



# Annual Plan 2022

## Power of Dialogue Consortium

1 November 2021



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## List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full name
<b>ABPoC</b>	Actor-Based Pathways of Change
<b>AMwA</b>	Akina Mama wa Afrika
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CEMI</b>	Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies
<b>CNT</b>	National Transition Council - Mali
<b>CRPH</b>	Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw - Myanmar
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>DGIS</b>	Inclusive Green Growth Department
<b>DSH</b>	Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EPD</b>	European Partnership for Democracy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GRIP</b>	Gender Roadmap to Inclusive Political Parties
<b>GORIN</b>	Gorée Institute
<b>HPR</b>	House of Peoples Representatives - Ethiopia
<b>IMD</b>	Institute for Multiparty Democracy - Mozambique
<b>IPOD</b>	Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue - Uganda
<b>KPSRL</b>	Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law
<b>LTO</b>	Long-Term Outcome
<b>OCGS</b>	Observatoire Citoyen sur la Gouvernance et la Sécurité - Mali
<b>OH</b>	Outcome Harvesting
<b>MoPPA</b>	Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs - Jordan
<b>MFA</b>	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MySoP</b>	Myanmar School of Politics
<b>NEBE</b>	National Election Board of Ethiopia
<b>NIMD</b>	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
<b>NUG</b>	National Unity Government - Myanmar
<b>PEA</b>	Political Economy Analysis
<b>PMEL</b>	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
<b>PoD</b>	Power of Dialogue
<b>PoV</b>	Power of Voices
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>WEO</b>	Women Empowerment Organization - Iraq

# 1. Introduction

This document outlines the 2022 Annual Plan for the Power of Dialogue (PoD) programme, that is being implemented under the 2021-2025 Strategic Partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in the framework of the ‘Power of Voices’ (PoV) grant instrument. The PoD Consortium is composed by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the Gorée Institute (GORIN), the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies (CEMI) and Akina Mama wa Afrika (AMWA). The programme, which is implemented in 15 countries<sup>1</sup> and includes regional and global components, carries the ultimate goal to ‘contribute to peaceful democratic space, and inclusive, responsive and representative political decision-making at all levels’.

The first year of programme implementation has been challenging on many fronts. First, based on an agreement with the Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid (DSH), the PoD Consortium made use of the first six months of 2021 to further develop a number of documents that will shape the implementation of the programme. Political Economy Analyses (PEAs) were conducted in the vast majority of countries included in the programme. Each PoD country teams subsequently made use of the PEA findings to update their contextualized country Theories of Change (ToC) and Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Frameworks. In order to further specify the implementation strategies with the actors targeted by the programme, each country team also developed a set of Actor-Based Pathways of Change (ABPC). This exercise was followed by the baseline measurement of programme indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, carried out during the third quarter of the year. As a result, the implementation of the programme is only truly picking up as we approach the end of 2021.

In addition, COVID-19 continued to cause disturbances, as a significant number PoD partners and country offices’ staff members were directly and/or indirectly affected by the disease in 2021. COVID-19 related restrictions also hindered the programming processes described above (i.e. inception phase, baseline study, annual planning, etc.). Neither the Consortium Partners nor the wider network were able to come together physically during this critical period, in order to provide mutual support and stimulate the much needed face-to-face programmatic interactions.

Most importantly, the political contexts in which the PoD Consortium operates deteriorated significantly during the first semester of 2021. From military coups in Myanmar and Mali, for the second time in less than a year, to ‘institutional coup’ in Tunisia where the President currently concentrates all powers in his hands, contextual changes have had or will have an impact on scope and impact of the PoD programme. Next to these hard changes, we witnessed the continuous deterioration of the democratic space in many countries included in the programme. Despite these negative trends, people continue to stand up for democracy and take matters into their own hands. This is often driven by young people and especially young women, who constitute the main target group of our interventions.

The present PoD Annual Plan 2022 is structured as follows. An overview of the main contextual change, and how they have impacted our country programmes, is presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides a summary of the country-specific and regional level annual plans, while the interventions planned at global level are presented in Section 4. The budget notes are presented in Section 5.

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<sup>1</sup> Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Mozambique, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Colombia, Guatemala and Myanmar.

The 2022 annual budget is presented in annex, as well as the list of specific interventions planned at country, regional and global level. A matrix with baselines (2021) and annual targets for the overall programme and per country is also provided in annex, together with an updated set of risk assessments and mitigation plans.

## 2. Contextual changes and implications on the programme

This section highlights some of the main contextual changes witnessed in PoD programme countries over the course of 2021, and provides a preliminary assessment of how these will impact programme implementation.

Within the **Horn of Africa region**, civic space in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan continues to face restrictive legislative frameworks and political interference and this poses challenges for actors working on building inclusive political processes and democratic governance. Restrictions on civic actors from the ruling government have been tightened making it difficult for individual entities to navigate the difficult operational terrain majorly because they have limited capacity to be enablers and drivers of change. The PoD programme therefore still presents an opportunity for collective action for civic and political actors to safeguard the civic space, strengthen partners' capacity and lobby and advocate for inclusive and gender responsive democratic governance.

According to the findings of the PEAs conducted in 2021, young women and men, and persons with disabilities in Uganda and Kenya continue to be marginalised and excluded from intra and interparty political processes through structural and attitudinal impediments. Monetisation of politics, high levels of youth unemployment and a patriarchal configuration of politics among others, still limit meaningful contribution of youth, women and PWDs to politics processes as enablers of change. Relatedly, the young people themselves have limited organisational skills and capacities to form an influential block that articulates their political aspirations and exploit their innate potential.

Following the 2021 General Elections in Uganda, the dialogue process among political parties especially those with representation in Parliament has continued to sour as the leading opposition party refused to join the Interparty Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD) platform due to mistrust and suspicion within the involved political parties. That decision is likely to affect the realisation of meaningful, inclusive dialogues and creation of strong alliances within political parties. This state of affairs will continue to undermine the realisation of peaceful interparty engagements and collaborations, leading the country programme to focus more on aspiring young and women politician and CSOs as main actors of change.

In the **Sahel region**, the Mali PoD programme began in the context of a political transition that is due to end in February 2022. A transition remains a democratic break, but it is also a window of opportunity to question the political and civic practices that are at the root of democratic dysfunction. The year 2022 is an electoral year that will provide an opportunity to measure the progress made on reform issues and to assess the level of involvement of young people and women in the public debate and the quality of their participation in decision-making. It will also be an opportunity to promote synergies of action between the PoD Consortium Partners active in the region, while consolidating the networks of local partnerships necessary to achieve long-term objectives.

In Niger, the swearing in of the new elected President of Niger in April 2021 marks the end of the post-electoral tensions that shook the country during the first quarter of the year. Niger is thus experiencing its first democratic transition since its independence in 1960. It is indeed the first time that an elected President has relinquished power to another elected President, although election results have been contested. The posture of the new authorities opens up another mode of governance which constitutes a sort of break with previous practices. Indeed, since that date, and in view of the new President's marked desire to promote dialogue with key stakeholders of the country, a relaxation of the political climate has gradually taken place. The assumption that the changing context marked by political alternation is favourable to strengthening democratic governance underpins the programme that will be implemented in 2022.

The **MENA region** also experienced radical changes during the course of 2021. This was particularly the case in Tunisia, where exceptional measures (suspension of parliamentary activities, lifting of immunity on MPs and removal of the head of government) were decided by the President of the Republic on July 25<sup>th</sup>. This decree establishes a concentration of all powers in the hands of the President, without any judicial control over these acts. This decision had consequences at the level of key political actors, with a wave of resignations within the Ennahda party, and the arrest of the Qualbtounes party president. Consequences were also noted at the level of democratic space and political culture, with a new political polarization between protesters and supporters of the presidential decree, unilateral decision-making of the President without having a clearly defined transitional roadmap, and the deepening of the divide between political parties and young citizens.

The expected short term changes in the Tunisian context include a definitive change in the nature of the political regime towards a strong presidential regime, paired with the possible disappearance of prominent political parties from the political scene. While the ToC developed for Tunisia was originally designed to be implemented in a stable political context, the exceptional measures taken on July 25 and the establishment of a provisional organization of public powers have led us to a situation of uncertainty and instability. In 2022, effort will be made to further contextualize the ToC and and strengthen the support given to the Tunisian youth in this new context, empower them to become real agents of change, and to preserve the democratic space that is currently threatened.

In Jordan, a royal committee was formed by HM King Abdulla II in May 2021 and tasked with reforming the political system in Jordan. The objectives of this committee are to promote political party life and to see greater engagement of youth and women in political life. Analysts are split on whether this will produce any tangible advancement, or end up like many other similar committees established in the past and that produced little results. Whether or not this committee ends delivering tangible results, NIMD will aim to contribute to the national debate.

In **Myanmar**, the Military (the Tatmadaw) began its attempt to seize state power on 1 February, thereby breaching the constitution drafted in 2008. The Tatmadaw proclaimed a yearlong state of emergency and declared that power had been vested in the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Min Aung Hlaing. It declared the results of the November 2020 general election invalid and stated its intent to hold a new election at the end of the state of emergency. The coup d'état occurred the day before the Parliament of Myanmar was due to swear in the members elected at the 2020 election, thereby preventing this from occurring. Shortly before the formation of a new government by the Parliament, President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained, along with ministers, their deputies, members of Parliament and the Union Election Commission. The Tatmadaw has so far failed to establish full control over the state. Massive and brave resistance by the population

hampers this control by the army over public administration, economy and the full population of Myanmar. Moreover, territorial control in the border areas has actually weakened. This means the coup is not yet a fait accompli, but at the same time, the country's prospects are very much uncertain.

In this context, the PoD Myanmar programme has been able to adapt itself, and moved to a phased approach. In the first part, MySoP will not be able to operate inside the country and its interventions will be limited, given the security risks for MySoP staff and participants. In the next phase, starting hopefully later in 2022, MySoP aims to continue with multi-stakeholder dialogues and political-civic coordination platforms from a location outside Myanmar, focussed on supporting cooperation between the emerging legitimate political and civic actors. Moreover, most activities can also be implemented through digital means. Furthermore, support for political parties and relevant political actors remain relevant. This will support meaningful and constructive dialogue to overcome mistrust, and to contribute to the advancement of an inclusive democratic transition and reconciliation process. More details are presented in the country section.

### 3. Country-level and regional plans

This section explains provides an overview of the priority outcome areas that will be targeted in 2022 in each programme country, as well as the results that the Consortium will strive to achieve under Long-Term Outcome (LTO) of the contextualized country-level Theories of Change (ToC). Where applicable, deviations from the original plans are explained.

For each country, an overview of the key actors that will be targeted in 2022 is also provided, based on an update of the Actor-Based Pathways of Change (ABPoC) that were developed during the inception phase.

The tables listing the specific interventions planned in the programme countries, for each intermediate outcome of the contextualized ToC, is provided in Annex 2.

#### 3.1 Sahel

##### 3.2.1 Mali

Lead: NIMD Sahel

The political context and ongoing dynamics, described in Section 2 above, demonstrates the relevance of working on the combined 4 LTOs of the contextualized ToC. Priority is given to training and information of youth and women to build this critical mass committed to a peaceful and accountable democratic culture.

Within LTO 1 'The consortium, partner networks and local CSOs are effective facilitators of democratic change', NIMD Sahel will work on the following aspects:

- Re-establish contact with GORIN to align our lobbying and advocacy actions towards ECOWAS with the 2021 additional protocol on democracy and good governance
- Strategic follow-up and networking of local partners

- Knowledge production on democracy
- Capacity building of NIMD staff and national partners

Within LTO 2 'Young people and women who aspire to become political and civic leaders are influential actors of change':

- Support the Political and democratic schools , through a contribution to 15 'political cafés' planned in the framework of an EU-funded project, and through financing of at least 3 school alumni projects aiming to strengthen the civic and political commitment of women and youth

Within LTO 3 'Political actors and citizens work together peacefully on a basis of trust':

- Strengthen spaces for dialogue and advocacy on reforms: nourish reflections on political and institutional reforms through lobbying and advocacy around 3 advocacy documents elaborated by the OCGS (*Observatoire Citoyen sur la Gouvernance et la Sécurité*), shared with the National Transition Council, key ministries (refoundation, territorial administration) and political parties.
- Support to women and youth organisations, and to the monitoring committee for advocacy on electoral reforms in the advocacy on reforms.

Within LTO 4 'National and international political and civic actors strengthen democratic space':

- National actors, in particular members of the National Transition Council (CNT), are informed of citizens' expectations on reform issues
- Lobbying and advocacy documents and actions are undertaken, in partnership with GORIN, to challenge ECOWAS on the effective implementation of texts and citizens' expectations in the sub-region
- The international community, in particular the EU, is increasingly alerted to the issues of governance and democracy in conflict resolution in the Sahel

As mentioned above, the main actors targeted will be **young and women leaders** who are part of the renewal of citizen and political action are invisibilised and unheard. Many of them operate outside the traditional spaces of political participation. The aim is to identify them and equip them to strengthen their desire to get involved in society. Training, information and digital platforms will make their voices audible and their actions visible in order to encourage a positive dynamic of engagement in their communities and organisations.

NIMD will also work with **Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and political actors**. The demand for dialogue is expressed by different actors and the few dialogue initiatives are often poorly organised, instrumentalised or suffer from inclusiveness. Establishing a meaningful dialogue between the various actors calls for diversifying the spaces for exchange around issues that are well identified and relevant to young people, women and part of the political crowd. These spaces will promote communication between the governors and the governed, a prerequisite for restoring a climate of trust.

Specifically, the capacity-building activities of **the members of the CNT** planned within the framework of the consortium will make it possible to alert decision-makers to the need to safeguard the civic and democratic space. This consortium of TFPs also provides an opportunity to inform CNT members who play the role of parliamentarians of our results in relation to political and institutional reforms. A regional synergy is necessary to carry out advocacy actions with regional institutions such as **ECOWAS**.

### 3.2.2 Burkina Faso

Lead: NIMD Sahel

From the first quarter of 2022, NIMD in Burkina Faso will focus on LTO 1, by strengthening the capacity of the local office in consultation with the NIMD regional Sahel office based in Bamako. This could be done through a series of meetings and exchanges to see to what extent NIMD Sahel and its consortium partners can deploy a strategy to achieve long-term results.

The NIMD Burkina team will also contribute to the achievement of LTO 2 through the Democratic and Political Schools, which aim at amplifying the voices of women and youth. Within the framework of the Schools, 40 young people will be trained in the values, skills and knowledge of democratic systems, with a particular focus on gender.

Within the framework of LTO 3, NIMD will facilitate Democratic Dialogues between political actors and citizens, where participants will be stimulated to make joint proposals, lobby and advocate with a view to strengthen the democratic space and convincing public decision-makers to carry-out reforms for a more inclusive and participatory political system.

With regard to LTO 4, the activities will be driven by the NIMD Sahel regional office, with plans for lobby & advocacy initiatives at regional and international levels. These advocacy actions will concern the importance of democracy to address issues of stability, the fight against violent extremism and the fight against migration.

In terms of targeted actors, NIMD Burkina Faso will put a lot of emphasis **youth and women**, who remain excluded from the political system. It is therefore necessary to focus on them through capacity building activities such as the Democratic and Political Schools. This will enable them to strengthen their political participation and better influence policy-making.

NIMD in Burkina Faso will also target elected and non-elected **political actors, CSO leaders and ordinary citizens**, so that they participate in democratic dialogue sessions and political debates. Regional and International actors, such as ECOWAS and the EU, will also be targeted through lobby & advocacy interventions foreseen under LTO 4.

### 3.2.3 Niger

Lead: NIMD Sahel

Similarly to Mali and Burkina Faso, NIMD Sahel will aim to achieve results under each of the 4 LTOs of the contextualized ToC in Niger.

Within the framework of LTO 1, it is envisaged to support the work of NIMD's local partners in Niger and to develop a robust communication strategy in order to amplify NIMD's work on the national scene.

Within LTO 2, three initiatives will be supported. Firstly, the political and democratic schools, within which at least 30 young and women leaders will be trained in 2022. NIMD will also support initiatives aiming at amplifying the voice of young people, through social media and other communication channels. Finally, NIMD will support lobby & advocacy campaigns aiming at increasing the participation of young people, for instance through law establishing youth quotas in decision-making bodies.

Within LTO 3, NIMD will aim to strengthen citizen's monitoring of elected political actors, as a way to increase social accountability. This will be done through support of the "Présimètre 2021" and sessions of "Accountability Forum" initiative, which is a framework for exchange and interaction between citizens and institutional leaders who will report on their mandate.

Finally, NIMD will support the network of women parliamentarians in Niger, in order to strengthen their capacity to make proposals for a better participation of women in public life.

**Youth and women leaders of political parties and CSOs** will be at the core of NIMD's intervention in Niger. Through the above-described interventions, support will be provided via capacity building, but also via lobby and advocacy initiatives. Dialogue between **Political actors and CSOs**, particularly around social accountability, will also constitute a central element of the programme in 2022.

### 3.2.4 Regional Approach

Lead: GORIN

Over the years, GORIN has grown and established itself as a key Pan-African civil society voice contributing to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and political process in West Africa and beyond. In the year 2022, GORIN will work with its partners in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal in various thematic areas.

Within LTO 1, GORIN will continue to strengthen its own capacity and will place a strong emphasis on strengthening synergies between Consortium Partners, so resources are dedicated to research and mapping our network partners for mutual support and collaborative engagement, particularly with NIMD Sahel. GORIN will also undertake research to deepen understanding of peace, governance and security challenges in the region, as part of an effort to inform more evidence-based intervention. This will also involve conducting in-depth assessment and analyses around emerging peace and security issues and contexts, as way of enhancing the PoD peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategy. Part of this exercise will also include creating shared experiences and supporting sharing knowledge online.

As evident in the two PEAs conducted by GORIN in 2021, LTO 2 will be realized by increasing the number of women and youth in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and decision-making processes. In this regard, GORIN will continue to work closely with women and youth both in the political arena and in the civic space in its strategy towards the effective implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2250 (2015). Critical attention will be paid at international instruments such as the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 2242 (2015), 2250 (2015), 2419(2018).

As the PoD programme also aims to strengthen the voice of civil society, LTO 3 will be addressed by building and strengthening partnership between pro-democratic political actors and civic groups. This is in line with the observation that most political actors in the targeted countries are failing to recognize the need for partnership driven approach, and are reluctant to collaborate with civic actors to foster political stability. Based on this backdrop, this outcome will be realized by fostering partnership and collaborative engagement between political and civic actors at regional level, with the aim of building trust for positive change.

Within LTO 4, GORIN will continue to provide a platform for both Civic Groups and Policy Makers to discuss how they can mutually contribute to strengthening civic voices of aspiring women and young

political actors in political processes. This outcome will be realised by undertaking facilitative multi-stakeholder dialogue seminar with critical attention to some of the barriers, factors and challenges contributing to weakening civic voices of women and young political leaders. An ICT platform will also be used to inform state actors about the danger of shrinking civic space and its implications in an already fragile security environment. GORIN will also support coordination and harmonization of lobby and advocacy initiatives from national to regional level.

In order to achieve results under each LTO, GORIN will target the following actors:

- **Women and young political actors, and Network Members of GORIN:** GORIN will make use of local partners and its women and youth network, that have significant presence and outreach capacity in the targeted countries, as well as its network of political actors who have benefited from previous projects implemented by GORIN. In line with the recommendation of the regional PEA, GORIN will also involve other sets of civic actors, including Community based groups, and other citizen (e.g. Youth Groups, Women’s Groups, Faith-Based organizations, Traditional leaders, etc).
- **ECOWAS and G 5 Sahel:** GORIN will endeavour to formalise synergy and partnership with these regional institutions as a critical success factor towards an effective implementation of the Power of Dialogue Programme. Over the years, GORIN has won the trust and confidence of ECOWAS with solid partnerships based on effective stewardship, mutual respect, commitment and professionalism. GORIN will aim to form alliance with other CSOs at national and regional level to lobby both ECOWAS, Sahel G5 and other regional actors towards influencing policy reform at national and regional levels. The aim will also be to influence the commitment of governments to address political promises and pledges, as well as policies to ensure they reflect concerns of women and youth at national and regional levels. GORIN will engage with **NIMD Sahel**, through mutually beneficial partnership, to achieve results at regional level.

## 3.2 Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

### 3.2.1 Tunisia

Lead: CEMI

Even after the events of July 2021, CEMI is still convinced that its initial choice of targeted actors is still relevant and necessary to build and consolidate democracy in this crucial transitional period:

- **Young politicians from political parties:** CEMI continues to believe that efforts must be invested in empowering young politicians with the knowledge and skills to train a new generation of politicians capable of fulfilling the expected programmatic function of a political party. It is this function that has always been lacking for most parties and it is for this reason that their discourse is often characterized by polarization and mutual accusation. If the programmatic function of political parties is reinforced, They will actively participate in the process of decision-making and the design of public policies instead of being embroiled in conflict, polarization and mutual accusation. CEMI will strive to strengthen the capacity of political parties to be more accountable

to their electorate and more able of being programmatic parties and strengthen their capacity to conduct crisis communication and remobilization during this period of discredit

- **Youth activists from CSOs:** since the revolution, CSOs have generally provided a function of monitoring and control which helped rectify the failings of the political course. These CSOs also denounced the institutional excesses and individual abuses emanating from politicians and government or administrative officials. Some of these CSOs have always advocated for the inclusion of young people and women in political life, the fight against corruption, the protection of rights and freedoms, this is why the CEMI seeks to equip them with knowledge and skills necessary to make them real actors of change. The monitoring and control action provided in particular by certain CSOs, the denunciation of abuses, frauds, illegal enrichment of certain politicians and the abuse of power, did not fail to generate tension and incomprehension between the actors of civil society and politicians. It is notably through its dialogue activities (in addition to the new mixed class experience) that the CEMI aims to establish a climate of trust and collaboration between these two actors. The CEMI aims to build on the experience of the national dialogue of 2013 to bring the country out of the most serious political crisis in its history. After the July 25 declaration, these CSOs were the first to warn against potential abuses, to call on the president to establish a roadmap, to denounce violations of rights and freedoms and to be a real bulwark against any regression in democratic space. CEMI will consolidate these mutual trust and collaboration in favor of safeguarded democratic space.
- **'Unstructured' young people:** Populist and even fundamentalist movements can easily manipulate unstructured / non-politically active youth. The rise of populism in Tunisia can lead these young people to vote overwhelmingly for people or parties who do not share democratic values and do not really believe in the foundations of the rule of law. The participation of these young people in political or public life is occasional, it was linked in Tunisia to the presidential elections of 2019. It is for this reason that their CEMI seeks to offer them the possibility of rationalizing their activism to also become actors of a conscious change and to offer them channels of dialogue, exchange and even engagement in CSOs or political parties. Through this supervision provided by the CEMI, this force will be directed towards the consolidation of the democratic space and the achievements of the revolution instead of generating perverse effects.

The specific interventions planned for each LTOs are provided in Annex 2. This also includes a descriptions of the two MENA regional interventions to be implemented by CEMI in 2022 (i.e. Regional Conference and Regional Youth Academy).

### 3.2.2 Jordan

Lead: NIMD Jordan

The update of the Jordan PEA, conducted in 2021, did not result in a need to adjust the targeted actors nor the TOC. However, the programme interventions to fulfil the long-term and intermediate outcomes will change. The following programme intervention adjustments to the ones foreseen in the Multi-Annual Plan will take place in 2022:

- Within LTO 1, NIMD Jordan and consortium members jointly identify key skills and experiences to share among themselves and then MIMD Jordan works with the relevant partners to acquire 2- 3 skills that fit and are relevant within its TOC and interventions in Jordan. The specifics of this

engagement will be determined based on the outcome of the capacity needs assessment. It is forecasted that this will include Gender and 'responsive political actors' related investments.

- Within LTO 2 and 3, the pilot conducted in the Karak governorate in 2021 will be replicated in four governorates with possibility of an extension in Karak being one of them. This programmatic module will include creating dialogue incubators at local levels in four governorates. A dialogue incubator is a local platform for youth to meet and discuss topics related to political participation and development and other topics relevant to their societies. They will be hosted by a local CSOs
- Within LTO 4, NIMD Jordan will create a Democratic Space Observatory where local CSOs and politically motivated youth will work to set criteria for monitoring progress of the democratic space, following the outcomes from the work of the Royal Committee to modernize the political system. These criteria will be used to measure progress of the youth and women participation in political life in Jordan, running up until the 2023/2024 parliamentary elections. In addition, four research papers will be carried out as well as some educational seminars to educate youth and women in local municipalities on the upcoming municipal elections and the outcomes of the Royal Committee, in partnership with the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs (MoPPA).

The Jordan School of Politics (SoP) will become a shorter yet more advanced version of the format implemented in 2021. The SoP topics will not be introductory, as these introductory topics will be delivered within the dialogue incubators at governorate level. The advanced topics will include specialized political seminars and discussion with politicians and will be delivered in Amman to the best performing and most active youth from the dialogue incubators.

The above-described changes to the programme mean that the target actors will primarily be reached at local levels rather than in Amman, which is not major change or issue. There will be an advantage to having a cohort from local citizens rather than a mix at national level in that they will be more specialized and be able to address specific local topics relevant to their local needs.

### 3.2.3 Iraq

Lead: NIMD and WEO

The PEA conducted collaboration with Clingendael in 2019 is still valid, although the political effects of the election results of October 2021 are still in flux. It appears that:

- National politics remains an elite pact between the same political actors.
- Geopolitical actors continue to have a major influence on national politics in Iraq.
- The grievances of the Tishreen protesters remain unresolved and there is an expectation that they will take to the streets again to protest for change.
- Militias directly linked to political actors will enforce the current status quo through violence or the threat of violence.

Given the above, NIMD will continue to work through country partner Women Empowerment Organization (WEO) to set up a democracy school programme to train and bring together youth and upcoming politicians from across the political spectrum. The hope is that this will develop into a network of democrats that can make a real change in Iraq several years down the line.

Considering that the democracy school pilot funded by the Netherlands Embassy in Iraq was successful, and given that the political context does not provide with a lot of political space for other elements typically in an NIMD programme, NIMD will continue to build the democracy school in Iraq. This means that the plan is to go through two rounds of democracy schools each year with 25 students per round with a set of alumni activities to keep the alumni engaged in the programme.

Together with WEO, NIMD will select 25 **politically active youth** per round of democracy schools. The aim is to have a 50-50 gender balance. The age of the participants is between 20 and 35 and to have a geographic spread between the North, Centre and South of the country. NIMD is targeting a mix of different political affiliations roughly 1/3 with a civil society background, 1/3 affiliated to political parties, 1/3 independent individuals with political aspirations (usually activists or members of youth coalitions). It is also important that all are fluent in Arabic and that they are available for all weekend classes. Besides ensuring diversity in their affiliation and backgrounds we also take into account their motivation and potential which we test through a motivation letter and an interview round. The underlying idea is to create a high potential group to incite them to engage in formal politics and to expose them to a diverse group of their peers while going through the course.

For 2022, the objective is to have one round funded by the Netherlands Embassy in Iraq. For the other round NIMD will try to get funding from another donor, either for a full round or partly in combination with PoD funds. Since NIMD has now chosen to make Iraq a full-fledged PoD programme, a baseline study for the SCS basket indicators will be conducted at the beginning of 2022.

### 3.3 Horn of Africa

#### 3.3.1 Uganda

Lead: NIMD Uganda

During the year 2022, NIMD Uganda will focus more on making programmatic strides under LTO 1 and 2, based on the following reasons:

- The program is still in its early stages of implementation and thus just taking shape.
- The fast changing political context in a way casts a shadow of doubt on who the probable actors targeted may be as new political groupings and outfits are beginning to emerge.
- Critical actors targeted under LTO 1 and 2 have exhibited a high level of willingness and appetite to engage with the program team towards achieving the objectives/outcomes of the program.

Under LTO 1 'AMwA, NIMD Uganda, local CSOs and informal collectives of practitioners are effective enablers of change', the country team will strive to achieve the following results:

- Strengthening the capacity and legitimacy of CSOs to influence state and non-state actors by reaching a number of agreements such as reform agendas / policies / legal amendments.
- Ensuring that CSOs build each other's, partner networks' and local CSOs' capacity through capacity building initiatives like trainings, peer learning etc

Under LTO 2 'Aspiring young (men and women) Women political and civic leaders in political parties and CSOs are influential actors of change':

- Strengthening the movements and organizations of PoD consortium partners and local CSOs with their increased capacity to act, organize and mobilize collective voice and action in political processes.
- Engaging political and civic actors to lobby and advocate for inclusive participation in decision-making processes.

Within LTO 3 'Political and civic actors engage in dialogue on a basis of trust':

- Address grievances through dialogue and mediation. The program team will seek to achieve this result by facilitating periodic dialogue engagements, conduct a training of political and civic leaders on dialogue and mediation.
- Participate in meaningful dialogue for peaceful resolution of political issues. To achieve this result, the program team will conduct regional multi-stakeholder dialogue sessions on various thematic issues, and also conduct a National multi-stakeholder dialogue session on various thematic issues.

The PoD programme in Uganda will continue to target **aspiring young and women political and civic leaders**. NIMD will work with these actors by building their capacity to advocate, lobby, influence policies, hold inter-generational discussions and support the implementation of the developed gender action plans. The program team does not envisage any changes in the ToC and this actor based pathway of change. **Political and civic actors** also remain a critical target group, given the ever shrinking political and civic spaces in Uganda, these will play an important role in advocating the required policy changes through a combination of approaches and strategies.

### 3.3.2 Kenya

**Lead: Mzalendo Trust and NIMD**

For 2022, the proposed interventions build on long-term activities underlying the PoD project but also seek to address emerging changes due to the political environment in Kenya. The inclusion of the young and women in political processes in the next elections will be pivotal in shaping the programme. Enhancing their capacity and opportunities not to just run for office but also to enhance their chances of winning especially at county legislative level and national as well will be a close step towards the realization of the two-thirds gender rule. This will be supported by development of democratic tools such as elections and vote-trackers, podcasts and alternative media to enhance youth participation, especially given the large bloc of new voters, estimated at over 5 million.

Strengthening the Consortium's engagement as well as expanding and entrenching networks, locally and in the region will also be critical in realizing the results. Local CSO alliances and networks will especially play key a role in amplifying our collective voices on citizen engagement and elections preparedness as well as engaging with various elections stakeholders. These voices will also be vital in addressing concerns relating to civic space. Cognizant too of the role that Parliament will play especially in budgeting and legislation, public participation, demands for accountability and transparency will also inform the work. PoD will therefore be critical in addressing attempted assaults on the civic space. The interventions will be supported by development of research products, use of

democracy innovation tools and technology, robust communication use, including social media, data collection and partnerships with like-minded institutions.

The PoD contextualized ToC for Kenya is premised on political, civic actors and citizens collaborating, influencing and participating in inclusive, transparent and accountable political processes at the sub-national and national levels. Accordingly, Mzalendo anticipates to work with the following six actors in 2022:

- **PoD Consortium partners:** Close collaborations will lead to strengthened partnership.
- **Women and Youth:** Increasing the number of youth and women participating in politics is one of the routes to enhance their inclusion.
- **Parliament:** Mzalendo will identify partners who are champions of transparency, inclusion and accountability, put in place citizen accountability tools and advocate for meaningful inclusion.
- **Civic, Political Leaders and Citizens:** Mzalendo will work together with partners in pushing for desired electoral reforms, engaging parliament in the law-making process, creating networks to leverage expertise and knowledge on legislative and oversight issues and generating knowledge management products.
- **County Assemblies:** Mzalendo will work to create a mass of women and youth seeking to run for office at county level through movement building and capacity enhancement, advocacy for youth and women inclusion, amplification of youth and women voices at county level, including those aspiring for office.
- **Regional and International Bodies:** In this regard, we intend to pay special attention to international and regional democracy standards, share and exchange information with like-minded peers in the region, review implementation and awareness of ratified legislation.

### 3.3.3 Ethiopia

Lead: NIMD Ethiopia

In 2022, NIMD Ethiopia will target the following actors:

**House of People's Representatives (HoPR):** The house of peoples representatives remains a key partner for 2022. The house will have new MPs in October after a delayed national election that was supposed to be held in 2020. NIMD hopes to actively work with the house to improve the capacity of the Secretariat and the MPs with the aim of impacting citizen engagement and responsible government.

**Caffee Oromia:** NIMD's relationship with Caffee is also extremely important. Caffee Oromia represents nearly one-third of the entire population. For next year, the aim is to work with the newly coming regional MPs and the newly appointed Secretariat leaders. Partnering with Caffee on a number of capacity building interventions will lead to improving the capacity of the new MPs to live up to expectations and the create accountability between the regional body and citizens.

**National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE):** Fresh from two years of election preparedness for the national and local elections, NEBE will gasp a sigh of fresh air next year to strategize activities and plan upcoming interventions in advance. With that in mind, NIMD will work with NEBE in 2022 in the areas of strategic thinking, staff development, research and training both for the five Board members and the NEBE office.

**CSOs:** If the capacity of CSOs and civic organizations working on promoting political participation of youth and women enhanced then CSOs and civic organizations work to promote the role of youth and women in politics and that in turn enables CSOs seek better representation within political arena which ultimately result in the role and representation of women and youth in politics is increased

The specific interventions planned for each LTOs are provided in Annex 2.

### 3.3.4 Sudan

Lead: NIMD

NIMD's programming in Sudan remains uncertain. The original PoD planning was counting on the prospects of building on a wider EU-funded project, that unfortunately did not materialize. In addition, the latest political development, combined with a crowded democracy support field, have led NIMD to pause its investment in Sudan. Therefore, no interventions have been foreseen in 2022.

However, Sudan remains a country targeted by the PoD programme, through the regional approach implemented by AMwA (see section 3.3.5 below).

### 3.3.5 Regional Approach

Lead: AMwA

Based on the findings from the PEAs and Baseline studies conducted in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, AMwA will prioritise interventions contributing to LTO 1,2, and 4 in 2022 as follows:

Under LTO 1 'AMwA and other Consortium and regional partners are positive drivers of change', AMwA will work on the following result areas:

Under LTO 2 'Aspiring and elected young and women political and civic leaders are able to effectively influence various national and regional processes and act as actors of change'

Under LTO 4 'Political and civic actors strengthen democratic space in their various countries and regionally'

In order to achieved the results mentioned above, AMwA will target the following actors in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan:

- **Political parties:** NIMD Uganda and AMwA have traditionally supported political parties with representation in Parliament and intend to continue doing the same. Furthermore political parties are key to enabling young people and women's political participation.
- **Women, Youth and PWD leagues/groups:** Key to addressing social norms, reshaping unequal power relations, promoting women's agency and inclusive electoral and political processes.
- **National Parliaments/Legislative Assemblies:** To promote and strengthen democratic and civic space in order to advance gender justice and women's political rights.
- **National, Regional & International Bodies/ Forums/Networks:** These platforms bring together civic actors from across the country or region for collective action and policy engagement.
- **Pan African and Feminist Social movements/collectives/pressure groups:** AMwA will work with selected movements in order to continuously build and strengthen solidarity and collective activism across Pan African and Feminist movements to address the democratic

deficit in Africa. Social movements have also become an alternative platform to the traditional political parties for youths and marginalized people to voice their concerns.

- **Women's Rights Organizations:** These are thematically focused organizations working on women rights especially women's political participation and leadership.

The specific interventions planned for each LTOs are provided in Annex 2.

## 3.4 Southern Africa, Latin America and Asia

### 3.4.1 Mozambique

Lead: IMD Mozambique

In 2022, IMD Mozambique will work on the 4 LTO of the PoD contextualized ToC, as follows:

Under LTO 1 'Consortium, partner networks and local civil society organizations are effective enablers of change', IMD will work on the following aspects:

- Exchange political experiences between women from national political party leagues and from other countries in the region and/or Europe.
- Taking into account the contextualized ToC, through these activities, it is expected to achieve the following results

Under LTO 2 'Aspiring young and women political and civic leaders are influential actors of change', IMD will aim to improve women's lobbying capacity, as well as their level of influence within political parties, by:

- Carrying out dialogue sessions between women from political parties, Civil Society youth, youth from the leagues and political aspirants.
- Conducting a Gender Roadmap to Inclusive Political Parties (GRIP) analysis
- Conducting lobby and Advocacy initiative (formal and informal) close to political parties leadership and women members of political parties

Under LTO 3 'Political and civic actors collaborate peacefully on a basis of trust', IMD will aim to strengthen social and political coexistence between political and civic actors. The objective will also be to increase inter-party interaction between political and civic actors through political inclusion, by:

- Training members of the women's leagues of political parties
- Facilitating political dialogue sessions between women's leagues and male leaders/elites of political parties

Under LTO 4 'Political and civic actors strengthen the democratic space', IMD will aim to improve the influence of women in the political decision-making process in Provincial Assemblies and the National Assembly, and increase interactions between elected representatives and civil society, by:

- Creating spaces for political dialogue between women from political parties and civil society.
- Facilitating dialogue session between women from the Women's Leagues of political parties, Assembly of the Republic, Provincial Assemblies and Civil Society (including young people) on

the process of Reform of the Electoral Law and other matters of political scope, of interest to women and young people.

- Facilitating interactive dialogue sessions between young people, women of political parties, MPs of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies.

Therefore, it is evident that the main actor targeted in 2022 will be **women political actors**, particularly the women's leagues of Political parties, the Women's Parliamentary Office within the Assembly of the Republic, as well as women members of the Provincial Assemblies. IMD will also work with **CSOs** at the national level, particularly those working on women's Civil and Political Rights, will be involved in policy dialogue and interaction with policy-makers.

### 3.4.2 Guatemala

#### Lead: NIMD Guatemala

In 2022, NIMD Guatemala has prioritized interventions under each LTO of the contextualized ToC.

Within LTO 1, the PEA conducted in 2021 will be updated, and internal training will be conducted for NIMD staff and partners on manuals and policies to improve and strengthen internal processes.

Within LTO 2, priority has been given to political dialogue interventions, technical assistance and training within the framework of the Training School for Democracy aimed at representatives of civil society organizations, political parties, Members of Parliament and legislative commissions with democratic agendas.

Within LTO 3, research and data collection processes have been prioritized in order to provide knowledge, tools and reliable sources of information to political and social actors for the consolidation of democratic spaces. A study is foreseen to conceptualize and measure inclusive democracy for Guatemala and the countries of northern Central America. NIMD Guatemala will also work on strengthening political parties and electoral institutions to achieve a better mechanism for political dialogue with citizen links facilitating spaces for formation, exchange, training, organization and coordination that defines social and political actors within the framework of dialogue making joint decisions in civic, political and electoral matters

Regarding the regionalization of interventions, within LTO 4, NIMD Guatemala has planned to integrate women from Honduras and El Salvador in the multiparty dialogue process for women politicians. In addition, the analysis of the concept of Inclusive Democracy will have a regional vision. Finally, the regional Democracy School Alumni meetings, which was organized in 2019, 2020 and 2021, will take place again in 2022.

The PEA and baseline study conducted by NIMD Guatemala in 2021 contributed to the validation of the actors targeted by the programme, and to the realization that in the construction of inclusive democracies, multi-stakeholder work is necessary. Therefore, the direct strengthening of CSOs, political parties, the Congress of the Republic and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal will continue. In addition, as indirect actors, think tanks, academia and independent media will be invited to participate, socialize and/or contribute, depending on the nature of the interventions.

### 3.4.3 Colombia

#### Lead: NIMD Colombia

In 2022, NIMD Colombia will prioritize the work under LTOs 1, 2 and 3. In addition, NIMD will initiate lobby and advocacy initiative with the Ministry of Interior and the Congress of the Republic, to pave the way for implementing interventions LTO 4 in 2023.

LTO 1: In order to establish NIMD Colombia and its partners as actors of change, two interventions will be conducted. The first is the implementation of the Colombian Network for Innovation in Democracy, which was created in 2021. The second is the development of a case study on the implementation of the Citizen Panels methodology.

LTO 2: In 2022, NIMD Colombia will implement at least 2 Democracy Schools and complementarily, the first Mentoring and Networking Program for young candidates to the House of Representatives will be developed.

LTO 3: To promote collaboration between civic and political actors to solve the challenges of their communities, NIMD Colombia will develop multi-stakeholder dialogue scenarios in 7 departments of the country, through two methodologies. The first is the territorial dialogue initiatives, which are inclusive policymaking processes. The second is the innovation laboratories in subnational collegiate bodies.

LTO 4: With the objective of establishing a shared agenda for strengthening democracy, NIMD Colombia will develop lobbying and advocacy activities with the Ministry of the Interior and the Congress. In complementarity with the QUORUM project: women and youth innovating democracy. The POD program will advance in the consolidation of a relationship with these two actors during 2022, which will increase the feasibility of advancing an agenda of democratic deepening and opening.

As part of this intervention strategy, the following five actors will be targeted:

**Colombian Network for Innovation in Democracy:** by improving the organizational capacities of NIMD and the organizations that make up the network to promote innovative dialogue scenarios between civic and political actors.

**Young leaders:** by increasing the knowledge, skills and capacities of young leaders to be candidates in the 2022 and 2023 elections and activate dialogue scenarios through which they can influence decision making.

**Sub-national collegiate bodies:** capacities will be developed in sub-national collegiate bodies to design and implement safe multi-stakeholder dialogue scenarios that allow different political and civic actors to reach agreements to solve community problems.

**Congress of the Republic:** in 2022, progress will be made in consolidating the relationship with the Congress of the Republic, so that in the next 3 years a multi-stakeholder dialogue initiative can be initiated that will result in the adoption of a joint democratization agenda, developed collaboratively by civil society and the political parties represented in Congress.

**Ministry of the Interior:** NIMD will continue to strengthen the relationship with the Ministry to engage it in the design and implementation of innovative and deliberative democracy processes.

### 3.4.4 Myanmar

#### Lead: Myanmar School of Politics (MySoP)

The context in Myanmar has changed dramatically since the military coup earlier in the year. The army (the Tatmadaw) began its attempt to seize state power on February 1<sup>st</sup> the day before the Parliament of Myanmar was due to swear in the members elected at the 2020 election, thereby preventing this from occurring. This started a highly volatile period for the country and that impacted on the ongoing programme, and has led to several adjustments for this annual plan. Foremost, the MySoP office in Yangon has been dissolved and the amount of staff has been reduced. This decision was informed by several considerations:

- The legal status of MySoP's work in-country is unclear. MySoP was working on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding with the civilian led Union Election Commission (UEC), which now has been repopulated by army appointed representatives. This has potential consequences for the safety and security of the Country Director, the staff but also for the actors targeted by programme interventions. Our operations are also influenced by regulations related to EU imposed sanctions for several junta-related institutions.
- Increased restriction on banking processes and scrutiny of bank accounts makes the transfers as well as the receipt of bank transfers highly unpredictable.
- Cases of violence are frequent in the country and increasing, exposing staff to undue risks

Despite the current situation, NIMD always had a long-term commitment to supporting the different electoral stakeholders in Myanmar. Moreover, MySoP has managed to build a strong track-record in working in the complex political environment at Myanmar's subnational level. Therefore, MySoP recognizes that its contribution now needs a different format, which is realistic and feasible in the current climate, while keeping an eye on the horizon for potential future possibilities should the situation evolve into a clearer scenario.

Should there be a constructive solution to the current impasse, there will be incentives on the part of key electoral stakeholders to build a genuinely democratic constitution with civilian control of the military, including electoral reforms and constitutional changes, including at the subnational level. Also, in different scenarios there are still ways and means to support democratic processes. Groups who are at the forefront of the peaceful resistance can be supported in their political knowledge and capacity to eventually institutionalize this knowledge in their own lobby, advocacy and political mobilization practices.

In this context, the PoD Myanmar programme will be adapted and implemented in a phased and incremental approach, navigating the possibilities and political developments. For 2022, MySoP will not be able to operate inside the country and interventions will be limited. The programme will operate from outside Myanmar and mostly through digital means. Priority focus will be on LTO 2, in order to target 'young, women and ethnic political leaders' to participate in online democracy schools and in the set-up of a Link&Learn Platform..Towards the end of the year, and when the political structures and roles of political parties, NUG, CRPH and NUCC are more established, MySoP will start to implement the proposed conflict resolution and mediation programme under LTO3. Moreover, precedents will be set for a coordination platform with local CSOs under LTO 4.

Based on this phased approach, the following actors will be targeted:

The programme continues with interventions targeting **towards young, women and ethnic political leaders**. Given the volatility of the political climate in Myanmar and the focus on re-strategizing and relocation in the previous months, we cannot give a clear vision yet on who we will target specifically from the broader group of youth, women and ethnic leaders. However, the last quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of 2022 will be used to reach out to relevant alumni political parties, organizations, CSOs and networks to understand how and who to reach from the aforementioned target group to maximize sustained impact.

In the second half of the year, another key actor to target are **relevant political actors who are engaged and responsible for democratic processes**. In addition, MySoP will target **CSOs** who are working for electoral and democratic processes in Myanmar. Currently, the continued shrinking space for civil society and marginalized (ethnic) voices is of increasing concern. There is an increased need and demand for coordination between civic and legitimate political actor to advance dialogue on the future democratic architecture.

## 4. Global level plan

The global work of the PoD Consortium is implemented and coordinated by NIMD The Hague. In 2022, this global programming will focus specifically on the following aspects: 1) overall coordination of Consortium operations; 2) continuing the roll-out and operationalization of the planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning (PMEL) framework; 3) facilitating knowledge management and implementing the PoD learning agenda; 4) operationalizing the capacity development component of the Consortium and; 5) starting the implementation of the lobby & advocacy strategy focused on the international level.

### 4.1 Consortium coordination

As Lead Partner, NIMD carries out extra roles and responsibilities within the Consortium. In 2022, NIMD continues to be responsible for hosting and coordinating the PoD Secretariat, which is composed of NIMD staff who work for the Consortium. The Secretariat provides administrative and logistical support, programmatic guidance, and coordinates the development of annual plans and reports.

In terms of coordination activities, NIMD is responsible for organizing the Consortium Steering Committee meetings that take place at least four times per year. Furthermore, the PoD Programme Management Team meetings initiated in 2021 will continue to take place on a monthly basis, to discuss day-to-day management and coordination between programmatic staff of Consortium Partners.

In addition, the PoD Secretariat aims to organize a physical networking event during the second quarter of the year, involving representatives from all partners and offices involved in the PoD programme. The objective of this event will be to stimulate mutual learning, engage in programmatic discussion, and exchange on topics that are at the core of the PoD programme (i.e. lobby & advocacy strategies, PMEL, capacity strengthening, thematic leads, etc.).

While the Consortium's work on integrity will also be on the agenda of the physical networking event, it will also be the topic of dedicated interventions in 2022. NIMD will continue to strengthen its network of confidential advisors, and will organize integrity workshops across the network.

## 4.2 Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

In 2022, NIMD will continue to support capacity development for PMEL of the PoD Consortium Partners, country offices and partners. PMEL programme support falls under LTO 1 'the PoD consortium, its network, local CSOs are effective enablers of change', by (mutual support of) collecting monitoring data, learning about what interventions work and using monitoring data for making informed programmatic decisions to become more effective enablers of change.

The priority support areas for 2022 will be:

- PMEL capacity strengthening (trainings, seminars, formats and tools)
- Support timely reporting in the Consortium's online programme management system (ProjectConnect)
- Support Outcome Harvesting (OH) and quality indicator measurements
- Facilitate effective use of monitoring data for learning and programme adaptation
- Establishing PMEL capacity support between PoD consortium members and partners

In addition to the above-listed priorities, the PoDPMEL team in The Hague will contribute to Partos PME community, participate in the KPSRL learning exercise on SPDD final evaluations, participate in DGIS PMEL Community of Practice, and Let's Talk: Political dialogue evaluation findings synthesis.

The key actors are the targeted PMEL focal points in the PoD programme countries and regions. Our objective is to capacitate, motivate and create the opportunity for PMEL focal points to 1) facilitate adaptation and steering of the PoD programme based on M&E data, 2) provide accountability by reporting quality M&E data and 3) learn about what works by reflecting on M&E data.

In 2022, this will be achieved by continuing 1-on-1 support, organizing refresher trainings, conducting in-country visits for support, and setting-up a training of trainer programme to further decentralize support.

In order to meet the objective, the changes expected in 2022 are that PoD PMEL focal points around the world:

- Submit intermediate outcome measurements of good quality
- Submit outcome descriptions that are formulated SMART, well explained significance and contribution descriptions. And a source of verification for the outcomes.
- Submit measurements and OH through ProjectConnect
- Use measurements and OH to reflect on progress, ToC and ABPoC based on monitoring questions in the Outcome Harvesting guideline
- Use measurements and OH to advise on planning and programme adaptation

## 4.3 Learning agenda

As part of its coordination role, NIMD will facilitate the implementation of the Consortium's learning agenda, which further refined during the inception phase of the programme. This agenda is centered around two pillars: ToC Outcomes and Thematic learning, and; Adaptive Programming.

### 4.3.1 ToC outcomes and thematic learning

The first learning pillar in the Consortium relates to the overall objective of the programme and the four long-term outcomes of the ToC. Based on this, each Consortium Partner continues to take on a leading role for their respective theme:

- AMwA leads on feminist leadership development, research, documentation and policymaking.
- CEMI leads on developing innovative tools and strategies to engage youth in decision-making processes.
- GORIN leads on tools and strategies for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and regional L&A.
- NIMD leads on policies and practices related to dialogue and trust-building, and link the wider PoD themes to the international L&A efforts (presented in the specific ILA section below)

In 2022, the thematic leads will support and operationalize the specific key learning questions formulated under each LTO of the ToC.

With regards to NIMD's thematic lead on dialogue and trust-building, the priority outcome area is 1.2, which is further contextualized to: "The PoD consortium builds each other's capacity to develop and implement dialogue trust-building interventions". By focusing on this outcome area, we want to contribute to long-term outcome 1, which is adapted to our dialogue and trust-building lead as "The PoD consortium are effective enablers of change by developing and implementing strong dialogue and trust-building". This outcome feeds into all the dialogue interventions across the PoD network under LTO 2, 3, and 4.

Planned interventions include jointly developed learning papers, peer-to-peer learning exchanges and online learning events on best practices. The actors that NIMD aims to influence and target specifically are the staff members of the PoD network with a close involvement and much experience in dialogue and trust-building, as well as new staff members for introductory trainings to political dialogue will be organized.

### 4.3.2 Adaptive programming

In 2022, NIMD will aim to further develop and embed adaptive programme management in the PoD country programmes, based on evidence and learning gathered through our processes and tools. Most importantly here, NIMD will finalize a format for the country programme reflection workshop for use in the PoD programme countries. An additional (refresher) training will be developed and offered in the early spring of 2022, before the 2022 annual reports are due, so that country teams have the capacity to engage in a process of reflection on results and implications for programme adaptation. A number of these workshops will be facilitated by the PMEL team, involving NIMD's Programme & Knowledge Advisers.

Adaptive programme support also falls under LTO 1 of the PoD ToC. Priority areas for 2022 will include:

- Adaptive programming capacity strengthening through training and hands-on work on PEA Strategy Notes, and results reflection workshops with country teams
- Effective use of monitoring data for learning and programme adaptation
- Translation of tools and guidelines for PEA, PMEL, and reflection workshop formats into French and Spanish

- Sharing of learning and programme adaptation experiences, including in wider networks such as KPSRL, DGIS and Partos CoPs on PMEL

#### 4.4 Capacity strengthening

In 2022, NIMD will pursue its effort to stimulate mutual capacity strengthening within the PoD network, with the aim to strengthen southern leadership, secure better quality and successful implementation of our programming. To this end, a capacity scan for PoD country offices and partners has been developed in 2021. The capacity scan covers the following areas:

Main components of capacity	Areas
<b>Core areas</b>	Thematic Expertise, Programming & Project management Communication and visibility
<b>Institutional areas</b>	Leadership, Integrity, Risk Management
<b>Operational areas</b>	HR management, Financial management, fundraising, Procurement & Logistics, IT system & infrastructure
<b>Cross –cutting issues</b>	PEA, PMEL, Lobby and Advocacy, Learning and innovation, Safety and security

This capacity assessment is not only meant to assess the availability of the capacity area within the office/partner but also to clarify why it is important to have it. This assessment is currently being conducted in all relevant PoD countries, through several online sessions involving all key staff members. The strengths, weaknesses and needs of each organization is captured on the basis of an open discussion and dialogue. With this approach, awareness is created on capacity gaps and shared understanding is generated across the staff.

Once the capacity scan are finalized, the results will be used to:

- Develop a capacity building plan for each country office and partners, including priorities for 2022
- Develop a tailor made global training program (cross –cutting needs) for the coming years for organizational and thematic areas
- Monitor progress based on the collected information

#### 4.5 International Lobby & Advocacy

The PoD ILA approach relates to targeting relevant international actors to build support for the Consortium’s objectives, and to link the country and region-based work from LTO 4 to international (external) pressure points. This means country analysis and programme results need to be linked to an overarching strategy to influence actors and policies. In parallel, a dedicated global strategy for

advocacy is needed that links to the PoD approach and objectives, and to the learning agenda and thematic priorities. In the current year the dedicated ILA strategy could not yet be developed as planned during the first semester of 2021. This process will be finalized during the last quarter of 2021, and this will inform the specific interventions planned for 2022. In general, the annual plan will consist of two streams that correspond to the two functions of the global ILA component: i) facilitating bottom-up ILA to ensure international pressure points are activated, and ii) international level advocacy on key PoD messages linked to for instance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The first stream is linked to domestic change agendas in the PoD countries, whereby NIMD will design the architecture and support systems to ensure linkages between the country and international level, support with advocacy capacity and campaigning, and connect this to key actors and organizations mentioned in the PoD Multi-Annual Plan. For the second stream, the Consortium has already identified three levels to focus on in its international lobby & advocacy approach: the UN ecosystem, especially around the SDGs, regional and economic cooperation bodies such as the African Union and ECOWAS, and international development (aid) partners. As for the UN, this agenda will depend on opportunities and partnerships with likeminded stakeholders while the regional bodies also link to the work of the other PoD Consortium Partners, such as GORIN's focus on ECOWAS and AMwA on the African Union (AU). For the latter, and related to the EU, the Consortium continues its collaboration with the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) and by organizing expert meetings and public roundtables on country and regional contexts. In addition, when travel permits this again, missions to regional and international bodies during relevant events and for advocacy meetings are foreseen.

## 5. Budget notes

Overall, the budget for 2022 increased with EUR 186,149 (3%) compared to the 2022 figures included in the multi-annual budget. This increase is financed from the expected underspending in 2021 from several budget lines. These savings are related to delays in the startup phase of the overall programme and the COVID-19 restrictions.

Overall, the PoD Consortium now foresees a budget of EUR 6,797,611 of which 90% goes to programming, including almost 60% on direct programming costs (please see Figure 2 below for the total budget allocation per main cost category).

### Direct Staff Costs

Within the budget heading direct staff costs, there has been a saving of 3%. This is mainly due to savings within NIMD offices in the Sahel and Colombia.

### Other Direct Programme Costs

On 'activity-related travel costs', there is an increase of 28% compared to the multi-annual budget, which is explained by the fact that most partners and country offices are anticipating that some COVID-19 related restrictions will be lifted, and are therefore planning more traveling compared to last year. On budget line 'E. Equipment and investments', the Consortium is planning an increase of EUR 24,155 which is an increase of 103%. This due to additional investments by GORIN, CEMI and the NIMD Sahel offices, mainly for office furniture, IT equipment and software.

### Overhead / indirect costs

Budget Heading III will stay on the same level as originally estimated in the 2022 budget

The foreseen budget, in summary is:

		Original Budget	Updated Budget
Direct staff costs	A. Staff costs	€ 667.719	€ 699.024
	B. Local staff costs	€ 1.443.170	€ 1.347.701
	C. Consultants and advisers	€ -	€ -
Other direct programme costs	A. Activity costs	€ 2.218.114	€ 2.252.961
	B. Costs of consortium partners and local NGOs	€ 486.256	€ 513.190
	C. Activity-related travel costs	€ 350.745	€ 450.131
	D. Project office costs (if applicable)	€ 349.060	€ 345.092
	E. Equipment and investments	€ 23.689	€ 47.844
	F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	€ 388.916	€ 452.643
Overheads / indirect costs	A. Costs of support staff	€ 254.199	€ 260.132
	B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	€ -	€ -
	C. Other non-allocable costs	€ 429.594	€ 428.894
		€ 6.611.462	€ 6.797.611

Figure 1 Budget allocation 2022 per main cost category.

The figures below present a summarized overview of the allocation of the requested budget. For more information, please refer to the 2022 budget for the Power of Dialogue programme, attached to this annual plan.




Figure 2 Percentage of budget allocation 2022 per main cost category.




Figure 3 Percentage of 2022 budget allocation per LTO




Figure 4 Budget allocation 2022 per PoD programme country.

### Description per cost category

Cost categories	Description
<b>I. Direct staff costs</b>	
A. Staff costs	Staff of lead Partner NIMD in The Hague, directly contributing to the PoD activities. The hourly fees per staff member are based on the 'productive hours' method, set out in the MFA manual for budgeting under the Power of Voices framework.
B. Local staff costs	Staff located in the PoD programme countries directly contributing to the PoD activities. These are the staff members of Consortium Partners and country offices. Costs are based on existing human resource management policies, salary scales and local labour law. Policies may differ per organization and country.
C. Consultants and advisers	N/A
<b>II. Other direct programme costs</b>	
A. Activity costs	The total sum of all activities directly contributing to the PoD ToC. For expected sub-contracting to partners, the total amount of the grant is included.
B. Costs of Consortium Partners	Costs for the coordination and strengthening of the PoD network. This entails, for instance, direct staff time of the Consortium lead linked to coordination, in addition to activities planned for this matter (e.g. Consortium meetings).
C. Activity-related travel costs	Costs for travel, based on the planned activities in-country and between countries. The impact on climate and of COVID-19 have been taken into account.
D. Project office costs	Office running costs required for the implementation of the PoD programme.
E. Equipment and investment costs	In year one (2021) most Consortium Partners will invest in required equipment. In some cases, additional (small) investments are done in the following years. Necessary internet connections and digital meeting facilities are included.

F. Monitoring, evaluation and auditing	Costs for lead Partner NIMD PMEL and financial control staff, trainings, and Mid-Term and Final Evaluations. This also includes annual audits for each Consortium Partner.
<b>III. Overheads / Indirect costs</b>	
A. Costs of support staff	Staff costs for Consortium Partners, to support the organization and management functions, based on time foreseen on said activities.
B. Not directly allocable administrative costs	N/A The PoD Consortium does not distinguish between ‘not directly allocable administrative costs’ (III.B) and ‘other directly allocable costs’ (III.C). To ensure consistency and harmonization within the overall budget, the Consortium has decided to use only budget category III.C.
C. Other not directly allocable costs	Consortium Partner running costs that are not presented under category II.D. These could include rent, depreciation and other institutional costs. This also includes other costs like non-activity related travel, institutional costs related to the governance of the organization, cleaning and security costs, communication not directly related to activities, and general supplies.

## 6. List of annexes

Annex 1 – PoD Annual Budget 2022

Annex 2 – List of planned interventions in 2022 (country, regional and global level)

Annex 3 - Matrix with baselines and annual targets for the overall program and per country on quantitative and qualitative indicators

Annex 4 - Updated risks assessment (including SEAH) and mitigation plan