the rule that candidates should not be representing any political party, but rather nominated by at least 400 citizens from their respective constituency.

As a result, the composition of Parliament and of the broader political landscape will change substantially. This means that CEMI, which has been mainly working up to now with the political parties represented in the previous Parliament, will need to assess the implications of this political re-composition on its interventions. For instance, this will impact the selection criteria to participate in the Tunisian School of Politics (TSoP). This is also the case for the composition of the Multiparty Dialogue Platform (MDP), which has been on hold for over a year. Overall, working on the POD



objectives in this context where the political space is rapidly shrinking will be increasingly difficult.

### Revised Theory of Change for Myanmar

The political landscape of Myanmar is in constant flux. The events following the coup in February 2021 upended formal political institutions and peace processes, as the junta dragged them under its sphere of influence to attempt to legitimize its authority. The space for political parties to interact with international organizations has also become extremely constrained following the SAC's UEC recent announcement in August 2022 which bars parties from interacting with international NGOs or institutions without prior consent.

Following the coup, NIMD Myanmar assessed the possibilities to continue working on Myanmar from outside of the country, as any engagement with undemocratic actors would go against the core values of the team and the organization. Additionally, continuing to safely work with democratic actors inside the country was also a significant security risk due to restrictions posed by the junta. As a result, operating in the new context of a physical office in Thailand has allowed for NIMD Myanmar to maneuver the challenges of in-country implementation and take advantage of valuable learning opportunities in a safe and free environment.

This also provided an opportunity for NIMD Myanmar to review its contextualized Theory of Change and intervention strategy. This exercise resulted in a reformulation of certain outcome areas to reflect the fact that NIMD will: 1) no longer work directly with political parties, but rather with political actors who are striving for inclusive dialogue processes, and focused on the subnational level and; 2) involve ethnic leaders in democracy education activities, initially targeting exclusively women and youth leaders. The latter will also bring more synergy and higher impact related to the work done by NIMD under the LEAP4Peace programme.

### Sudan and Iraq

During the first two years of the PoD programme, the Consortium's investment in Iraq and Sudan remained limited. In Iraq the ongoing Democracy School project was supported and for Sudan only explorative steps were taken that were stalled due to the political turmoil in the country. In 2023 however, the Consortium, through NIMD with support from CEMI, will increase its involvement in Iraq with a continuation of the Democracy School project that with Iraqi partner Women Empowerment Organization (WEO). This intervention will be co-financed by the Netherlands Embassy in Iraq, for one round of Democracy School per year until the end of the PoD programme period. In this way the PoD funds are leveraged to still be able to run a full School cycle in light of the high cost of organizing activities in the Iraqi context.

The Consortium's engagement in Sudan will remain more limited. AMWA will target it via its regional interventions involving Sudanese participants. However, the initial country budget initially reserved by NIMD for Sudan will now be allocated to Iraq, in



order to finance the above-described democracy school. In parallel, NIMD is currently in advanced talks with the Netherlands Embassy in Sudan to support a new Democracy School programme, based on the Ethiopian Democracy Academy (EDAC) model. This will still allow synergies with POD and involvement in regional activities under PoD and with its consortium partners.

### Changes to the Learning Agenda

There are no specific changes foreseen for the PoD Learning Agenda and underlying learning questions. An emphasis will be put on learning activities and International Lobby & Advocacy (ILA) interventions focusing on issues related to political participation of youth. This aligns also to the EU International Year of Youth, with several events and advocacy taking place to engage with. Youth participation will feature therefore as key thematic focus for Consortium learning.

### Changes to the budget

The 2023 annual budget has been slightly increased compared to the original multi-annual plan, through re-allocation of the reported under expenditure in 2021. The estimated expenses for 2022 are more or less in line with expectations but the COVID-19 affected first year still has an impact on the multi-annual budget division. The justifications for deviations per budget lines are provided in Section 5 and Annex 1.

## 3. Country-level and regional plans

This section provides an overview of the priority outcome areas that will be targeted in 2022 in each programme country, as well as the results that the Consortium will strive to achieve under each Long-Term Outcome (LTO) of the contextualized country-level Theories of Change (ToC).

The tables listing the specific interventions planned in the programme countries, for each intermediate outcome of the contextualized ToC, is provided in Annex 2.

### 3.1 Sahel

#### 3.1.1 Mali

Lead: NIMD Mali

While the duration of the Malian transition has been set to last 24 months (March 2022 to March 2024), the government presented a roadmap for the reforms and elections that should lead to a return to constitutional order. Following the revision of the electoral law, 2023 will be dedicated to drawing up and adopting a new Constitution, as well as reviewing the Charter of Political Parties.

In this context, NIMD Mali will continue to work with the committee for advocacy and monitoring of electoral reforms (CPSRE), supporting it in becoming a credible actor



in the establishment of a climate of multi-stakeholder dialogue to promote inclusiveness and consensus around reforms. The committee will hold one meeting per quarter to monitor and advocate for the consensual reforms of the electoral law, the Constitution and the political parties' charter. These meetings will help bring together key actors from political parties, civil society and institutions to foster a peaceful climate of dialogue necessary for peaceful collaboration between actors in the implementation of political and institutional reforms.

Moreover, the partnership with the Citizens' Observatory on Governance and Security (OCGS) will be resumed, continuing its institutional anchoring and its facilitation of a framework for collective reflection on key issues related to governance. OCGS will facilitate spaces for exchange, briefing sessions with the authorities and produce analysis to provide input to the system-level reforms process defined by the transition roadmap. The briefing sessions with the National Transition Council (CNT) will be an opportunity to share citizens' expectations with decision-makers.

In addition, NIMD will continue to provide direct support to the CNT, by providing training on law drafting and monitoring. This constitutes an entry point for NIMD to strengthen relations with this institution. The above-described intervention are foreseen under LTO 3 and 4.

With regards to LTO 2, NIMD will continue to advocate for the quota law by meeting with youth and women from different regions of Mali (Kayes, Sikasso). Meetings will also be planned with political actors to raise awareness on the need to improve the representation of young people and women in the party leadership and other decision-making bodies. A social media campaign will also be carried out on social media to raise awareness on the need for the quota law. the interest of citizens around the advocacy for a quota law. Moreover, NIMD Mali will also seek support from AMWA to organize women leadership training for Malian political leaders. Linked to this, the three NIMD offices in the Sahel will conduct country case studies on women's participation in electoral processes. Following the studies, a consolidation workshop will be organised to identify common challenges and define opportunities for programming.

Finally, as part of LTO 1, NIMD Mali will organize a workshop on the 2023 planning with national partners to identify obstacles and opportunities as well as building synergy to achieve the intended results. This workshop is part of the strategic monitoring planned in the implementation of the PoD in order to promote and strengthen complementarities between national partners.

### *3.1.2 Burkina Faso*

Lead: NIMD Burkina Faso

As explained in Section 2 above, based on the context, NIMD Burkina Faso will make use of the coming months to review its intervention strategy and re-assess existing partnerships with local CSOs. This reflection work will consist of an overall analysis of the socio-political and security context in Burkina Faso. Secondly, it will highlight



the various possible scenarios for the continuation of the political transition. In the third part, NIMD will identify opportunities for new interventions to increase the programme's impact. The fourth step will be to define an intervention strategy that is fit for the context, as well as to identify the key actors to involve in the implementation of the programme.

While awaiting for the conclusion of this analysis, tentative interventions have been identified, both with regards to building the capacity of local partners (LTO1) and conducting L&A activities with CSOs. This L&A campaign will focus on key issues such as inclusive democracy, the inclusion of a youth quota on electoral lists, the place of women in the management of public affairs. As mentioned in the Mali chapter above, this campaign will potentially be carried out in collaboration with the NIMD offices in Mali and Niger.

Within the framework of LTO2, NIMD Burkina Faso tentatively plans to fully implement the democracy schools and political cafés, rather than going through a local partner. This will not only allow for greater control over these activities and their orientation, but also for better monitoring of the process of political engagement, emergence and participation of the young people and women who are trained in the framework of the democracy schools. However, the partnership with the CDBF remains likely for 2023, with regard to actions to strengthen women's political participation. A final decision on the above-mentioned points will be taken once the analysis will be completed.

As far as LTO3 is concerned, the specific interventions related to political dialogue and contribution to the transition will be defined upon completion of the analysis.

### 3.1.3 Niger

Lead: NIMD Niger

The political context in Niger has been relatively appeased in the recent period. The president's challenger in the last elections, Mahamane Ousmane, has accepted the verdict from the ECOWAS court of justice that rejected his appeal, thus putting an end to the main electoral dispute.

Consequently, the inter-party dialogue platform, the National Council for Political Dialogue (CNDP), was reactivated and held a first session after a three-year hiatus. Emphasis will be placed on continuing these efforts in 2023, starting with conducting a needs assessment and a multiparty dialogue training for the CNDP, within the framework of LTO 3.

Regarding LTO 2, NIMD Niger will continue to organize its Democracy School in partnership with *Alternative Espace Citoyen*, targeting youth members of the political parties represented in the National Assembly, as a way to ensure that women and youth aspiring political leaders to become influential actors of change. NIMD Niger has been able to double the number of young people enrolled in the Democracy Schools, thanks to the additional support from the Swiss Development Cooperation



(SDC). In this framework, NIMD Niger will also support two networks of women parliamentarians (gender issues and women entrepreneurship).

Finally, NIMD Niger will resume its work on accountability through the *Presimetre*, an instrument of citizen monitoring of public policies and more particularly of the campaign commitments of the President of the Republic of Niger, initiated by the Pan African Network for Peace, Democracy and Development (REPPAD).

#### 3.1.4 Regional Approach

Lead: GORIN

At the regional level, the changes in national political context called for an updated PEA to determine the significant drivers of political stability and sources of resilience in the target countries (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal). The updated regional PEA will focus on the drivers of political instability and factors weakening civic space within the respective national and regional context. Once the significant causes of political instability and the sources of resilience are identified and prioritized in terms of their relative importance, the updated PEA will have helped to decide which of the priority drivers of change should be incorporated into planning and implementation of the POD program for 2023, and the subsequent years. As part of LTO 1, GORIN will also undertake a study on youth participation in political process in Senegal and continue its bi-monthly policy briefs.

The recent episodes of coup d'états in Sahel calls for more partnership driven approaches to strengthen democratic stability at the national and regional levels. This outcome will be achieved by building and strengthening partnership between pro-democratic political actors and civic groups. As also documented in our regional PEA, weakened trust between civic and political actors to address common governance challenges, democratic decline and shrinking civic space continue to create setback to democratic progress in the targeted countries. The positive milestone is that GORIN and NIMD Sahel have set the stage to strengthen partnership with respect to expressing collective voice, and to be a positive conduit for effective advocacy initiative at national and regional levels. Already, political, and civic actors have shown a growing interest that is self-evident in the joint Goree Institute-NIMD-Sahel Forum successfully organised from 12th-13th September 2022. The planned activities under LTO 3 include:

- One joint GORIN-NIMD Forum targeting fifty representatives drawn from Civic groups, Political Actors including Parliamentarians and Regional Actors.
- Post Joint GORIN-NIMD Forum civic engagement to influence policy directive towards the promotion of peaceful democratic space and inclusive, responsive, and representative political decision-making process at all levels.
- One Annual Youth Forum: Youth inclusive voices in peacebuilding and political in Sahel targeting forty participants
- One Annual women Forum: Women's voices for inclusive peacebuilding and political stability in the Sahel targeting forty participants



LTO 2 will be realized by increasing the number of women and youth in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and decision-making processes in response to the reality that though women and youth represent majority of the Sahel's population, their exclusion from decision-making and peacebuilding processes persists. GORIN will organize one annual Regional capacity building workshops on women and youth leadership in peacebuilding and political processes targeting thirty women and youth, as well as a Training of Training (ToT) on building resource in democracy, governance and elections. GORIN will also continue with its Youth Mentorship Programme in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and political decision-making.

As for LTO 4, this outcome will be responding to the ongoing governance challenges in a dynamic political context which calls for deeper collective intellectual and policy reflection to find corresponding options to the political uncertainties, democratic governance challenges, shrinking civic space and security complexities in Sahel. GORIN's annual symposium will bring actors to brainstorm on these challenges to come up with context-specific actional recommendations to states and regional institutions. This will have provided an opportunity to foster more interaction between regional, state and civic groups, and to come up with common position on how to address some of the barriers, factors and challenges contributing to weakening civic voices of women and young political leaders in decision making process.

## 3.2 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

### 3.2.1 Tunisia

Lead: CEMI

CEMI's Tunisia programme was initially designed to be implemented in a stable and democratic political context. Since the 25th July 2021, the country has been going through a challenging phase, which has led to a situation of uncertainty, political instability and a threatened democratic space. However, these challenges will not go as far as changing the nature of the PoD interventions, ToC or target groups. CEMI will rather work on contextualizing them, for instance after the parliamentary elections take place, as explained in Section 2 above.

Under LTO 1, CEMI will continue supporting its partners and network by sharing knowledge, expertise and experience. In particular, support will be provided to WEO Iraq in adjusting their Democracy School curriculum and training their trainers.

Regarding LTO 2, CEMI will continue to be engaged to take actions in order to strengthen their movements and organizations, to equip them with the needed tools to become more qualified and effectively take part in decision-making, to express themselves and spread their knowledge, democratic values, and skills, throughout the usual activities. However, some changes might occur some activities to match with the national context.



This is the case for the Youth Collaborative Platform, an intervention targeting young people for are politically active outside traditional party structures, which was initially meant to be an online platform but will now turn into physical workshops in three different regions of Tunisia. Other activities foreseen under LTO 2, such as the TSoP level 1 class and Freesh YouTube channel will continue to be implemented.

CEMI will also keep organizing two regional activities: the Regional Academy involving MENA region youth aiming to strengthen and deepen their knowledge and skills and the Regional Conference involving MENA region experts and youth to deepen their knowledge on certain topical matters.

Regarding LTO 3, CEMI will continue working on maintaining its spaces for dialogue and consolidating the values of pluralism and collaborating in mutual respect. As it is challenging to keep the Multiparty Dialogue Platform (MDP) alive in this challenging context, its composition and objectives will be re-assessed once the parliamentary elections take place and the recomposition of the political landscape is achieved. Similarly, the Nouabook platform has been suspended when the parliament was dissolved in 2022. The reactivation of this platform will depend on the resumption of the parliament's normal activity after the legislative elections which will reconnect political and civic actors.

Finally, in order to preserve the democratic space and the culture of dialogue as democratic gains, CEMI will focus more on strengthening the capacity of young political and civic actors under LTO 4, empowering them to be actors of change and to work more on anchoring the culture of dialogue which will create a collaborative mindset.

### *3.2.2 Jordan*

Lead: NIMD Jordan

The most important change in Jordanian politics has been the formation of the Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System. The committee submitted its recommendations back in September 2021; the main focus of the recommendations was on promoting political party life in Jordan and increasing the participation of youth and women in politics. The recommendations were later enacted into laws by the parliament, and they included:

- Changing the elections law such that it provided for 30% of the seats to be contested by political parties only in the next elections. This ratio will increase to 50% and then 65% of the total parliament seats in the next two elections respectively.
- The new law provided youth and women quotas in the closed lists system whereby the top three names of any competing political party list must have a woman. The next three names must have a woman. Additionally, one youth below the age of 35 must be among the top 5 names in the PP list.
- The new political parties' law raised the number of founding members and indicated that they must represent at least five governorates. All existing political parties must comply with the new law by May 2023. It is expected



that there will be a movement to consolidate and merge between PPs. It is highly expected that many political parties will also disappear.

The above reforms promise to usher in a new era of political life for Jordan. However, despite the optimism, many analysts and nearly all CSOs warn of the shrinking civic space and restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association, especially among youth from political groups which the government considers opposition. Experts also point to efforts by the government to design the political party landscape in a way to ensure that a few loyalists and co-opted political parties are the ones that end up leasing the political landscape.

Given the above changes, NIMD's programming changed in 2022 and will follow suit in 2023. Under LTO1, NIMD Jordan will continue to develop the team and NIMD Jordan network in conjunction with the consortium in areas relevant for work and establish NIMD as a key driver for reform towards inclusive and representative democracy. This requires an emphasis on the skills and actions needed to empower political parties.

Previously, NIMD did not work with political parties due to restrictions imposed by the government. This started to change in 2022 following the outcomes of the Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System. In 2023 within LTO 2, NIMD will target parties and focus on supporting them in becoming more responsive, inclusive, and capable of attracting and engaging different groups, especially youth and women, into their ranks and support in areas of planning, outreach, electoral strategies, building coalitions, etc.

NIMD will also continue to target youth from within and outside political parties to build their capacities. By doing so, youth from within should evolve in the direction of strengthening their PPs. As well, youth from outside PPs will be encouraged to join PPs, or support PPs.

Finally, Given that Jordan is going through a transformation process, it is important to keep an eye on the developments in the democratic space. Based on continuous monitoring, NIMD will convene awareness and dialogue sessions that aim to build trust, discuss, and make recommendations to strengthen the democratic space, as part of LTO3 and LTO4.

### *3.2.3 Iraq*

Lead: NIMD and WEO

In 2020 and 2021, NIMD and the Women Empowerment Organization (WEO) have implemented a pilot project on democracy education for youth in Iraq, which has been supported by the Embassy of the Netherlands in Baghdad and the UNDP. The project targeted 25 youth from different backgrounds and focused on strengthening their capacity on issues related to political systems, rights and freedom, political dialogue, advocacy strategies, etc.

The Democracy School pilot was considered successful, as it brought together young Iraqi participants from across the political spectrum and helped them identify the



common obstacles that they face to meaningfully participate in politics, while having constructive dialogue on how to overcome them. Based on this first positive assessment, NIMD made the decision to continue investing in at least one round of Democracy School per year, building on the lessons learned from the pilot and adding an emphasis on creating a strong alumni network.

Therefore, the PoD Iraq project will mostly focus on LTO 2, through three training sessions for the School participants, to provide a total six training modules (two modules per session). The tentative curriculum – to be updated in the first quarter of 2023 – includes an introduction to Iraq's political system, a focus on individual rights and freedom, as well as an extra emphasis on practical skills needed to participate in politics (i.e. dialogue, communication, manifesto development, political/contextual analysis, strategic planning, etc.). The training sessions will take place in Erbil and are expected to last for four days, with the last session expected to last one day longer. Additionally, students will be required to produce papers on three thematic areas. The semester will culminate in an evaluation and graduation ceremony to take place in Baghdad in March 2023. Besides the regular curriculum, dialogue sessions and informal debates between participants and political actors will be organized in parallel to the school sessions. An alumni event will also be organized, as a way to connect participants from the two School rounds and support the establishment of a strong alumni network.

As part of LTO 1, CEMI will continue to provide thematic and technical support to WEO, including a Training of Trainers.

### 3.3 Horn of Africa

#### 3.3.1 *Uganda*

Lead: NIMD Uganda

Based on the contextual assessment explained in Section 2, NIMD Uganda will intensify its efforts in working with aspiring young and women political and civic leaders under LTO 2. This is because these have largely been marginalized and left out of the political decision making processes and yet they constitute the majority of the Ugandan population. In order to deal with this marginalization, the capacity of young people will be built so that they are able to voice out their concerns and participate in decision making processes. NIMD will work with actors like; Multi-Party Youth Forum, Youth leagues of Political Parties, some young people in women council and women leagues of political parties, young members of Parliament, by building their capacity to advocate, lobby, influence policies, support the democracy schools, hold inter-generational discussions and support the implementation of the developed gender action plans.

Within LTO 3, NIMD Uganda will work with political parties represented in Parliament, the Leader of Opposition in Parliament (LOP,) the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the Ministry of internal affairs, the Ministry of justice & constitutional affairs and the



Office of the Speaker of Parliament. Despite the withdrawal from IPOD, NIMD will continue to work with these actors and engage them in different interventions, such as multi-stakeholder dialogue. As for the civic leaders, the program team will continue working with those that it has worked with in the first year without any envisaged changes. These two actors will be engaged in activities of trust building, dialogue, developing common policy influencing agenda as well policy advocacy.

As for LTO 4, NIMD Uganda will continue working with political and civic actors through policy dialogue and advocacy platforms. This is because given the ever shrinking political and civic spaces in Uganda, these will play an important role in advocating the required policy changes through a combination of approaches and strategies. Informal space for political party and leaders and young politicians will also be created.

### 3.3.2 Kenya

Lead: Mzalendo Trust and NIMD

Kenya has just concluded a lengthy election process. As has been the case in all instances, it has taken court determination to declare the winner, following contestation on the process and people responsible running the elections. Overall, though, the election has been hailed as the most transparent, issue-based and peaceful in recent times, leading to accolades across the region. Some key highlights of the elections include the fact that it recorded the lowest turnout in recent times, at about 65%. The youth participation in this election was also low at 39.1%, compared to 2017, notwithstanding that an estimated 4 million young people attained the voting age this year. This apathy and lack of interest in young people was also witnessed during the voter registration process, with IEBC failing to meet the targets during the multiple enhanced voter registration processes. The election also had a first, having the least number of presidential candidates since the advent of multi-partyism and the highest number of females running mates, who all gave a good running. Despite the fact that the highest number of women was elected to office, the desired two-thirds was not achieved and a promise of a 50:50 representation at Cabinet level has not been met.

As a result, Mzalendo's focus in 2023 will be aimed at incrementally building on the gains made in the last year while being cognizant of emerging developments. The proposed interventions will build on long-term activities underlying the PoD project but also seek to address emerging changes. In LTO 1, there is an opportunity for consortium partners to meet more since travel restrictions due to COVID -19 have been lifted. This will provide more cross- learning opportunities and pooling our skills, expertise, and networks in some of our interventions. In LTO 2, bearing in mind the post 2022 elections realities, we will broaden Mzalendo's interventions to reach more youth across the Kenyan counties by organizing dialogue sessions and strengthening the youth movements therein. In the past election, more women have been elected both at the national and the sub- national level, but the need for a more sustained



advocacy on fair representation and capacity building the ones in decision making positions to make women and youth friendly legislations and policies remains.

Within LTO 4, we shall incrementally work on the success that we have realised towards making Kenya's parliament open by ensuring that there is sufficient and proactive information sharing by Parliament, ensuring public participation in the legislative process and civic engagement to ensure that citizens understand parliamentary processes. Mzalendo will also continue publishing reports on the work of Parliament and more so the annual scorecard to ensure that citizens demand accountability from their elected leaders. Regionally, we will leverage on the networks that we have created to ensure that there is a strong network of CSOs in the region that advocates for openness and public participation in the regional parliaments.

In addition to the work of Mzalendo, NIMD also recently opened an office in Kenya through an EU-funded project, which will be co-financed by PoD in 2023. This project is implemented in partnership with Mzalendo, CMD-Kenya, the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) and the Oslo Center. It aims at strengthening Inclusive and Democratic Political Actors in Kenya

### *3.3.3 Ethiopia*

Lead: NIMD Ethiopia

The conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which rules the Tigray Regional States, continued throughout 2022 despite a five-month ceasefire. Power dynamics and conflicting narratives/visions about the nation's past and future are closely tied to the violence and conflict in Ethiopia, particularly in the north. The involvement of foreign actors— in some cases overtly and in others covertly— is also exacerbating the scale of the conflicts. Following many previous unsuccessful attempts, negotiations—backed by major international actors including the US, EU, the UN and many African countries— have commenced between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leaders in South Africa since October 2022. The talks—which are generating high expectations and pressure, considering the previous failed attempts— are being held under the auspices of the African Union (AU).

Parallel to the third-party mediated peace talks addressed above, the Ethiopian government has also established a National Dialogue Commission (NDC) as part of efforts to address these conflicts, and also accelerate the pace of democratic reforms that began in 2018. The Commission has a mandate to facilitate the forging of consensus on contentious political issues as a key step towards a new political dispensation. The hope is that this will also result in the renewal of the social contract in the form of a new (or amended) Constitution. Preparations are underway for the process which is formally scheduled to commence in November 2022. This is an ambitious initiative with profound implications for Ethiopia. Including all voices and stakeholders is thus imperative, or even crucial for a successful and sustainable outcome.



At the same time, some major stakeholders mainly political parties are yet to reach consensus on the initiative. The ruling party (PP), EZEMA, NAMA and others support and have signed up to it. However, major opposition parties, notably from Oromia, Somali, Afar, Tigray, Wolayita etc., without necessarily opposing dialogue, have reservations. To mitigate the effects of the negative developments around the national dialogue initiative, NIMD is proactively working with the relevant actors including National Dialogue Commission, JPPC, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) and the political parties. A series of retreats have been and will continue to be organized by NIMD to address the issue.

Despite the challenges, inclusive dialogue will remain central to NIMD's trust building work. Specifically, through interparty dialogue platforms, NIMD Ethiopia will continue to strengthen the trust we have built between the Ethiopian political parties both from the ruling and opposition (LTO 3). Capacity-building activities will also remain as an important intervention we will leverage to support the development of essential democratic institutions (i.e. the House of People's Representatives, NEBE, Caffee Oromia , EPPJC).

Some new activities will be implemented in 2023 under LTO 4, including developing mobile applications for the Caffee Oromia regional council, which will help the local community in sharing concerns with the regional house of people representative. MPs will also be able to make announcements and hold opinion polls using the mobile application.

#### *3.3.4 Regional Approach*

Lead: AMwA

In 2023, as part of LTO 1, AMwA will work closely with PoD consortium partners and its expanded network of local partners in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. AMwA has planned for co-funded activities such as a training in resource mobilization, joint resource mobilization, quarterly PMEL meetings and strategies for influencing change and engaging the actor-based-pathway of change. In keeping with building each other's capacities, AMwA will hold a Feminist and Transformational Leadership training for the PoD Consortium members to build partners capacity to apply feminist principles and approaches in their leadership practice, programme design and strategies, dialogue and policy and advocacy engagements. AMwA will attend Democracy School in order to strengthen its capacity and legitimacy to advance and safeguard the democratic and civic space in the region, taking into account the shrinking civic space and backslide of democracy.

AMwA will also heavily invest in LTO2 through funded and non-funded activities such as the provision of thought leadership. The outcomes harvested in 2021 and 2022 from Alumni of The African Women's Leadership Institute (AWLI) demonstrate that the AWLI is fundamental to building the capacity and legitimacy of women, youth, political and civic leaders to be influential actors of change and achieve impact across LTO1, LTO2 and LTO4. Therefore, in order to effectively contribute to the intended outcomes of the POD programme, AMwA will focus on LTO2 in partnership with the



POD Consortium members and its expanded network of actor-based pathways of change. In spite of the shrinking civic space increasing intolerance and state-instigated violence it is expected that the movement of women and young feminist political and civic actors will grow as a result of the AWLI and multi-stakeholder dialogues.

Given the new government in Kenya, AMWA in coordination with NIMD, Mzalendo Trust, Kenya Women Parliamentary Association, CRAWN TRUST, and Badili Africa, will focus on strengthening the capacity of the newly elected women and other political and civic actors to act, organize, and mobilize collective voice and action in political processes. AMWA with partners, will also enhance political and civic actors to lobby and advocate for women and youth meaningful representation and engagement in the political and decision-making processes of the country.

In Sudan, AMWA will maintain a somewhat arms-length approach by only working with the National Sudanese Women's Association (NSWA) and focus in mainly on LTO2. Engagement with the growing number of AWLI alumni will be done through NSWA with the aim of strengthening women political and civic actors capacity and collective efforts to advocate for democratic governance in the country.

Similarly, in Ethiopia, AMWA will work with the National Ethiopian Women's Association as an umbrella platform for women political and civic actors. It will continue to train women and young women political and civic actors under the AWLI.

### 3.4 Southern Africa, Latin America and Asia

#### 3.4.1 Mozambique

Lead: IMD Mozambique

In 2023, the Mozambican context will be politically dominated by the 6th elections in the 53 municipalities. Undoubtedly, this electoral contextual dynamic may be somewhat atypical for the municipalities and districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula, especially those affected by terrorist conflicts. This dynamic serves as an opportunity for greater engagement by civil society and clearly for the PoD programme, for advocacy and influence for greater inclusion of social groups such as women and youth in the following matters that will be decisive for next year.

Considering this electoral context for 2023, LTO 2 will be the one that IMD Mozambique will invest on the most in terms of influence and advocacy for political actors through working with the Women's Leagues within Mozambican political parties. They will be the main targeted actor for 2023, because it is through them that women can be placed on election lists and gain more legitimacy to influence the electoral agenda of their parties. IMD will also train political parties' leadership in drafting gender-sensitive election manifestos. This intervention will take advantage of the electoral period to influence political parties so that electoral manifestos are designed in the light of a gender perspective.



In addition, IMD Mozambique intends to continue its dialogue (LTO 3) and lobby & advocacy work (LTO 4), including with diplomatic missions established in Mozambique.

### 3.4.2 Guatemala

Lead: NIMD Guatemala

Democratic space continues to deteriorate, as Guatemala entered Civicus' watch list for the serious and rapid deterioration of civic freedoms. The interests of powerful groups have focused on the persecution of opponents, led by the Public Prosecutor's Office with the support of judges allied to pro-corruption groups and conservative actors such as the so-called Foundation against Terrorism. This has affected former prosecutors who participated in the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, as well as journalists and activists. In the first quarter of 2022 alone, the Human Rights Defenders Unit counted 589 attacks on human rights defenders.

Since 2023 will be an electoral year for central and municipal government authorities, as well as for members of Congress of the Republic, the interventions foreseen under LTO 3 and 4 will be oriented towards the electoral issue. This will entail reducing some of the technical assistance support that NIMD Guatemala is providing each year, in order to strategically redirect resources to activities that focus on the electoral process through trust and cooperation building, institutional strengthening, and the transformation of the political system and culture.

Work with political parties could resume in the second half of the year and focus on multi-party training processes for newly elected MPs and mayors. Regarding the work with CSOs and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, there will be opportunities to pursue it in 2023 but in a different form: focusing on technical assistance, training, strengthening and dialogue actions related to the electoral process, strengthening democracy and promoting participation of citizen.

In the broader Central American region, El Salvador continues to experience a significant democratic deterioration that has led to the articulation of the legislative and executive bodies, forming a single force that concentrates political power. This has manifested itself in the dismissal of the Attorney General of the Republic, the removal of judges and the approval of the State of Emergency, which will be renewed from March 2022. In Honduras, a reconfiguration of political forces has taken place in Congress, as well as a lot of political turmoil regarding the constitutional changes announced by President Castro, which constitutes both a risk and a window of opportunity for multi-party work.

While from 2021 to 2022 the Regional Programme has been able to work with civil society organisations, political parties, Congresses and Supreme Electoral Courts in the three countries, in 2023 interventions will prioritise facilitating spaces and collaborations between political and social actors to strengthen democratic spaces in difficult political contexts, address the closing of the democratic space, respond to



the political electoral moment and improve the regionalisation strategy and integration of NIMD offices in the region.

As part of LTO 1, NIMD's Central American staff will also be strengthened in terms of digital security, as well as in mechanisms for reacting to threats and attacks, and in strengthening capacities to facilitate dialogue. This support will also be provided to local partner organisations.

### *3.4.3 Colombia*

Lead: NIMD Colombia

2022 was marked by the elections of the new Congress of the Republic and new President and Vice-President. There was a significant change with respect to the direction of the National Government and the majority composition of Congress, which historically has been mainly to the right of the ideological spectrum, and will now be led by center-left parties. At National Government level, the opposition candidate Gustavo Petro and his running mate Francia Márquez, both from the Pacto Histórico party, were elected. Their election results are, in part, a reflection of the 2021 mobilisations in which young people from all over Colombia participated. The new national government and the Congress of the Republic have demonstrated their willingness to implement the Final Peace Agreement signed with the former FARC, as well as their willingness to resume the work on the peace agenda.

This might provide an opportunity for NIMD Colombia to re-engage on the peace process after several years of hiatus. In particular, as part of LTO 4, NIMD hopes to reactive its relationship with the Ministry of the Interior, in order to resume its role as international accompanier of point 2 of the Final Peace Agreement, and the development of public policies aimed at total peace.

Within LTO 1, the Colombian Innovation Network, now divided into two initiatives, will be consolidated and organised as follows: in the Alliance for Open Democracy, which will be articulated with the group of Foundations, Philanthropies and Funders in order to support, organise and implement activities on deliberative democracy, among others; and by the Table for Open Democracy developed with the House of Representatives to support the process of modernisation of the Congress of the Republic, as there is a more consolidated opportunity for participation than the work on political reform.

As part of LTO 2, the Democracy Schools 2.0 pilots will be developed with a hybrid methodology and a virtual learning platform that is expected to reach more than 300 students. We will also focus on training future candidates for local elections, as the intervention with subnational bodies will be suspended for elections.

Regarding LTO 3, NIMD Colombia will – among other - provide technical assistance for the modernization plan of the Congress and facilitate multistakeholder dialogue around the peace agreement.



#### 3.4.4 Myanmar

Lead: NIMD Myanmar

As explained in Section 2, NIMD Myanmar has adjusted its Theory of Change and will, as a result, implement the following interventions.

Under LTO 1, NIMD Myanmar will continue to look for ways to implement more works complementary to local like-minded CSOs to share experience and build internal capacities. This is now feasible, considering the registration of a regional office in Thailand is well underway and a physical office space has been secured. Staff are to receive training on dialogue and mediation, in addition to other topics that will further capacitate them and the organization to be effective enablers of change.

Under LTO2, NIMD Myanmar has been able to hold both online and in-person democracy schools in 2022. In acknowledgement of this intervention's potential impact and rich outcomes, as well as asks from participants themselves to expand the training to more states and regions, NIMD Myanmar will aim to hold 2 democracy school trainings for mixed geographical groups of 20 participants from 3 states/regions in 2023 (Kayin, Kayah, Mon). These democracy school trainings will be complemented by networking and learning events, which will be targeted towards the democracy school alumni from Shan, Mon, Kayin and Kayah regions.

In addition, there will be a public roll out of the MyDemocracy School app to the wider public with promotional materials in the second quarter of next year, as well as 1 democracy education course offered through the app in that will target 40 participants from the broader public—a group that will be separate from the targeted participants from MyDemocracy School, although from the same demographic of youth, women, and ethnic leaders. These activities will be carried out with the aim of increased reach in empowering women and youth from the broader public in Myanmar to apply their knowledge and skills to strengthen democratic values within their networks.

Under LTO3, NIMD Myanmar will firstly conduct a PEA to assess the local contexts of the target states/regions regarding emerging democratic multi-stakeholder dialogue processes. Then, NIMD Myanmar will design a tailor-made conflict resolution and mediation training program for 15 democratic political actors from 2 states and regions (Shan, Kayin). The online trainings will invite relevant international guest speakers/lecturers with translation services as needed.

Overall, to outmaneuver and manage the unpredictable ripple effects of the SAC's scheduled elections which are slated to occur in August 2023, most activities—particularly in-person activities—will occur in Q1 and Q2. All activities in Q3 and Q4 are to be carried out virtually unless stated otherwise. In accordance with this, we expect over half the budget will be utilized in the first half of the year on critical capacity building knowledge and skills trainings which will set the foundation for the establishment of dialogue platforms and network strengthening activities in the second half of the year.



## 4. Global level plan

The global work of the PoD Consortium is implemented and coordinated by NIMD The Hague. This global programming focuses specifically on the following aspects: 1) overall coordination of Consortium operations; 2) continuing the roll-out and operationalization of the planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning (PMEL) framework; 3) facilitating knowledge management and implementing the PoD learning agenda; 4) coordinating the capacity development component of the Consortium and; 5) continuing the implementation of the lobby & advocacy strategy focused on the international level.

### 4.1 Consortium coordination

As Lead Partner, NIMD carries out extra roles and responsibilities within the Consortium. In 2023, NIMD continues to be responsible for hosting and coordinating the PoD Secretariat, which is composed of NIMD staff who work for the Consortium. The Secretariat provides administrative and logistical support, programmatic guidance, and coordinates the development of annual plans and reports. The PoD Secretariat will organize four Consortium Steering Committee meetings in 2023 (at least one physical), while the PoD Programme Management Team will continue to meet on a monthly basis.

In addition, the PoD Secretariat will still aim to organize a physical partner event during the second quarter of the year, as this did not materialize in both 2021 and 2022. The event will involve representatives from all partners and offices participating in the PoD programme. The objective of this event will be to stimulate mutual learning, engage in programmatic discussion, and exchange on topics that are at the core of the PoD programme (i.e. lobby & advocacy strategies, PMEL, capacity strengthening, thematic leads, etc.). It will also be an opportunity to discuss the Mid Term Review process and reflect on progress and good practices. By also inviting relevant other strategic partners related for instance to L&A, women inclusion and youth participation the event is aimed as catalyst for learning focused on creating impact on the POD objectives for the second half of the programme.

### 4.2 Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

In 2023, the PoD programme will reach its midterm. Therefore, the PMEL agenda will focus on the facilitation of and learning from the Mid-Term Review (MTR). Currently, the ToR have been finalized and the assignment is open for external evaluators to apply. The MTR will look at 1) programmatic aspects such as validity of the ToC and achievements on intermediate and outcome level and 2) different aspects of the partnership, including relationships with embassies and the ministry, as well as 'leading from the south'. The results and findings from this MTR will be shared in various fora during the last quarter of the year.

Beside the MTR, the NIMD PMEL team will continue to support capacity development of PoD Consortium Partners, country offices and partners, as well as other programme staff in the Hague. PMEL programme support falls under LTO 1 'the PoD



consortium, its network, local CSOs are effective enablers of change', by (mutual support of) collecting monitoring data, learning about what interventions work and using monitoring data for making informed programmatic decisions to become more effective enablers of change.

The priority support areas for 2023 will be:

- Conduct midterm outcome measurements
- PMEL capacity strengthening (trainings, seminars, formats and tools)
- Support Outcome Harvesting (OH) and quality indicator measurements
- Facilitate effective use of monitoring data for learning and programme adaptation
- Establishing PMEL capacity support between PoD consortium partners
- Consolidate IATI reporting

In addition to the above-listed priorities, the PoD PMEL team in The Hague will contribute to the wider PMEL community by participating in the Partos PME community, DGIS PMEL Community of Practice, as well as various evaluation conferences.

The key targeted actors are the PMEL focal points in the PoD programme countries and regions. Our objective is to capacitate, motivate and create the opportunity for PMEL focal points to 1) facilitate adaptation and steering of the PoD programme based on M&E data, 2) provide accountability by reporting quality M&E data and 3) learn about what works by reflecting on M&E data.

In order to meet this objective the PMEL team in the Hague will continue 1-on-1 support, conducting in-country visits for support, create a PoD community of practice, brown bag sessions, and organize learning session around the MTR recommendations.

### 4.3 Learning Agenda

As part of its coordination role, NIMD will facilitate the implementation of the Consortium's learning agenda, which further refined during the inception phase of the programme. This agenda is centered around two pillars:

#### *4.3.1 ToC outcomes and thematic learning*

The first learning pillar in the Consortium relates to the overall objective of the programme and the four long-term outcomes of the ToC.

In 2023, NIMD's priority in its thematic lead on dialogue and trust-building will be outcome area 1.2, which is further contextualized to: "The PoD consortium builds each other's capacity to develop and implement dialogue trust-building interventions", culminating in the contextualized long-term outcome 1; "The PoD consortium are effective enablers of change by developing and implementing strong



dialogue and trust-building interventions". This outcome feeds into all the dialogue interventions across the PoD network under LTO 2, 3, and 4.

One set of planned interventions focuses on enabling dialogue experts within the PoD network to strengthen other new and experienced members of the network with their knowledge and expertise. These are;

- One offline advanced peer-learning week for expert PoD staff involved in dialogue interventions
- Bilateral peer-to-peer learning exchanges for new and experienced staff, online and offline
- One offline Training of Trainers to strengthen the dialogue facilitation expert group who can train and support other colleagues and facilitators throughout the Latin and Central American region
- One online 'Introduction to political dialogue' training in 2023 for all new PoD staff
- For each programme with dialogue and trust-building elements, the dialogue lead and team will give specific support and advice to country teams on demand.

This set of interventions is closely connected to learning questions related to LTO1, most notably;

- How can we best strengthen our PoD/CSO network to be a pivotal enabler for our other outcomes?
- How have we been able to transfer expertise, across each Consortium partner, as well as between partner networks and local CSOs?

A second set of interventions focuses on supporting innovation in dialogue and trust-building strategies within the PoD network. These are;

- One jointly developed learning paper on best practices of including marginalized groups in dialogue and trust-building
- One jointly developed methodology on best practices of engaging both civic and political actors together in a dialogue process.

This second set of interventions is closely connected to learning questions related to Outcome 3, most notably;

- How can we best support civic and political actors to overcome existing barriers to collective action (i.e. grievances and root causes of exclusion and conflict) and form legitimate coalitions with sufficient power and sustainability?
- How have we supported these actors to have access to spaces where such coalitions can be built?



- What has worked in creating new and inclusive spaces, and using our networks to enable access to invited and closed spaces for civic and political actors, particularly for women, youth and other marginalized groups?

In addition to the thematic work of NIMD, GORIN will Conduct a Peacebuilding and conflict prevention training for the PoD network Partners, while AMWA will continue to support the network, either bilaterally or through online training, on feminist leadership development.

#### *4.3.2 Adaptive programming*

In 2023, NIMD will further embed adaptive programme management in the PoD country programmes, based on evidence and learning gathered through our processes and tools. A refresher training will be offered in the early spring of 2023, before the 2023 annual reports are due, so that country teams have the capacity to engage in a process of reflection on results and implications for programme adaptation. In addition, on-demand and tailor-made support to ongoing PEA processes will be offered throughout the year.

Adaptive programme support also falls under LTO 1 of the PoD ToC. Priority areas for 2023 will include:

- Documenting the adaptive programming cases in the Myanmar, Colombia and Ethiopia programmes
- Adaptive programming capacity strengthening through training and hands-on work on PEA updates, and results reflection workshops with country teams
- Follow up of (draft) MTR findings on adaptive programming practices
- Translation of tools and guidelines for PEA, PMEL, and reflection workshop formats into French and Spanish on a needs basis
- Sharing of learning and programme adaptation experiences, including in wider networks such as international evaluation communities, KPSRL, and DGIS and Partos CoPs on PMEL

#### 4.4 Capacity strengthening

The PoD Consortium agrees on the following principles that will guide our mutual capacity development agenda:

- Analyze gaps and build shared capacity for specific development approaches and tasks;
- Emphasize peer-to-peer learning between countries and regions, and at a global level, where participating teams are encouraged to both learn and teach one another;
- Build a culture within which there is tolerance, patience and acceptance of our differences;
- Promote a focus on capacity strengthening as an enabler of the successful delivery of our programmes;
- Allocate and create a global budget and structure for capacity strengthening to empower partners at a country level.



In 2023, NIMD will continue to support mutual capacity building within the PoD network in order to ensure higher quality and more impactful PoD programme implementation. Based on the results of the capacity assessment which was completed successfully in 2021, we will follow up to implement the capacity development plan developed for each country. The capacity assessment addressed both institutional capacity needs and thematic support.

To that end, we will continue to support the PoD network in its efforts to harmonize human resource policies and procedures, improve the quality management system, and finalize internal policies. We will support exchange across regions in learning and exchange around the financial system and management, initially holding two online and one physical regional training.

Given the increased security risks in the majority of PoD countries, NIMD will work with partners and offices to develop their safety and security protocols, as well as provide trainings for staff.

Since lobbying and advocacy training has been identified as a key priority by Consortium Partners and country offices, a capacity development activity will be organized for the whole network in 2023. Furthermore, to ensure maximum transparency in our work, NIMD will continue to raise awareness and build knowledge and commitment to integrity policies and practices, as well as how to deal with challenges. For each region within the network, an online training will be organized.

#### 4.5 International Lobby & Advocacy

NIMD is the lead organization on International Lobby & Advocacy (ILA) within the Power of Dialogue (PoD) Consortium. As an important international player in the field of democracy support, the NIMD network and consortium partners have the responsibility, the means and the reputation to lobby and advocate for democracy support and raise awareness. There are two broad sets of instruments for the L&A work:

Firstly, to proactively engage with national, regional and international bodies that are mandated to support democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This is done together with the consortium partners, NIMD country offices and partners. Through a combination of activities, ranging from one-on-one meetings, speaking at conferences, and organizing thematic events to discuss political developments, we inform these bodies about the consortium's work and make them aware of different ways to support democracy.

Secondly, to advocate through ongoing communication and outreach activities. NIMD has a solid online visibility, and involves the consortium partners in the communication where relevant. By continuously publishing blogs, opinion pieces, human interest stories and statements, the importance of inclusive democracy and our work is conveyed.



The target audience for lobby and advocacy is very broad in principles and is specified depending on the context, the issue and the scope of the message. This can range from (European) governments and embassies, and multilateral institutions like the EU and the UN.

In 2023, the ILA work will primarily focus on the following actors:

1. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its embassies;
2. The European Union and European delegations– through close collaboration with the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD);
3. UN Resident Coordinators Offices and UN agencies.

The Netherlands MFA and the EU are strong players in the democracy support sector. Therefore, they will remain our main target groups in the coming years. In addition to the EU institutions in Brussels, we are increasingly focusing our attention on European delegations in the programme countries. This allows us to better align our international L&A work to the programmes and the lobby and advocacy at national level.

In 2023, NIMD will also invest in stronger relations with the UN Resident Coordinators Offices and with the UN agencies active in the programme countries. The main goal is to link the work of PoD to the (monitoring of the) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We have a strong relationship with UNDP, UN Women and with local representatives of UN agencies in several countries, but we are not well connected with their headquarters, where policy influencing usually happens. NIMD will organize missions to the UN in New York to engage and give visibility to the work of the consortium. The UN will organize an SDG Summit in 2023, in addition to the regular High Level Political Forum. These two events will be particularly important in our L&A work towards the UN. The list of ILA interventions foreseen at all levels is provided in Annex 2.

## 5. Budget notes

Overall, the budget for 2023 increased with EUR 218.876 (3%) compared to the 2022 figures included in the multi-annual budget. This increase is financed from the overall underspending reported in 2021.

Overall, the PoD Consortium now foresees a budget of EUR 6.876.908 of which 90% goes to programming, including 60% on direct programming costs (c.f. Figure 2 below, for the total budget allocation per main cost category).

### **Direct Staff Costs**

Within the budget heading direct staff costs, there has been a saving of 2%. This is mainly due to savings within NIMD offices in the Sahel, Ethiopia and Colombia.



## Other Direct Programme Costs

On 'activity-related travel costs', there is an increase of 1% compared to the multi-annual budget, which is explained by the fact that now that COVID-19 restrictions are lifted, most partners and country offices are anticipating to resume their activities and related travel as originally planned.

On the budget line 'E. Equipment and investments', the Consortium is planning an increase of EUR 55.297 which is an increase of 64%, mainly within the Sahel region, CEMI, Kenya and Myanmar and due to several factors at play. Indeed, within the Sahel Countries (more specifically GORIN and Mali), significant investment in video conference materials is required to match the increasing numbers of online meetings, combined with investment in internet/mobile phone credit to support this. Moreover, internet and airtime costs have gone up due to the current inflation rates). For Kenya, more equipment is needed to accommodate for the expansion of the Mzalendo office. On a more general level, the yearly fee related to the renewal of the bookkeeping software licenses also contributes to the overspending on this line.

## Overhead / indirect costs

Budget Heading III will stay on the same level as originally estimated in the 2023 budget

The foreseen budget, in summary is:

		Original Budget	Updated Budget
Direct staff costs	A. Staff costs	€ 667,719	€ 709,550
	B. Local staff costs	€ 1,460,771	€ 1,366,157
	C. Consultants and advisers	€ -	€ -
Other direct programme costs	A. Activity costs	€ 2,149,217	€ 2,327,527
	B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	€ 488,756	€ 508,044
	C. Activity-related travel costs	€ 360,227	€ 375,102
	D. Project office costs (if applicable)	€ 352,505	€ 343,256
	E. Equipment and investments	€ 33,780	€ 55,297
	F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	€ 459,957	€ 497,609
Overheads / indirect costs	A. Costs of support staff	€ 255,505	€ 265,382
	B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	€ -	€ -
	C. Other non-allocable costs	€ 429,594	€ 428,985
<b>Total</b>		<b>€ 6,658,031</b>	<b>€ 6,876,908</b>

Figure 1. Table of the budget allocation 2023 per main cost category

The figures below present a summarized overview of the allocation of the requested budget. For more information, please refer to the 2023 budget file for the Power of Dialogue programme, attached to this annual plan.




Figure 2. Percentage of budget allocation 2023 per main cost category




Figure 3 Percentage of 2023 budget allocation per LTO




Figure 4. Budget allocation 2023 per Country

#### Description per cost category

Cost categories	Description
<b>I. Direct staff costs</b>	
A. Staff costs	Staff of lead Partner NIMD in The Hague, directly contributing to the PoD activities. The hourly fees per staff member are based on the 'productive hours' method, set out in the MFA manual for budgeting under the Power of Voices framework.
B. Local staff costs	Staff located in the PoD programme countries directly contributing to the PoD activities. These are the staff members of Consortium Partners and country offices. Costs are based on existing human resource



	management policies, salary scales and local labour law. Policies may differ per organization and country.
C. Consultants and advisers	N/A
<b>II. Other direct programme costs</b>	
A. Activity costs	The total sum of all activities directly contributing to the PoD ToC. For expected sub-contracting to partners, the total amount of the grant is included.
B. Costs of Consortium Partners	Costs for the coordination and strengthening of the PoD network. This entails, for instance, direct staff time of the Consortium lead linked to coordination, in addition to activities planned for this matter (e.g. Consortium meetings).
C. Activity-related travel costs	Costs for travel, based on the planned activities in-country and between countries. The impact on climate and of COVID-19 have been taken into account.
D. Project office costs	Office running costs required for the implementation of the PoD programme.
E. Equipment and investment costs	In year one (2021) most Consortium Partners will invest in required equipment. In some cases, additional (small) investments are done in the following years. Necessary internet connections and digital meeting facilities are included.
F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	Costs for lead Partner NIMD PMEL and financial control staff, trainings, and Mid-Term and Final Evaluations. This also includes annual audits for each Consortium Partner.
<b>III. Overheads / Indirect costs</b>	
A. Costs of support staff	Staff costs for Consortium Partners, to support the organization and management functions, based on time foreseen on said activities.
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	N/A The PoD Consortium does not distinguish between 'not directly allocable administrative costs' (III.B) and 'other directly allocable costs' (III.C). To ensure consistency and harmonization within the overall budget, the Consortium has decided to use only budget category III.C.
C. Other not directly allocable costs	Consortium Partner running costs that are not presented under category II.D. These could include rent, depreciation and other institutional costs. This also includes other costs like non-activity related travel, institutional costs related to the governance of the organization, cleaning and security costs, communication not directly related to activities, and general supplies.



## 6. List of annexes

Annex 1 – PoD Annual Budget 2023

Annex 2 – List of planned interventions in 2023 (country, regional and global level)

Annex 3 – PoD 2023 targets contribution to SRL - SCS indicator frameworks

Annex 4 - Overview of targets deviations per country

Annex 5 - Updated risks assessment